

in the magazines

The People's Republic of China has now adopted a "new look" for its African policy, a style characterized by "more flexible and subtle diplomatic tactics." In this way, says French political analyst Gilbert Comte (*Africa Report*, March), Peking is able to maintain normal diplomatic relations with governments such as that of King Hassan II of Morocco or Emperor Haile Selassie's Ethiopia . . . without questioning their social structure."

"At the same time, special treatment is reserved for the more than one million inhabitants of the Popular Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), China's foremost African ally . . . Here is active collaboration with a government in agreement with Peking's theories and inspired by its example. . . .

"China's poverty and limited means have prevented it from providing its friends in Africa with massive aid. With the exception of the TanZam railway, Chinese projects symbolize moral and political solidarity without involving substantial investments. On the other hand, some of its technical projects are highly suitable to African conditions. It sets up small-scale factories using machinery and technology considered obsolescent in the West, but capable of absorbing much more labor than more modern methods. Peking is careful to keep its technicians to a minimum, to emphasize training of natives, to quickly relinquish control to the host government, and to provide more generous terms of credit and repayment than either Moscow or the Western countries. . . .

"Now, with its involvement in the TanZam railway, Peking has committed itself to a project whose scale and value are greater than the total of all its African efforts to date. The railway will enormously increase potential African power in a confrontation with white Southern Africa. In order to further this aim, Chou En-lai significantly modified his diplomacy towards governments which do not strictly adhere to Marxist-Leninist tenets; President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania is hardly favorable to Peking's rigid collectivism, and Zambia's official ideology, humanism, is deeply permeated by the Christian beliefs of President Kenneth Kaunda."

Of course, Comte continues, President Nasser of Egypt "also professed a nonaligned socialism" when first accepting Soviet aid, but "continued Egyptian military and economic weakness compelled him to give way more and more to Soviet 'suggestions' in foreign policy. . . .

"It is true that the Middle Eastern crisis accentuated Egyptian dependence on the Soviets, and since there is nothing comparable yet in East or Southern Africa, Tanzania is not similarly at the mercy of Peking. Nevertheless, it remains to be

seen whether Tanzania's freedom of maneuver would survive an escalation of the action in Southern Africa, by the Mozambique, Rhodesian or other Southern African liberation movements based in Dar es Salaam. These movements, incidentally, represent a precious opportunity in which Communist China can presently remain faithful to its revolutionary ideas without treading on the toes of African governments."

But "in the long run," Comte concludes, "the success of Chou En-lai's more flexible diplomacy will not primarily depend on either African opposition or support. What happens to China in Africa will depend above all on its future relations with the Soviet Union. If the current fragile détente with Moscow is really confirmed, China should be able without too much difficulty to extend its influence and reputation according to the classic diplomatic methods. Otherwise, it will be tempted to do so by means of revolutionary action. . . ."

•

Canada, though the world's fifth-ranking exporter of arms, leads first-ranking America in the per capita value of its arms exports—this from an item in the new bi-weekly, *Disarmament News & Views*. According to information supplied by the Canadian Peace Research Institute, "The value of weapons exported by Canada comes to about \$2 per Canadian per year. The comparable American figure is \$1.40." That nation is "also the largest supplier of military equipment to the U.S."

•

The discovery that "the vast shallow areas running from Korea to Thailand might contain 'potentially one of the most prolific oil reserves in the world'"—oil with a low sulphur content and therefore less of a pollutant too—may introduce new factors into America's Vietnam policy, according to Gabriel Kolko (*The New Republic*, March 13). Heretofore, he writes, "one of the most remarkable aspects of the U.S.'s decade-old intervention in Indochina is that it never developed an important, specific economic constituency that could only lose from total American withdrawal." "Indochina's main blessing, ironically, was that while it was known to be rich in agricultural commodities, until 1968 too little was known about its other resources to make it appear worth the costs to profit-oriented businessmen."

But industry predictions of a "blue-chip boom" for oil everywhere in Southeast Asia might affect the shape and timing of American withdrawal by providing, among other things: (*Continued on p. 19*)

brother Eufemio as a swarthy Sun Dance Kid). However, there were other more powerful movements stirring elsewhere which joined with *Zapatismo*, in a liaison characterized more by treachery than love, to revolutionize the Mexican state.

The group that actually brought down the Diaz regime did not look upon itself as revolutionary at all. Led by the son of a wealthy *hacendado*, Francisco I. Madero, they had merely sought to bring some law and order to the country and to reduce corruption. They failed to realize that, given the totalitarian context in which they found themselves and the antipathy with which the United States viewed Diaz, any appeal for reform, no matter how tepid, would have revolutionary impact. Due to their remarkable political acumen, they survived just long enough to give their leading general, Huerta, time to amass the resources and self-confidence to assassinate Madero and occupy the Capital.

Womack has aptly dubbed the followers of Venustiano Carranza, heir to Madero, as the nationalist entrepreneurs. Although they professed reformist goals similar to those of Madero's Constitutionalists, their interests were more economic than political. On opposite sides of the political fence from the *hacendados* of Morelos, their vision was quite similar. They sought to create a truly national economy in Mexico by means of rapid industrialization, a reduced

foreign presence, and the expropriation of all land that was not being put to efficient use. In order to oust Huerta, this group allied itself both with Zapata and with the Division of the North led by Francisco "Pancho" Villa. Villa's army came from the part of northern Mexico which borders the American southwest. His followers could have been supplied by John Ford. They were cowpokes, bandits, rustlers, drifters, n'er-dowells of all shapes and sizes, aimless and ferocious. As Womack puts it, they were more a force of nature than a political entity. After the victory over Huerta, their instinct for chaos soon triumphed over their greed, and they disappeared leaving no permanent impact on the future of Mexican politics.

The *Maderista's* legacy is the procedural formulation of the Mexican government. Elections are held regularly, replete with opposition candidates and fiery campaign oratory. Yet somehow the P.R.I. always wins. The nationalist entrepreneurs' contribution has been more profound. Since 1920, they have maintained more or less constant control of the Mexican government and have created a viable and booming economy. They have accomplished this through adroit manipulation of revolutionary symbolism and periodic appeals to Mexican nationalism. They have developed the uncanny ability to obtain U.S. funds for economic development at the same time that the "im-

perialist monster to the North" is being villified in the nation's press. Even Cardenas, the President who came closest to implementing revolutionary policies, obtained U.S. permission *before* he nationalized the largely U.S.-controlled oil industry.

Despite the seemingly total prostitution of revolutionary ideals, *Zapatismo* does exert an influence upon contemporary Mexican life. The students who went to the barricades and sustained severe casualties in 1968 did so to protect the long-established right of the university to remain free of police intervention. In the face of increasing pressure from the modern sectors of the economy, the pueblos cling tenaciously to their communal lands and continue to pressure the government into maintaining and expanding the Ejido program which redistributes land to villagers interested in farming it cooperatively.

Although such actions may seem mere straws in a wind of entrepreneurial expansion and exploitation, the other Latin countries lacking a revolutionary tradition have accomplished less. If the paradoxical nature of that tradition has prevented the realization of Zapata's vision of a communal utopia, its mere existence has been sufficient to convince elements of successive generations of Mexican citizens to fight and die to prevent what they considered to be unacceptable encroachments upon their traditional liberties.

in the magazines . . .

(Continued from p. 2)

1. An opportunity to fill the vacuum in the shaky South Vietnamese economy caused by lowered U.S. military expenditures and troop withdrawals.

2. The previously lacking "politically and economically powerful constituency . . . with a tangible vested interest in Indochina puppet regimes and a protracted war to consolidate U.S. hegemony in the

region." Already the Thieu regime, which, says Kolko, has begun "accepting tenders for leases," is stressing that "whether American business will reap the harvest depends on a regime ready to cooperate with the United States on most generous terms. Such a government," he notes, "precludes both a political settlement to the war and American withdrawal."

PAMPHILUS