

we can no longer accept simplistic notions which attribute man's state merely to ignorance or to the corrupting effect of institutions: There is too much in our experience which casts doubt on this answer. On the other hand, it would seem equally doubtful that the extreme pessimists are entirely right. There is a hope for fundamental change and, within limits, "revolutionary" possibilities exist in every situation. But the obstacles are enormous; and to overcome them we need utopian ideals, clarity about both ends and means, and more courageous men like David Dellinger—and, to avoid disillusionment, an

admonition not to expect too much at a given time.

We should probably add, too, that, even if great progress is made in the direction of the egalitarian revolution, the gains are likely to be partially cancelled because of such factors as complacency, the so-called iron law of oligarchy, and the tendency to institutional corruption. Every generation, therefore, must be challenged to institute a new revolution, not only to counteract the decline from old achievements but also to go beyond the attainments of the past. The revolution, we may suggest, is never victorious but only in process of being won.

PEACE, AND THE USES OF WAR

Guy G. Davis

Is there a "peace movement"? It would appear so, if for no other reason than that a great many people count themselves part of "the movement," as it is customarily called. Yet the independent researcher will be hard pressed to find any single unifying factor besides opposition to the Vietnam war. Even opposition to war generally or to similar forms of violence is not uniformly shared. Many have no objection to "just" wars or to the use of violence, e.g., revolution, to gain desired social reform. As the Vietnam war winds down, the movement is slowly being faced with the inevitable problem of maintaining some semblance of cohesion and unity.

Besides several vertical dichotomies in the movement, there has also been a great horizontal divergence between its "head" and its "heart." That is to say, between its intelligentsia on the one hand, who conduct research and theory on high historical, sociological, economic, theological and ethical levels, and the popular leadership on the other, who traffic in concepts simply stated and easily grasped which, if lacking in subtlety, have gained a certain respectability through long and repeated usage. Between these two extremes, the process of cross-fertilization is at best fitful, weak and errant. No more eloquent demonstration of this can be found than by comparing the learned journals of opinion, in which movement intelligentsia articulate and debate with each other, to the underground press and other popular

publications. The contrast is striking—and depressing.

This is not to deny that various intellectuals often resort to simplistic utterances for the sake of expediency. We find no less eminent a thinker than Robert Hutchins, addressing the assemblage of notables attending *Pacem in Terris II* in May of 1967, asking them "How can we make peace, . . . peace, pure, simple and durable?" While durability is certainly to be desired, Dr. Hutchins well knows, as his other statements and writings demonstrate, that there is nothing "simple" about peace. (And what "pure" means in this context is anybody's guess.) Such convenient and pious verbiage on the part of those who know better should be discouraged, no matter who the perpetrator, as a mindless betrayal of leadership function and responsibility.

If the movement is to continue in any organized manner beyond the Vietnam war, the valuable popular movement attitudes and ideas must be related to the often profound and innovative concepts of its intellectual leadership. Not the least task is to dispell a great time-honored fog of simplistic clichés, plus a few hackneyed thoughts of more recent vintage but of equal shallowness:

"Wars never settle anything." Refuting this bit of wishful thinking is so easy as to be almost embarrassing. Wars have, of course, settled a great many questions and often with a finality lacking in other solutions (e.g., where is Hitler's Third Reich?). True, wars don't always settle issues, or often not those originally provoking the struggle, but no human activity is completely efficient. Recognizing this,

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some pacifists have said that if wars do occasionally settle some questions, they create or incur other problems and thus do not *really* settle anything. If this is a valid observation about war, however, it is just as apt a criticism of the peaceful solution of problems, for exactly the same phenomenon occurs. The unpleasant fact of history is that war is an efficient enough means for the solution of certain problems to guarantee its perpetuation until some better means is found.

"Old men (leaders) get us into wars and young men (the people) have to fight them." Again, history embarrasses impartially. Examples of governments and leaders reluctantly pushed into war by the pressure of popular opinion are not difficult to find. John Adams would probably have enjoyed a second term in the White House had he bowed to contemporary public enthusiasm for war with France. A more recent example is seen in the career of King Hussein of Jordan whose efforts to restrain the war fever of many of his subjects has led, ironically, to prolonged civil conflict.

In this particular dogma there are overtones of the present "generation gap." But it is well to recall that Hitler and Mussolini were young men when they came to power and were widely regarded as representatives of the new generation then coming to the seats of power. Nor does there seem to be a lack of modern young leaders willing to turn to war and the techniques of warfare to gain desired political ends, as witness Castro's attempts to export violent revolution to the rest of Latin America or the bloody conflict in the late Biafran war between the followers of Colonels Gowon and Okjubwu. If it is true that young men (the people) have had to fight wars brought about by old men (the leaders), it is just as true that those in authority have often prevented, or tried to prevent, the governed from fighting wars they were eager and ready to wage.

"Nobody profits from war (except, variously, the munitions-makers, capitalists, war-lords, war criminals, tyrants, etc.)." War can be very profitable, not only for those individuals and organizations trafficking in its implements and supplies, but for an entire society, and often as much so for the vanquished as for the victors. In fact, there seems to be considerable evidence that, contrary to popular mythology, the munitions-makers, or military-industrial complex, to use the current equivalent of this term, do not always profit as much as one might suppose from armament programs, although other sections of the society may be enjoying a high degree of pros-

perity from such preparations. In a series of articles in *The New Republic* in December, 1969, George Berkley details the severe losses sustained by the top five defense contractors during the previous four years, some of whom are on the verge of bankruptcy as a result. Yet most of this period was highly prosperous for the economy as a whole.

The overall prosperity of the technologically advanced nations for the past twenty-five years, however—including, significantly, both Germany and Japan—is a direct result of World War II. This is also true of the Soviet Union, a fact not generally recognized. Since the end of the war, Soviet propaganda has very effectively created an impression that the peoples of the USSR in the prewar period were happily united in a steady progress toward achieving the goals of socialism, a progress which was cruelly interrupted by the Nazi invasion. After rallying to repulse the invaders, this story goes, the Soviet peoples once again resumed their triumphant march together toward the millennium.

Although the bravery of the Soviet peoples is beyond dispute, factual analysis reveals that the economy of the USSR, like that of its non-Communist neighbors, drifted and stagnated during the '20's and '30's. It was the need to rebuild and restore after the destruction of World War II which gave the Soviet economy, like that of many other countries, a much-needed impetus toward achieving prosperity and progress.

Surveying history, one can find few economic stimuli as powerful and productive as war, the preparation for war and the recovery from its effects. While few would deny that prosperity should be accomplished without reliance upon death, destruction and bloodshed; the simple fact remains that this is how it has often been most effectively achieved.

"War is a bad habit." Another important peace movement attitude, not easily expressed in a catchword or slogan, is that war is "something bad" that people do but shouldn't, a bad habit mankind has picked up along the way and really should be cured of. *Fellowship*, the magazine of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, actually used this term when it noted, in March of 1970, that the U.S. led in the number of citizens who had quit smoking and urged that Americans similarly "kick the war habit."

Nevertheless, there is hardly a single existing nation or culture in the formation and development of which war did not play some crucial part. Every people has its great hero-warrior, figures of legend and story, and the literatures of virtually all the world's languages contain epics celebrating some ancient struggle in which the race or nation found

its identity. This process goes on, albeit in a somewhat different style, in the various armed struggles, both international and internal, involving the many former colonies which have gained independence since the end of World War II. Initially, most of these clashes were laid to "neo-colonialism" and there is some truth in these charges, as in the Congo, for instance, where former colonial interests clearly did intervene. The significant if discouraging fact, however, is that war was almost automatically sought as a means of achieving national identity. And so it has gone in a long continuing series of "brush-fire" conflicts around the globe. In the Chad, the Sudan, Somaliland, Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia, and many other places, not to mention Vietnam, war has been used to determine national identity and achieve national unity. The Third World has, ironically, made more frequent use of war for its own purposes than have the superpowers whose confrontations the Third World has often so virtuously deplored.

"*War is endemic to the system.*" This basic rationale of the New Left, by which the need for revolutionary reform is justified, is admittedly a more sophisticated concept than the "war-is-a-bad-habit" school of thought. It suffers, however, from two severe handicaps. First, the system or systems usually advocated by such revolutionaries have shown no particular success in abolishing war. Socialist and Communist societies seem to engage in conflict, both domestic and foreign, for much the same reasons as other societies. When the USSR was the only Communist nation, this fact was less evident. The growth of the Communist bloc since the end of World War II and the frequency of conflict occurring both within this bloc and between it and outside interests prove beyond any reasonable doubt that communism is neither barrier to war nor guarantor of peace.

This fact, nevertheless, seems to escape many, particularly among the New Left. In the issue of January 15, 1969, of the former S.D.S. publication, *New Left Notes*, appears a call for "reconsolidation of the mass anti-war movement under the anti-imperialist, anti-racist banner of support for the Vietnamese people, led by the National Liberation Front . . ." That many in the peace movement would find an irreconcilable contradiction in being led by supporters of a guerrilla warfare movement, highly proficient in terrorist and torture techniques, apparently does not occur to the authors of this statement.

Secondly, and perhaps more important, the revolutionary analysis which blames the system is based on the theory that it is man's social order rather than the nature of man himself which gives rise to war. The convenience of this idea is evident; if the cause

of war is the result of man's own nature, the task of abolishing it becomes vastly more difficult. It is hard to see, though, how the development of human society throughout history could fail to have reflected the constituents of man's basic character.

In an article entitled "The Why of War" (*War/Peace Report*, October, 1970), Ruth Harriet Jacobs tells of her dismay on learning that most students in her course on the sociology of war "generally saw individual man as the evil that causes war. Most did not conceptualize beyond the personal level." Professor Jacobs sought to correct this "misconception" by pointing out that "war is not something intrinsic but rather a cultural invention of man." "War is *not* inevitable. Many cultures have not invented it." None of these "many" cultures, however, is listed. I do not intend to refute Professor Jacobs' thesis but merely to point out that this intelligent and knowledgeable movement activist automatically rejects any notion that man's nature might be responsible even in part for the existence of war. In the absence of any contrary evidence, it would seem safer, if somewhat less inspiring, to assume that man's basic characteristics *do* contribute in some measure to the origins of war.

"*If men would only learn to get along together, wars would cease.*" This dictum ignores the fact that if history is marred by wars which were the result of men failing to get along together, it is equally starred with happier achievements whereby widely differing peoples living side by side got along perfectly well for extended periods of time. The long continuing existence of the Swiss Republic is testimony to this fact. The Roman Empire was, among other things, a monument to the ability of highly exotic peoples to cooperate efficiently for centuries. This is one reason for the persistence of its favorable memory despite frequent failures and oppressions. Men do indeed know how to get along together and have developed many ingenious techniques for so doing. Wars, then, are due rather to the sad fact that men do not always find co-existence and cooperation more profitable than war. The problem is not one of ignorance but one of choice.

Another idea, corollary to the above dictum, is the belief that if rival nations would only become better acquainted with each other's language, customs, history and viewpoint, conflicts could be resolved without recourse to war. While simple logic would seem to sustain such a conclusion, and while few men would not advocate such exchanges between enemies, history offers no clear vindication

of this assumption. There remains the haunting example of France and Germany, neighboring countries who for decades enjoyed intimate exchange on every conceivable level—governmental, artistic, business, labor, scholarly, scientific, and personal—yet who persisted in an enmity resulting in protracted and bloody conflicts. One recalls the melancholy and prophetic remark of General Lautey in Morocco upon learning of the outbreak of hostilities between France and Germany in 1914. To the mystification of his fellow officers, he shook his head sadly and said, "It's a civil war."

"Armaments make wars possible; only disarmament can bring peace." The relationship between war and armaments is too obvious to be argued away, but so is the fact that nations generally do not arm for abstract reasons. They arm in response to the perception of specific threats, whether real or imagined. To reduce or abolish armaments without resolving the issues and conflicts which prompt such preparation would mean very little, especially in modern technological society. Whatever effective disarmament has taken place in the past, and history offers scant example, has followed conflict resolution or subsidence, e.g., the signing of the London Treaty on Naval Limitations in 1930 followed a decade of greatly lessened tensions between the chief naval powers. Significantly, the treaty was abrogated when tensions were renewed and increased a few years later. Yet many in the peace movement today would agree with Maxim Litvinoff when he said in Geneva in 1932 that ". . . moral disarmament can only be brought about through physical disarmament, that is, through the abolition of armaments. Once real soldiers have been got rid of, the world will have nothing to fear from tin soldiers." Shortly thereafter, it should be recalled, Hitler's "tin soldiers," after occupying the demilitarized zones of the Rhineland with dummy wooden rifles and cardboard tanks, were able to convert the industrial capability of a defeated and disarmed nation into the most advanced and productive armaments machine the world had seen.

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"Men should negotiate their differences." Again, while no one can fault the sentiment, there seems little or no realization here of the role violence, as a potentiality, plays in negotiated settlement. When pacifists wish to stress the value of negotiation over war, they frequently refer to such successful negotiations as the boundary arbitration between the U.S. and Canada, or the Antarctic Treaty signed by the U.S., the USSR and other nations. Such examples,

however, are meaningless since all diplomatic negotiations are not the same. They fall into one of two basic categories which I would term "administrative" and "conflictive." The former occur when the nations involved have already agreed to agree, leaving only the final shape of the agreement to be determined.

"Conflictive" negotiations, on the other hand, are concerned with hard-core diplomatic problems which, interestingly enough, almost always involve disputed territory. The most important motivating factor here is the possibility of war which both parties, for various reasons, have decided to avoid if possible, at least for the present. When there is no real possibility of armed conflict, such negotiations are not likely to take place, because the party in possession of the disputed territory, or having the upper hand in some other type of situation, has no motivation to negotiate. To cite a current and striking example, the USSR finally agreed to sit down with the Red Chinese to discuss the millions of square miles of territory the Romanovs wrenched away from the Manchus during the last century *only* when China had at last achieved enough technical prowess to constitute a real threat to Soviet security. Until this occurred, protests by the Communist Government of China and by former Chinese governments went unheeded. The simple dichotomy between negotiations on the one hand and warfare on the other does not stand up; it is not an "either/or" proposition.

The underlying assumption of all the foregoing dicta is, of course, that war is utterly useless. Now, despite the vast accumulation of countless folly, man at heart is a pragmatic creature. If this were not so, the human race would never have survived the vicissitudes of time and nature. If an institution such as war has persisted throughout man's history, being revived and revised again and again, at least some credence should be given to the possibility of war's utilitarian value, and value not to just an evil few but to the society at large. It will then become apparent that war will not, cannot, be abolished until other means are found to achieve the same ends with at least an equal amount of efficiency.

Certainly this is not to say that moral arguments should be abandoned, for if it is true that history suggests that little has been accomplished for purely ethical reasons, neither does the strictly pragmatic make much of a show. The great peaceful reforms in history seem to occur when the moral and the pragmatic converge, re-inforcing each other. All men who desire change without violence should constantly strive to find ways of bringing the moral and pragmatic dimensions of a given problem together.