

I speak of the relevance of philosophy to politics I am not urging philosophers to seek political office or influential positions in power centers. Socrates said in the *Apology*: "He who would really fight for justice must do so as a private citizen, not as a political figure." I take him to mean that thinking about political issues requires a certain freedom from social routine. One cannot stress too much the dangers of turning philosophers into men of action. As Sidney Hook writes:

Philosophers are better critics than laureates of the status quo. The very virtues that make a thinker a man of vision—prolonged reflection, skepticism of one's own first principles, the long view, the attempt to see the situation from the standpoint of the other—may prove drawbacks in action. Philosophers have a keen sense of alternatives. They are likely to be more aware than others of the disparities between the ideal and the actual. Above all they cannot without stultification give their primary intellectual loyalty to any nation, cause, party, or organization but only to the truth as they see it.

It is sobering to recall examples of the philosopher as man of action. The great Plato was a failure as a practical politician. Hegel's genius did not prevent him from imagining that Napoleon was the World Spirit on horseback. Nor Santayana's from praising totalitarian governments as the incarnation of Plato's *Republic*. Sartre was a disaster as a leader of his own political party. And Heidegger's support of Hitler as well as many of Russell's political judgments had only tenuous connections with clear thinking.

A *third* area of rapprochement between philosophy and politics is in the realm of ethics. I think it can be said without much fear of contradiction that the great problems of our times are ethical ones. Philosophy's record is a glorious one in this domain, for it has had its finest moments in dealing with questions of moral choice and the good life. Interestingly enough, the problems which the Society for Philosophy and Public Policy recommends for philosophical examination are, without exception, moral in nature. This, I feel sure, is why philosophical novelists like Camus and Kafka as well as psychological writers like Laing and Fromm have such wide appeal. They deal convincingly with those ethical aspects of living in the contemporary world to which professional philosophers pay scant heed. Sometimes, in a playful mood with my students, I lay out a sum of money on a wager that the next significant breakthrough in philosophy will be in the realm of ethics. In my opinion, there hasn't been one since Nietzsche.

Finally, there is what I would call the imaginative contribution of philosophy. I am a believer in the

old adage that without a vision the people perish. Of course other agencies, like religion and literature, provide imaginative nourishment; but at the heart of every great philosophy is a poetic kernel, a sustaining metaphor which rounds out the labor of logic and gives it universal appeal. Some examples would be the vision of Beauty in Plato, the heavenly city of Christian philosophy, or the earthly city of Marx. The negative images of existentialism also serve this purpose in a kind of reverse way. In this perspective, the great challenge facing philosophy today is to give rational expression to a unifying myth, one that gives purpose to our experiences and cohesion to our social institutions. In the final analysis, the philosopher must join hands with the poet and the mystic to do his job well.

## correspondence

### "THE NEW STYLE IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY"

Oxford, Ohio

Dear Sir: Recently, my colleagues, Drs. Enloe and Réjai, were thoughtful enough to pass along to me the copy of *worldview* (November, 1970) which contained their article on "The New Style in U. S. Foreign Policy." Since both authors are friends of mine, I dutifully set about reading the piece. Now, I am rather cranky because the central notion of the article seems to me to be pernicious.

At the center of their analysis is the observation that people are unable any longer to meaningfully discuss U. S. foreign policy because their "vocabulary is not equipped to cope with their country's behavior. The poverty of vocabulary stems from a more serious conceptual vacuum."

The remainder of the article, very perceptive in parts, is devoted to making a plea, not for the development and employment of, say, "expertise" in matters relating to the discussion and/or prosecution of foreign affairs but, rather, for the development of a conceptually sophisticated theory of foreign policy—a systematic systems theory, as it develops.

Trying to understand how it is that one might sponsor a copious vocabulary, hence an adequate if not reassuring grasp of U. S. foreign policy, by first insuring a conceptual plenum has left me dotty. If anything, it seems to me that this is precisely the sort of effort which has gotten the U. S. into its present pickle(s)—lots of positin' but little thinkin'.

Fleeing a humiliating and malingering death from the rigors of terminal chagrin, Louis J. Halle, former member of the Policy Planning Staff, wrote from Geneva in his book *The Cold War as History*:

The original cold war had been set-off by the sudden expansion of Russia in Europe. Consequently, there could be little doubt in any impartial mind

that, when the West rallied under American leadership to halt that expansion, it was acting in its own legitimate defense rather than in a spirit of aggression. But China, when the United States undertook its containment, had not expanded. . . . To anyone familiar with the dynamics of revolution a theoretical danger of expansion did exist, and this justified vigilance. . . . Because it had not in fact expanded, however, and because the United States was in the position of denying the new Chinese Government's right to govern even in China proper, the United States was, in this case, the party that appeared to be playing the role of aggressor in Asia.

Halle was well aware that too many of the people concerned with foreign policy analysis, formulation, and execution have come to treat mere concepts as if they were reality with such alacrity that we customarily mince about on tip-toe with our noses out of joint whenever someone suggests that "expertise" (the knowing of something without quite being obsessed or able to explain why or how one knows whatever it is that is known) is a rational basis for action. And he also knew that this conceptual arrogance, which is entailed by the journalistic misapprehension of science, is at the base of the mythology which misleads us into pre-emptive actions that make our foreign policy prophesies self-fulfilling.

Unless we seriously believe that only those matters which are amenable to systematic conceptual description and categorization effect the course of trends and events in which we are interested, then we had better pay attention to, say, experts who promulgate little theory, because they know too much, but who have usually been right about matters to which they have turned their undivided attention.

Quite contrary to popular belief, nay faith, science does not deal with explanation, except incidentally. Rather, it is concerned with prediction. Where, then, there is demonstrated accuracy, never mind an inhibiting or promiscuous narrative, there is science.

It might be precious but it is surely instructive to point out that one of the most systematic of foreign policy analysts has a conceptual vocabulary of less than 100 words. Clinical psychology classifies as a low-grade moron anyone with a vocabulary of less than 500 words; and as paranoid anyone whose conceptual orientation to the world in which he lives is perfectly tautological—a status fopishly courted by the systematic theorist.

W. R. Campbell

Dear Sir: In the spirit of collegial reciprocity, we have dutifully studied Dr. Campbell's letter in order to ascertain whether it is in fact responsive to our article. We have concluded that it is not. Dr. Campbell sets up a straw man—on at least two scores.

First, Dr. Campbell takes us to task for "making a plea" for systems theory, while in fact we do no such thing. Our standpoint is that of the observer commenting

on the work of others. We adopt the posture of the analyst not the advocate.

Second, Dr. Campbell accuses us of imputing to systems theory a scientific status, which, again, we do not do. To us, systems theory is nothing more than a medium of intellectual exchange—a way of approaching, organizing, and understanding reality. We hasten to emphasize that "system" has no objective reality, let alone any utility for prediction.

If we had done what Dr. Campbell suggests, we might have become "cranky" enough to question the validity of the links he seems to want to establish between morons, paranoids, and systems theorists. We might further have wondered why the same links do not extend to "experts who promulgate little theory."

Cynthia H. Enloe and Mostafa Rejai

## "THE GREENING OF CHARLES REICH"

Vancouver, B. C.

Dear Sir: Since moving to Canada about one year ago, we have continued to enjoy our copies of *worldview*, which we hasten to complement you on as constantly improving in depth and awareness over the past two years. . . .

I just had to take exception to Dr. Bernard Murchland's *approach* to Charles Reich's book (*worldview*, February). I have no feeling for an apologia for *Greening*, but I certainly do for such approaches as Dr. Murchland's. One of Reich's reasons for writing was undoubtedly an effort to escape the ideological hang-ups of writers like Murchland. And as one dealing in the problems of theological communications, I tremendously appreciate Reich's efforts at communication. At least I feel I "hear" what Reich is attempting to say.

. . . If one begins a criticism of a critic whose logic is substantially encased in Reich's Consciousness I, whose contemporariness rings like a nineteenth-century popularist, it would hardly be justified to expect sensitivity to youth culture. But, Mr. Murchland, saying so just won't make it go away. Youth culture is not an "idea" or a commodity; it is an experience. Its mentors use ideas to relate to it, just as you do; but it has no rationale. If Reich's problems are political, their solution, to the youth culture, is strictly "not" political. The Murchland critique is rationalistic. But Reich's Consciousness III is a-rationalistic. It patently rejects Hegelian dialectical relationships as a sign of "life"; it accepts it for what it is, a sign of the mind! Consciousness III deals with the dialogue relationship of self with selves, personalistic and existential. The theme of the new mood, perhaps falsely attributed to the so-called youth culture, is awareness. It is this awakening to an awareness of ourselves and our world that Reich proposes. . . .

From my efforts at relating to the American political science scene in classroom and political activities, I must certainly take exception to the "translation" of Reich by Murchland.

Charles E. Argast