ties—and pay the costs of failure. Certainly, Just is right in saying that when civilian leadership fails, the military will provide its own direction, if only by following the path of least resistance.

Just seems to be arguing that all America needs is more active civilian control, a contention that is very suspect. Given the Army's continuing effort to win the admiration of America, what we need is a civilian society capable of creating new standards of honor, new terms on which we can respect our soldiers and they can respect themselves. The old certainties no longer have real force; they will not serve the Army nor can they be relied upon in civilian society. One element of a new code of honor might be to free the Army from the modern obsession with technology and with success. We might say, in effect, that "fighting well" has no necessary relationship to victory, that the honor of America and its Army demand that there be things we will not do to win, even if the price is defeat. (Nobility is always easy when one is sure to win anyway.) Certainly, I have provided no set of techniques by which such a moral revolution—it would be nothing less—might be wrought in civilian society. But perhaps that may be excused; our demand for methods is often only the reflection of our desire to avoid facing questions of substance. Yet face them we must, given the military crisis of the time. Civilian society is the source of most of the military's problems—as it is of their possible solutions. It cannot be otherwise as long as soldiers and civilians are still alike in being citizens of a republic.

THE AMERICAN STYLE OF WAR

William Pfaff

The Calley case has laid bare a neglected fact: Of all the major nations and their armies, the United States and its army have been, in moral terms, the least able to deal with the type of situation Vietnam has presented.

The American style of war has always been the engineer's style—for West Point is, traditionally, a school for engineers. We apply technology to grossly defined problems. We seek our military solutions in logistics, sheer manpower and firepower, thus overpowering all discrimination and subtlety. We have no military caste; since the permanent expansion of our standing army in the 1940's, the influence of the old American military families and schools has been submerged, and with it the last vestige of the aristocratic military ethos. The day of Marshall and MacArthur, of Lee, of the Grant who told a defeated enemy to keep its sidearms, and its horses and mules for the spring ploughing, is finished. The military ethos, for all that was wrong with it, provided some degree of internal safeguard against the barbarian extremities of war.

Since Vietnam has been a professionals' war, without a sustaining popular mandate, the career officer corps has contained none of the leavening it had in past American wars. Armies are never very congenial to intellect and original talent. It is their nature to prize obedience, duty, conformity. Without an influx of highly motivated civilians to take over staffs and the junior and middle levels of command, deprived of tradition, the American army in Vietnam has relied wholly upon its career officers—and they have not been very good. Compare their success, in purely professional terms, with the tactical competence of the French in Algeria, even—with their slender resources—the French in Indochina in the 1950's. Compare the British operations in Malaya, Kenya, Aden—and the skill of the British army in maintaining civil order in Ulster today.

The accomplishment of the professional American army in Vietnam has been wholly technological, and corrupting. It is precisely this national valuation of machine violence over the human value and political subtlety of the enemy which has morally devastated our conduct in Vietnam. We have never come to terms with the enemy as men, as individual humans to be confronted as persons. We have, as a nation, seen them only from bombing altitudes. Thus the peculiar shock of the Calley affair, where the Vietnamese were dealt with as individuals, but in the moral framework of technological man.
Under the clamorous surface of the Calley controversy another and related theme emerges: the continued popular power of that undiscriminating puritan view of war which historically has been fostered in the American Protestant tradition. The past two decades of Niebuhrian attack upon this puritanism and upon its companion, that political perfectionism which has seen organizational reforms as the key to a transformed international order, has obviously had little popular effect. In the 1950's and 1960's the defense intellectuals and the "realist" political scholars and commentators put forward a doctrine of limited war which had a very large influence upon national policy. They held that violence is an inevitable tool of state, and that it is necessary to learn to use violence with discrimination and limit. But this doctrine was uncongenial to Americans. Indeed, the defense intellectuals themselves were responsible for its crucial contradiction. Their ostentatiously cool and amoral instrumentalism in matters of war set loose the technological juggernaut of violence in Vietnam.

Under pressure of seven years' war and frustration we now see American absolutism about war re-emerge as a popular force. It arises on both left and right, among both the defenders of Lieutenant Calley and in the peace movement. The defenders of the hapless lieutenant insist that all war is terrible; that Calley was trained to kill; that he was only doing his duty. On the Left there is a reply which is something like agreement: He is not guilty so much as are his superiors. He was indeed only doing what he had learned from the example of his superiors. The only remedy for atrocities is no war at all. As for Calley himself—he told us that had he been acquitted he would have made a world tour preaching pacifism.

In all of this the moral proposition is that all war is evil; but if you are engaged in a war, discrimination among the acts of war is futile or fatuous. The only possible conclusions from this argument, as Calley himself has discovered, are pacifism on the one hand, and on the other—among those who say, as the majority do, that despite its evil this war or some other war has to be fought—that any kind of violence is licensed. It is all indiscriminately evil. Out of this view has come Hiroshima, Dresden, and much of what we have done in Vietnam. Out of it comes the conclusion that no one man is guilty of an atrocity of war but that we are all guilty. Which is an elaborate way of saying that no one is responsible.

So deep a popular view is unlikely to be changed. It is not without its domestic challenge, as we have seen in the letter which Captain Aubrey Daniel, Calley's military prosecutor, directed to President Nixon. Yet the power and extent of the popular outcry goes the other way. Seventy-nine per cent of the American public, in the first few days after the Calley verdict, told the Gallup organization that they disapproved of the verdict. Fifty per cent said they believed that the My Lai atrocity was an incident "common" in this war. Only 20 per cent thought that it was not a crime. Seventy-one per cent said that others shared Calley's guilt. Yet fewer than a third in the sample thought that there should be war crimes trials of the higher officials, whom they apparently regard as the ones really responsible for My Lai. The contradictions in this are instructive.

The country undeniably wants out of this war, and the country undeniably is disturbed by the things that have gone on in Vietnam. But public motives and passions remain complex and contradictory. The United States can be a vengeful country as well as a forgiving one, but it is not given to moral subtleties. The President and Mr. Kissinger should take note that the country longs for simplicities. Peace is a simplicity, for which much can be forgiven. Denied peace, the country in its anguish will search for other simple things.

WHO'LL INVESTIGATE THE INVESTIGATORS?

Rosemary Ruether

During these last few months, in the furor surrounding the Calley trial, the Berrigan indictment and the exposure of F.B.I. documents stolen from its office in Media, Pennsylvania, many Americans have become aware, on a new dimension of intensity, of the way in which our public institutional life has become corrupted by governmental efforts to repress dissent. Much must be blamed on the Vietnamese war, to be sure. But public disgust over the war merely brought this corruption out in the open. Every revelation of the extent of the development of an internal police network to repress dissent has revealed that its roots go back not only to the early

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