

in the magazines

One issue is the Government's policy toward providing access to classified sources. Another, and related issue, concerns the manner in which the author of a scholarly work—and its readers—are to deal with material which must remain "unattributed" to government documents and officials. Both are raised by Theodore Draper in a review of a new volume on the 1965 Dominican revolt (*Political Science Quarterly*, March).

"... We have no way of putting [certain books] to any scholarly test," says Draper, "because they hide behind their 'classified' and 'restricted' sources. What justification can there be for this practice? ..."

"... Journalists may protect their sources; scholars must provide them. Indeed, where scholarship claims to break new ground, it should more than ever furnish the evidence on which other scholars may make up their own minds.

"Those who work on contemporary history know how hard it sometimes is to live up to this ideal. But it should be recognized that contemporary history suffers as a discipline to the extent that it does not live up to it. The primary responsibility for the dilemma—of accepting onerous conditions and betraying the standards of scholarship or rejecting such conditions and giving up the opportunity altogether—rests with official agencies. If, like the State Department, they practice flagrant favoritism, they divide and contaminate the community of scholars. ..."

"Professor James MacGregor Burns has called attention to 'the problem of access by historians and other scholars to classified Government records covering relatively recent military and diplomatic actions of the United States Government.' The issue, he pointed out, is not merely the 'scholar's right of access' but, even more basically, 'the public's right to gain reliable information.' ... But there is the more complex and subtle problem of those who get access—on terms which should be unacceptable to the scholarly community. These terms make a mockery of all accepted canons of scholarship and a sham of the government agency's own rules. ... It serves no national interest and stifles the national conscience."

The winter number of the *Columbia Journalism Review* contains a special section devoted to assessments of how well the U.S. news media have described and explained the war in Vietnam.

For the Los Angeles *Times*' Jules Witcover, "Where Washington Reporting Failed" was in "the breakdown of a cardinal principle of newsgathering, especially early in the war: pursuit of all points of view.

"While the Washington press corps in those years diligently reported what the Government said about Vietnam, and questioned the inconsistencies as they arose, too few sought out opposing viewpoints and expertise until very late, when events and the prominence of the Vietnam dissent no longer could be ignored." "We were largely at the mercy of the Administration then," Witcover reports a Washington bureau chief as saying. "We had no touchstones on the war. And we were less skeptical on the war than we were on other things. There was a tendency to believe more because they were supposed to have the facts and you didn't, and we were more inclined to accepting an official's word on something as cosmic as a war. After all, we don't consider our government a foreign power just yet."

For Fred W. Friendly, former president of C.B.S. News, "ineffective" is the word for "TV at the Turning Point." "With few exceptions," he recalls, "the world outside and the pictures in our heads, as far as Vietnam was concerned, were not appreciably different from those of the Administration. The broadcast journalist went into Vietnam the same way he went into World War II and Korea—as a member of the team."

"There were really four Vietnam stories: the military, diplomatic, political, economic. We may have been providing most of the parts of that mosaic but in my view we lacked the will and imagination to relate them to one another. ... It was not just a shortage of air time. ... Nor can we blame it all on the profit demands of the networks and the unwillingness of some local stations to carry serious Vietnam coverage. The equally disturbing problem was our inability to understand the complexities of the Vietnam puzzle and to assemble a comprehensive profile early enough to make a difference. ..."

Others take up the cudgel from there. Don Stillman probes deeply into "Tonkin: What Should Have Been Asked," Nathan Blumberg reports on "Misreporting the Peace Movement," James McCartney asks "Can the Media Cover Guerrilla Wars?" and Robert Shaplen examines "The Challenge Ahead."

"During the [Catholic/Humanist] Dialogue [held in Brussels last fall] we debated the problem of the open society. What are the prerequisites for it? To what degree is it possible for individuals to be left alone by the Church or the State? ... Is there any sphere of privacy into which neither Church nor State may move? Does the marriage bed really isolate the private conscience? ... doesn't the humanist, traditionally favoring separation of Church and State,

(Continued on p. 8)

act at once, and the result was the *coup* by the Colonels. The code name of the plan they used, "Prometheus," is said to be "simply the label of a contingency plan prepared in the Athens general headquarters, which Greeks proudly call 'the Pentagon.' It had been accepted as part of NATO's response in the event of war with a Communist country." Sulzberger adds that "the purpose of the original plan was, of course, to prevent a *coup d'état*, not to promote one."

Now Sulzberger is not antagonistic to NATO, as evidence his subsequent remark "that we must carefully distinguish between military policy toward a member of the NATO alliance and political policy toward Greece as a nation." His statement is especially interesting since he had just demonstrated how difficult it is to keep these categories separate.

In a more critical article in *Harper's* ("The Death of Liberty," October, 1969), John Corry gave credence to a persistent story that "American intelligence recently turned over to Greek intelligence 1,200 telephone tapping devices for what was officially called 'NATO purposes.'" And there are other indications of the fact and purpose of U.S. responsibility for the *coup*. Nicholas Gage and Elias Kulukundis reported from Greece in 1970 ("Under the Junta," *The American Scholar*, Summer, 1970) that many Greeks seem to want to continue to enjoy the stability of the 1950's. Certainly they do not see it as their responsibility to oust the Colonels. That regime is in power, Greeks believe, because the U.S. wants it to be: "The Americans brought them in and the Americans can get them out."

U.S. support for the junta as NATO partner continues, according to a report in the *International Herald Tribune* for September 8, 1970, "for strategic reasons":

The U.S. Defense Department sees the growing Soviet military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean—not Greek democracy—as the key issue.

And testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at first secret but made public on October 4 of last year, revealed that \$168 million worth of military aid was sent to Greece in the last three years, at the same time the U.S. declared a "selective arms embargo" against the junta (*The Boston Globe*, October 5, 1970).

It becomes abundantly clear that a policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member nations is a morally tricky category—especially when this policy must be specifically applied, as in the case of Soviet action in the CSSR, Portugal and her colonies, and Greece. But this principle has, in fact, been employed as justification for help to the Greek

Colonels in their own power struggle and for assistance to Portugal in its war against its territories. What has happened to the noble ideas of democracy, free institutions, the rule of law?

• *Conclusion.* If we are to support further American participation in NATO—and no conclusive case against the organization has been made here—there are damaging questions of a moral nature that must be asked—and answered. We noted three premises that underlie the usual studies of NATO. The *first*, which regards the world as being divided into "free" and "totalitarian" communities, must be re-examined in light of the examples of Greece and Portugal. It may be, too, that further account should be taken of changes in the adversary.

The *second* premise permitted the advancement of seemingly conflicting goals: deterrence of aggression and accommodation with Russia. Even granting the efficacy of deterrence in the short run, such a threat system may interfere with the long-range goals of arms limitation and genuine security for all of Europe. The *third* premise imposes a cylindrical vision upon European security. In that context, the Alliance's focus upon military security effectively precludes interference with Portugal's policy in Africa or the internal situation in Greece. Both cases provide examples of ideals in conflict (non-interference vs. self-determination), but they also call attention to NATO's role in the violation of its own principles.

The suspicion emerges that the ideals articulated in the NATO Charter and in subsequent statements are mere "window dressing" designed to justify a military strategy *vis-à-vis* a perceived Soviet threat but not intended to apply to member nations or to the partners' dealings with non-European peoples. If justification for NATO's existence rests only on the need for military deterrence, the Alliance is required, on moral grounds, to state this in its own stark geopolitical terms.

in the magazines

(Continued from p. 2)

sound increasingly authoritarian if he advocates controls that run from taming U.S. Steel to encouraging marriage partners to steel themselves against having too many children? This brings us to the paradox of tolerating the intolerable. Dare we? And with what consequence? Is the open society a reliable guide to pedagogy? How much, and when, is learning merely indoctrination? How much, and when, does it promote human growth?" (Roy P. Fairfield in *The Humanist*, May/June.)

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