

now faced with one of the most illiberal peoples in the whole Western world.

Richard Rose's book is disturbing in a slightly different way. Its lesson is that there is no solution to the Ulster crisis. Ulster is not a community and not a nation, and cannot go on pretending to be one. When asked to describe their nationality, 76% of the Catholics say they are Irish, whereas 39% of the Protestants say they are British, 32% say they are Ulster, and only 20% say they are Irish. When asked what they liked about the other side's church, 68% of the Catholics and 56% of the Protestants couldn't think of a single thing.

Bernadette Devlin is correct to say that religion is "irrelevant" to the "real" problems of the North Irish. But her obvious good sense is beside the point. When the British created a colony in Ulster and vowed to defend it to the end, they created a politically unreal state whose citizens developed an unreal mentality. The Ulster Protestants cling to the seventeenth century (their slogan is "Remember 1690") because that was the last time their nation made any sense politically. Ever since they have clung to the past, and in doing so have made of the Catholic minority in Ulster an implacable enemy. Neither will the Catholics ever be content to remain under the care of the Ulster government, whose hostility to them has been amply demonstrated.

The one ray of hope in the Ulster crisis is that it makes America's problems seem small in comparison. The race problem is terrible, but one can still imagine solutions to it, even if few of these solutions are compatible with liberal political theory. And as hostile as most whites still are to blacks, they would probably not try to overthrow the government if these solutions were attempted. Whites and blacks are still willing to occupy the same country. Farrell and Rose are not sure that even this much can be said of Ulster.

Will we always be able to say it of this country?

## Man and Socialism in Cuba: The Great Debate edited by Bertram Silverman

(Atheneum; 382 pp.; \$12.50)

## Cuba: Socialism and Development by Rene Dumont

(Grove Press; 240 pp.; \$7.50)

### Miguel A. Bretos

One of the Cuban Revolution's fascinating characteristics, at least during the first half of the sixties, was its leadership's willingness to face and debate some of the fundamental philosophical and tactical problems posed by Cuba's forced march towards socialism. The Revolution made its cataclysmic entrance into the stage of Cuban history as a profoundly dynamic, though scarcely cohesive, complex of latent frustrations and vague yet powerful yearnings for a better, freer Cuba. What was essentially a political movement against the supremely unpopular, corrupt usurper regime of Fulgencio Batista almost overnight became a question mark as large as Cuba itself.

In falling, the Batista government brought down with it important segments of the old order. The consequent social vacuum opened a whole new range of tantalizing alternatives for the future of Cuba. Yet, the new Revolutionary government most conspicuously lacked an ideological common denominator, a more or less concrete perception of aspirations and goals and the means whereby they might be implemented. Was the Revolution to pursue a social democratic course as the government assembled under President Manuel Urrutia strongly suggested? Would the Revolution, on the other hand, become increasingly radicalized? Questions such as these, largely moot in 1959, became increasingly relevant as divisiveness ensued between Fidel Castro and some former supporters.

Some recent commentators on the Revolution have seen something of a

continuum, of a logical sequence, between pre-Castro Cuba and the Revolution's eventual socialist course. For others, the Revolution embraced socialism as an alternative, almost as an afterthought. In this latter perspective, the events of the period 1959 to 1961 take on added importance: the hostility of the United States towards the Castro regime, the rising influence of certain members of Castro's inner group such as "Che" Guevara and Raul Castro, the mirage of socialist prowess exemplified by the Soviet Union's space feats of the early sixties. Whatever the reasons, deterministic or circumstantial, by 1962 Castro's regime was deeply committed to carry on a "socialist" revolution.

And what conspicuous consumption there was of this thing called socialism! The new power elite of Cuba gave itself with *élan* to the task of unraveling the mysteries of the new panacea. While for most of the Eastern Europeans flocking to Cuba in droves from 1961 onwards, socialism might have been something of a fact of life, a catechism learned in school and taken for granted, for the new Cuban revolutionaries it soon became an exciting, open idea. Young men and women, who, scarcely a few years before, would have been hard put to tell the difference between the Marxes—Groucho and Karl—devoured abstruse Marxist texts and talked about dialectics and Marxist surplus theory.

Cuban socialism, however, still had to resolve fundamental questions after the initial honeymoon period

of the early sixties. True, the Revolution was committed to a socialist program, but how was it to be implemented?

Between 1962 and 1965, selected organs of the Cuban press carried a lively and continuing controversy over such basic, sensitive issues as the role of money and the laws of the market, the problems of centralized versus decentralized management structures and the relative merits of material versus moral incentives as factors in the "construction" of socialism in Cuba. From this "Great Economic Debate"—as Belgium's prestigious Marxist economist Ernest Mandel called it—there soon emerged two fundamental schools of thought. On one hand, there were those who advocated economic rationality and a cautious, eclectic approach to socialist economic reorganization, retaining at least as a temporary expedient important capitalistic forms such as material incentives and market autonomy. On the other hand, there were those who affirmed that the only valid *raison d'être* of the Cuban experience was to create a new socialist awareness, indeed, a new socialist man quintessentially incompatible with capitalistic mores and modes of production. This trend, which found its most forceful and influential proponent in Che Guevara, postulated short-range socialization of the means of production, a tightly centralized planning and management of the economy, and the introduction of moral incentives as the primary agenda for the socialist transformation of Cuba.

To think of the "Great Debate" as something akin to a general referendum, reaching large segments of the Cuban population, would be a serious error. To be sure, the debate—in which noted foreigners like M. Mandel and the French Marxist economist Charles Bettelheim participated—was conducted at the highest decision-making levels of the Cuban Government with little or no participation from below. That the debate was carried on in full public view even within the totalitarian political framework of Cuba is important, however, and extremely suggestive.

It not only reveals the leadership's willingness to confront the issues but also the fact that, during the early to mid-sixties, a state of fluidity existed; consensus in important areas had not been achieved. The future course of the Revolution was as yet undecided, was still very much an open-ended proposition.

The Great Debate is most assuredly a thing of the past. Che Guevara's disappearance from the Cuban scene put an end to this fascinating stage of the revolutionary process. We are fortunate that Bertram Silverman, Professor of Economics at Hofstra University, has made once more available the most significant articles to emerge from the debate. His is a judiciously selected anthology enhanced by a concise and suggestive introduction.

There is a measure of irony in the fact that this fascinating testimony should appear at a time when the Revolution seems irretrievably headed towards an era of deepening economic crisis, ideological rigidity and increased pressures for conformity to officially consecrated dogma. The deteriorating internal situation of Cuba, both economic and political, has been made manifest, first, by the catastrophic failure of Fidel Castro's sugar panacea, the Ten Million Harvest and its belt-tightening sequel. This was followed by the shameful Heberto Padilla affair and Castro's subsequent bitter break with the community of European and Latin American intellectuals of the Left, impressing upon world opinion the increasingly intolerant, repressive nature of Castro's calcified dictatorship.

Silverman suggests that the present Cuban crisis has come about as a result of her desertion of open and frank analysis in favor of ideology; for brushing aside, as it were, the spirit that made the Great Debate possible. But it can be argued that the phasing out of the Great Debate answers to more fundamental reasons. It is because the Great Debate *was resolved*—and resolved in the direction of Guevara's general points of view—that Cuba has entered a stage of deepening crisis. Naturally, the Debate itself has ceased to have via-

bility. Choosing to disregard the Soviet experience of the twenties, the Cubans embarked on the same adventure the Bolsheviks did and with, at least so far, the same results. Silverman cites evidence to indicate that Che Guevara was disappointed when he left Cuba because he felt that his views, despite his efforts, had not carried the day. If so, he was as wrong in this as in his assessment of Bolivia's ripeness for revolution. Castro has, if anything, further radicalized the original Guevara formula since 1966. This is clearly borne out by Professor Silverman's inclusion, by way of epilogue, of a speech delivered by Castro on July 26, 1968. In it, the Cuban Premier outlined the policy of the Revolution—which has been followed since 1966—of the primacy of moral incentives, tight centralization and the absolute disappearance of the private sector. Why Castro, who kept a sense of neutrality during the Great Debate, should seek to surpass Guevara's zeal is a crucial question. Is it too far-fetched to speculate that Castro, being Castro, could not resist the temptation of going Che one better?

Although his work is not represented in the Silverman anthology, the name of René Dumont is intimately tied to the larger context in which the Great Debate lies. His important 1964 criticism of Cuba's agricultural performance was not only a major role for rationality in planning the Cuban economy but also a major indictment of the evils of *socialismo a la cubana*. Dumont's book, long available only in French, has now appeared in English translation.

René Dumont enjoys a solid reputation as a knowledgeable and severe critic of Third World and socialist agricultural systems. A friendly critic, to be sure, but one not likely to spare anyone in pursuit of his long-held view that the developing countries' first order of business is with the bread-and-butter problems of economic development. The importance of Dumont's book does not lie in the forcefulness of his argument, for his is a poorly written, disorganized (and now, badly trans-

lated) exposition of the point of view that socialism must follow, rather than precede, development. Yet few men can match the breadth of his acquaintance with the nitty-gritty of development nor his unique opportunities to observe at close range the inner workings of the decision-making process in Cuba, particularly the role of the "Maximum Leader" himself. Dumont's work is also significant in the literature of the Revolution, for it has emerged as standard anti-Castro matter, and thus it has attained a certain degree of influence.

Dumont's relations with Cuba, Castro and the Revolution go back to 1960 when he arrived as a visitor to the island. In subsequent visits until 1963 he returned as a special advisor to Fidel Castro. If one is to believe M. Dumont, one of the genuine ills of the Cuban experiment is the inordinate importance of Castro's personal influence in the day-to-day running of Cuba. He is described as the fulcrum on which ultimate power rests. Since he is also portrayed as a super-dilettante who believes in his expertise in almost every field of human activity, it follows that Castro's intervention can result, has resulted, in serious dislocations.

But Castro is not the only problem. At the root of Cuba's economic malaise Dumont sees the interplay of several factors: over-centralization, waste, the emergence of a rigid, inefficient bureaucratic structure, the subordination of economic to social and political goals, the elimination of the profit motive in an over-hasty transition to socialism. It is important to keep in mind that Dumont wrote in 1964, before the Revolution entered its more radical phase of the later sixties. Yet, he was able to clearly perceive the long-range implications contained in the Revolution's movement towards ideal rather than concrete objectives. It is possible that, as a friend of Cuba and the Cuban Revolution, Dumont was saddened by the thought that the Revolution's wine might well become vinegar in the seventies. As a soothsayer, however, he has reason to be proud.

## The Atlantic Fantasy: The U.S., NATO, and Europe by David Calleo

(Johns Hopkins; 192 pp.; \$7.00)

### James Loesel

With Henry Kissinger busy recreating American foreign policy toward Asia, it is comforting to know that scholars like David Calleo still think seriously about European relations.

His argument is short and direct, and stimulating. He says Atlanticism has become a fantasy that prevents a restructuring of Europe to benefit mutually the U.S., the USSR, East and West Europe.

While Calleo is quite willing to concede that NATO and Atlanticism have been successful in the past, a new way of thinking will be necessary to overcome the present-day problems. His list of problems includes: the high cost of the U.S. military, either imperialistic pretensions in America with accompanying corruptions by power or the threat of genuine neo-isolationism in the U.S., continued confrontations with the USSR over Germany, and continued German division.

Continuing with NATO cannot solve these problems, he says, and the problems which NATO could handle—such as deterring a Soviet attack and stabilizing West Germany—are no longer the great problems of Europe.

According to this analysis, the best way for the Americans to find a proper balance between goals and means is the devolution of military responsibility upon European countries. This means a European nuclear deterrent. (However, Mr. Calleo favors a nuclear-free zone that includes at least East and West Germany—just to assure everyone that Germans must share the bomb elsewhere if they have it at all.) Devolution of military responsibility also means encouraging a European defense coalition to replace NATO.

This grouping presumably would be loosely allied with the U.S., although free to act independently of us. More than that we cannot expect, he suggests.

If he is right, the result would be: (1) substantial savings on the cost of maintaining troops overseas, (2) Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, (3) a more stable and normal European community, (4) a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, (5) possibilities for German reunification and neutralism, and (6) healthier foreign and domestic policies for America.

It is hard to believe it could all come out this way (a fantasy?). Mr. Calleo does not speculate on the difficulties of arriving at his utopia or what might go wrong along the way, but that, too, must be thought about before we begin dismantling NATO and pulling out U.S. troops from Germany. While consolidation of a credible European nuclear force is feasible given present European technology and economic strength, a political structure to decide under what circumstances a nuclear deterrent should be used is not visible today. Mr. Calleo can envision a loose confederation of conventional forces to deter Soviet conventional forces, but it is difficult to see a nuclear deterrent force without more integrated leadership.

I also find it difficult to get from the idea of a Western Europe which has assumed the responsibilities of the common defense to the vision of a greater Europe which has a nuclear-free center—specifically, a neutral Germany. There may be several books still to come that explicate this leap, but this book does not.

I also wonder why a militarily re-