lated) exposition of the point of view that socialism must follow, rather than precede, development. Yet few men can match the breadth of his acquaintance with the nitty-gritty of development nor his unique opportunities to observe at close range the inner workings of the decision-making process in Cuba, particularly the role of the “Maximum Leader” himself. Dumont’s work is also significant in the literature of the Revolution, for it has emerged as standard anti-Castro matter, and thus it has attained a certain degree of influence.

Dumont’s relations with Cuba, Castro and the Revolution go back to 1960 when he arrived as a visitor to the island. In subsequent visits until 1963 he returned as a special advisor to Fidel Castro. If one is to believe M. Dumont, one of the genuine ills of the Cuban experiment is the inordinate importance of Castro’s personal influence in the day-to-day running of Cuba. He is described as the fulcrum on which ultimate power rests. Since he is also portrayed as a super-dilettante who believes in his expertise in almost every field of human activity, it follows that Castro’s intervention can result, has resulted, in serious dislocations.

But Castro is not the only problem. At the root of Cuba’s economic malaise Dumont sees the interplay of several factors: over-centralization, waste, the emergence of a rigid, inefficient bureaucratic structure, the subordination of economic to social and political goals, the elimination of the profit motive in an over-hasty transition to socialism. It is important to keep in mind that Dumont wrote in 1964, before the Revolution entered its more radical phase of the later sixties. Yet, he was able to clearly perceive the long-range implications contained in the Revolution’s movement towards ideal rather than concrete objectives. It is possible that, as a friend of Cuba and the Cuban Revolution, Dumont was saddened by the thought that the Revolution’s wine might well become vinegar in the seventies. As a soothsayer, however, he has reason to be proud.

The Atlantic Fantasy: The U.S., NATO, and Europe by David Calleo
(Johns Hopkins; 192 pp.; $7.00)

James Loesel

With Henry Kissinger busy recreating American foreign policy toward Asia, it is comforting to know that scholars like David Calleo still think seriously about European relations.

His argument is short and direct, and stimulating. He says Atlanticism has become a fantasy that prevents a restructuring of Europe to benefit mutually the U.S., the USSR, East and West Europe.

While Calleo is quite willing to concede that NATO and Atlanticism have been successful in the past, a new way of thinking will be necessary to overcome the present-day problems. His list of problems includes: stimulating. He says Atlanticism has become a fantasy that prevents a restructuring of Europe to benefit mutually the U.S., the USSR, East and West Europe.

While Calleo is quite willing to concede that NATO and Atlanticism have been successful in the past, a new way of thinking will be necessary to overcome the present-day problems. His list of problems includes: the high cost of the U.S. military, either imperialistic pretensions in America with accompanying corruptions by power or the threat of genuine neo-isolationism in the U.S., continued confrontations with the USSR over Germany, and continued German division.

Continuing with NATO cannot solve these problems, he says, and the problems which NATO could handle—such as deterring a Soviet attack and stabilizing West Germany—are no longer the great problems of Europe.

According to this analysis, the best way for the Americans to find a proper balance between goals and means is the devolution of military responsibilities upon European countries. This means a European nuclear deterrent. (However, Mr. Calleo favors a nuclear-free zone that includes at least East and West Germany—just to assure everyone that Germans must share the bomb elsewhere if they have it at all.) Devolution of military responsibility also means encouraging a European defense coalition to replace NATO.

This grouping presumably would be loosely allied with the U.S., although free to act independently of us. More than that we cannot expect, he suggests.

If he is right, the result would be: (1) substantial savings on the cost of maintaining troops overseas, (2) Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, (3) a more stable and normal European community, (4) a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, (5) possibilities for German reunification and neutralism, and (6) healthier foreign and domestic policies for America.

It is hard to believe it could all come out this way (a fantasy?). Mr. Calleo does not speculate on the difficulties of arriving at his utopia or what might go wrong along the way, but that, too, must be thought about before we begin dismantling NATO and pulling out U.S. troops from Germany. While consolidation of a credible European nuclear force is feasible given present European technology and economic strength, a political structure to decide under what circumstances a nuclear deterrent should be used is not visible today. Mr. Calleo can envision a loose confederation of conventional forces to deter Soviet conventional forces, but it is difficult to see a nuclear deterrent force without more integrated leadership.

I also find it difficult to get from the idea of a Western Europe which has assumed the responsibilities of the common defense to the vision of a greater Europe which has a nuclear-free center—specifically, a neutral Germany. There may be several books still to come that explicate this leap, but this book does not.

I also wonder why a militarily re-
vitalized Western Europe should remain as friendly to American interests as is implied in The Atlantic Fantasy. The problem is more than just nuclear proliferation, which the author does recognize. "Gaulists," I suspect, would be very uncomfortable to live with (as will a Japan with independent military power).

Although it leaves so much in doubt in relation to the difficulties of American disengagement from Europe via European military consolidation, The Atlantic Fantasy is helpful in clarifying our own goals about the shape of the world to come. Without this political imagination we leave the leadership and direction of events to others or to chance. Perhaps the initiative of Senate Majority Leader Mansfield to sharply cut U.S. troops in Germany will begin the kind of changes David Calleo foresees. Jerking U.S. troops out may destroy the fantasy in Atlanticism. But will we and the Europeans understand common goals? Atlanticism without American troops in Germany would be an even worse fantasy than today's situation, although somewhat better for our balance of payments situation. The remaining problems of American-European relations would still remain, with Germany even more unstable than today.

The implications of a sudden unilateral American troop withdrawal have not become part of the public debate. Until the dimensions of new relations with Europe (and therefore the Soviet Union) are explored in studies such as The Atlantic Fantasy, we are likely to stay with the fantasy we know so well, or create a response in Europe and the Soviet Union that will result in a European situation far less stable than that imagined by Mr. Calleo.

The Politics of Disorder by Theodore J. Lowi
(Basic Books; 193 pp.; $6.95)

William J. Stevenson

Over the past few years, Theodore Lowi has emerged as a major critic of the American political system. In The End of Liberalism (1969) he launched an attack on the failure of American pluralist practices to establish a publicly accountable rule of law. In The Politics of Disorder, originally intended as a clarification of the anti-pluralist alternatives put forward in the earlier volume, Lowi has broadened the scope of his analysis. Both in tone and substance Lowi is, in 1971, much more deeply disturbed by what he sees. Unless we are willing systematically to overhaul our basic governmental institutions and procedures, he argues, democracy as we now know it may well disappear.

The Politics of Disorder is revolutionary in a basic sense: Lowi asserts that the greatest obstacles preventing a meaningful realization of democracy are the very institutional and attitudinal outlooks that traditionally have been regarded as the foundations of our democratic success. Bargaining, compromise, delegation of authority, and decentralization, which, according to both political leaders and social scientists supply the perfect balance between individual flexibility and social stability, are subjected to critical reappraisal. Rather than a perfect balance, our close adherence to pluralism has moved our political life, Lowi asserts, not toward a perfect balance but toward stagnation and atrophy. Worse still, an all-consuming "political quiescence" threatens to absorb the last remaining vestiges of dynamic and vigorous opposition into the lethargic confines of mainstream thinking. Once this process is completed, Lowi states, America will no longer be democratic. All groups will seek segmented minority interests at the cost of public concerns; and all will passively continue to be manipulated by the hierarchical imperatives of modern organizational life.

Lowi suggests a series of alternative measures which he hopes may wrench established groups from their familiar routines. The concept of "juridical democracy," first spelled out in his conclusion to The End of Liberalism, becomes a central theme in the present work. Under the program of juridical democracy, the Courts would enforce Constitutional guidelines in which legislators would once again be obligated to create government by law. Rather than permitting greater degrees of delegated decision-making to decentralized agencies, juridical democracy would insist on returning policy-making to the formalized, legislative domain. Rather than allowing major societal problems to be reduced to manageable, yet ultimately ineffective, incremental solutions, public standards and clear-cut choices of action would be expected from elected legislators. Strengthened law and public authority, not entrenched minority interests, would restore public confidence and revitalize political life.

Lowi recognizes, however, that such an innovation cannot be realized independently. It is to three new forms of societal and attitudinal disorder, therefore, that the bulk of his analysis turns. The effects of these disruptions, coupled with his previous plan for tighter jurisdiction, he believes, may lead the way to greater public confidence through law.

The first "disorder" contributing to this goal Lowi sees coming from contemporary social movements of protest that are unwilling to abide by established pluralist procedures. Because of their isolation from the American mainstream, the demands of these movements, whether for economic redistribution or civil rights, are basically out of tune with

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