vitalized Western Europe should remain as friendly to American interests as is implied in The Atlantic Fantasy. The problem is more than just nuclear proliferation, which the author does recognize. "Gaulists," I suspect, would be very uncomfortable to live with (as well a Japan with independent military power).

Although it leaves so much in doubt in relation to the difficulties of American disengagement from Europe via European military consolidation, The Atlantic Fantasy is helpful in clarifying our own goals about the shape of the world to come. Without this political imagination we leave the leadership and direction of events to others or to chance. Perhaps the initiative of Senate Majority Leader Mansfield to sharply cut U.S. troops in Germany will begin the kind of changes David Calleo foresees. Jerking U.S. troops out may destroy the fantasy in Atlanticism. But will we and the Europeans understand common goals? Atlanticism without American troops in Germany would be an even worse fantasy than today's situation, though somewhat better for our balance of payments situation. The remaining problems of American European relations would still remain, with Germany even more unstable than today.

The implications of a sudden unilateral American troop withdrawal have not become part of the public debate. Until the dimensions of new relations with Europe (and therefore the Soviet Union) are explored in studies such as The Atlantic Fantasy, we are likely to stay with the fantasy we know so well, or create a response in Europe and the Soviet Union that will result in a European situation far less stable than that imagined by Mr. Calleo.

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The Politics of Disorder by Theodore J. Lowi
(Basic Books; 193 pp.; $6.95)

William J. Stevenson

Over the past few years, Theodore Lowi has emerged as a major critic of the American political system. In The End of Liberalism (1969) he launched an attack on the failure of American pluralist practices to establish a publicly accountable rule of law. In The Politics of Disorder, originally intended as a clarification of the anti-pluralist alternatives put forward in the earlier volume, Lowi has broadened the scope of his analysis. Both in tone and substance Lowi is, in 1971, much more deeply disturbed by what he sees. Unless we are willing systematically to overhaul our basic governmental institutions and procedures, he argues, democracy as we now know it may well disappear.

The Politics of Disorder is revolutionary in a basic sense: Lowi asserts that the greatest obstacles preventing a meaningful realization of democracy are the very institutional and attitudinal outlooks that traditionally have been regarded as the foundations of our democratic success. Bargaining, compromise, delegation of authority, and decentralization, which, according to both political leaders and social scientists supply the perfect balance between individual flexibility and social stability, are subjected to critical reappraisal. Rather than a perfect balance, our close adherence to pluralism has moved our political life, Lowi asserts, not toward a perfect balance but toward stagnation and atrophy. Worse still, an all-consuming "political quiescence" threatens to absorb the last remaining vestiges of dynamic and vigorous opposition into the lethargic confines of mainstream thinking. Once this process is completed, Lowi states, America will no longer be democratic. All groups will seek segmented minority interests at the cost of public concerns; and all will passively continue to be manipulated by the hierarchical imperatives of modern organizational life.

Lowi suggests a series of alternative measures which he hopes may wrench established groups from their familiar routines. The concept of "juridical democracy," first spelled out in his conclusion to The End of Liberalism, becomes a central theme in the present work. Under the program of juridical democracy, the Courts would enforce Constitutional guidelines in which legislators would once again be obligated to create government by law. Rather than permitting greater degrees of delegated decision-making to decentralized agencies, juridical democracy would insist on returning policy-making to the formalized, legislative domain. Rather than allowing major societal problems to be reduced to manageable, yet ultimately ineffective, incremental solutions, public standards and clear-cut choices of action would be expected from elected legislators. Strengthened law and public authority, not entrenched minority interests, would restore public confidence and revitalize political life.

Lowi recognizes, however, that such an innovation cannot be realized independently. It is to three new forms of societal and attitudinal disorder, therefore, that the bulk of his analysis turns. The effects of these disruptions, coupled with his previous plan for tighter jurisdiction, he believes, may lead the way to greater public confidence through law.

The first "disorder" contributing to this goal Lowi sees coming from contemporary social movements of protest that are unwilling to abide by established pluralist procedures. Because of their isolation from the American mainstream, the demands of these movements, whether for economic redistribution or civil rights, are basically out of tune with
group bargaining goals. Due to their refusal to compromise behind the scenes, such social movements tend to force issues into public view and thus to enlarge political discourse. Disruptions and public conflicts, as a consequence, make social problems into political ones. The result, according to Lowi, is a fundamental challenge to "organizational atrophy," and opens up the possibilities for meaningful public law.

A second form of positive "disorder," the deliberate restructuring of accepted administrative regulations over group life, Lowi hopes, will result in greater civil liberties among the populace. He argues that arbitrary, often inconsistent group controls over individuals will be lessened through the restoration of Congressional supremacy in law-making. Instead of numerous organizational controls, from unions and farmers' organizations to the A.M.A. and N.A.M., the result of clarified Congressional policies would establish greater citizen freedom through more regularized interaction between formal government channels. In addition, Lowi sees the reassertion of Congressional over Administrative and Presidential foreign policy decisions as a major factor in strengthening flagging public confidence. Citizen divisiveness and confusion stemming from questionable legal actions, such as Vietnam, would be reduced considerably with the establishment of clearly defined standards for external government actions.

Finally, Lowi advocates the maintenance of university independence as a place where theoretical alternatives (e.g., intellectual disorders) to status quoism can be developed. While bothered by the technical, service-orientation of present university involvements, he sees cautious hope for the continuation of academic autonomy and the creation of broad solutions to public problems. Academics, he insists, must refuse to be coopted by the system; only their "constructive alienation" will allow them to contribute profound visionary inputs to society's ills. By wedding themselves to a service outlook, they essentially forfeit their unique role as intellectuals. Severance and theoretical foresight, not incorporation, should ultimately be their goal.

In his discussion of the prospects for associational, governmental, and intellectual disorders, Lowi argues persuasively for the creation of alternative courses of action. Disruption and chaos become an indispensable element for the continuance of political choice and vitality in American life. Nevertheless, despite, or because of, his stress on the increasing consensualization of American public behavior, Lowi's conclusions contain an unfortunate and even self-defeating pessimism. Assuming the rigidity of the pluralist consensus, from whence can we expect these healing disorders to arise? The stranglehold that group bargaining maintains over the political system, the frequent cooptation of previously public-minded social movements, and, as he sees it, the rapid deterioration of academic and university independence, all bode ill for the future.

Further, Lowi fails to clarify his proposal for "juridical democracy," as originally intended, while excluding other, more participatory, alternatives. The possibility that political parties might contribute to greater public involvement and accountability, for instance, is merely glossed over. Similarly, the hope that political leaders might emerge who are capable of rejuvenating public interests is never seriously pursued. Despite some vacillations, Lowi insists on combining "administrative" and political leaders, to the detriment of the latter. While his understandable desire is to establish the rule of law as an antidote to delegated, often irresponsible official discretion, the fact remains that he eliminates fundamental sources of political activation in the process.

In spite of these reservations, I think Lowi has written an extremely important book. With our American political system challenged on all fronts, and with pluralist incrementalism proven to be an ineffective governing mechanism, it is a matter of survival that all constructive alternatives be given serious consideration. At a time when mainstream political science continues to operate within the narrow confines of empirical exactitude, the contribution of such efforts as The Politics of Disorder is reassuring. Theodore Lowi is clearly one of our significant visionaries.