Protestants have made to the slighting of the positive contributions of racial problems involving both Indians and blacks. Marty suggests that Protestantism has an inbred affinity for rural and small-town life, as though this tendency was essential to the nature of Protestantism itself. In treating theological trends, the author bypasses the influence of the more radical empirical theologies of H. N. Wieman (he gets one reference) and D. C. MacIntosh in the 1930's and '40's, although these significant thinkers represented a uniquely American version of religious thought. The great crises of the Civil War and two world wars are not dealt with specifically, although tendencies before and after these events are carefully treated. The alienation of labor from the Protestant churches is insufficiently discussed. Pointed, pertinent quotations spice the book, but context and documentation are missing, thus denying the pedant the means to check Marty's reading of the sources. There are chapter notes for books consulted, but they do not identify the passages cited. These limitations notwithstanding, the book is fascinating reading. It is swift paced, searching in its analysis, and, if it be not frivolous to say so, entertaining even when it hurts.

STUDENT RATES

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Youth and Dissent
by Kenneth Keniston
(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; 403 pp.; $9.95)

Todd Gitlin

Kenneth Keniston has a deserved reputation as one of the keenest observers writing about the dissident young in America. In a time when social theory decomposes at least as rapidly as social institutions, Keniston's The Uncommitted (1965) holds up as a classic—an almost cinematic portrait of the increasingly familiar alienated college student and his parental types and a full-fledged analysis of the social matrix of explicit alienation as well. His discussions there of the stresses on the "technological ego" and the consequences of the languishing of utopianism in America still stand as marvelously seminal evocations of some central discontents of this civilization.

Keniston's Young Radicals (1968), on the other hand, should have failed, and somehow didn't. From a tiny and unrepresentative sample of the radical movement, Keniston distilled a contrasting family map and an analysis of potential political traps and opportunities. Much of his analysis and cautions still hold up. What is remarkable in this second book is not what Keniston did not anticipate (he holds no monopoly on faulty predictions) but what he did—the emergence of youth as a "stage of life" in the developmental sense of his mentor, Erik Erikson; and the pressures on aging, full-time activists to find ways of combining radicalism with work and family. Along with his use of Erikson's supple psycho-historical method, and despite the limits of his research procedure, some remarkable intuition operates in Keniston's work.

The earlier works, then, generate great expectations for Keniston's new book, expectations which will be disappointed. Having been both an "uncommitted" and a young radical, I suppose I was looking to Keniston to be my fortune-teller. An absurd anticipation, of course, but I was nonetheless disappointed. Keniston's sensitivity to the future emerging within the present seems to have slackened. Moreover, the future of the "new opposition" hinges substantially—though not, of course, totally—on external political developments about which he chooses not to speculate.

Youth and Dissent is a collection of mostly unrevised, previously published essays. There runs through it, as Keniston notes, an "increasing awareness of the inadequacies of the structures of liberal thought, which I was brought up to take for granted, and my increasing sense of a need to re-evaluate and go beyond traditional liberalism." But the trajectory of this progress is like a journey through a maze, proceeding by fits and starts, marked by dead-ends and false beginnings.

Most of the territory in the first essays was more ampley covered in his earlier books, particularly The Uncommitted. In subsequent essays, Keniston performs variations on his main themes: the development of the "protest-prone" personality in a protest-prone culture; the divide separating the experience and worldview of the activist and that of the alienated, of the "politico" and of the "hippie"; the centrality of violence as modern specter, replacing sex as the prime material of repression. There is much here to learn from as well as to take issue with, and Keniston always writes lucidly. As X-rays of the counter-culture, these essays are among the most penetrating.

Yet there are significant omissions. The absence of comparisons between dissident youth in America and in other industrial nations is a major deficiency. The student is still "he"; the women's liberation movement,
central in its critique and its presence to the activism of the last several years (and in its fusion of "political" and "private" matters), is wholly ignored in this collection. Keniston also misses the Yippie synthesis, the gradual and uneven convergence of radical activism and cultural innovation for large numbers of young people, and their facility in moving from uncommitted to young radical and back again. He emphasizes correctly the privation of the counter-culture, but he ignores the emergence of outward-pointing political activity in the youth enclaves of Berkeley, Isla Vista, Madison, and other college towns. Furthermore, the social base of both student activism and the counter-culture has, since their emergence, widened markedly beyond the upper middle class. The dissidents are no longer merely the elite of the elite universities; rather, the revolt—sometimes shouting, sometimes, as at present, muttering—has reached into the middle tier of colleges and lower. At least the accoutrements of revolt (drugs, music, hair, clothing) have been grasped by a growing number of non-college youth, about whose needs and states of mind we know precious little.

Most glaringly, and despite Keniston’s intention to employ a psychohistorical method which integrates the study of individual development with the study of historical forces, the historical receives scant attention. The discussion of student violence and privatization largely ignores the context of frustration and the experience of defeat. One may locate that defeat in the continuation of the war, the debacle of liberal reform, the 1968 Democratic Convention, and the failure of Eugene McCarthy, political trials (especially that of the Chicago Eight), police and administrative repression on the campus, the class isolation of the movement, the disaster at Altamont, the disintegration of S.D.S. in the wake of its failure to generate a credible strategy for radical change—but, whatever the particulars, the bloom is off the movement’s myths, including the media-fed myth of quick solutions. Defeat is a harder and frustration is a perverter of dreams, especially when the dreams are rooted in innocence, impatience, and lonely self-reliance. Lacking a sufficiently supple ideology, a vision of a new society, and definitions of useful political work, the movement and its nurturing campus soil drift into desperation in the wake of defeat. Minority violence and privatism are twin and self-defeating adaptations. Even the violence seems played out now. It is a sense of this sequence of gropings for a way of living opposition that Keniston has not incorporated.

His most recent essays are the most useful. "You Have to Grow Up in Scarsdale (to Know How Bad Things Really Are)" convincingly argues the important proposition that two revolutions are proceeding in tandem. The first is an attempt to universalize existing values (the revolution of minorities and the poor); the second is a straining toward now ("post-scarcity") values and ways of living. As Keniston points out, these tendencies do clash in practice. Indeed, we are now required to conjure up a vision of a revolutionary process within which both developments are compatible, and then to actualize this synthetic principle in countless situations where the tension—between blacks and whites, N.O.W. and radical lesbians, internationalist revolutionaries and back-country commumards, "old" and "new" working-class—arises. Much of the movement’s internal dissension becomes intelligible when this tension is reckoned with.

"Vulnerabilities of the Counterculture" is a terse, telling critique of Roszak’s The Making of the Counter Culture. Roszak’s assault on “objective consciousness,” like the counterculture’s, will not enable the counter-culture to become anything more than counter, will not allow it to prevail and reorganize the society. As Keniston nicely concludes: “ ‘Objective consciousness’ cannot simply be refused; it must be incorporated into a world view that also includes the visionary imagination. If American technocracy is the thesis, Roszak admirably defines the anti-thesis. We still await the synthesis.”

“The Unholy Alliance” (of the Left and Right against the university), written with Michael Lerner, is a great disappointment, a rehash of the familiar argument about the irrationality of extremes. “Despite the innumerable failings and compromises of American higher education, the university is one of the few places where truly critical thinking about American society sometimes takes place. For that reason alone, if for no other, higher education is worth defending.” This is a little like saying that since prisons are one of the few places where self-actualizing revolts occur, the prisons ought therefore to be defended. The defensiveness of the argument suggests the viewpoint of someone who has succeeded in the university, not that of the many who have been fired for pursuing ideas different from Keniston’s, or the even more who have fallen into careerism. Which is not to say that the university is not what Keniston says it is. But it is also a center of training—not into the “military-industrial complex” in the crude sense but into submission to the rules of liberal conduct, liberal passivity, liberal capitalism as a whole.

The university, in other words, is conflicted and paradoxical. Critical thinking is encouraged, but only up to a point. I agree with Keniston that the university should be defended—but in order that it be changed; not because it is a center of radical critical thinking but because it could conceivably be. Some radicals have not understood that they need the university tactically; but Keniston’s counterattack is based on a misunderstanding of the most sophisticated radical arguments and contributes more heat than light. Introducing the piece, he admits there are “several . . . political limitations” to it, but he does not take the opportunity to elaborate or revise. A missed opportunity.

The epilogue, “Revolution or Counterrevolution?” brings Keniston back from easy polemic to his usual judicious style. Here he takes on both the rosy Reich-Roszak view of the counter-culture as the revolution
incarnate and the Bell-Brzezinski view of youthful revolt as a Luddite rejection of the technological future, pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of both. But beyond this Keniston is writing, as he says, a memorandum for future study. Again, he calls for synthesis—the construction of a utopia which welds technological capacity and decentralization, cognition and feeling. The call cannot be made too many times. He rightly attacks liberal psychology’s assumption of infinite human plasticity and liberal sociology’s assumption that equilibrium is the divine state of society; here he is in his element. But when he steps outside to a discussion of the “knowledge industry,” his preconceptions render the discussion forced and superficial. An example: “Only by remote analogy can [knowledge workers] be considered a true ‘working class,’ for only rarely are they the direct or indirect victims of capitalist exploitation.” He dismisses in one sentence the Marxist notion of surplus value, the understanding that knowledge is expropriated and channeled like physical labor, and the ecological view of environmental destruction as a form of capitalist tax on both nature and man! Not that a simplistic Marxism is final truth—indeed, “knowledge workers” dominate other workers as they are themselves dominated and are, therefore, both victims and accomplices—but a reconstruction of a radical worldview should absorb Marxism in order to transcend it.

To learn how the youth revolt can be extended into a radical social transformation will require the most serious and widespread intellectual as well as practical work. What remains is to move beyond calling for radical critical theory to the production of it—a process that should engage those who perceive the need regardless of whether they spring from the rubble of liberalisms or Marxism. Because Keniston has already contributed so much to the understanding of relations between social structure and psychological process this book, for all its inadequacy, whets one’s appetite for the next.

America’s Empire by Claude Julien
(Pantheon; 442 pp.; $10.00)

Imperialists and Other Heroes by Ronald Steel
(Random House; 447 pp.; $10.00)

Wilfrid Knapp

Of the two, Claude Julien has written the more serious book. Ronald Steele gets maximum mileage from his own ideas, and, as in Pax Americana, repeats much that was already said in End of Alliance. Steele’s new work is for the most part a reprint of review articles which appeared in magazines ranging from the New York Review of Books to Mademoiselle.

Julien, who worked for La Dépêche Marocaine in Tangiers before joining Le Monde (of which he is now Foreign News Editor), provides a stimulating account of the growth of the American empire from its continental expansion as a nation until the present. It is an empire without frontiers, based on financial and other means of indirect control, but nonetheless effective—sometimes more effective—for being so flexible. Julien’s account is provocative and in some places shows fresh vision; his description of a small percentage of the world’s population consuming a vast proportion of its resources is indeed frightening. But so interminable is he in his denunciation and so utopian in his conclusion that his work loses much of its intended effect.

Julien’s antipathy to the United States derives from a mixture of resentment and alarm at the success of industrial enterprise, the political power which such enterprise creates, and the use to which political and military power is put in protecting business and trade—all resulting in an inexorable process in which the United States can do nothing right. The prosperity of the U.S. is based, as he argues, on the exploitation of the resources of the world. The statement is incontrovertible, if by it one means that American companies mine or drill for raw materials in underdeveloped countries and use them for manufacture (and therefore profit) in the United States itself.

For Claude Julien this constitutes the “impoverishment” of the Third World; but he is at once so sweeping and so exclusive in his denunciation that he destroys his own case. He is concerned that scarce resources will be consumed in the great industrial maw of the U.S. before other countries have developed to the point of using them themselves. In making this case against America, Julien can only indict her for her size.

The relationship that Julien so roundly condemns is better represented by that between France and Algeria. For the French government goes the American one better: The U.S. defends the interests of privately owned oil companies, but the French government has set itself up in business, creating a state-owned company. (None of which, complain the Algerians, has Julien’s newspaper reported with that objectivity it has customarily shown on issues less close to the emotions of Frenchmen.) Julien’s political and emotional arguments are graced by a veneer of economic fact. The text is interspersed with very round statistics; the source occasionally given is the Statistical Abstract of the United States (a table designed to show a balance-of-trade surplus ends with the year