

incarnate and the Bell-Brzezinski view of youthful revolt as a Luddite rejection of the technological future, pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of both. But beyond this Keniston is writing, as he says, a memorandum for future study. Again, he calls for synthesis—the construction of a utopia which welds technological capacity and decentralization, cognition and feeling. The call cannot be made too many times. He rightly attacks liberal psychology's assumption of infinite human plasticity and liberal sociology's assumption that equilibrium is the divine state of society; here he is in his element. But when he steps outside to a discussion of the "knowledge industry," his preconceptions render the discussion forced and superficial. An example: "Only by remote analogy can [knowledge workers] be considered a true 'working class,' for only rarely are they the direct or indirect victims of capitalist exploitation." He dismisses in one sentence the Marxist notion of surplus value, the understanding that knowledge is expropriated and channeled like physical labor, and the ecological view of environmental destruction as a form of capitalist tax on both nature and man! Not that a simplistic Marxism is final truth—indeed, "knowledge workers" dominate other workers as they are themselves dominated and are, therefore, both victims and accomplices—but a reconstruction of a radical worldview should absorb Marxism in order to transcend it.

To learn how the youth revolt can be extended into a radical social transformation will require the most serious and widespread intellectual as well as practical work. What remains is to move beyond calling for radical critical theory to the production of it—a process that should engage those who perceive the need regardless of whether they spring from the rubble of liberalism or Marxism. Because Keniston has already contributed so much to the understanding of relations between social structure and psychological process this book, for all its inadequacy, whets one's appetite for the next.

America's Empire by Claude Julien

(Pantheon; 442 pp.; \$10.00)

Imperialists and Other Heroes by Ronald Steel

(Random House; 447 pp.; \$10.00)

Wilfrid Knapp

Of the two, Claude Julien has written the more serious *book*. Ronald Steele gets maximum mileage from his own *ideas*, and, as in *Pax Americana*, repeats much that was already said in *End of Alliance*. Steel's new work is for the most part a reprint of review articles which appeared in magazines ranging from the *New York Review of Books* to *Mademoiselle*.

Julien, who worked for *La Dépêche Marocaine* in Tangiers before joining *Le Monde* (of which he is now Foreign News Editor), provides a stimulating account of the growth of the American empire from its continental expansion as a nation until the present. It is an empire without frontiers, based on financial and other means of indirect control, but nonetheless effective—sometimes more effective—for being so flexible. Julien's account is provocative and in some places shows fresh vision; his description of a small percentage of the world's population consuming a vast proportion of its resources is indeed frightening. But so intemperate is he in his denunciation and so utopian in his conclusion that his work loses much of its intended effect.

Julien's antipathy to the United States derives from a mixture of resentment and alarm at the success of industrial enterprise, the political power which such enterprise creates, and the use to which political and military power is put in protecting business and trade—all resulting in an inexorable process in which the United States can do nothing right. The prosperity of the U.S. is based,

he argues, on the exploitation of the resources of the world. The statement is incontrovertible, if by it one means that American companies mine or drill for raw materials in underdeveloped countries and use them for manufacture (and therefore profit) in the United States itself.

For Claude Julien this constitutes the "impoverishment" of the Third World; but he is at once so sweeping and so exclusive in his denunciation that he destroys his own case. He is concerned that scarce resources will be consumed in the great industrial maw of the U.S. before other countries have developed to the point of using them themselves. In making this case against America, Julien can only indict her for her size.

The relationship that Julien so roundly condemns is better represented by that between France and Algeria. For the French government goes the American one better: The U.S. defends the interests of privately owned oil companies, but the French government has set itself up in business, creating a state-owned company. (None of which, complain the Algerians, has Julien's newspaper reported with that objectivity it has customarily shown on issues less close to the emotions of Frenchmen.)

Julien's political and emotional arguments are graced by a veneer of economic fact. The text is interspersed with very round statistics; the source occasionally given is the Statistical Abstract of the United States (a table designed to show a balance-of-trade surplus ends with the year

1966). From the economic facts it could, of course, be argued that nasty, sticky substances like oil, or obdurate ores like manganese, receive economic value by their use in an industrial country with a large consumer market. Such an argument does not get us very far, but it is as valid as the more emotional one that the U.S. "impoverishes" developing countries (even by employing its doctors in their hospitals, since they received their training, Julien assumes, in their own country).

These are among the systematic shortcomings in Julien's book. The manner of presentation is tendentious, to say the least. It is no credit to the foreign editor of a great newspaper to discuss the United States relationship with Egypt in 1965-66, when the U.S. did indeed try to use the lever of aid (in the form of agricultural surplus) to influence the Egyptian government, without mentioning the clash of interests over Yemen. It is misleading in detail to report the AIOC's agreement of 1949 with the Iranian government without mentioning the new and more generous offer which immediately preceded the nationalization but was rejected; and it is a gross distortion (and not even a new one) to recount the events of 1951-53 in Iran solely as an example of C.I.A. machinations, as if Iran was not and had not been the object of Russian ambitions.

But above all there is a utopian piety which robs most of the work of its persuasiveness. On the one hand, *every* use of American power is implicitly or explicitly condemned with almost the same fervor—whether the intervention in the Dominican Republic or the pressure on Britain, France and Israel to halt the Suez invasion; on the other, Europe is urged to avoid becoming a vassal of the United States by "increasing production without artificially stimulating consumption . . . by building more tractors and agricultural machines for the underdeveloped countries." It would, of course, be unfair to reproach Julien with the actions of his own government in

so successfully meeting its balance of payments problems by selling arms to developing countries which, for their part, often prefer them to tractors. But this is the kind of reproach his level of argument is likely to evoke, except, of course, from those who share his prejudices.

Among those who share Julien's prejudices is Ronald Steel, and there is a certain amount of mutual admiration expressed. To review *Imperialists and Other Heroes*, though, is to make the initial mental note not to republish the review in a book, for someone might then review it, and so on *ad infinitum*. Collections of book reviews bound together in hard covers, like Steel's, are inevitably frustrating, so variable is the quality. Rarely is the immediacy of a book review the characteristic one most looks for in an extended work; but, then, Steel offers us this collection "not so much as a call to action as the account of a personal journey."

Ronald Steel has an independent mind and his comments are stimulating for all that they are disjointed. His progressive liberalism does not prevent him from pointing out, for example, the dangers of a U.N. which, impotent in the great crises of the world, turns its energies upon "isolated and weak states"—Rhodesia, possibly Portugal and Israel next. Yet he still has as conglomerate a view of Europeans as many Europeans have of the United States. Only De Gaulle, it seems, is sufficiently distinctive a political phenomenon to stand out from the generalized mass of "Europeans." The moral example which Steel draws for his own countrymen is well put:

"For all his nationalism, De Gaulle understood what Lyndon Johnson has yet to learn: that a great nation's prestige does not depend upon the tenacity with which it clings to obsolete involvements, but upon its ability to distinguish national interest from national pride. It takes a great realist to make this distinction, and a great illusionist to make it palatable."

But apart from De Gaulle, Western

Europe seems to be peopled by a strange tribe referred to as "many Europeans," who are manipulated by the United States. These "many Europeans" feared the Marshall Plan because it might "antagonize Moscow." It is true that some—a minority—of Europeans were anxious in this respect. But it was Europeans—Bevin, Schuman, Adenauer—who were eager to reconstruct their own half-continent and who thought (no doubt arrogantly) of providing the political leadership which American aid would render effective. Steel reproaches his own government for trying to force Western Europe into a pattern of its own devising and blames the American side of the Nassau agreement for the breakdown of Britain's Common Market negotiations. But Britain's relations with France have an historical background reaching back further than Steel's admitted perspective beginning with the "early sixties"; nor, most certainly, was the "special relationship" made from the American side alone.

The point is an important one. Richard Neustadt, in *Alliance Politics*, has analyzed carefully the Anglo-American relationship at the time of Nassau (in a manner which shows up the superficiality of Steel's comments, pithy and provocative though they may be) and raises the question of how adequately the U.S. government could hope to understand Vietnam if it went so wrong on England.

That same question can be put to most of the American critics of the American empire; they show so little understanding of Europe that this European at least is led to question their understanding of the rest of the world. In advocating a course between the extremes of intervention and isolation, the critics of American empire, of course, want their readers to regard Czechoslovakia, Korea, Lebanon—even Europe—as real places rather than as milestones in U.S. foreign policy. Unfortunately, the degree of their own narrow introspection prevents them from doing so.