

India Realigns

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In the past two decades most discussions about Indian foreign policy dealt with the nature and limitations of nonalignment. The discussions usually had an air of remoteness. In American perceptions, India as a policy area was peripheral to America's immediate political and strategic interests. Even when humanitarian motives were invoked as factors for political consideration there was a feeling that India was too bulky, too riddled with immense problems. Thus, Americans were never sure whether intimate political ties with India were probable or even desirable from America's point of view. If this was the general picture accepted by liberals in America, conservatives asserted that India was "wimpy-washy" toward the Communist bloc. India's refusal to join the American alliance system confirmed this suspicion.

Underlying these diverse and opposing attitudes were intensely personal feelings about India. Some among the small group of Asia experts in the USA loved Jawaharlal Nehru for his British manners and personal charm, but most experts nurtured an intense hostility toward Krishna Menon, an hostility that was reciprocated. Many other Americans had little patience for a far-off land which was high on culture and maharajas but short on economic development and friendly bars. All in all, if the imagery about India's historical past attracted the off-beat tourist, the government types were struck by the sense that far from being an apostle of peace, India was a particularly insidious element in the contemporary world order.

The schizophrenic political attitudes Americans had toward India were not, of course, one-sided. The Indian masses did not know or care about Disneyland, Wall Street, Madison Avenue, or how the

American political system worked. But political experts in New Delhi were convinced that although Lincoln's and FDR's America would help India in its development plans, there could not be an equal relationship between Nehru's India and Dulles's America because the latter was so conscious of its great economic and military power. Thus if America's richness was viewed as a source of valuable economic and technological support, India's suspicions and fears about the implications of unquestioned American leadership of the non-Communist world reflected Nehru's and Menon's concern with America's haughtiness. With such a perception, India's aim in the political sphere was to deny to Washington its claim of greatness and moral leadership. In the Americas and in Europe India could not challenge America's predominance, but Nehru was in a position to pursue a strategy of denial in Asia.

The original reasoning in the nonalignment policy was fairly straightforward. Two factors figured prominently in Indian policy-making. Because India was internally weak, it hoped to upgrade India's economic infrastructure by a strategy of development based on controlled economic planning and a heavy dose of foreign assistance. Secondly, Nehru's government surmised that because India was internally weak, the great powers would impinge upon India's political processes. But on the other hand it was felt that because the USA and USSR were hostile to each other, India could benefit from this hostility by cultivating bilateral relations with these powers. Indians felt that the gains could be maximized if the Indo-American and the Indo-Soviet alignments were delicately balanced so that neither power could achieve a predominant status in South Asia.

Nehru's thinking seemed to develop as follows: Because Soviet Russia was India's strongest neighbor, it was likely to be India's main long-term foreign policy problem. Therefore, rather than alienate Moscow, from India's point of view it was desirable to

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achieve a working relationship with the Russians. Secondly, although the USA was too far away for military action in the subcontinent, India's bargaining relationship with Moscow had a better chance of success if a reliable Indo-USA political understanding could be used to offset possible Soviet demands. Such an understanding required agreement on two points, namely, (1) that it was essential to free world security that India should not join the Communist bloc, and (2) that the USA would restrain itself on the Kashmir question and in its military aid policy toward Pakistan, since interference in these areas would affect the natural balance in the region and, furthermore, invite counter-interference from Russia and China. Thus India sought a de facto political alignment rather than a formal military alliance from Washington. In India's view, because of the geographical and political distance between aligned America and nonaligned India, the former was ideally suited to perform the role of a balancer in South Asian politics.

Among the three policy choices available to India during the 1950's, this choice appeared to be the least expensive politically. The first choice required a military alliance with the USA, but this was rejected because it would have worsened India's political and strategic relationship with Moscow without any offsetting gain. The second choice was the possibility of developing a trilateral Indo-Soviet-American alliance, but this was both impractical and unlikely and was rejected accordingly. The final choice, which Nehru adopted, was to promote the development of a South Asian balance based on two levels of stability. At the first level the USA and the USSR would balance each other through bilateral means. The second level was based on the assumptions that Sino-Soviet hostility could become the basis of a power balance in Asia and that the USA would have only limited power to shape the Sino-Soviet balance. In this frame of thinking India's goal was to promote China's cause in the United Nations so that China could lessen its isolation and become less closely tied to Moscow's leadership.

The problem of the degree of consistency between India's nonalignment theory and its actual behavior has been raised frequently, but no systematic scholarly effort has been made to explain the apparent discrepancy. From an Indian viewpoint the question can be examined in three different perspectives. First, the problem does not seem to be one of consistency; rather, the problem seems to be a product of misperception by Western minds about the real nature of Indian nonalignment. Second, as Indians see it, it is a mistake to think that the nonalignment label reflects the various facets of India's external relations and the central interests of Indian foreign policy. Superficially, nonalignment can mean two things: (1) It can be described as a

subjective attitude which expressed friendly feelings for the various peoples of the world; this definition is inadequate because Indians obviously do not love all the peoples of the world, and such expressions of friendliness do not say very much about India's real interests. (2) Another fashionable view is that non-alignment is simply a wish to keep out of power politics. This definition also comes apart. In the history of Indian foreign relations there was a systematic attempt to steer clear of military alliances, but from this one cannot deduce that India also wanted to exempt itself from the obligations and opportunities of power politics. The history of Indian involvement in the Korean War, the Geneva Accords and the disarmament debate indicates active Indian involvement in global power politics.

But, the skeptics will ask, how does one explain the inconsistency between India's professed moral aims and the use of force in Goa and Kashmir? Such questions relate to the conceptual framework of Indian foreign policy and require a statement of fact. For instance, did Indian speeches and foreign policy behavior necessarily suggest that Indian policy-makers were committed to an intellectual and policy choice in favor of "peace and nonalignment" and equally committed against "power politics and the use of force" in world politics? Alternatively, was nonalignment a form of power politics for the weaker states and did these states try to resist Big Power Politics with the view that economic and military power should not be the sole basis for the distribution of world power? Finally, was nonalignment an ethical doctrine in the sense that an attempt was made to use ethical concerns, such as disarmament, human rights and anti-colonialism, to shape the political concepts and international processes during the 1950's and 1960's?

If these questions implicitly reveal the third perspective, which is the more meaningful way for studying Indian foreign policy, high-level official Indian statements nevertheless provide ammunition for the view that in advancing the concept of non-alignment India was trying to avoid the obligations of entangling alliances. On December 7, 1946, before India became independent, Nehru said that India proposed "as far as possible to keep away from the power politics of groups aligned against each other, which in the past had led to World Wars and may again lead to disasters." Again, on March 8, 1949, after India was independent, Nehru asserted that "We are concerned with the problems of power politics." This attitude toward power politics was reiterated by India's Foreign Minister in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly in 1969:

There is a systematic attempt to widen progressively the gap between the militarily powerful and the weaker rest. Concentration of enormous power in the hands

of a few nations is leading to a division of the world into spheres of influence in which might alone becomes right in the ordering of relations between States. *It is imperative that this slow but steady drift toward a new and unequal balance of power must be halted and reversed* (my italics).

A content analysis of Indian speeches shows two major nuances in India's approach to foreign affairs. On the one hand India was suspicious of policies which divided the world into great power spheres of influence. This suspicion flowed from the probable effect of this division upon India's interests, not from a preference for abstract morality. On the other hand, because of this concern there was a discrepancy between India's declaratory and her operational foreign policy views. The declaratory views were *against power* as the basis for ordering interstate relations, while the operational interests primarily dealt with efforts to arrest the development of a "new and unequal balance of power." As the Indian Foreign Secretary T. N. Kaul suggested, India was nonaligned because, among other reasons, "it was felt that India was big enough to stand alone militarily and defend its interests." In addition, India has always maintained a sizeable military establishment, showing that in the official assessment military power was not disassociated from nonalignment but was actually a pre-condition for the proper growth of a balanced Indian foreign policy. With the benefit of hindsight it is self-evident that in 1962 Indian leaders misperceived the nature of the foreign threat and miscalculated that "India was big enough to protect itself militarily." One cannot argue, therefore, that the connection between nonalignment and military power was conceptually absent in India's worldview.

It would be a mistake, however, to argue that India's record was unambiguous. The connection between security interests and nonalignment policy became explicit after India became involved in wars with Pakistan and China, and after a protracted diplomatic struggle on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty forced India to make a strategic policy choice. On April 8, 1970, the Indian Foreign Minister declared that "the ends of our security cannot be maintained against the background of isolation in scientific, technological, industrial, economic or political fields" and that for "a country of our size and of our resources, there is no other way." Thus even if Indian attitudes are inferred only from a study of documents, the decision to recognize the obligations and opportunities of international power politics is clear: there was "no other way" for a country of India's size and resources; security through isolation was not feasible. Stripped of its cover, the policy statement meant that nonalignment was fine but the "ends of our security" required a stronger strategic posture based on national development and selective interactions with the world community.

Contemporary Indian foreign policy now requires an assessment of those new policy issues which have changed the context of Indian nonalignment. Revisions in India's policy instruments reflect the changes, but at the same time it should be noted that India continues to be revisionist because of the persisting belief that the world order should be reformed to allow for a more equitable redistribution of the global resources and power. Reducing the impact of great power politics will thus continue to be an important declaratory goal.

The elements of change are, however, more interesting analytically because these changes reveal that, although the policy norms continue to be inflexible, Indian foreign policy is dynamic in its operation. Thus, in emphasizing the operational content it is worth reiterating that India's conception of what the world ought to look like does not necessarily mean that Indian decision-makers believe that such a world can be realized in the foreseeable future.

The changing issues reflect trends which are emerging but which have not fully emerged. Each issue has increasing importance for the revolution of Indian foreign policy but also for the political processes in Asia and in the world. The following policy areas seem to be most relevant:

1. Although defense expenditure has seldom exceeded 4 per cent of India's gross national product, the volume of India's defense budget in recent years has exceeded \$2 billion annually. The volume is expected to grow considerably in the near future because India's GNP is growing; because Indians recognize the importance of having a credible military force to protect its territorial and political boundaries; and because India's extended and logically difficult borders require a defense force which is an integrated and a modernized fighting force and which is mobile and efficient in mechanized and mountain warfare. Increases in defense spending since the early 1960's are thus one indicator that the role of force has grown in Indian policy perceptions. Consequently, the use of controlled force cannot be overlooked as a variable of increasing importance in India's foreign policy behavior.

2. Bangla Desh is the first successful instance of revision of the status quo through the use of force in the postwar order. As a precedent, the use of Indian military power outside India's borders represents a new dimension in Indian foreign policy. Against the setting of parallel Chinese and American moves against India, the demonstration of India's staying power also raises a question whether the USA and China can achieve stability in the Asian regions without the cooperation of the USSR and India. The psychology of Indian decision-making on Bangla Desh merits attention. If a protracted armed struggle had developed—as seemed likely—there was danger that a Peking-oriented, Vietnam-

style liberation movement would have gained ground. In acting decisively to end the prospect of a protracted armed struggle, India established the rule that if externally supported military activities threatened India's stability and its military security, the use of force was necessary in its contingency plans.

3. On August 9, 1971, India and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. Legally, this treaty supersedes the Sino-Soviet defense pact of 1950, which had a life of thirty years but which has not been officially repudiated. The Indo-Soviet treaty says that India and the Soviet Union will consult with each other in case there is a threat to the security of either country. Secondly, the treaty obligates both countries to provide no assistance to a party which is involved in a conflict with either country. This clause means that, in effect, Moscow cannot support China or Pakistan in case these countries are involved in hostile action against India. The clause also means that no matter who fires the first shot, the USSR will not side with China against India so long as India and China are hostile. In future Indian choices two questions are raised by Indian claims that the treaty does not violate non-alignment and that India is willing to sign similar treaties with other states: first, how valid is the claim that the treaty does not violate nonalignment? secondly, what is the likely impact of the Indo-Soviet alignment upon Asian political processes in the 1970's?

4. The history of India's public stand on nuclear disarmament need not be repeated here, but it is worth explaining the policy interests which are less evident in India's Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) statements. Psychologically, since the bulk of India's argumentation was presented in the India-China framework, the stand on NPT not only implicitly revealed the future direction of India's nuclear policy but it also reflected its strategic posture in Asia. By rejecting the treaty, India successfully demonstrated that it had freedom of action in its diplomacy and its nuclear policy. The psychological dimension was important for another reason. After India's miserable performance against China in 1962, Nehru's nonalignment policy lost its dynamism and the Indian posture was frozen. India's position in the 1965-68 international nuclear debate restored the sense of direction and movement in Indian foreign policy. Militarily, the NPT provided India with an opportunity to develop an explicit option to go nuclear if the nuclear powers failed to achieve meaningful nuclear disarmament. Finally, in declining to accept the application of International Atomic Energy Safeguard arrangements, although bilateral and trilateral arrangements on a temporary basis were accepted, India again demonstrated its sensitivity to discriminatory rules which differentiated between the haves and the have nots.

Thus two principal factors now shape Indian policy choices. First, as India faces the 1970's, the military and political options depend on the extent to which the great powers can bring India to their side by offering India an incentive to seek peaceful change rather than change through a coercive bargaining strategy which occasionally may involve the use of military force. India's demands for a more equitable distribution of resources and influence in the existing world order can be readily seen in Indian arguments in GATT, UNCTAD, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Geneva disarmament conference. In most instances, the objective is to secure a better redistribution of resources. For instance, it is little noticed that India has argued for more trade rather than aid. Indians are suspicious of the aid philosophy because in its experience what appeared as aid was really a sound banking operation where the customer with a good credit rating could get a loan. The pace and scope of change in the international redistributive processes is thus one fundamental environmental factor which shapes policy perceptions in New Delhi.

The second factor is that policies which impinge upon India's interests are likely to get a hostile reaction from India. India's demand for change reflects a concern with those policies which, according to the Indian Government, are an unnecessary interference by the great powers in South Asia. For instance, the annual Message of President Nixon to Congress in 1971 read as follows on South Asia:

We will try to keep our activities in the area in balance with those of the other major powers concerned. . . . We will do nothing to harm legitimate Soviet and Chinese interests in the area. We are equally clear, however, that no outside power has a claim to a predominant influence, and that each can serve its own interests and the interests of South Asia best by conducting its activities in the region accordingly.

As Indians see it, only the South Asian states have "legitimate" interests in the region, and any great power arrangement about India is an unfriendly act. Similarly, it is felt that a policy which encourages the buildup of Pakistan as a military bastion against India follows from a style of thinking which must be abandoned in American foreign policy.

The creation of Bangla Desh and the disintegration of Pakistan as a political, economic and military unit has partially satisfied India's view, first, that there should be a natural balance in South Asia in which India is naturally predominant, and secondly, that it is desirable to have a stable military imbalance (as is now the case) rather than an unstable military balance as was the case before Bangla Desh. From India's point of view, Pakistan's disintegration has clarified the military pre-condition in Indian foreign policy, since, in the foreseeable future, Pakistan will not be able to engage in military

balance-of-power politics in South Asia. With almost 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war in Indian hands and without the foreign exchange earnings of Bangla Desh, the Pakistani leaders will need to concentrate on their domestic front. Pakistan cannot afford a standing army of more than 100,000 troops, and these troops are just not enough to pacify the northwestern frontier regions of Pakistan and to liberate Kashmir at the same time. In short, Pakistan is in the awkward position that it can neither pursue a warlike strategy nor can it seek peace with India.

In contrast with Nehru's peace diplomacy, the post-Nehru phase in India's foreign relations shows that a systematic attempt was made to develop the quality of denial and deterrence. Two conditions in the international system favored the development of a coercive and a bargaining strategy. First, the global system was militarily stable, but there were political uncertainties in the attitudes and behavior of the great powers; the NPT and Bangla Desh proved this. Secondly, the great powers were unable to use their "great" power to secure compliance from India with respect to their foreign policy goals. NPT and Bangla Desh again proved this.

In view of these systematic conditions in the international environment, how will India behave as the dominant actor in South Asia? What are the possibilities in India's relationship with the USSR, bearing in mind Moscow's interest in India and Japan as the counterweights against China and the USA? Finally, what are the possibilities in Indo-Japanese relations?

In India's perspective for the 1970's, the starting point is that India's experience has shown that the great power is not necessarily the dominant partner in a dyadic situation. This general proposition is true with respect to Indo-U.S. and Indo-Soviet negotiations because the notion of dominance fails to explain the actual evolutions of relations in these dyads. The experience of the Indo-American dyad is self-evident with respect to NPT and Bangla Desh because the White House discovered that things did not happen just because the American President wanted things done in a particular manner. The experience of the Indo-Soviet dyad is less obvious. So far, India has not been asked, and consequently has not made, a military payoff, for instance in the form of a naval base for the Soviet navy, as is frequently suspected by the American press. The payoff occurs through the manipulation of the exchange rate in Indo-Soviet aid and trade agreements. India has allowed Moscow to charge a very high ruble-rupee exchange rate, namely, eight Indian rupees to a Soviet ruble when the standard rate is about three Indian rupees to a ruble. With a concrete economic payoff it is not necessary to make a military or a diplomatic payoff. It is worth mentioning that, after Bangla Desh, the Indian Prime Minister thanked the

Soviet Union for its "tremendous moral support." There is no need, obviously, for India to reward Moscow with a military payoff in return for the Soviet Union's "tremendous moral support"!

The second point concerns the differences between India and the USA with regard to the assessment of the problems and prospects underlying the emerging balance of power in Asia. India's scenario runs somewhat as follows: In theory, President Nixon's foreign policy goal is to achieve a "generation of peace" in Europe and Asia. In practice, the need to balance Soviet Russia with China, and China with Japan, forces Mr. Nixon to help China develop into a counterweight against the Soviet Union while Japan is also being promoted to play a greater military and political role in Asia. But since a strong China is anathema for India, Nixon's balance-of-power politics in effect leave India and the USA on the opposite sides of the political boundary in Asia. The breakdown of bipolarity with respect to Asia, and the emergence of new policy centers, namely, Peking, Tokyo and Delhi, seem to suggest that at least five major powers must participate in the development of a stable balance of power in Asia. The Indo-Soviet treaty consolidates the tendency whereby new policy centers are beginning to reassert their claims in the Asian community and, in doing so, seek to develop military and political alignments. A measure of the change in Asia is that the Sino-Soviet military alignment has been replaced by the newly emerging Indo-Soviet alignment. At the same time, the U.S.-Japanese security alignment appears to be in a process of change. Thus, while the "China threat" has been moderated in American perceptions, it has been upgraded in Soviet and Indian perceptions. In this framework, the Indo-Soviet treaty has acquired a long-term significance which is related to the shaping of balance-of-power politics in Asia and is not merely restricted to the treaty terms. Given such a fluid situation, Indian experts seem not to think that the USA alone, or in cooperation with China, can easily manage the Asian balance because of the political uncertainties which are reflected in the attitudes of the major powers.

If the fluidity in the international political situation gives India a fresh opportunity to engage in the time-honored Indian art of manipulation and bargaining, India's changed self-image gives it a "good" feeling about its new power. In the 1950's Nehru saw himself as the bridge between the East and the West, and between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds. The idealism of that time is gone and the new feeling is one of pragmatism in definition of Indian goals and its means. Today, the monolithic images of "communism" and the "free world" cannot portray the variety in meaning which is needed to describe actual political processes. Having rejected the grandiose thinking

which comes with monolithic imagery, post-Nehru India is beginning to use the consciousness of its coercive and bargaining power in new directions. Indians have learned that unless one has the power to hurt one cannot bargain. And what better method is there to hurt and to bargain than to expand India's strategic role in a manner which complicates the strategic planning of the great powers?

Because the USA is a superpower and India is not, India's new power, and the fact that the two countries are on opposite sides, should not cause much discomfort to Washington's strategists. The scenario, however, does not provide much comfort. First, when China gets closer to acquiring a credible and a stable second-strike nuclear capability or an unstable first-strike capability against India, the latter will have to go nuclear. It will, that is, if the present direction of India's nuclear policy does not change.

Secondly, if India goes nuclear, for policy and prestige reasons the Japanese cannot stay outside the nuclear club. Finally, once the proliferation barrier is broken by the two countries, who knows when the right-wing gentlemen with hot lines to *Der Spiegel* will also want a German program? The scenario may not develop like this, but then it just may. And the prospect of Soviet Russia sandwiched between a nuclear China and a nuclear Germany is obviously not a pleasant one for Soviet planners, just as the prospect of three middle-sized nuclear powers probably upsets American calculations to have a neat and a manageable world.

In strategic terms it seems that political uncertainties have diminished, for the 1970's, the role of rationalist concepts of deterrence and power which pervaded the bipolar era. According to the bipolar concept, India as an underdeveloped state should only be capable of enjoying local influence in South Asia. But this is not quite the case. By using the Indo-Soviet treaty to its advantage, India was able to paralyze Peking while its ally in Pakistan was being dismembered. A major reason for India's success was that China could not help Pakistan because the Soviet generals were hoping to find a suitable excuse to open a front in Sinkiang, and against this China had no reliable deterrent.

If this set of circumstances helped India's initiative against Pakistan, Indian security experts nevertheless recognize that once Peking deploys a credible second-strike deterrent against the USSR, India may not be able to rely upon Soviet support. Consequently, according to the logic of the situation, India will have to build its independent strategic deterrent which is credible for conventional and nuclear contingencies in the India-China model.

The India-China model has political and military characteristics which condition future Indian moves in Asia. The model is characterized by a no-war no-peace kind of relationship, and the quality of revisionism is implicit in Chinese and Indian claims.

From India's point of view China's territorial claims are revisionist because these are based on the concept of the Middle Kingdom; from China's point of view, India's claim that the concept of the Middle Kingdom is something which Peking must abandon if there is to be peace between the countries is also a revisionist claim. Militarily, the model is stable because the two forces are evenly poised in the Himalayas, and Peking has little to gain militarily against India while the risks of a military engagement are high. But the military balance between Indian and Chinese forces in the region is a local one and could become unstable if a second-strike Chinese nuclear force were to be poised against an Indian conventional military force.

If the deployment of a Chinese nuclear force in the region is one element of instability, the second de-stabilizing element lies in the fact that the Karachi-Tibet-Sinkiang road, which was built by China at a fantastic cost of \$100 million, has given a ready access to Chinese forces. Ostensibly the road was built for trade purposes, but Sino-Pakistan trade did not increase after the road was constructed. The tonnage handled by the Karachi seaport has increased tremendously, and it is conceivable that the road is actually meant to carry supplies for the Chinese garrison in Sinkiang. If this is the likely explanation for the heavy investment which China had made on this road, then it follows that China will continue to need Pakistan's friendship to protect its lines of communication in Sinkiang where the Soviet and the Chinese are in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. In other words, will India remain "against" China because of China's friendship with Pakistan, which China must preserve to keep its logistical lines clear of Pakistani interference?

In view of the practical demonstration of the effectiveness of the Indo-Soviet treaty in the Bangla Desh crisis, it may be tempting to say that the Indo-Soviet treaty should under present circumstances be sufficient for managing the military and political contingencies in the Indo-China relationship. This view, however, is superficial on two grounds. First, the Indo-Soviet alignment is effective only so long as the USSR and India are hostile to China. Once the hostility diminishes, either as a result of arrangements between the Soviet Politburo and the post-Mao leaders in Peking or as a result of exchange of ambassadors between India and China, there may be differences between India and the USSR in interpretation of the treaty. Secondly, while it is in Moscow's interest to facilitate the development of a strong conventional Indian military deterrent against China, it is definitely not in Moscow's interest that India should go nuclear, because an Indian nuclear weapons program could catalyze similar programs in Japan and West Germany. In this case it seems that the present level of aid and trade relationship reflects the optimal limits of the relationship.

From the foregoing analysis two points can be hypothesized. First, as India becomes self-sufficient in basic defense technology, its need for Soviet blueprints of military equipment will decline accordingly. So, given the continuation of present trends, the military aid relationship between India and the USSR is likely to end in a few years, and insofar as Indo-Soviet trade is tied to Soviet military supplies, adjustments in the trade relationship are also likely. Secondly, as India's nuclear projects become operational and India comes closer to becoming the sixth or the seventh nuclear power, Soviet concern about India's nuclear intentions is likely to produce strain in the Indo-Soviet relationship. At this point Indians will want to find alternative policy choices which facilitate technological collaboration, provided the arrangements are not inhibited by political pre-conditions.

It is in this kind of scenario that countries like France and Japan are of great interest to India. France's interest in India's nuclear projects dates back to 1966 when the father of India's atomic energy program, Homi J. Bhabha, was negotiating with the French shortly before he died. France is presently helping India in its fast-breeder program. In terms of aid, France has followed a philosophy independent of American policy prescriptions; the Japanese have followed their commercial interest except for items of a strategic nature, the selection of which conforms in practice to American policy views.

In the 1950's India's nonalignment policy and Nehru's suspicion of the close U.S.-Japan association colored that relationship. Although India was not strong, Japan viewed her as a potential rival. This probably explains why Japan has invariably interacted with India on economic issues where Japan is in a stronger bargaining position, rather than on political issues where India has more room for maneuver. However, as a result of India's actions in the NPT and in Bangla Desh, Japan seems to be re-appraising the basis of its relationship with India. Indo-Japanese collaboration in peace-oriented activities which do not violate the Japanese constitution is possible if the revised Japanese attitude toward India materializes. Recent changes in the Asian security environment also indicate that there is now an opportunity for improving Indo-Japanese relations on the political plane. The Sino-Soviet realignment has altered the security context for Japan, and the new context has lessened Japan's need for an American security umbrella. The increase in trade competition between the USA and Japan for the China market is likely to affect the priorities in the U.S.-Japan relationship. The dramatic method by which Nixon moved toward Peking without consulting its faithful ally has released forces in Japanese politics which are seeking to reformulate the U.S.-Japan relationship and to broaden Japan's relationship with China, the Soviet Union and India. Finally, one

should not overlook the interesting loopholes which Japan has created in the frequently changing definition of "self-defense forces"; the high ratio of the military officers' class which has been preserved in postwar Japan and the growing talk about the need for a greater Japanese role in post-Vietnam Asia offer some clues about the future direction of Japanese foreign policy.

India has now emerged as a major power center in Asia. With its new power it is able effectively to challenge the American diplomacy which promoted military balance-of-power politics in South Asia. Mr. Nixon gave up the role of a world policeman, and instead the USA found itself constrained to seek a parallel dialogue with the USSR and China. But America's balance-of-power approach to world politics has aroused suspicion among the third parties not directly involved in talks with the USA. From India's point of view, if the USA and China collaborate in a manner which impinges upon India's interests, it is probable that India in cooperation with the USSR will intervene against Sino-American moves; the formalization of the Indo-Soviet alignment with the signing of the treaty elevates India's diplomatic role in Asian affairs. Moreover, India's military and diplomatic victory in Bangla Desh outmaneuvered Peking and Washington, and as a consequence it has enhanced India's power to extend its initiative in defense and foreign affairs. Bearing in mind the precedent of Indian military assistance to Ceylon and Bangla Desh there is a pointed lesson in these conflicts that the stability of the smaller powers in the Indian Ocean littoral area depends heavily upon India's stability.

The attitudes of the great powers will continue to be significant in shaping India's policy perceptions, but at the same time the influence of the great powers need not be overestimated. The great powers appear to agree in principle on the desirability of stabilizing crisis situations, but it is premature to assume that the great powers have identical views on a given problem or that they are willing to subordinate their interests to the needs for stability in a region. The search for stability appears to be genuine, but the great powers seem to disagree on the substantive issues underlying the causes of instability. Under these circumstances it is a bit hard to think of contemporary international politics without a "bad guy," that is, someone who frequently threatens and infrequently even uses force, but who is not inclined to make love or total war. Threats and counter-threats are going to be part of the Asian political processes during the 1970's, and one can hypothesize that in the subcontinent stability can be achieved only through military imbalance in which India is dominant; without India's cooperation there cannot be any stability in the region.