stages of thought and life. Feudalism (both its heroes and devils) must become like a mathematical null set, rendering feudalism an empty concept, the result of feudalism multiplied by (a cultural) zero. To accomplish this, all reactionary culture—foreign and domestic—must be eliminated, thereby giving room for the new will to thrive.

Levenson views both the early translators and the cultural revolutionaries as equally alienated; the former from China, the latter from the world. Levenson's faith is that ". . . China will join the world again on the cosmopolitan tide. Cultural intermediaries, Cultural revolutionaries—neither will look like stranded minnows or stranded whales forever."

Revolution & Cosmopolitanism assumes that cosmopolitanism will win out. Revolution is a momentary thrust which cosmopolitanism must parry. Politics is denied. The work does not take seriously enough China's rejection of Western values in her attempt to create an anti-imperialist and socialist civilization. This lacuna is also present, understandably enough, in Levenson's own interest in Judaism. To him, both the Chinese empire and Judaism were cultural movements with the intellectual—mandarin and sanhedrin—in the vanguard. When the twentieth century threatened Judaism, Levenson sought a cultural-religious redefinition of Jewishness—not a departure into the political and social action of the State of Israel. That he found no other way to express himself than through faith in the cosmopolitanization of the world and in a reformed religiosity was, after all, his "long way home" toward his identity.

The Chinese can have faith in the political development of his homeland as a model for the world and can find identity through Mao's voluntaristic beliefs. The intensity and artistic beauty of Levenson's book is that he makes his private quest a universal challenge. He has thus partially answered his own question of how to give particularity a universal meaning.

Peace and Counterpeace: From Wilson to Hitler by Hamilton Fish Armstrong

(Harper & Row; 585 pp.; $12.95)

George A. Lanyi

Like many memoirs of real interest, these too are an amalgamation of several books. One is a highly personalized, yet fascinating, account of American and European diplomacy between 1918 and 1933. A second is the account of the political education of the writer, who, in spite of his impressive modesty, was far more than a foreign correspondent and magazine editor. Armstrong could better be described as an important minor figure of a subsection of the Eastern Establishment. And, in a third theme, we learn here much about that very subsection, the Council on Foreign Relations, and its magazine, *Foreign Affairs*, of which the author was at first Managing, then Chief Editor for fifty years. No other organized élite had as much influence on the formation of educated American public opinion and directly on foreign policy decisions as the Council.

It is, of course, impossible to separate these three "books" completely and discuss them as self-contained treatises. The strands are not only interwoven, they blend in the mind of their author. He sees the world of fifty or forty years ago, partly still through the eyes of the young man he then was, using fragments from his diaries, his letters, his memoranda. Born into a rather liberal-thinking New York upper-middle-class family, he adopted its precepts and combined them with the not so dissimilar ideas of his Princeton professors and of certain journalistic and foreign service sets with which he came into easy contact. His outlook on European diplomacy, the whole locale of his perspective, was strongly affected by his education, by the atmosphere of the New York liberal press, by the strong personality of Harvard's Archibald Cary Coolidge (who was also a member of the American team at the Paris conferences), and by his own pro-Serb bias, the latter acquired incidentally through early personal contacts which led to his only official position, Assistant Military Attaché in Belgrade in 1919. Basically HFA accepted Woodrow Wilson's principles and approved of the way in which they were carried out, albeit imperfectly, in the Paris peace treaties.

For him the tragedy came when the United States turned its back on Wilson by not ratifying the Treaty and by refusing to participate in preventing another world conflagration. In his account of Europe between the wars, the emphasis is on the defense of the status quo, particularly as practiced in Paris. He is fascinated by the not always savory political kaleidoscope of the Third Republic, and hugely enjoys his close personal relations with King Alexander of Yugoslavia and his patriarchal prime minister, Nikola Pashich, whose political style takes us back to the benevolent royal despotism of earlier centuries. Yet, somehow, these two highly diverse systems, as well as many others of equally great diversity, were subsumed in the minds of Western liberals under the heading of "democracy"! The radical socio-economic changes and the violently conflicting ideologies which threatened to tear Europe apart receive rather superficial treatment, while personalities are analyzed with the painstaking attention to detail becoming a conventional novelist.

It is amusing to see how Armstrong's esthetics are affected by his cultural and political biases. Thus, while he calls the gifted but reactionary Count Stephen Bethlen "an

insignificant little man with a drooping moustache" (within the Hungarian milieu he was not insignificant, drooping moustache or no), he says nothing about the certainly insignificant appearance of President Benes of Czechoslovakia, whom, together with almost all Western liberals, he greatly overrates as a personality and a statesman. Yet his vivid and amusing sketches, particularly of American personalities at the Paris Peace Conference, of French politicians and of East European capitals, succeed in evoking a vanished world, or, rather, its glittering facade. The political analyses which accompany them are often, one suspects, more superficial than were the author's original observations. Is this because our memories are imperfect, or because of the demands of the memoirs-reading public?

The second strand evolves around the political education of the young HFA, the contemporary of Scott Fitzgerald and Edmund Wilson in Princeton. There is the great mentor, Harvard's Coolidge, who introduces him into the mysteries of Eastern Europe, and there are the Olympian figures of the last classic period of American Liberalism: Woodrow Wilson, Elihu Root, Newton Baker, Colonel House. Here there is much to learn and to enjoy not only for the memoirs-reader but also for the specialist. The influences of these larger-than-life figures on the next generation were decisive: This was an expansive and naively self-righteous American Liberalism, which still carried a punch. In the foreign policy field there was the heroic and only partly successful effort to save America from both an untimely isolationism and "too emotional involvement." (It strikes one how similar were the motives, xenophobic and/or ideological, behind these violent swings of the American temper toward those two opposite poles.)

Armstrong himself as a young man was close to the State Department without becoming really a part of it and assumed some of the better qualities of the professional diplomatist: tact, discretion, sensitivity to detail. Yet there was also a deeper layer of the academic historian: attention to background, a wider perspective and scholarly objectivity. Combined with an often beguilingly amateurish generosity of the diplomatic journalist, these traits helped him to stand up against the narrowness and near-bigotry which at times beset the State Department in the interwar period. Even toward Russia he does not show the intransigent spirit of the doctrinaire liberal but rather the admittedly "soft" hope that even the rudest of revolutionaries may be "civilized" when listened to and treated as equals. So when HFA scouts Europe for contributors to *Foreign Affairs*, he does not stop with Herriot and Poincaré, Benes and Sforza, but believes that in order to establish a genuine "dialogue" he must confront them in his magazine with the real radicals: Radek, Bukharin, John Dewey, Harold Laski, Karl Kautsky, and W.E.B. DuBois. But while thus opening the doors of respectability to the Left, HFA opposed a similar policy toward the ever stronger Fascist right. In 1924 he still regarded Mussolini lightly as an opéra bouffe character, but he soon saw his error and did not repeat it when perceiving Hitler's relentless march to power. Unlike some fellow liberals in Britain and America, Armstrong was never an "appeaser," as his pamphlet, *We or They*, eloquently testified.

Today, at seventy-seven, much that he relates seems to him *déjà vu*: "though the *dramatis personae* and the stage setting vary, the scenario is also much the same." Yet we should not lose sight of the author's philosophy, which was not uncharacteristic for the Eastern Establishment. Central, perhaps, was a strong belief that there is an "intimate relationship between the national interest and the interest of society as a whole." Another was that the gentle but firm hegemony of the liberal Western powers is the best guarantee for peace and can, if not save the world for democracy, at least save the democracies from the onslaught of its enemies. The nation-state fitted into this picture as something good" and so did the League of Nations. (Yet the anarchistic helplessness of the weak, small states in Central and Eastern Europe, which practically provoked the imperialistic appetites of their large and voracious neighbors, was not sufficiently realized even by such a well-informed student of Balkan politics.) How well this worldview was expressed by Elihu Root's statement (which was given the leading place in the first issue of *Foreign Affairs*):

"When foreign affairs were ruled by autocracies or oligarchies the danger of war was in sinister purpose. When foreign affairs are ruled by democracies the danger of war will be in mistaken beliefs. The world will be the gainer by the change, for, while there is no human way to prevent a king from having a bad heart, there is a human way to prevent a people from having an erroneous opinion."

It is, of course, this very worldview which informed the foundation of the Council on Foreign Relations. Its genesis and history make up the third strand of the memoirs, more fragmentary and raising even more questions than the other two. These men range from Widener Library to Wall Street and to Washington. As the group is far from monolithic, one misses more analyses of the differences *between* these men, though occasional anecdotes show that they did not always agree. HFA proudly states that his journal "will tolerate wide differences of opinion," but these differences as presented seemed wider and more pronounced between the spokesmen of foreign countries than between representatives of different American groups. He proudly asserts that "*Foreign Affairs*, like the Council itself, would not ask or take aid of any sort from the Government," though they "usually remained on excellent terms with the State Department, whatever its political complexion, but never felt, or was, under any obligation to treat its views with more than polite respect."

Armstrong admits, however, that successive administrations' evaluations of the magazine "rose or fell . . . depending on whether we happened

to print articles in which the authors praised government policy or criticized it." One suspects this somewhat simplistic explanation of the Council's undulating effectiveness in influencing Washington. Was it not rather dependent on the changing importance of the Eastern Establishment in the total political structure, which was apparently much stronger under the Eisenhower-Dulles regime than under the present Republican Administration?

Armstrong's retirement as editor of *Foreign Affairs* has recently caused a mini-storm around the Council. The semi-secret "other State Department" was bitterly criticized, and the selection of William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State in the Johnson Administration, as the next editor of *Foreign Affairs* resulted in an outburst of indignation on the part of a group of younger Council members. According to J. Anthony Lucas (*New York Times*, November 21, 1971) it is widely believed that even Walter Lippmann, not quite so young and not active in the Council since 1938, resigned from the Council for this very reason. The memoirs show that from the very beginning a certain tension existed (in Lucas's words) "between the Council as a seminar and the Council as a club." But the contemporary challenge goes deeper. It questions the exclusiveness of the Council, its methods of recruitment, the confidentiality of its seminars, its discreet attitude toward official policy, and even its unwillingness to punish "the guilty," namely, those who participated in decisions which caused America's deep involvement in Southeast Asia. There is much that is true in these accusations and also much that is unfair. Even a cursory inspection of fairly recent issues of *Foreign Affairs* show that some of the most vocal critics of America's Asian policy freely expressed their views in its columns, for example, Hans J. Morgenthau and John Fairbank.

Be that as it may, the memoirs deal with quite a different period of American foreign policy, in which the Council's principles appear vastly more enlightened and realistic than those of the American mainstream. In a sense the Council was a forerunner of bipartisan foreign policy, the creation of which, during the war and afterwards, was by and large salutory, though revisionist historians would disagree. Whether after 1952, or, for that matter, today, the Council and *Foreign Affairs* still fulfill the function which they performed during the first thirty years of their existence, should, perhaps, be discussed when further volumes of Armstrong's memoirs appear. The case for the prosecution has been submitted, that of the defense is still incomplete. In the meantime, however, the quasi-monopoly of the Council has been broken by the new "other State Department," which is right in the White House, rather than by the various institutes on foreign policy, while *Foreign Affairs* has been challenged since 1970 by the more lively and less orthodox quarterly, *Foreign Policy*.

Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis by Graham T. Allison

(Little, Brown; 338 pp.; $8.95)

Stephen E. Ambrose

Graham Allison, a professor of politics at Harvard, has undertaken an ambitious task, for this is really two books: one dealing with the Cuban missile crisis from different points of view, the other attempting to build a new theoretical model for understanding the decision-making process. In neither case is Allison wholly successful, but there are some interesting results.

Allison uses three models, or sets of assumptions, to analyze the crisis. Model I is "The Rational Actor," the traditional way of looking at a governmental policy or action. It assumes that one man at the top ultimately makes the decisions on the basis of a rational calculation of the gains and losses to be expected from a proposed action. Model II, "Organization Process," assumes that "governmental behavior can therefore be understood . . . less as deliberate choices and more as *outputs* of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior," which is jargon for saying the bureaucracy runs everything, regardless of what the President or Premier wants. Model III, "Governmental Politics," stands in contrast to Model I by involving more actors in the game; i.e., Model III emphasizes the tug and pull of personal politics at the top of the organization, whether it be the National Security Council (NSC) or the Presidium. Allison goes into great detail to explain what he means and how his models work; indeed, he seems more interested in establishing his theoretical propositions than he does in dealing with actual events.

Allison maintains that using Model II or Model III assumptions about the nature of decision-making yields new insights in examining governmental actions, insights which presumably bring us closer to reality. But in order to emphasize his models he creates a strawman, arguing that all previous investigators in this area have neglected the impact of the bureaucracy and the importance of high-level personal politics. Nothing of the sort is true. Further, Allison's models are by no means as new as he claims. All he is really saying is that historians should take as much into account in explaining a decision as possible, which is something historians have known for a long time now.