

# In the Magazines

"As we prepare for some contact with the new revolutionary generation in China, our first need is for a genetic, historical grasp of past Chinese-American relations," writes the Director of Harvard's East Asian Research Center, John K. Fairbank. One aspect of those relations was discussed by Shirley Stone Garrett in her "China Missions and the Perils of Benevolence," which appeared in *Worldview's* May issue. And, indeed, Dr. Fairbank's remark is made by way of introduction to a special issue on "China Missions in History" of the *Journal of Presbyterian History*.

Our cover designer's tongue was in the vicinity of his cheek when he called Dr. Garrett's piece "Those Ungrateful Chinese," a reference to the number of missionaries and Sinophiles who viewed as a failure the attempt to inject the Christian message into Chinese culture.

But such people, says Fairbank, "completely miss the significance of the missionary chapter in Chinese history. . . . [I]t is plain that, in the 19th century, Chinese society underwent a demoralization for many reasons, both internal and external, and many evidences indicate that the Chinese people felt a great need for spiritual revival. This was attempted at mid-century under the pseudo-Christian banner of the Taiping rebels, and it was sought later in the great movements for a post-rebellion Confucian restoration and then for reform and revolution at the turn of the century. The Chinese Revolution indeed is probably the greatest in all history measured in either quality or quantity. The spiritual component in this revolution must come in large part from within the Chinese scene. Reporting on Mao's China, James Reston has recently remarked that it is a veritable sink of morality. It is hardly enough for us to describe this Chinese spirit under the heading of that vague term 'nationalism.' But in fact China's nationalism has achieved its current fulfillment by rejecting the Christian West in favor of that minor 19th century western Christian heresy, Marxism-Leninism. Anyone who reads Chairman Mao's little red book will be struck with the amount of 19th century ethics of the Industrial Revolution and the nation-state that has been smuggled into the new Maoist culture.

"Missionaries, in short, helped to begin the inevitable Chinese revolution. They made their contribution to the new China in innumerable ways that we still have not studied, with innumerable effects and influences of which we are still unaware."

"Asia has been dominated by a sense of the sacred. Examples of the sacred view of history and the sacral nature of government are to be found through-

out Asian writings. It has been suggested that Asia has generally lacked a sense of history, but it may be far more accurate to say that Asia has not held to a secular view of history (i.e., concern with factual accuracy of time, place, and events in historical narrative), but to a sacralized history in which the sense of the sacred in history, the myth of history in terms of cultural and moral values, is made dominant. Religion and culture were virtually coterminous, with religion an integral part of the state and the function of religion one of serving the state and its rulers and vice versa. In the content of traditional Asian thought, the very concept of 'church and state' was historically incomprehensible. Asian religious history is inseparable from Asian social and political history. The sacral nature of government and rulers virtually precluded any secular or desacralized view of political power." Thus Editor James E. Wood, Jr., in the Winter issue of the *Journal of Church and State* devoted to "Religion, Revolution, and Nationalism in Asia"—one of the few editorial echoes to the call for greater understanding of the relation in the Far East between ethics and public policy. Among the valuable contents of this collection: "Militant Buddhist Nationalism: The Case of Burma," by Guenter Lewy; "Shinto and the Social Order," by Robert S. Ellwood; "The Fusion of Politics and Religion in Japan," by John Kie-chaing Oh; "Missionaries and Colonialism: The Case of the New Hebrides in the Twentieth Century," by Charles W. Forman.

Chess perhaps, "Monopoly" maybe, but dominoes are out as an image for the future of Southeast Asia, according to *The Manchester Guardian Weekly* (May 20). "A new atmosphere and balances of power are emerging. Their effects on the countries in the area will be measured in terms of territory and influence, arrived at by force, collapse, or negotiation.

"Changes in government and regime are inevitable," notes the *Guardian*. "In crude terms these will depend in part on their distance from the epicentre of the Vietnam earthquake. The future of Cambodia and Laos, for example, cannot be separated from that of Vietnam. But it would be an error to assume that even a complete victory by Hanoi would produce a domino reaction. The change in circumstances will inevitably lead to a change in regional tensions and ambitions. The challenge to the governments of Southeast Asia will be to find the best means of reacting. In the process some governments may fall, but this could not be attributed directly to a North Vietnamese triumph. . . ."

"The days of Lon Nol in Cambodia are surely numbered. Competition for succession appears to lie between the return of the semi-Socialist Sihanouk and a Marxist-Leninist government derived from the GRUNC and FUNC organisations. The choice would be complicated by the preferences of the United

States and China, and by the Soviet Union's reservations about all these alternatives. In Laos the likelihood is that the longer the war continues the less there will be left, as China, Thailand, and North Vietnam compete for influence. The Pathet Lao would be left as a rump in the middle.

"Thailand is the most secure State in the area. While Laos and Cambodia wait on events, Thailand is in a position to decide for itself. How its policies evolve will depend on its assessment of China's and North Vietnam's intentions. . . .

"Of the outer ring of countries—Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines—only the first could

claim that its insurgency problem could be directly affected by events in Vietnam. A victory to Hanoi and the bonus of an American humiliation would boost the morale of rebel groups in these countries. But the longer term effect of a settlement might well be debilitating to the rebels and governments alike. President Park of South Korea (although with North Korea, Taiwan, and Japan in a related but separate web of political relations) reacted last year to Sino-American detente with a state of emergency. The countries of South-east Asia will find the atmosphere of post-Vietnam as hard to live with as the period of the war."

PAMPHILUS

## Correspondence

[from p. 2]

Consider Holden's apologetic for the colonels' "wholesale removal of judges who delivered judgments they did not like . . . political censorship even of . . . classical Greek dramas . . . immediate imprisonment of Andreas Papandreu with threat of bring him to book for the Aspida affair . . ." and other "detentions" of dissidents. Holden attributes these misdemeanors to the junta's "impressive inability to understand the first principles of either diplomacy or public relations"!

Flesch would comment on the 69-word sentence which included these charges. A functional-fog index would catch the queasiness in the reference to Papandreu: The colonels threaten to "bring him to book for the Aspida affair on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the government. . . ." Why, since they had summarily disposed of cases far less grave, did they release him untried? Holden implies that he avoided prosecution—and, as a matter of course, execution—because he had "gained . . . widespread sympathy as a noble martyr. . . ."

Certainly there was "widespread" mobilization of the intellectual community on his behalf. Marquis Childs reported LBJ's instructions to the State Department, after receiving voluminous appeals from American academicians—"Tell those Greek bastards to let that son-of-a-bitch what's-his-name go." Elsewhere, however, Holden pictures the junta as being impervious to such pressures.

To refute "the theory of a CIA conspiracy," he finds in the colonels

"men of great determination and independence of mind," whose rejection of attempted pressure by "America's partial suspension of military aid" argues against "the view that they had been Washington's chosen instrument" for a *coup d'état*. It seems to argue equally against their yielding to moral duress and releasing an inveterate enemy, against whom, Holden infers, they had valid proofs of treason.

I have been led to believe that the regime's case rested on two affidavits testifying to overheard remarks by Papandreu in favor of the Aspida conspiracy of leftist army officers. And that it was only after the two affiants had fled to America and had publicly repudiated their affidavits, claiming coercion, that the junta found "bringing him to book" inadvisable. If this version is false, Holden should plainly say so instead of befogging the issues—as he also does that of systematic torture.

Holden correctly warns against simplistic moralizing over a very tangled can of worms indeed. However, simplistic value judgments concealed in functional fog don't aid in the untangling. Peyton Bryan *Smithville, Tex.*

## In General

To the Editors: I came across my first copy of *Worldview* on a newsstand, and bought it to read what György Lukács had to say about Marxist theory ("The Failure of Marxist Theory," May). Perhaps you will allow a comment on that article and on that issue of your magazine.

Lukács was, as you note, one of the, if not the, leading Marxist theorists

of our century. In the light of the whole issue it is appallingly clear why you chose to publish this interview. It is Lukács as an old man, clearly discouraged and, in a moment of weakness, inclined to disparage contemporary socialism. It is hardly representative of Lukács's thought. The advantage of that kind of article to the editors of *Worldview* is obvious when one looks at the other articles in the same issue, almost all consistently reactionary: McNerny talks about "original sin" in order to undermine whatever democratic impulses there might be in American political history; Shirley Garrett, in "Those Ungrateful Chinese," almost completely whitewashes the imperialist history of missionaries in China; Ashok Kapur discusses India's foreign policy in a way that completely agrees with the discredited notions of balance of power; surely no one not in the pay of the Greek colonels will doubt that Holden's piece on the Greek junta is little more than propaganda; and Neuhaus, while he used to be known as a radical, can hardly be taken seriously when he talks about U.S. "responsibility" in the Third World. As for the lead article by John Bennett, such theological meanderings only serve an obscurantist purpose, distracting from the revolutionary struggle. . . .

Somewhere I heard that *Worldview* was a journal with no political or ideological line. After the May issue, I've filed that little piece of information along with other myths and fairy tales about Establishment journalism. Carl Gilles *Chicago, Illinois*