Eastern Europe and European Security
by William R. Kintner
and Wolfgang Klaiber
(Dunellen; six + 393 pp.; $15.00)

Walter C. Clemens, Jr.

What are the alternatives for Europe in the 1970’s? Will we be able to speak of "Pan-Europa" — not just as a dream but as a reality? If so, will "Pan-Europa" include Russia? May all of Europe be dominated by Moscow—or by Washington? Meanwhile, as we think about improved relations between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, what can we do about the Czech and Slovak intellectuals displaced or imprisoned since 1968?

All these questions loom as momentum builds for a Conference on European Security and Cooperation, a meeting which many Western governments fear will be counterproductive but to which they may be pulled toward by an idea whose time has come. Surely this is an opportune time to consider the issues and the realities portrayed in this book, which has evolved from studies conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia.

The book is kaleidoscopic. In part this reflects the authors’ effort to be comprehensive. They begin with an historical survey of events since 1945. Second are case studies of Bulgaria, East Germany and Hungary to assess the “dynamics of political change.” Third is an analysis of “the changing framework of Soviet hegemony,” one in which the Eastern European states have moved from being “pawns to participants.” Finally there is a discussion of Czechoslovakia 1968 and the implications of the entire study for Western security. The kaleidoscopic impression the book leaves may be due more to the diversities of the states analyzed—from Albania to the German Democratic Republic.

It should be understood that this is an important and useful book for anyone concerned with Eastern Europe. Its main contribution is a systematic effort to state clearly a series of hypotheses about the relationship of the East European countries to the USSR and to the West; to assemble data that help to test these hypotheses; and to interpret this data and candidly reassess the initial hypotheses.

Though the book may be of greatest interest to researchers specializing in East-West relations, it also provides a solid introduction useful to the student or concerned layman. The historical survey of Eastern Europe since 1945 is not simply a rehash of standard works such as Brzezinski’s Soviet Bloc, but incorporates many findings uncovered in the course of researching the major hypotheses of this book. It reports in some detail, for example, the steps taken since about 1965 to strengthen the legislature and trade unions of Hungary to provide some vehicle for greater popular representation.

While the methods employed by Kintner and Klaiber are in themselves not terribly original as political science, they are noteworthy for the clarity of exposition, educating the reader each step along the way. Further, it is unusual in Soviet and East European studies to pursue one’s hypotheses so systematically, specifically stating where the data are inadequate to make any conclusion or to confirm some of the original hypotheses.

The information amassed here is itself useful, quite apart from the way the authors apply it to the problems at hand. Many readers will have the feeling: “This is what I always wanted to know about Eastern Europe but didn’t take the trouble to investigate”—for example, the amount of trade (and other transactions) each country has had with the USSR, with other East European countries, and with the West (1956-1967).

Having noted the book’s accomplishments, I can take issue with some of its conclusions and its underlying assumptions. To begin with, one may question whether the task which the authors pursue can be accomplished using the methods they employ. True, their data seem to support the hypothesis that the greater the East European trade dependence on the USSR, the greater the conformity to Soviet policy. But when we come to particular cases, looked at dynamically over time, even this intuitively plausible hypothesis loses its persuasiveness. Thus, the three countries whose trade with the USSR exceeded 50 per cent of their total trade in 1958 were Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. If trade binds, each should have remained a faithful ally. In fact, however, political considerations seem to have outweighed economic ones. Albania defected in 1961 (in which year trade with Russia fell to 36.1 per cent); Romania began her autonomous foreign policies in 1962 (trade with Russia falling to about 40 per cent until the mid-1960’s when it went below 30 per cent). From these cases and from that of Sino-Soviet trade (not examined here) it appears that declining trade can be a sign of political trouble—after it occurs—but that economic dependence is not a sufficient factor to deter such severe political conflict.

As an index of fidelity to Moscow, the trade of both Bulgaria and East Germany with the USSR has remained at a high and steady level from 1956 through 1967, ranging from 41 to 53 per cent. Czechoslovakia’s level of trade was also fairly constant, however, ranging from 31 to 39 per cent in those years, giving in itself no warning of the new course that would develop there almost spontaneously in 1968.

That Bulgaria and East Germany rank highest in conformity with Soviet policy (according to the authors’ “index of conformity”) raises some difficult problems. For one, it challenges the hypothesis that “the higher an East European country’s
level of socioeconomic development, the greater its deviation from Soviet policy." The paradox is that Bulgaria is one of the poorest and East Germany one of the richest of the East European countries. What statistics can resolve this inconsistency? (The index of conformity is itself skewed by the fact that it begins in 1956—thereby omitting the strikes and demonstrations in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1953.)

Another hypothesis is that "the more cultural interactions an East European country maintains with the Soviet Union, the more it will conform to Soviet policy." The authors find that Soviet cultural relations have indeed been most intensive with Bulgaria and East Germany. What these findings omit are the vital qualifiers that Bulgaria has traditionally been pro-Russian while Germany and Russia have often been at war. Further, my own impression as an exchange student and visitor to the Soviet Union has been that—if all visitors from fraternal European countries—Bulgarians and East Germans are the most disliked in Moscow.

Even using the types of measures that can be tested statistically, we have trouble weighting them and knowing how to interpret them. Bulgaria, some have suggested, benefits considerably from her economic relations with Moscow, whereas many other East European countries (including East Germany) have felt themselves exploited. Thus, the quality as well as the quantity of the trade relationship needs to be explored.

Another weighting problem: Is it more important that East Germany has considerable trade with Moscow or that there are 20 Soviet divisions on her soil? The authors hypothesize that "the easier it is for the Soviet Union to apply military force in an East European country, the more subservient that country will be to Soviet leadership." But even this statement does not explain the defiance of the East Germans in 1953; the Hungarians in 1956; the Czechs in 1968 (their country the subject of prolonged Warsaw Pact maneuvers much of that summer); the Gdansk workers in 1970-71. Nor does it help to explain the acquiescence of Bulgaria (with no Soviet troops stationed on her soil).

Implicit in the foregoing critique is the belief that "soft" variables may be as important as "hard" data in explaining East European behavior. Many of these soft variables fall under the rubric of "national character"—notoriously difficult to analyze and yet strikingly salient to most observers of national behavior. How do we take account of the pro-Russian sentiments that have been widespread in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia? The anti-Russian feelings of many Poles? The francophilism of many Romanians and Poles? The
war memories that must trouble East Germany's relations with Russia and most East Europeans (known to erupt during Warsaw Pact exercises)? Or how can we measure the importance of such variables as a proclivity to action or inaction; open resistance or passive Schweikism; rebellion or dissent?

Mixing our hard and soft variables, how will the political forecaster determine how to assess the importance of rates of change and critical thresholds? In the Czech-Soviet case, for example, all the hard indicators (and many of the soft) looked positive until 1968, when a Stalinist regime was replaced by a more liberal one, itself to be put down by Soviet armies—thereby reversing most popular sentiments about Russia.

We might, finally, criticize the premise that views Eastern Europe in terms of a zero-sum relationship between the superpowers. "If the area is dominated by the USSR, or by communist regimes, it is lost to the West. To the extent that we can pry it away, we will gain." These are among the tacit assumptions the authors make. Thus, they hypothesize that increased trade, intergovernmental and cultural relations should make for a greater "deviation from Soviet policy." In fact, they note, Rumania's autonomous policies have taken place despite her relatively few transactions with the West, while Bulgaria appears faithful to Moscow while trading twice as much of her net national material product with the West as Bucharest. (The extreme cases of Albania and Yugoslavia, however, do support the original hypothesis.)

One may doubt if Western security or the well-being of the East Europeans will ever be put on a solid foundation so long as nations continue to view these problems in zero-sum terms. It may be that a Pan-European power grid or a common struggle to clean up the environment will be needed to transcend the outlooks that have led us to what Pierre Hassner has termed a "hot peace" superseding a "cold war."

From the Jaws of Victory
by Charles Fair
(Simon and Schuster; 445 pp.; $8.95)

Nicolas Turner

Charles Fair has made a study of examples of military stupidity through the ages. Whether or not intended, no clear central thesis emerges. It may have been the author's desire that the reader should get the impression that wars are won and lost by stupidity alone. It might have been better if he had admitted that in some campaigns and battles stupidity was about equal on both sides. One does get the feeling, save in odd examples such as Charles XII of Sweden, that such influences as luck and failures of communication between commanders and subordinates have been undervalued here.

Yet the book undoubtedly succeeds in what should be its main purpose, to show just how often events have been greatly influenced by the foolishness of commanders. It is on the whole rare for an historian to spotlight the loser and his faults rather than the victor and his virtues. In the author's numerous examples, stupidity has its antecedents in a variety of causes such as plain ignorance, inadequate preparation, the irrational desire to promote senseless attacks against well-fortified positions, and of failing to strike quickly when the time is ripe.

It would be unsound for the reader to draw too many general conclusions from the book. In the first place, the author could have done no more in one volume than select cases from a very rich field. The majority of wars have gone unmentioned, as have both the great men and the general run of quietly competent commanders.

Mr. Fair begins his study with Crassus, whom he sees as the forerunner of a "type of general who hopes by sheer technical and numerical superiority to bludgeon his way to victory." Moving on, he sees the Middle Ages as a time when valor and seemingly hopeless attacks carried out according to the rules of chivalry counted for more than clever generalship, an overstatement but quite interesting. Meanwhile, he contrasts the chivalry of the medieval nobility to their opposite numbers in the enemy army with the often brutal and merciless treatment meted out to lesser folk, whether combatant or not. Yet when dealing with an age when most leaders viewed the masses with either contempt or disinterest, it is hard to find examples where this factor was actually decisive in a campaign.

His analysis of the Hundred Years War suffers from a failure to delve deeper into the political and military realities. A great deal of space is devoted to a study of the failings of Philip VI of France and his son John, with extensive quotations from C. W. Oman, J. F. C. Fuller, and Guizot, not an adequate set of sources for a true grasp of medieval military history. Having shown the cause of the initial French defeats to lie almost exclusively with the stupidity and rashness of her kings and the antiquity of her feudal army, he portrays Edward III's later failures as due to the aimlessness of his policy. The latter's financial difficulties and the improved French strategy get no proper mention. The English policy under Henry V and Henry VI for the systematic conquest of France gets no mention at all, though there was plenty of foolishness on both sides; in the final analysis, however, the English offensive ran out of steam.

That atrocities on the civil population are often counterproductive is a recurrent theme in the book, the repressive policy pursued in the Netherlands by Philip II of Spain and the Duke of Alba being given in elaborate detail. Yet the cases where