

tell him about Italy, Fascism, Russia and the war, in which he seemed only mildly interested." There was more concern for human things in the hermit quoted by Helen Waddell in *Desert Fathers*: "Tell me, I pray thee, how fares the human race: if new roofs have risen in the ancient cities: whose empire is it that now sways the world?"

But Santayana was not piloted toward isolation by philosophy alone. He was a solitary before he submitted to its authority, and he was made one, as the autobiographies attest, by the peculiar domestic and social circumstances in which he matured and no less—it must not be ignored—by a native fastidiousness (akin to that of a Walter Pater, a Henry James, or a Henry Adams) which shrank from the touch of common things and which he was enabled to indulge by a legacy that purchased him a retreat that he could rightly describe as a "little garden of Epicurus." Yet, however varied the factors that gave its peculiar character to his life, Santayana came to regard his isolation as the only asceticism that could discipline his mind and heart for the pursuit and the acceptance of the truth. And this total detachment "from things and persons" had, in his view, to be complemented by detachment from the self, by the stern denial of the elemental human need for assurance that the Whole within which man must live is not hostile or even indifferent to his aspirations. To indulge this need is to repeat the sin, first committed by Socrates, of projecting "the economy of the human mind into the universe," of making nature "hold the mirror up to man." It is to shrink from the truth that "the spirit . . . altogether, at every instant and in every particular . . . is in the hands of some alien and inscrutable power" only to invent gods of the kind which men normally fashion "in their own image, to be servants of their interests."

To avoid this madness—a "normal madness"—the philosopher must abstain, as Spinoza abstained, "from all easy faith"; "ultimate religion" (the subject, and the title, of a lecture

Santayana read at the Spinoza House in Amsterdam on the third centenary of his birth) is the prize only of those who follow the moral example of Spinoza, who "by overwhelming all human weaknesses, even when they seemed kindly or noble, and by honoring power and truth, even if they should slay him . . . entered the sanctuary of an unruffled superhuman wisdom. . . ." The only wisdom worth attaining, then, is *superhuman* wisdom, and it is reserved for the heroic Spinoza and his intellectual

and moral disciples; the mass of men are doomed to live by fables of their own invention, to enjoy only such intellectual and moral satisfactions as their delusions can supply. To be wise one must first rise above the human state. Santayana has said that his poetry was inspired by an "actual spiritual experience." Could that experience have been the experience of *hubris*? And were the "faiths of old" really his "daily bread," or only the objects of his aristocratic condescension?

French Colonialism in Tropical Africa, 1900-1945

by Suret-Canale

(Pica Press; 521 pp.; \$17.50)

Eboué

by Brian Weinstein

(Oxford University Press; 350 pp.; \$8.95)

Isebill V. Gruhn

Enlightened re-examinations of European colonialism in Africa ought to be taken seriously, especially since the literature abounds with silly, self-serving, ideological tracts which either defend or condemn policies and their consequences. In 1972 neither the exploited nor their exploiters are aided by superficial or selective commentaries on the evils of colonialism. It hardly seems necessary to affirm that whatever the motives of and benefits to the colonizers, merely condemning the past has limited utility. Seeking to understand the past and its impact on the present and future is an urgent task which demands the best minds regardless of racial or national origin.

In America in particular, self-confident social scientists forged ahead in the 1950's and '60's with academic scalpels and chisels to dissect the history, politics, economics and other social processes of African

states and peoples. Armed with generous financial support, Parsonian analysts and Behavioral analysts, among others, approached and carried out their work with an unabashed and strong disposition toward American and European democratic political forms. Americans found it quite natural, whether they were academics or technical aid officials, to approach the so-called "Dark Continent" with the national predisposition toward hard work, pragmatic programs, a little money and much optimism, offering these as tools for the quick transformation of African states into coherent political units with respectable economic growth rates. Africans and Americans tended to share the euphoric belief that much of the colonial inheritance could be ignored by a continent reborn through political independence. The naiveté of these assumptions is all too visible in 1972.

Chronic political and economic problems are only the top of the iceberg, and only the blind and the egotistical can afford to assume that answers outnumber questions regarding the past, present and future of Africa.

Suret-Canale's rather long and frequently exceedingly detailed study of French colonialism is not a good book for the uninitiated. The book abounds with names of places and people which lend clarity for the well-informed student of African affairs but are sheer tedium for the more general reader. Furthermore, his knowledgeable and detailed statistics of production figures, kilometers of railroad tracks built in a particular year and place are not the sort of stuff made for casual bedtime reading. However, these *caveats* to the general reader can be ignored by the student of African affairs, whose attention ought to be drawn to the fact that in economic matters this book is frequently a gold mine of detailed information.

Beyond the above warnings and encouragements, Suret-Canale does fall into an identifiable genre of analysis. He is a Marxist and in good Marxist tradition brings his material to bear mainly on questions of economic exploitation by French public and private agents and agencies in Africa. He goes further than condemning superficially, however, and seeks to demonstrate not merely that Africa was exploited in an extractive sense but that colonialism, both in its successes and failures, harmed Africa in many known and some more subtle and less-known ways. According to Suret-Canale the African balance between man and nature was destroyed, causing starvation and disease. He makes the unoriginal point that the crime of colonialism was not merely that French capitalism profited but that much which was creative and healthy in Africa became degenerate, diseased and permanently thwarted. In spite of the wealth of factual information and the indisputable familiarity of the author with the subject of the book, his Marxist orientation leads him to devote the major portion of the book to causes and

consequences of economic exploitation. One senses that the author probably had a great deal of insight into the social, political and psychological consequences to former French Africa; but the pages given to these matters are not only less numerous but also more superficial and less well-documented.

From an historian's perspective, this quantitative and qualitative imbalance is unfortunate though not necessarily critical. From the vantage point of a political or social analyst, as well as policy-makers inside and outside of Africa, it is a more serious matter. In fact, such an imbalance casts this book into that large bin of literature which sheds light on the failures of the past and correctly identifies the criminal and the nature of the crime but fails to shed sufficient light upon matters of rehabilitation. It is not enough today to tell the peoples of Africa that they have been exploited and victimized; it is imperative that knowledgeable men like Suret-Canale use their knowledge to do more than merely condemn. Europeans and Americans could perhaps serve the African cause by focusing more frequently and less ideologically upon the fabric of the African states which was inherited from the colonial period. This would include insightful and sensitive analysis of the social, political and psychological dynamic underneath the machinery of state, a structure which in most cases is beginning to crack in the process of transition.

Brian Weinstein's biography of Eboué looks at French colonialism in Africa primarily, though not exclusively, during the same period of French rule examined by Suret-Canale. Eboué, born in French Guinea, is the only black man interred in France's Pantheon, the resting place of her heroes. He is a man who struggled through the French colonial services and with no little difficulty rose in the ranks to cap his career of over twenty years in Africa as the governor of Tchad. A simplistic view of Eboué might suggest that he was a black lackey for French exploitation of other

blacks in Africa, a man who did France's bidding, who believed colonialism was not merely exploitative but could bring development, education and recognition for black men. Weinstein's portrait of Eboué is intended to leave one with many contradictions. Eboué administered French policies; he administered and frequently fostered forced labor, for example. Yet, he was also a man who respected African tradition and custom, traveled relentlessly through the territories under his administration and sought to shed light on African languages, music and culture by writing and publishing papers on these subjects. Eboué believed in France and its culture, but he also believed in the dignity and worth of black men both in Africa and in his homeland in the Western Hemisphere. On some levels it is easy enough to dismiss Eboué as an interesting, in some ways admirable and sad, man. His tenacity to prevail professionally against grave odds of personal racism which affected his professional assignments and promotions is admirable. Admirable, too, were his assertions of his own blackness and humanity. And finally, one comes to view him as sad because the honors and recognition that he did receive came at a very high personal, human cost. Some of his highest honors might never have come if he had not joined De Gaulle's camp in the Second World War.

Eboué emerges as a man who achieved his "manhood" by becoming a Frenchman. From the vantage point of 1972 one feels ambivalent toward him and cries out in rage against the system which created him as well as the choice he made to join the exploiter, thus placing himself in the position of the exploited. Weinstein ends the biography by suggesting that moral ambiguity plagues us all and implies that individuals frequently are allowed little choice. Yet one reflects back upon Eboué's life and wants to say he was offered a choice; he could have pocketed his personal ambitions and not done the bidding for the French. What we forget is that the subject of colonialism, whether

it be colonial control over land and materials with which Suret-Canale is mainly concerned or control over the mind and emotions of a black leader which serves as Weinstein's material, is easier to condemn than understand. The radical blacks in America and Africa today owe a substantial debt to the courage and stamina of the black men who preceded them, who fought the initial private and public struggles and created images and models for generations to come. The black man's struggle to be recognized is long and painful and by no means uncomplicated. The Eboués of this world in their own way gave their lives to that struggle, and in their stubbornness and perseverance helped, perhaps more than we are willing to acknowledge, to bring about the pride and the political stridency which characterize today's Africa and America on matters of colonialism and racism.

In one sense Eboué, like Booker T. Washington, is a black hero, and hence this biography is an important addition to our understanding. But for the student of colonialism this account of a French administrator, the policies, enlightened and otherwise, which he sought to enforce, the failures of the colonial polices and the relationship of administrator to the colonized—all these point to a more complex set of human, administrative and political problems than facts and figures regarding economic exploitation would suggest or identify.

If the Marxian economic promise were realized, if racism were to disappear tomorrow, if neo-colonialism were neither a problem nor a threat, men would still be faced with difficult public and private choices regarding the problems of societies caught between an age gone by and a future of technological complexity, undigested and maybe undigestible.

French colonialism between 1900 and 1945 did much to disrupt and exploit mankind in Africa. Yet, who had the right to tell an Eboué not to strive toward personal achievements, not to select from among the alternatives for a career, a political

philosophy, a life style? Similarly, the clock cannot be turned back on the changes which colonialism brought to Africa economically, politically and socially. The Western white man can easily be condemned for the havoc he has wrought in Africa; yet, he should perhaps teach himself the past and seek to understand the present, rather than con-

verting his private guilt into judgments about past and future choices that Africans have the right to make for themselves.

Both of these books help illuminate the sorts of things both the scholar and the actor need to better understand before claiming to comprehend the choices available to men and societies in Africa.

The Police and the Public by Albert J. Reiss

(Yale University Press; 228 pp.; \$7.95)

Fred Lazin

Albert Reiss—in contrast to many experts—offers clarity and wisdom on the problems of crime and the role of the police. His focus is on the relationship between police and public; in their interaction, he argues, lies the cause of many problems and the potential solution to them.

According to Reiss's research, the police are basically a reactive organization, responding to citizens rather than acting on their own initiative. Reiss discounts police efforts to prevent crime, for outside of narcotics and morals, "where one can intervene in transactions that are part of an organized system of transaction," most preventive techniques do not feed into the criminal justice system. For example, "about 93 per cent of all incidents processed by the patrol division in Chicago developed from citizen initiative." And for this reason too, Reiss contends, the suggestion that policemen should be returned to foot patrol is misconceived:

"[The foot patrolman] was relatively ineffective in dealing with crimes without citizen co-operation, he rarely discovered crimes in progress, and his capacity to prevent any crime was extremely limited by his restricted mobility, especially after the advent of the automobile."

The relationship between police

and public also has an effect upon police behavior in face-to-face encounters. When do policemen use excessive force? Reiss argues that it is the respect shown for authority rather than race or the seriousness of the crime which determines if the arresting officer will use force (verbal abuse is not considered here). The police are more often violent with minor criminals who do not show respect for their authority than with major criminals who do. When a citizen considers the police intervention legitimate, the encounter is likely to be civil. When he does not, the policeman is prone to assert his authority, either through threats or the actual use of force. Reiss found the latter situation more likely to occur when the police intervene on their own and in minor violations in which the violator and/or bystanders view the police action as arbitrary or discretionary. He also found that resistance to arrest and interference more often occur in connection with minor crimes.

Reiss places partial blame for police misconduct on the criminal justice system. He describes the latter as a loosely articulated hierarchy of five major subsystems: citizens, law enforcement or police, public prosecution, misdemeanor and felony courts and the appellate subsystem. All too often, he says, each subsys-