

quite different, and Niebuhr had always shown himself able to use either theological or nontheological language as the occasion required; compare his articles and editorials in *Christianity and Crisis* with those in *The Nation* or *The New Leader*. It is true also that Niebuhr, in the 1965 volume, is deeply critical of the parochialism of the religious communities, especially Protestantism; but this is nothing new in Niebuhr. His appreciation of secular sources of wisdom, emphasized in 1965, was anticipated by his call in the Gifford Lectures for a supplementation and correction of the Reformation by the insights of the Renaissance, as well as by his appropriation of Marxism. The evidence, therefore, does not support the thesis that these features of his later works indicate a

move by Niebuhr away from the specifics of the Christian faith, as Stone implies. Early and late, he showed an ability to combine the Christian and the modern, the religious and the secular, in a way that baffles even his best interpreters.

The author terms his work an "intellectual autobiography" of Niebuhr, and he offers sufficient detail to enable the reader to place Niebuhr's developing thought against the background of his life, though for vividness of portraiture it can hardly compare with June Bingham's *The Courage to Care*, which has just been reissued with an addendum on Niebuhr's last years. Stone's work is more an essay in conceptual analysis and clarification, and as such it deserves to be taken seriously by students of Niebuhr's thought.

not only a major force for change, but a force that questions the sanctity of private ownership and the process by which wages, hours, and profits were to be negotiated." So informed, the captains of the free-enterprise system, led by Judge Gary of U.S. Steel, went on a massive strike-breaking crusade. Using the backdrop of the Soviet revolution, they successfully portrayed organized labor as part of an international conspiracy that was set on destroying everything sacred to America, from sexual decency to motherhood.

Levin relates how these respectable business leaders used every deceptive tactic they could find to avoid negotiating the strikers' demands for the right to collectively bargain to improve their wages, hours and working conditions. Labor spies and detectives were used to infiltrate and collect false evidence for deporting immigrant union men. U.S. Steel reproduced thousands of copies of the *Communist Manifesto*, in the name of the strikers, and then had them confiscated and displayed to the American public as proof of the conspiracy. And through these means U.S. Steel successfully smashed the strike of their 250,000 workers and dismantled their union for years to come.

But, as Levin points out, business could not have created such a myth without the help of other elements of the pluralist coalition. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, along with the young, energetic J. Edgar Hoover, immensely enhanced their careers by promoting the conspiracy through deportations, phony raids, illegal detainments and fabricated plots. They expanded their Justice Department empires by requesting and receiving congressional funds for additional personnel to fight the Reds. In addition, Palmer used the issue to catapult him to a possible presidential nomination.

Yet another willing partner was the American press, our "bastion of freedom." With a keen nose for hot views and a sharp eye for increased profits from expanded circulation, almost every major newspaper hopped on the anti-Communist band-

Political Hysteria in America: The Democratic Capacity for Repression

by Murray B. Levin

(Basic Books; 312 pp.; \$8.50)

Leslie J. Leopold

Most of us would prefer to forget about Red Scares altogether and if we are reminded, it is comfortable to treat them as an infrequent aberration from our otherwise decent social pattern. Pluralist intellectuals, like Richard Hofstadter, Daniel Bell and Seymour Lipset, have an even more comforting explanation. Red Scares are the price our system pays when the masses are inspired to deal with highly charged moral issues. In the pluralist view, we could best avoid political hysteria by allowing responsible leaders of interest groups to deal in the practical world of bread-and-butter issues, leaving aside the troublesome moral claims which leave no room for compromise and tend toward dogmatism and fanatic repression.

And then there is Murray Levin. Levin demonstrates that the great

Red Scares were not odd exceptions to the rule, not the loss of some mythic pluralist balance, but an ugly symptom of a prevailing, continuing sickness in our political souls. American pluralism, far from curing the disease, is one of the causes.

In the Red Scare of 1919, for example, Levin finds that the turmoil was not created by a mass which ran amok but by a combination of various elite groups which saw their diverse interests best served by fostering an almost totally fantastic belief that America was threatened by a Bolshevik conspiracy. Big business, concerned about the growing power and militancy of organized labor after World War I (in 1919 there were 3,600 strikes involving four million workers), was in the forefront. The corporations seemed to sense, Levin states, that "organized labor was

wagon. Sensationalist journalism of the type and quality which served so well in World War I covered the nation. The press, almost without exception, printed and supported every fantasy the Justice Department issued and consistently sided with the corporations in their efforts to break the unions.

And there were still more groups profiting from the hysteria. The military sought more funds to roll back the Russian Revolution. The AFL maintained its dominance over labor by encouraging the destruction of the radical and industrial unions. Suprapatriotic organizations and speakers began to grow fat with increased revenues from their expanding memberships as well as from money donated freely by large corporations.

Through his exploration of the 1919 Scare, Levin successfully counters the pluralist arguments. Mass politics did not create the hysteria but rather "leaders of interest groups—many of whom belonged to several—men of the highest social standing, men deeply socialized in American belief, men allegedly committed to pluralism and democracy, promoted an extremist hysteria. Mass politics in America can be an excellent mask for privilege and pluralist self-interest." Mr. Levin, of course, is not the first person to argue successfully against the pluralists. If the only aim of his book were to take another shot at Lipset et al., this reviewer would still applaud, but more from force of habit than genuine enthusiasm. But Levin goes one step beyond to deal with why the vast majority of Americans respond so favorably to the theme of anti-communism.

The beginning of an answer comes from an understanding of Americans and the American political culture. Due to our peculiar history, liberalism, with its competitive individualism, is America's sole ideology. Nearly every American feels liberalism as part of his identity, to the violent exclusion of any other perspective. But more importantly Americans suffer tremendously from a lack of "*communitas*." We are "not a community of citizens with fraternity," Levin states, "but an ag-

gregate of private and competitive persons." However, under certain conditions Americans do close ranks and become brothers and sisters. Unfortunately it usually takes a war or a Red Scare, waged against the enemies of liberalism, in order for us to feel some sort of "*communitas*." Tragically, in our desperate efforts to join together, we destroy the left ideologies that perhaps would help us create a society which truly values community and fraternity. Instead, we seem consistently to follow the lead of elite groups that serve their own vested interests by crushing the left.

This reviewer is certain that many readers of *Political Hysteria in America* will find it too radical. Still others may question the soundness of working with such all-encompassing themes. But no reader will easily forget the troubling implications of the arguments. And all but a few will have broadened their perspectives about anti-communism in America.

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Briefly Noted

The British in Egypt by Peter Mansfield

(Holt, Rinehart & Winston; 351 pp.; \$8.95)

Always sympathetic to the nationalistic aspirations of Egyptians, Mansfield's book is painstakingly just to the British imperialists who ruled Egypt after 1882. For most American readers, Mansfield's book will be invaluable in explaining Egyptian politics and political history, especially in making sense of Egyptian political factions—sometimes invisible, sometimes incomprehensible to outsiders without the author's experience in Egyptian affairs. *The British in Egypt* also provides interesting information about contemporary Egyptian leaders; for example, Sadat favored active cooperation with the Axis in World War II as Nasser, apparently, did not. Mansfield, who resigned from the foreign service over the Suez invasion of 1956, is severe in his treatment of Eden and the others who supported that misadventure, but his case, though partisan, is not unfair. And recent events support Mansfield's argument that any foreign power which underrates the strength of Egyptian national sentiment has made an error of major proportions.

Nasser

by Anthony Nutting

(Dutton; 493 pp.; \$10.00)

A marvel of a book. British diplomat Anthony Nutting negotiated with Nasser the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954 and later represented Great Britain at the U.N. He resigned in protest against the British-French-Israeli invasion of 1956 and has devoted his considerable talents since then to writing books that are among the best things we Western types have for understanding the labyrinthine politics of the Arab and African worlds. *Nasser* is a sympathetically critical story of the late Egyptian leader, focusing almost en-

tirely upon the years in power, during which Nutting had rare official and unofficial access to the dictator's behavior and intentions. Although Nasser's contribution, according to Nutting, was hindered by his almost obsessive preoccupation with pan-Arabism, Nutting concludes that Egypt was enormously strengthened, both in material things and in the realm of the spirit, by his leadership. Few writers have conveyed with such lively detail the travail of poorer nations caught up in the brutal machinations of great power politics. *Nasser* is unquestionably an important book for understanding the dilemmas of the Middle East and it will be given further attention in the pages of *Worldview*.

**That Greece Might Still Be Free:
The Philhellenes in the War
of Independence**

By William St. Clair

(Oxford University Press; 412 pp.; \$14.95)

The fact that the Greek War of Independence, one of the earliest "national liberation struggles," inspired European intellectuals is common knowledge. Byron alone would have made it so; dead, the saying went, he "was worth an army to the Greeks." But St. Clair shows that the Philhellenes, ignorant of actual conditions in Greece, projected their own romantic vision into a brutal and very barbarous civil war, turning chieftains who were little more than brigands into heroes in the antique mode. Their efforts to aid the "cause of Greece" were necessarily abortive and mismanaged. In fact, in St. Clair's analysis, even Byron appears pragmatic by comparison. The Greece the intellectuals loved was one which—if it ever existed—had died centuries before; the real Greece they neither admired nor understood. Despite disillusionments, however, the fantastic propaganda of the Philhellenes helped shape the policies of European states. And in more ways than one, the Philhellenes resemble the intellectuals of our own time in their perception of the wars and suf-

ferings of unfamiliar peoples and places.

The Air War in Indochina
ed. by Raphael Littauer and

Norman Uphoff
(Beacon; 289 pp.; \$3.95 [paper])

This is a revised and updated version of the report by the Air War Study Group of Cornell University which was so instrumental in first alerting the American public to the destruction and technological sophistication of the "new phase" of the war in Indochina. The material included here becomes increasingly important as, under President Nixon's Vietnamization program, U.S. casualties decline and the impression of the war's being over is successfully promoted. This inexpensive volume includes statistics and official and unofficial analyses that fill in the background to Frank Harvey's March, 1972, *Worldview* article, "Air War Vietnam—1972." The preface by Neil Sheehan is an especially reflective comment on the politics and morality of air warfare and the problems it poses in communicating the realities of war to the general public. In its original and now revised editions, *The Air War in Indochina* is a basic document in what must be the continuing debate about this war and about the ethical, political and military issues it has raised.

12, 20 & 5

by John A. Parrish

(Dutton; 348 pp.; \$9.95)

The author, now of the Harvard Medical School, offers a moving narrative report of his year as a medical officer with U.S. forces in Vietnam. Dr. Parrish makes specific and painfully personal the nature of that war as viewed from the "triage," where warrior-victims were brought to suffer, to die or maybe to recover and kill again. Such stories do not provide answers to all the questions about the ethics of warfare, but answers that evade stories such as this are little more than dehumanized nonsense.

Goebbels

by Helmut Heiber

(trans. by John K. Dickinson; Hawthorn; 387 pp.; \$9.95)

The merit of this biography of the Nazi propaganda minister is that it takes seriously his intellectual history and gives more than usual attention to Goebbels's own writings, both before and after his accession to power. The too brief treatment of the cultural and political background of Goebbels's life is thoroughly conventional and the only lesson drawn is yet another restatement regarding the banality of evil.

Protestantism

by Martin E. Marty

(Holt, Rinehart & Winston; 368 pp.; \$8.95)

We approached this one with some trepidation. What more could Marty possibly have to say about "Protestantism," especially so soon after last year's warmly received *Righteous Empire*? But this is an entirely different kind of book. In fact, he isn't attempting to say anything "more"; there is really little argument of any sort. What he has done is to survey the wide ranges of Protestantism, in both space and time, and help the reader to touch most, if not all, the bases on subjects from doctrine to ethics to polity. More than three hundred annotated bibliographical references enhance the value of this distinct contribution to the publisher's "History of Religion Series." Introductory surveys of Protestantism have been done before but seldom by an author with Marty's command of the literature and highly readable style. An eminently useful reference volume for students of religion and society.

Ethics and the Urban Ethos

by Max L. Stackhouse

(Beacon; 220 pp.; \$7.95)

Criticisms first, please. Reading the professor of ethics at Andover-Newton Theological School is heavier going than would seem necessary. And

this "Essay in Social Theory and Theological Reconstruction" seems largely aimed at urban planners and other experts who might find the theological-historical excursions excessively offputting. What's more, this is more a systematic argument than an essay; describing it as an essay is perhaps an excuse for sometimes not following through on suggestive allusions that cry out for careful elaboration. But now to the more important points: Professor Stackhouse has given us a statement, both courageous and convincing, that effectively counters the themes of urban weariness and return-to-nature that afflict current intellectual discourse. He of-

fers a carefully nuanced argument establishing the linkage between the city and Judeo-Christian religion and, indeed, between both of them and Western civilization. In a way that goes beyond the now conventional polemic against the vaunted "objectivity" of the sciences, he exposes the historical, metaphysical and even theological assumptions that, for the most part unconsciously, undergird contemporary social theory. (The chapter on "Social Theory as Secular Theology" is recommended to social scientists of all varieties.) Professional ethicists might well argue with Stackhouse's use of "the fit" as an ethical category (what is

good, what is right, what is fit). It is well worth an argument. Stackhouse joins neither in celebrating Harvey Cox's secular city nor in bemoaning Jacques Ellul's doomed Babylon, nor does he merely chart a safe middle way between extremes. He suggests, rather, an urban model for the anticipation of history's fulfillment, and for all of us who may be far from that fulfillment he offers illuminating guidelines for ethical decision along the way. The reader may not buy the answers offered in *Ethics* but he can hardly help being provoked to re-examine the answers with which, knowingly or not, he is now operating.

Correspondence

[from p. 2]

the "deeper meaning of nonalignment." On page 41 Mr. Ranly says that India refused to enter the game of balance of power. These views are only partially correct because all that Jawaharlal Nehru did was to say that the evils of power politics ought to be removed; that European power rivalries should not be extended into Asia; and that India wanted to proceed without joining military alliances. But rarely did Nehru forget in practice that nonalignment was also a form of power politics—albeit a nonmilitary form which was necessary for a weaker member of the world community until such time as it could become strong and be able to "call the shots." The point, therefore, is that India entered the game of power politics in the 1950's, but the entry was not perfect and as such was counterproductive, as, for instance, in 1962. In other words, nonalignment is an important facet of power politics; it is not independent of it or a substitute for it.

Other meanings can be seen in the relationship between nonalignment and power politics, as, for instance, in Nehru's concern to pursue a defense policy through friendship with the USA and China and in his effort to achieve a balance in inter-

national alignments by democratizing international political processes. This is the essential message of Indian negotiators in trade and disarmament affairs, and the message has been consistent from the 1950's to the present. As such it is more appropriate to argue that Nehru was essentially against Big Power politics, and the assumption was that the great powers were the sources of global tension and as such it was essential to rectify the sources of tension rather than the symptoms. A study of actual Indian behavior, in and outside South Asia, will reveal that even though the rhetoric was against power politics, and this camouflaged India's central interests, the actual behavior was an adaptation from the balance-of-power approach to foreign policy.

Second: On page 37 Mr. Schall says that the argument between "three-quarters of the world's governments and Mrs. Indira Gandhi was not about the politics of east Bengal, but about the relationship between politics and force." This description needs to be refined: It is true that the question was not merely one of what happened in Bangladesh but also about the kind of precedents which were being created. But even though the focus was on the relationship between politics and force, the difference between

the Indian and the American governments concerned the implied rules in the relationship. The precedents of Soviet involvement in Czechoslovakia and American involvement in North Vietnam eroded the inhibition against the use of force, and this seemed to be the effect also in Indian foreign policy. Against this, one issue which Messrs. Nixon, Kissinger and Rogers invoked was that "every great power must follow the principle that it should not encourage directly or indirectly any other nation to use force or armed aggression against one of its neighbors" (Nixon's remarks at the State Department, April 10, 1972, USIS text, pp. 1-2). In the context of U.S. views that the USSR should restrain India in security matters, Indians were quick to notice that such logic applied to India's military action vis-à-vis Pakistan but did not seem to apply to the worldwide involvements of the great powers. As such it seemed that the argument was not only about the relationship between politics and force but whether there were going to be at least two sets of rules on this point, one of which applied to the nuclear superpowers and the other which applied to lesser powers.

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