American Policy Toward Africa:
Cause for Indictment?

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In his study of U.S. Vietnam policy, The Limits of Intervention, Townsend Hoopes ruefully admitted that "nothing is more difficult to confront than the need to outgrow conceptions that have had undeniable validity—have been in truth basic reference points for thought and action involving the life of the nation. It is a difficulty that persists even when one is intellectually aware that familiar conceptions no longer fully square with the facts." Hoopes intended his strictures to apply to the cold war tenets which for so long provided the guidelines for U.S. foreign policy. They apply with equal force, however, not only to either official policies and orientations but to the conceptions of their critics.

Nowhere is the need to outgrow familiar conceptions more necessary than in the case of those who have long advocated more enlightened and liberal policies toward the African continent. This includes not only those who advocate a more generous approach to developmental problems of black Africa but also those who advocate a more militant American approach to the racialist, minority regimes of Southern Africa. This constituency emerged at a time of unusual optimism in America. The simultaneous advent of the Kennedy Administration and the upsurge in African sovereignties was particularly felicitous. The energies of an activist and innovative Presidency were wedded to a feeling of hopefulness and expectation on the African continent. An administration that could underwrite the slogan "Africa for the Africans" would not be spiritually or cogitatively remote from the aspirations of 250 million people for autonomy, identity and self-respect. Nor could it lend much comfort to people who dominated and manipulated those considered racial inferiors.

It would be overly cynical to suggest that cold war diplomacy and great-power rivalry were the sole wellsprings of this African-American embrace. African independence was as morally unassailable for the Kennedy Administration as was the quest by America's black citizens for equality and expression. And the orientation of American policy in the early 1960's was characterized by an ongoing and limitless generosity, based upon the notion that no problem was insoluble if the resources, resolve and good will of the United States were brought to bear upon it. No problem was permanently insoluble—neither racial oppression nor underdevelopment. For their part, African leaders conveyed to us the impression of responsible, statesmanlike men grappling with the protean and elemental problems of development and autonomy. Never were issues seen with greater clarity; never were problems addressed with more forthrightness and candor.

But to expect these perceptions and values to remain constant through a decade of governmental instability, internal and international violence, thwarted expectations in Africa and equally monumental alterations in the political life of America is to be susceptible to dangerous fantasies. Africa is not as it was in 1960; neither is the United States. Forces which prompted American activism in the early 1960's have become muted or are interpreted in vastly different ways and result in arguments for retrenchment. Principles which served as guideposts for policy a decade ago are now relegated to desuetude. The realities of sub-Saharan politics, so crystalline and unambiguous, now give way, in a period of growing pessimism, to murky and uncertain conditions which do not yield starkly moral stands.

A few latent realities demand explication at this point. First of all, Tropical Africa—that stretch of the continent south of the Sahara and north of the Zambezi—no longer provides much grist for the policy mills of America. The political climate of the 1960's with its attendant proclivity for tarring every African

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conflict with the cold war brush is thankfully past. One can only imagine the cosmic coloration that might have been given to the recent communal warfare in Burundi if the issue had arisen in the 1960's. Even by the time of the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war, the 1960-vintage predilection for casting every African quarrel in ideological terms had noticeably ebbed.

Even more marked than the disappearance of the cold war test for almost every cataclysm in Tropical Africa is the increasing tendency of the independent black states themselves to downgrade issues of decolonization in favor of more prosaic day-to-day problems of identity and survival. Old facile judgments have been rendered quite inappropriate. In the sixties, for example, American partisans of African independence and autonomy confronted few ambiguities and could be generally supportive of the new states. The issues were clearer then and less fraught with uncertainty. They embraced questions of independence versus dependency, national autonomy versus neocolonialism, and the right of the new states to order their destinies free from the constraints of alien influence.

And now, as we enter the seventies? Residual foreign control of African territory and the continued denial of sovereignty by former colonial powers is no longer the burning issue it once was in Tropical Africa. A relative handful of Africans in the heartland of the continent now live under foreign political control. Neocolonial economic hegemonies persist but their continuance—often at the behest of independent governments—is a more elusive target than the existence of outright colonial rule.

Unquestionably the residual economic control of African economies by European powers is a limitation of effective sovereignty, but given the diminished interest in Africa by nations with no colonial tradition and the general decline in development assistance funds, what incentives do the independent states have to finish off the lingering influence of the old imperial powers? The sectoral and asynchronous impact of private foreign investment and even outside bilateral nation-to-nation aid is well known. Making Abidjan into a tropical fantasy land not only does little for the rural areas of the Ivory Coast but indeed bleeds its rural vitality by depopulating the countryside of its most talented and ambitious people. Creating a great oil empire in the delta region of the Niger may, in the long run, percolate down to the war-shattered village societies. Its immediate impact, however, has been to enrich a handful of entrepreneurs, politicians and soldiers.

Far more troubling from a moral perspective is the wave of expulsions involving the half million Asians in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. In East Africa it is not the large foreign companies which are regarded as the problem but rather the small shopkeepers, mechanics and professionals of Subcontinent descent. Despite the recent furor over the expulsion of these Asians from Uganda by the military government of General Idi Amin, this is not a novel problem, nor one restricted to Uganda nor, indeed, even to East Africa. When the issue was one of coping with large foreign corporations or even with favored groups such as the settlers in the “White Highlands” of Kenya, moral qualms could be laid to rest by invoking the exigencies and imperatives of independence. But when the alien economic influences are themselves a petit bourgeoisie of small-holders, shopkeepers and artisans and Third World persons, the issue becomes more uncertain. To be sure, these Asians were given the choice at the time of independence of becoming citizens of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania or retaining their British passports. These Asians are, moreover, vulnerable to charges of repatriation of capital and acting in a high-handed
manner toward Africans. But it is one thing to give a large European corporation its walking papers and quite another to condemn to hardships thousands of men, women and children only slightly more prosperous than the African population.

There are, moreover, ominous signs that the East African initiative on the expulsions of Indians, Pakistanis and Bengalis may well be imitated by West African states that have their own alien comprador classes. In the midst of the purges of Asians in Uganda, Liberian Age, a spokesman for the Monrovia government, hailed the expulsions, thereby raising the threat that the same fate might await Liberia's Lebanese and Syrian shopkeepers who dominate the retail trade of that nation. Ample precedent for the expulsion of non-European aliens exists in West Africa. Shortly after becoming Prime Minister of Ghana in 1969, Dr. Kojo Busia ordered out thousands of resident Tagolese. There has also been a history of depredations against resident Nigerians in the Ivory Coast. Recently the government of Zaire expelled thousands of Nigerians who had played an important role in that nation's retail trade. As the crisis of development becomes more acute in many African states, the frustrated and hapless leadership can often find no satisfactory foreign challenge upon which to displace popular anxiety. Some have turned inward to provide targets for popular frustration.

As development efforts have lagged and national optimism been replaced by the grim realization that the world no longer focuses attention on Africa and its problems, internal difficulties have been magnified and draconian measures imposed by the African regimes. Crimes of violence and crimes against property have risen sharply in recent years. In Nigeria such criminal activity has attended the demobilization of almost a quarter of a million men in the Nigerian and defeated Biafran forces. Weapons once used in battle are now employed in bank robberies and other assaults. The response of the Federal Military Government has been harsh and retributive. In the first half of 1971 over forty men accused of armed robbery faced public execution by firing squads. This practice has been intensified in the face of continuing criminal activity. But even in those countries with no demobilization problem the second decade of independence has seen alarming rises in criminality and stern responses. Recently in Bangui, capital of the Central African Republic, the President, General Jean-Bedel Bokassa, presided over the exemplary beating of accused thieves, some of whom died in the process of the public spectacle. In East Africa the government of Kenya introduced legislation authorizing capital punishment for armed robbery. To some degree the seemingly minatory responses of the African governments are merely reflective of the legendary African distaste for crime and a manifestation of the traditional belief in justice sternly meted out. But they also reflect a casting about for scapegoats upon which to place the blame for developmental stagnation. The increase in crime can be traced to deep-seated societal causes, such as frustration with continued national poverty, an inability of the regimes to process satisfactorily the demands of the society and an influx of hopeful but unskilled country people to the cities.

Even these African governments which have attempted novel and innovative schemes to foster development which no longer rely upon foreign investment have found that in the absence of an adequate resource base, imagination and self-discipline cannot prevail. In an attempt to arrest the decay of rural life in Tanzania, President Julius Nyerere instituted in 1967 a policy of rural revitalization based on socialist principles and fueled by exhortations to hard work and self-reliance. Far from suffering apathy and skepticism—the fate of other such programs in Africa—the so-called ujamaa villages have had more applicants than they could efficiently handle. Development experts frequently state that material resources in the absence of popular will cannot achieve a developmental breakthrough, but Tanzania with great will and few resources is experiencing serious problems. These difficulties are compounded by a lack of managerial skills to operate an economy which is farther along the road to operative socialism than any in Africa. The state corporations of Tanzania are experiencing operational difficulties unparalleled except by those Kwame Nkrumah encountered in Ghana prior to his downfall in 1966. In Ghana itself, two military regimes and a civilian government attempted to honor the $94 million debt to foreign companies incurred by the Nkrumah regime. With the price of cocoa, Ghana's principal export crop, now in a tailspin, the military government of Colonel I. K. Acheampong repudiated the debt, calling it "tainted and vitiated by corruption." So long as Ghana attempted to deal with the rigors of repayment it occupied a special position as one of the few grateful poor. The chances for further private investment are now clouded.

The developmental crises thus create moral ambiguities within the states of Tropical Africa. But they do even more. They establish inevitable links to international problems which cannot be shunned entirely by the great powers. For it moral uncertainties surrounded the expulsions of aliens, the harsh penalties for malefactors, the xenophobic and fratricidal invocation of primordial loyalties—if they do not appear to have direct consequences for the great powers, there is another facet of the developmental crisis that does. Inexorably, as the frustration with lack of developmental or, worse, decay, intensifies and most sources of domestic disharmony have been exorcised, African leaders will again turn to the unresolved problems of the continent, and the classic pattern of displacement of popular frustration on external antagonists will come into play.
It has become an article of faith and policy among the foreign policy elites of the United States government that this country should de-emphasize its political involvement in Africa. On a declaratory level, of course, the government maintains the opposite. Speaking before the Mid-America Committee in Chicago on June 28, Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom sought to assure his listeners that the level of U.S. interest was both high and healthy. Mr. Newsom took to task "a few critics" who "ignore the large and growing U.S. interest in black Africa and, particularly, our interest in the majority-ruled states in Southern Africa. They ignore the fact that our one major intervention in Africa, in close cooperation with the U.N., was to preserve the unity of the Congo against efforts to dismember it supported by the white-dominated regimes." Mr. Newsom's citation of a decade-old event says little about the present state of affairs, but after a lengthy explanation of U.S. policy in regard to the Portuguese territories, and Rhodesia and South Africa, Mr. Newsom returned to black Africa. His recitation of the bona fides of the U.S. toward the developing states is poignant in its quaintness and vagueness.

Through visits, correspondence and the work of our diplomatic missions, we have established bonds of friendship and common interest which belie any suggestion of neglect. The Ambassador of one of the most militant African countries recently told one of our officers that he was preparing a memorandum for his government emphasizing the degree of attention given both personally to him and to the needs and interests of Africa by those in the U.S. government. We are in continuing correspondence with several African heads of state, including one from another militant government who, while not agreeing with all that we are doing, emphasizes the appreciation for the attention we give him and the needs of his country.

The civility of the United States to Africa has never been questioned and words of encouragement are never in short supply. Assistance figures, however, tell a different story, and they reveal that U.S. public economic aid to Africa declined from a high of $457.6 million in 1962 to slightly over $150 million in 1971. The number of states receiving significant assistance has, through a policy of "concentration" initiated in 1967 pursuant to the Korry Report, declined from 36 as late as 1963 to eight. There are sound reasons for much of this consolidation, for many projects supported by U.S. economic assistance were marginal to national development efforts. There were, however, moral as well as economic judgments implicit in the U.S. aid retrenchment, most notably in selecting eight target states as recipients of the bulk of U.S. bilateral assistance. In effect, the United States decreed that eight states have the potential for survival and development, and the balance will either have to secure assistance from the former metropolitan powers or attempt to make it on their own. Of the eight states, one (Liberia) is a traditional haven for U.S. private investment; another (Ethiopia) is the site of important U.S. military and intelligence-gathering facilities; Nigeria is not only the ninth most populous nation but a state regarded as uniquely favored for private investment; Ghana's repudiation of the $94 million debt may jeopardize its favored category among the "big eight," and the recent uncertainties about the East African Community (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania), especially after the destabilizing effect on the community of the Uganda coup, may raise questions about the future of bilateral assistance in that region.

But even if U.S. assistance should stabilize at the $150-175 million level, exclusive of surplus food programs, Peace Corps expenses and military assistance, it is unlikely that the United States will do much to alleviate the crisis syndrome in the independent states of black Africa. There are simply too many holes to plug in a continent where the annual per capita income amounts to only $135; where literacy rates average less than 20 per cent on a regional basis; where life expectancy is 44 years; where about 80 per cent of the labor force is involved in agriculture; and where the annual population growth rate approaches 3 per cent. If every form and modality of present U.S. assistance--multilateral and bilateral, military and economic, technical and material, public and private--were aggregated, it would still be only trifling support for this continent of 300 million people. As Aaron Segal recently observed, the level of U.S. bilateral assistance to Cambodia in 1971 exceeded that of all aid to Africa. There appears nothing that the United States is capable, or willing, to do to alleviate the plight of the people or the frustration of the leaders of Africa. Political reasons no longer compel involvement and compassion appears inadequate to foster significant assistance.

Unquestionably that which could serve as an outlet for the frustration of the black states and possibly involve the major powers are Portugal's residual colonial control and white minority-ruled states in Rhodesia and South Africa. On a rhetorical level the United States has traditionally invoked proper anti-colonial and anti-apartheid sentiments. To read State Department and White House statements on the subject is to be struck by the ostensible degree of U.S. commitment to the principles of majority rule. Here again there is slippage between profession and action.

It has become fashionable in Washington to stress the depoliticization of African issues. Implicit in this sentiment is the belief that the cold war rivalries were the principal sources of political tensions in the continent and that the decline in the interests of the great powers in Africa
has eliminated the possibility of ideological clashes. It is true that the chances for a direct great-power confrontation in Africa have diminished. But the frustration attendant on the developmental crisis may yet result in confrontations between the blackruled states and whiteruled states of Africa—confrontation which could have the secondary effect of involving the great powers. There is a profound belief in Washington that this will not happen. This belief, as expressed in the State Department’s report to the President, “United States and Africa in the Seventies,” states that “We cannot accept the fatalistic view that only violence can ultimately resolve these issues [racial oppression and residual colonialism]. Rather we believe that solution lies in the constructive interplay of political, economic, and social forces which will inevitably lead to changes.”

For the United States this attitude represents a tour de force of positive thinking. Certain developments within Africa gave some substance to this notion. For the past several years an increasing number of “pragmatic” African leaders seemed to be drawing back from their declared hostility to the white regimes. Indeed, the forces of confrontation were in such disarray that any scenario of black-white international conflict would have amounted to science fiction. This deeply cherished belief of the United States was reinforced by favorable auguries in both Southern Africa and in the mid-continent. The voices of conciliation—President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Premier Busia of Ghana and President Tsirinana of the Malagasy Republic—were holding the palm branches, at least to Pretoria if not Salisbury. South Africa, moreover, could make moderation profitable. The hope of a liberalizing trend in South Africa centered on the so-called perligtheid (enlightened) policies of cooperation with black Africa set forth by Prime Minister Vorster and the cutting off of the old Afrikaner irreconcilables from the National Party to form the Reconstituted National Party.

On closer examination, however, verligtheid appears to be no more than South Africa’s attempt to create discord in the Organization of African Unity, to accept (but ghettoize) African diplomats, and to create for all the world the illusion of evolutionary change. Manifestly, verligtheid had few domestic consequences apart from some effort to equalize pay for identical jobs held by blacks and whites. Not only did the policy of grand apartheid as defined by the creation of a bantustan in Namibia by the creation of a bantustan in Namibia in the defiance of a World Court decision and the United Nations. Domestically, the National Party, if headed anywhere, is moving in the direction of less liberal-

ism. The recent resignation of the Minister of the Interior to work for improved race relations leaves the cabinet in the hands of strongly conservative elements. External dialogue with black Africa was not even mentioned during the last sitting of the South African Parliament.

The response of the United States to dialogue has been quite enthusiastic, since it appeared to alleviate some of the pressure on this country to discourage private investment in South Africa. The Department of State has long maintained that it neither encourages nor discourages such investment. But other executive agencies, notably the Department of Commerce, extravagantly tout South Africa as an investment haven. In addition, some officials and corporations argue that an expanding South African economy will inevitably erode the system of apartheid labor and that a large American commercial community will liberalize racial policies. A recent survey of the racial attitudes of American businessmen in South Africa calls this latter argument into question, since it indicates general U.S. business support for the existing racial policies.

The black African side of the dialogue also appears to have been blunted. The erosion of support for the liberation activities of the OAU appears, for the time being, to have been arrested. That erosion can be attributed in part to the removal or alteration of pro-dialogue voices. The overthrow of Dr. Busia in Ghana, a staunch partisan of détente, and of President Tsirinana of the Malagasy Republic, a long-standing voice of dialogue, has left Houphouet-Boigny and the heads of vulnerable Southern Africa fringe states as the principal exponents of détente. Other leaders have changed their minds about dialogue. General Idi Amin, Uganda’s mercenaried leader, has altered his position and now speaks of developing regional commands which would have the task of liberating specific colonial or white-dominated areas. President Marien Ngouabi of the Congo, Africa’s most uncompromising Marxist, called for an international brigade to combat colonialism and racism. These and other confrontational views were dominant at the 1972 meeting of the Organization of African Unity at Rabat. Even more surprising was the new militancy of King Hassan of Morocco, who not only severed his country’s already declining economic ties with Portugal but made a personal contribution of one million dollars to the OAU’s Liberation Committee. As Rabat made evident, rivalry among liberation groups is also declining. If only for the sake of superficial comity, Holden Roberto of Angola’s FNLA and Dr. Agostinho Neto of the rival MPLA agreed to shake hands. This may be like De Gaulle and Giraud shaking hands at Casablanca, but it could also signal a closing of the ranks.
How seriously do U.S. policy-makers take these manifestations of militancy? After all, the OAU policy of liberation is almost a decade old and little has been done to divest the Portuguese of their holdings or to mount an assault against the citadel of apartheid. The guerrilla movements function as more of an annoyance (outside of Guinea-Bissau) than an authentic threat to the hegemony of Portugal and of other white-ruled states. If all of this liberation rhetoric is so much feeble sabre-rattling on the part of states that can barely keep their own internal security problems in check, and if the putative internal opposition in South Africa is controlled by an effective system of repression, should the United States take an activist role in Africa on behalf of repressed majorities? Considering only the allocation of commitments, the answer is unquestionably No. From a moral point of view the answer should be a resounding Yes, but purely moral arguments for foreign policy involvement tend to be seen as subjective. If the moral stand proposed and the nature and essence of the political regime charged with fulfilling it are not congruent, it is idle to urge upon the regime an unwonted course of conduct. The record of the Nixon Administration on holding the feet of right-wing dictatorship to the fire is not one to foster enthusiasm. The United States Government has absolutely no intention of pursuing any of the courses of action currently proposed by the American Committee on Africa, the World Council of Churches or any of the many ardent advocates of confrontation with apartheid and residual colonialism. Secretary Rogers, in his March, 1970, statement on Africa, made it quite clear that no thought would be given to severing diplomatic relations with Pretoria. The declaratory support for the U.N. embargo on Rhodesia has been consistently high from the State Department.

It is no doubt true that the State Department’s Africa Bureau really did wish to maintain the integrity of the embargo. The Administration, however, does not speak with a single voice, and while the State Department’s liaison officers were doing battle to head off the Byrd amendment to the Military Procurement Bill which sought to waive the embargo on Rhodesian chrome as a strategic necessity, the White House remained curiously silent. It may be that the Senate Republican leadership, speaking through Senator Hugh Scott, was prodded by the White House to attack the Byrd amendment, but there was none of the vaunted arm-twisting that has attended other issues of presidential interest. So close was the vote on the amendment that even a moderate effort on the part of the White House could have been decisive in securing its defeat. Thus Secretary Rogers’s declaration that the United States “will continue to support U.N. economic sanctions” rings hollow.

But if the friends of Rhodesia in Congress and the allies of corporate interests in the White House are to be condemned for sins of omission, those who advocate maintaining the sanctions are guilty of sins of inaction. The Black Political Caucus, by and large, acted in a fairly irresolute manner, and the various religious, academic and organizational constituencies simply did not measure up to the lobbying juggernaut of various mineral companies and the partisans of Ian Smith who lobbied impressively and, ultimately, effectively. Given the policy predilections of the foreign affairs directorate in the White House and their clear hegemony in policy questions, it is unrealistic to expect the State Department in its secondary role in the formulation of policy to have borne the principal responsibility for the defeat of the amendment. As despairing a realization as it may be, there is simply no way in which the American foes of apartheid and colonialism are going to have much impact on the White House. It is principally at the congressional level that action must be taken in order to influence government policy, and in this battle the advocates of a more progressive policy have been found wanting. Prudent opponents of our African policy should redirect their efforts from the present hortatory and symbolic appeals to a traditional type of lobbying.

It is revealing no doubt of the problems which beset the black American constituency for Africa that the range of problems with which they must cope is so completely dominated by domestic concerns such as integration, income and employment that, even for them, Africa must assume lesser importance. It is questionable indeed how much emotional and material energy can be lavished on African questions in the face of the precarious economic and social position this group occupies in America. Other ethnic groups having attained substantial economic success and political recognition can turn their attention to the concerns of overseas kinsmen. This luxury is not yet available to the American black community.

It would be inaccurate, however, to suggest that African problems have no saliency for American blacks. At this particular time the black constituency is only beginning to grasp the cultural affinities which tie them to Africa. Their period of familiarization with their ancestral home is only now developing at a mass level into an appreciation of the outstanding political issues on the continent. Black political and organizational leaders have not previously presided over a responsive constituency as far as African political questions are concerned. This is now changing. As the first shipment of Rhodesian chromite ore for the Foote Mineral Company was arriving at Burnside, Louisiana, in March, a number of black organizations made plans to picket the unloading of cargoes which had circumvented the blockade. By the time the second shipment destined for the Union Carbide plant at Marietta, Ohio, was being unloaded at Davant, Louisiana, in April, protests were mounted.
These demonstrations persisted as the barges carrying the ore moved up the Mississippi. These activities were followed by a protest at the April 8 stockholders meeting of Union Carbide. Demonstrations were also held at the plant of the Foote Mineral Company in Steubenville, Ohio. Although none of these protests was massive or successful, an important African issue had been successfully introduced into the black community in America.

The potential of African political issues in rallying a black constituency for Africa is increasingly evident. The Gary conference, the May meeting at Howard University and the subsequent rally of over 10,000 people in Washington on behalf of African liberation all point strongly to a more vocal advocacy for African involvement among black Americans. These conferences were followed in September by the meeting in San Diego of the International Conference of African People which brought together black political leaders from the United States and Africa. If this emerging concern for African political issues on the part of black America were to coalesce with the ongoing efforts of church groups, the American Committee on Africa and dissident stockholder and university groups, a broad-gauged assault could be mounted on a passive and equivocal official policy. Even without a man in the White House for whom such groups represent a natural constituency, at least a repetition of the Byrd amendment fiasco might be avoided.

Words of caution, however, are requisite. The organizations and interest groups composed of liberal churchmen, politicians and academicians who have so long carried on the struggle for a forthright stand against discriminatory regimes may discover that the fruition of black involvement in African political affairs may be for them a mixed blessing. As the members of the African Studies Association discovered several years ago at their tumultuous meeting in Montreal, the long period of stewardship of African studies by white academicians was regarded with hostility by the rising group of black scholars. The traditional advocates of African interests in America may well find that they too may be spurned by blacks who see the political advocacy of African welfare as more appropriately theirs. Given the enormous tasks, the modest victories and the limited interest in the area, such a division of forces would be regrettable. With interest in African political issues waning perceptibly within U.S. policy circles, the prospects of its being reawakened depend on three contingencies. The first would be a forced and traumatic reinvolve-ment as internal crises of development in the states of black Africa are redirected as an armed challenge to the white-rulled states. The second, and more unlikely, is strong internal opposition to these regimes, resulting in widespread civil strife. The third, and most positive, is the establishment of Africa as an important policy area for the United States through the emergence of a black domestic constituency for Africa. One or both of the former eventualities might even foster the growth of the latter. In the absence of these contingencies we can expect Africa to recede further in the policy priorities of the United States—a development which even cogent moral arguments cannot arrest.

Those who deplore the passivity of the United States Government in the face of apartheid, colonialism and minority-rule have an obligation to themselves and to Africa not to be deduced into thinking that the simple invocation of moral symbols is sufficient to neutralize the corporate allies of apartheid and the official advocates of retreatment. They cannot, moreover, repose much faith in the ability of the forces of change within the white-rulled states to successfully challenge these regimes. It is, moreover, not ineluctable that even an individual or collective decision by black states to march on Salisbury or Pretoria would involve the United States. Indeed, such American involvement under present political conditions would by no means represent an unambiguous sign of U.S. support for African liberation. If U.S. investments are imperiled by such a development we could well find ourselves involved on the side of the white regimes. There are dangers, moreover, that direct American involvement in Africa would not follow the model of the U.S. support for the U.N. effort to maintain the territorial integrity of the Congo from 1960 to 1964 but might rather imitate the controversial Stanleyville operation of 1964, when U.S.-supplied aircraft and personnel were used to rescue American nationals in the hands of the Congolese rebels. It is not difficult to imagine the recurrence of such a situation today. If the government of Uganda, for example, were to threaten Americans in that country, a repetition of Stanleyville could well occur.

The most feasible, realistic and positive development in pulling the United States out of the morass of inactivity would be the maturation of an effective constituency for Africa within this country—a coalition of groups and individuals willing to articulate persuasive arguments for actions supportive of African development and liberation. Lacking executive empathy and congressional support, and in the face of popular indifference and inauspicious conditions on the continent itself, those Americans who care about the future of Africa must envi- gilitate legislation, challenge policies, contest corporate decisions and create a climate for reigniting political interest in Africa. Simple affirmation and witness are no longer sufficient, nor is the anticipation that some force majeure on the continent itself will reawaken the need for positive and supportive action for the causes of African independence, liberation and self-sufficiency.