authorized to participate, in varying degrees, in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy.

Yost calls for a curtailment of this growing trend toward the military's domination of foreign policy decision-making. He recognizes the real difficulties involved in reversing the trend but argues that not only our country but the entire world is in danger if we do not do so. One cannot believe that Yost is crying wolf. Much has been made lately of the growing power of the President, and rightly so. If those who perceive a gradual movement toward dictatorship have any case at all, it surely rests with the strength being concentrated in the executive branch, an occurrence which seems more ominous, given the military's growing role and power.

Yost does not stop with a general criticism. He lists several ways that the power of the military could legitimately be curtailed. First of all, he suggests a three-quarter cut in the service attachés (military intelligence) assigned to U.S. embassies, a drastic reduction of the U.S. military officer corps, and a three-quarters cut in the staff of the Central Intelligence Agency. (Yost's book should have appeared six months earlier; George McGovern needed the support.) Secondly, he envisions an expansion of the activities of the State Department to encompass some duties which have traditionally been handled by the military and/or the CIA. Finally, he recommends that the National Security Council, if it is going to remain dominated by military men, confine itself to giving military advice, which can then be related to conditions existing in the international community by others possessing broader perspectives.

The weakest portion of The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs is its conclusion. Yost, undoubtedly influenced by his later years with the United Nations, looks to that institution for a ray of hope. Pointing out that the United Nations has lacked political power primarily because the superpowers have willed it that way, he maintains that the threat of nuclear holocaust brought on by the escalating arms race should move the superpowers to re-evaluate their relationship to the U.N. Unfortunately, the vision of a strengthened United Nations with meaningful enforcement powers, though most palatable, seems quite remote.

One of the most interesting offshoots from Yost's book is the reflection upon the gap between his unofficial positions now clearly stated and the official positions necessitated by his place in the U.S. foreign policy hierarchy. It is at the same time encouraging and frightening. It is encouraging to learn once again that there are in high-level government positions clear-thinking men and women such as Yost who have not been blinded by their own rhetoric. It is frightening that a man of his responsibility could or would do so little to affect the direction of U.S. foreign policy. Yost offers yet another example of a phenomenon in American society today—the elusiveness of power. We hear daily from congressmen, Supreme Court justices, even the President—and now Yost—that they are powerless to do this or that. It is to Yost's credit, however, that he does not join Charles Reich in continuing the illusion that power is being diffused; he places the preponderance of power precisely where it lies—in the office of the President with the energetic support of his top advisors, including a number of military men. The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs is written for the general reader, but its uncommonly good sense commends it to the professional foreign service officer as well.

A Theory of Justice
by John Rawls

Alan Emdin

Men have always been concerned with the standards of right and wrong by which they might judge the ordering of their common life. Such standards have been provided by tradition, by the gods or by various modes of philosophy. Perhaps the greatest philosophic doctrines were the classical teachings of Plato and Aristotle, which, through contemplating the unchanging nature of things, put forward standards so pure as to be unattainable in social fact.

In the persons of Descartes and Hobbes classical philosophy was rejected by early modernity on the ground that its metaphysics was untenable. Yet the thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries still believed that nature provided a basis for the rights of men and a guide by which social actions might be judged. Their concern was not for esoteric utopias but for rules naturally acceptable to all, rules which could guarantee minimal rights and security.

Even these standards did not go unchallenged for long. Bentham declared their talk of natural rights to be just so much "nonsense on stilts." In place of natural rights he advanced the criterion of whether an action's consequences maximized pleasure and minimized pain. Unlike natural rights, the existence of pleasure and pain seemed clear. While philosophers of the past might quarrel with the crudeness of Bentham's standards, they recognized that Bentham's approach allowed choice between alternatives, a possibility soon to be virtually denied in social and philosophic thought.

Economists came to the conclusion that one could not really speak of utility as a property of objects or
actions but only as an effect induced in persons. Fresh from his travels in Viennese circles, Lionel Robbins proclaimed that there was no scientific basis by which to compare the effects on one man with those on another. One could not sum up the utilities which alternative courses of action produced in a number of people and then conclude that the action producing the highest total was most choiceworthy. Only those actions from which at least one of the affected believed himself to benefit, and none felt himself to lose, could be scientifically approved of. Needless to say, few such alternatives present themselves, and despite all the imagination and theoretical rigor economists have put to the task, their theories are largely inapplicable to choices in the real world.

Anglo-American philosophers fared little better. Some ignored the question of interpersonal comparisons of utility and proceeded to outline a plethora of act-and-rule utilitarianisms whose complexity is exceeded only by a common inability to provide an acceptable account of our common lives. Some adopted the positivist doctrine that ethical assertions were meaningless and turned their attention to more important topics. Others attempted to rescue ethics from this critique. Slowly, slowly the reconstruction proceeded, often employing Wittgenstein's insights into language. Ethics was not simply a matter of emotions, since it was expected that one could give generalizable reasons for one's claims. While the advances were made with great difficulty and were perhaps indispensable to further progress, it could hardly be said that their end result was in any way comprehensive.

So things stood until the recent publication of John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*. In a conceptual variation of eighteenth-century contract theory, Rawls synthesizes the insights of previous thinkers into what some critics have hailed as a philosophic work of the first rank. He postulates a group of individuals attempting to formulate the basic structures of their society while in the "original position" of ignorance of the particular goals they might later wish to pursue. They would, he claims, unanimously agree to grant each the most extensive liberty compatible with an equal liberty for all others. They would agree that economic inequalities are tolerable only to the degree that they benefit the least advantaged. Rawls also believes that a rather complex set of priority rules through which these maxims could be applied would be unanimously accepted.

Thus formulated, Rawls's theory adopts the most attractive features of welfare economics while avoiding its failings. He uses the economic notion of "lexical ordering" skillfully in the formulation of his priority rules, but he recognizes that the notorious question of interpersonal comparisons of utility is just the problem of the existence of "other minds" in wolf's clothing. More important, he sees that so long as it cannot give more than formal guidance in the formation of preferences nor take full account of the inefficiency of the "political marketplace," the strict economic approach is of only limited applicability to ethics. Having chosen his tools carefully, Rawls constructs a theory by which he incorporates a stunning breadth of topics, ranging from civil disobedience and obligation to taxation and rate of savings.

Any work of so grand a scale will have its minor faults, and Rawle's is no exception. Some subsections dealing with technical philosophic questions fail to advance the main theory, and his indulgence in a bit of social Darwinism is incongruous.

More significant is Rawls's acceptance of what he terms the "natural duties" without presenting a rigorous philosophical justification. It places him in the tradition of Locke rather than of Spinoza and is indicative both of the stature of his book and of our times. Rawls believes that ethics can be dealt with separate from problems of epistemology and metaphysics, as when he writes of Kant's ethics apart from the rest of the Kantian system. The tactic is a risky one. Rawls asserts a similarity between his own work and Aristotle's by citing a passage of the *Ethics* which appears prior to the "new beginning" Aristotle finds himself forced to make in light of the existence of intellectual as well as moral virtue. Indeed, Rawls's rejection of what he terms Aristotelian "perfectionism" on the ground that it would not receive unanimous support in "the original position" simply misses The Philosopher's point.

Disconcerting in a book of such great breadth, this shallowness manifests itself repeatedly. The natural duties, given a justification that is sketchy at best, are further weakened when Rawls divorces them from such notions as obligation. His account of human "development" from childhood notions of authority to more mature moralities of association and principle ignores the efforts of such thinkers as Arendt and Berger to give a greater depth to liberal social theory. When Rawls claims that mutual compliance with the principles advanced by his theory gives an adequate account of community, he gives the game away. Community, after all, is a sentiment which results from sharing a way of life. By admitting that his theory does not apply either to daily interactions or to ritual or to religion, while at the same time asserting that it does account for community, Rawls conjures a picture of the human condition that is all too familiar and far too limited.

The standards by which I criticize Rawls are not easily met. They have driven great minds to despair. "Oh to have lived in the days of Leibnitz," wrote Bertrand Russell, "when systems were still possible." Still, one suspects that most men have always found their times debilitating and that in the end it is not the age but the man that is crucial.

Rawls began his project faced with a bewildering multiplicity of problems. He has spun a web whose intricacy demands admiration, but in so doing he has illustrated a greater truth. If, as the scholastic Bernard of Chartres (and not Francis Bacon) first noted, standing on the shoulders of giants permits us to see farther,
standing on each others' shoulders sometimes presses the giants below into the ground and out of our thoughts. To borrow the words from Rawls himself, our debt to him is best measured "not by the shortfall from what might be, but by the distance traveled from the beginnings." The question is just where the beginnings should be located.

The Chilean Revolution: Conversations With Allende
by Régis Debray
(Pantheon; 201 pp.; $8.95)

James Nelson Goodsell

Salvador Allende Cassens may seem like a very unlikely exponent of revolution. Born to middle-class Chilean parents, Allende grew up in a patrician atmosphere and continues to enjoy a life-style more in keeping with traditional upper-middle-class Chilean values than one normally associates with revolutionaries. Allende, for example, collects Oriental art as others do postage stamps.

Yet it was Salvador Allende as a young doctor who helped found the Chilean Socialist Party in 1933 and who, in late 1970, became president of Chile and head of a Marxist-oriented government seeking to revolutionize Chile's political, economic and social structures. In the two years since then, his efforts have brought significant change to Chile and promise to do even more, although vigorous opposition from the political right and center makes the going increasingly rough.

Whether Allende's brand of revolutionary change can truly be classified as revolution is open to some question, however, and the debate is a lively one, particularly in Chile. Yet the goals sought by Allende and his Unidad Popular coalition government, composed of Socialists, Communists, Christian leftists and others, are clearly revolutionary. An insight into these goals and the Allende concept of how they can best be achieved in Chile is contained in this valuable set of conversations that French leftist Régis Debray had with Dr. Allende in early 1971.

Debray clearly admires the Chilean President, although he is challenging in the questions he puts to Allende, who styles himself the "Comrade President." Under Allende, the goals of a revolutionary society are being sought through the laws of Chile and within the traditional framework of Chilean society. In a sense, Allende is working within the very system that he wants to change. This in turn explains some of Allende's problems, particularly those he has with his own Socialist Party, which is calling on him to move faster and, in some instances, go outside the traditional patterns of Chilean behavior to make the desired changes.

But Allende is convinced that his approach is right—at least as far as Chile is concerned. Over and over again, in answers to questions posed by Debray, he indicates that Chile is unique and must be regarded as an individual case, that in judging Chile and his performance one must keep the Chilean reality in mind. In this connection Allende and Debray (in his introduction to the book) argue that, as president, Allende is committed to his own legitimacy. Allende recognizes that this poses problems. But he says at one point in his conversations with the French journalist that "each leader must make a concrete analysis of a concrete situation—this is the essence of Marxism. Thus, each country prepares its own tactics in the light of its own situation."

That would seem to sum up the very Chilean nature of his program, which aims at nudging Chile as fast as possible along the road to socialism, but always within the framework of what Chilean laws permit. In his first year in office those laws permitted a great deal—the nationalization of copper, massive efforts to accelerate the agrarian reform process, takeovers of foreign and domestic companies, the nationalization of the banking industry through government purchasing of the shares of the banks, and so forth.

But those very laws provide also for an opposition which at the moment is becoming increasingly vocal and increasingly able to frustrate Allende in many of his goals. The opposition has, in effect, said "hasta (enough)!" and has thrown numerous roadblocks in Allende's path. At this time, Allende appears to be revising some of his strategy in the light of these roadblocks, and there are some in Santiago who feel that the Comrade President may well yield to the urgings of his more radical supporters who want him to push ahead with his program even if it means he goes outside the system to do it.

After reading the Debray-Allende conversations, however, one is struck with the basic desire of Allende to work within the system. Yet if Allende does stick to this approach, the very revolution which the Debray book proclaims in its title could be derailed and Allende could go down in history as less of a revolutionary than he sees himself. That in essence is Allende's basic dilemma.

Whatever the outcome of the current struggle in Chile, the conversations in this book provide a much-needed insight into Allende the man. One caution is in order. Interviewer and interviewed think much alike, and the language is clearly Marxist-oriented. Moreover, some of the references to fact and history, particularly in Debray's footnotes, are woefully inaccurate and one-sided. Nonetheless, The Chilean Revolution is a vigorous defense of Allende's goals and ideals; it is important reading.