

but Saloma and Sontag seem to regard procedural change as sufficient. There is hardly any mention of the policy consequences of party behavior and structure. Thus, in discussing Congress, the conservative effects of the committee system are not considered. Although it is suggested that appointees to committees be screened for "competence," they do not propose that congressmen be screened for their policy views. Even party leaders, Saloma and Sontag suggest, "would be evaluated less in terms of their support or loyalty to a written party program than in terms of actual political performance and party due process." Surely such proposals emphasize form over content.

Even if we accept the goal of procedural reform as an ultimate objective, we can doubt its feasibility. Few people are moved to political action by an unanchored interest in open caucuses or annual budget reports. Rather, it is substantive demands that bring procedural changes. The discontent with American politics was engendered by racism and Vietnam, not party rules. The reforms in the Democratic Party came because activists wished to end the war and achieve other policies. Without such policy issues, party reform is unlikely.

The critical issue here is that of the incentives to political activity. What will induce citizens to fit the Saloma-Sontag outline? In traditional parties, activity was encouraged by patronage, contracts and what these authors call "the power motive." They suggest no new incentive for their citizen politicians other than a vague "demand for governmental competence and performance." Will this really be sufficient to encourage citizens to campaign, contribute, recruit, program computers to address envelopes and do the other hundreds of jobs involved in politics, and to do so for years on end? Policy goals are the only observable alternative incentives, but these are given little attention.

While Saloma and Sontag note regretfully that "the political landscape is littered with the bleached skeletons of citizen endeavors," they

have failed to consider the basic reasons for these repeated defeats. Their vision of the parties' future is therefore attractive but incomplete.

That vision must include not only a roadmap of the routes to Utopia but also a guidebook to the new City of God.

The Party of Eros: Radical Social Thought and the Realm of Freedom by Richard King

(University of North Carolina Press; 227 pp.; \$7.50)

Daniel M. Ogilvie

The appearance of the book *The Party of Eros*, or one like it, in spring, 1972, was predictable. The time was ripe for a review of the ideas of scholarly heroes who had provided the intellectual and philosophical groundwork that had been molded into explanations for felt dissatisfactions of youths and reasons for social protest in the 1960's. It was time to say that these writers not only had personal histories but also intellectual forebears and that basic faults of logic or theoretical omissions could be located somewhere in the writings of each.

Richard King singled out Herbert Marcuse, Paul Goodman and Norman O. Brown for concentrated critical review. Before that task was undertaken, Mr. King reconstructed a portion of the history of radical social thought in America during this century. This chapter, the book's first, is King's most original contribution and reveals an enviable level of scholarship that remains essentially intact throughout the remaining chapters.

Special emphasis is placed on Dwight Macdonald's *Politics*, a journal published from 1944 to 1949 that sought to find a "third way." No friends of New Deal liberalism or Stalinist communism, MacDonald and his contributing authors, including Goodman, tried but mostly failed to find their way to a convincing description of happier alternatives for American society. The

journal did succeed, however, in becoming a forum for radical ideas, some of which would become popular in the 1960's. Communes, the relativity of social justice, the dangers of scientism and the interplay between sexual and political repression were some of the topics discussed in *Politics* that found new life some twenty years later.

Appropriately enough, King's second chapter discusses Sigmund Freud and Wilhelm Reich. The theories of both, especially their theoretical treatments of the relationships among human sexual drives and social organizations, had to be discussed in order to provide a context for Goodman, Marcuse and Brown.

Chapter two also sets a pattern for the remainder of the book. It is serious and well researched. The reader is informed of the basic ingredients of the theoretical views of the persons discussed, the criticisms of those views by other authors and King's own discoveries of theoretical and/or practical inconsistencies. But somehow through the maze of abstractions, fine theoretical distinctions and "telling" points Eros gets lost. Radicalism born out of severe dissatisfaction and the search to identify and write about sources of human discontent are taken to levels of abstraction that allow little else than mental games.

For those readers who want to be-

come familiar with the ideas of Wilhelm Reich, Paul Goodman, Herbert Marcuse and Norman O. Brown, *Eros* provides an intelligent and truthful summary of each. One should be warned, though, that the "party" is not much fun. Despite King's scholarly treatment of each guest, they stand in separate sections of the ballroom, dusty. Well-intentioned, partly right, partly wrong. They stand as willing or unwilling academic/radical/literary referents of a burst of energy four or five years ago, now pegged by an academic tradition that goes on and on and on.

The drudgery that builds up through the pages of *Eros* is partly

relieved in the final chapter when the author discusses "The New Transcendentalism." The chapter seems to be an afterthought, a way to get in some licks at Theodore Roszak, Philip Slater and Charles Reich. In the meantime, King raises, but does not elaborate on, some important aspects of the new mysticism. *Eros*, whose primary aim is to establish intimate and self-verifying relations with others, is seen as fearing that direction and making a regressive turn toward a mystical union with the universe. For once, *Eros* comes alive in the book. But life passes swiftly as the author turns again to arranging colleague-impressing abstractions.

thesis hamper Dornberg's search for sources of change or reform. All well and good to place hope in a "Soviet Alexander Dubček waiting in the Kremlin wings" or—"more likely"—in the post-Stalin generation. Indeed, this hope is implicit in the book's title and in the quotation of Yevtushenko's *The Heirs of Stalin*:

We bore him out of the mausoleum.

But how, out of Stalin, shall we bear Stalin's heirs . . .

While the heirs of Stalin walk this earth,

Stalin,

I fancy, still lurks in the mausoleum.

Yet, given Dornberg's premise of continuity, the arrival of a Dubček *deus ex machina* should have little more impact than past czars, e.g., Alexander II, the "Czar Liberator" or "Czar" Khrushchev, and the same premise dashes hopes for regeneration once Stalin's heirs have passed from the scene.

Dornberg, former chief editor of *Newsweek's* Moscow Bureau, has written an interesting and readable book of ambitious scope. He touches upon the danger of re-Stalinization, on the dissent movement, nationalism and bloc relations, the privileges enjoyed by the classless society's upper classes and problems in society and the economy, all with a knowing hand and a clear style. But one wishes that instead of a lengthy survey he had limited his topic to his early emphasis on the danger of re-Stalinization and the dissident intellectuals and elaborated upon their implications for the handling of dissent in Soviet society. Or perhaps a comparison of the contemporary and of the nineteenth-century dissident movements. Their resemblances are acknowledged in his comment on the Kremlin's awareness that "similar voices in the 19th century had helped to weaken the fabric of the tsarist empire," but Dornberg doesn't pursue them. And some very provocative analogies and contrasts could have been made between the aims, methods and fate of the dissenters and the populist (*narodnik*)

The New Tsars: Russia Under Stalin's Heirs by John Dornberg

(Doubleday; 458 pp.; \$10.00)

Della Sheldon

The New Tsars deals implicitly with the continuation of czarist Russia in the Soviet Union and the prospect for reform in the USSR. Mr. Dornberg premises an ineluctable continuity between the czarist and Soviet systems: "Ivan the Terrible, Boris Godunov, the Romanovs, Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev—a succession of tsars, crowned and uncrowned"—and the "immutability of Russia and the Russians," where, for centuries, "secrecy, police surveillance, rewriting of history, the omnipotence and arrogance of rulers, adherence to a doctrinaire ideology, idleness, poverty and Potemkinism have been institutionalized." At the end of the 1960's Dornberg discerned a "clear and imminent danger that the heirs of Stalin now in power will throw the wheel of history into reverse" and abandon Khrushchev's de-Stalinization for "re-Stalinization."

The reasons for Dornberg's pessi-

mism lie either in the nature of the system or in the Russian "national character" or in Stalin's heirs, but he never quite decides which. The negative characteristics of Soviet society are variously attributed to the 250-year Tartar rule, which "imbued the Russian national character with aspects it never lost"; the Russian propensity for "borrowing" from the West—Christianity, science and technology and Marxism; and Stalin's heirs. Communism is neither held responsible nor praised, for it has resulted in "little change." Moreover, "the reign of Stalin was no accident of history but the ineluctable consequence of Russia's heritage. Today his heirs are at the helm and they are steering Russia in the same channels of borrowing, imitation and insulation mapped out nearly a millennium ago. . . ."

His failure to locate the factors responsible for the negative aspects of Soviet society and the "immutability"