

come familiar with the ideas of Wilhelm Reich, Paul Goodman, Herbert Marcuse and Norman O. Brown, *Eros* provides an intelligent and truthful summary of each. One should be warned, though, that the "party" is not much fun. Despite King's scholarly treatment of each guest, they stand in separate sections of the ballroom, dusty. Well-intentioned, partly right, partly wrong. They stand as willing or unwilling academic/radical/literary referents of a burst of energy four or five years ago, now pegged by an academic tradition that goes on and on and on.

The drudgery that builds up through the pages of *Eros* is partly

relieved in the final chapter when the author discusses "The New Transcendentalism." The chapter seems to be an afterthought, a way to get in some licks at Theodore Roszak, Philip Slater and Charles Reich. In the meantime, King raises, but does not elaborate on, some important aspects of the new mysticism. Eros, whose primary aim is to establish intimate and self-verifying relations with others, is seen as fearing that direction and making a regressive turn toward a mystical union with the universe. For once, Eros comes alive in the book. But life passes swiftly as the author turns again to arranging colleague-impressing abstractions.

thesis hamper Dornberg's search for sources of change or reform. All well and good to place hope in a "Soviet Alexander Dubcek waiting in the Kremlin wings" or—"more likely"—in the post-Stalin generation. Indeed, this hope is implicit in the book's title and in the quotation of Yevtushenko's *The Heirs of Stalin*:

We bore him out of the mausoleum.
But how, out of Stalin, shall we bear Stalin's heirs . . .
While the heirs of Stalin walk this earth,
Stalin,
I fancy, still lurks in the mausoleum.

Yet, given Dornberg's premise of continuity, the arrival of a Dubcek *deus ex machina* should have little more impact than past czars, e.g., Alexander II, the "Czar Liberator" or "Czar" Khrushchev, and the same premise dashes hopes for regeneration once Stalin's heirs have passed from the scene.

Dornberg, former chief editor of *Newsweek's* Moscow Bureau, has written an interesting and readable book of ambitious scope. He touches upon the danger of re-Stalinization, on the dissent movement, nationalism and bloc relations, the privileges enjoyed by the classless society's upper classes and problems in society and the economy, all with a knowing hand and a clear style. But one wishes that instead of a lengthy survey he had limited his topic to his early emphasis on the danger of re-Stalinization and the dissident intellectuals and elaborated upon their implications for the handling of dissent in Soviet society. Or perhaps a comparison of the contemporary and of the nineteenth-century dissident movements. Their resemblances are acknowledged in his comment on the Kremlin's awareness that "similar voices in the 19th century had helped to weaken the fabric of the tsarist empire," but Dornberg doesn't pursue them. And some very provocative analogies and contrasts could have been made between the aims, methods and fate of the dissenters and the populist (*narodnik*)

The New Tsars: Russia Under Stalin's Heirs by John Dornberg

(Doubleday; 458 pp.; \$10.00)

Della Sheldon

The New Tsars deals implicitly with the continuation of czarist Russia in the Soviet Union and the prospect for reform in the USSR. Mr. Dornberg premises an ineluctable continuity between the czarist and Soviet systems: "Ivan the Terrible, Boris Godunov, the Romanovs, Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev—a succession of tsars, crowned and uncrowned"—and the "immutability of Russia and the Russians," where, for centuries, "secrecy, police surveillance, rewriting of history, the omnipotence and arrogance of rulers, adherence to a doctrinaire ideology, idleness, poverty and Potemkinism have been institutionalized." At the end of the 1960's Dornberg discerned a "clear and imminent danger that the heirs of Stalin now in power will throw the wheel of history into reverse" and abandon Khrushchev's de-Stalinization for "re-Stalinization."

The reasons for Dornberg's pessi-

mism lie either in the nature of the system or in the Russian "national character" or in Stalin's heirs, but he never quite decides which. The negative characteristics of Soviet society are variously attributed to the 250-year Tartar rule, which "imbued the Russian national character with aspects it never lost"; the Russian propensity for "borrowing" from the West—Christianity, science and technology and Marxism; and Stalin's heirs. Communism is neither held responsible nor praised, for it has resulted in "little change." Moreover, "the reign of Stalin was no accident of history but the ineluctable consequence of Russia's heritage. Today his heirs are at the helm and they are steering Russia in the same channels of borrowing, imitation and insulation mapped out nearly a millennium ago . . ."

His failure to locate the factors responsible for the negative aspects of Soviet society and the "immutability"

leaders of the late nineteenth century.

Another lost opportunity—the fuller explanation of the reciprocal relationship between the dissidents' "devotion to legal principle" and the "vague but perceptible currents of democracy in the Soviet Union which raise the hope of closer adherence to 'socialist legality' in the future." The author's assumptions about ineluctable forces apparently kept him from exploring these promising implications, although he admits that they result from the dissident movement.

His warning that there is a clear and present danger of re-Stalinization is relevant and provocative. And one cannot disagree with the conclusion that prospects for dramatic changes in the Soviet Union are bleak. They are; and for complex reasons they are likely to remain so for some time. However, Dornberg's ambiguous presentation of the issues involved and uncertainty about where to pin the hope and place the blame for the Soviet system does little to advance our understanding of the pertinent questions of how much actual change results from a revolutionary replacement of leadership, dissent in an authoritarian regime, and the probable impact of re-Stalinization or reform of the USSR's domestic and foreign policy.

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Briefly Noted

People of Paradox
by Michael Kammen
(Knopf; 322 pp.; \$8.95)

Subtitled "An Inquiry Concerning the Origins of American Civilization," Professor Kammen of Cornell seems at least equally concerned about the *results* of American civilization. His thesis is that almost *any* thesis about the American experience is a half-truth at best. He offers a valuable collection of judgments by historians and observers to the effect that "the national character" is distinguished chiefly by its contradictions, paradoxes and contrapuntal themes that defy generalization. Kammen remarks of one observer that he saw America whole because he divided it in half. Kammen himself would seem to demand many more divisions than that. There is obvious learning and discernible wisdom here, but the book would seem to be of chief value for its occasional insight and sometimes brilliant asides. It is also a catalog of conflicting interpretations and thus a handy reference for putting down overly zealous generalizers who presume, from time to time, to discover the key to understanding the American character.

Race Against Time
by Andrew Schulze
(Valparaiso University; 153 pp.; \$2.00 [paper])

Andrew Schulze happens to be a pastor in the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, but almost every predominantly white church body in the country has been blessed, infuriated, prodded, inspired and changed by the Andrew Schulzes of America. Looking back on fifty years of ministry devoted to achieving racial justice, Schulze bears his scars without bitterness or recriminations.

He graciously affirms the good intentions of his opponents and modestly—perhaps too modestly—places a higher premium on the contributions of others than on his own. Founder of the Lutheran Human Relations Association, Schulze traces the "racial revolution," which he believes began in the 1930's, up through the present, illuminating one corner of that revolution's impact as it was felt through the theologically conservative and socially courageous ministries of a handful of confessional Lutherans. It is a large story writ small; it shows where we have been and offers an example of faithfulness to strengthen us in the long way to go.

Envy: A Theory of Social Behaviour

by Helmut Schoeck
(Harcourt, Brace; 408 pp.; \$3.95 [paper])

Given current intellectual moods, this book is certain to receive more criticism than acclaim, or—more likely—to be largely ignored. Schoeck launches a frontal assault upon various egalitarianisms, usually traveling under socialist banners, that underestimate the pervasiveness and inevitability of envy as a social dynamic. There is no doubt that the breadth of his references—anthropological, psychological, historico-political—and the relentlessness of his argument make this a landmark contribution to social theory. The almost singular focus on the envy component in various quests for "social justice" tends to lead Schoeck to underestimate other dynamics (besides "envy-evasion") that shape the sense of responsibility (not necessarily guilt) the rich must have toward the poor in a livable world. Schoeck does succeed, however, in demolishing the illusion, notably prevalent among intellectuals, that equality requires an envy-free society. The book should be read as a chastening and corrective experience for those who strive for a more so-

phisticated and honest definition of democratic egalitarianism. Various revolutionary moralists and theologians, also, would do well to attend to Schoeck's contention that the social role of religion and ideology is, whether we like it or not, to legitimate and humanize the inescapable facts of inequality. Altogether a scholarly and thorough argument deserving of a wide readership. (An article by the author appears in the next issue of *Worldview*.)

The Best and the Brightest
by David Halberstam
(Random House; 688 pp.; \$10.00)

A gallery of character studies dramatically hung in order to reveal the tragedy of men undone by their own doing. McNamara, the Bundys, George Ball, Maxwell Taylor et al. were positioned by John Kennedy and, for the most part, stayed in place, if not in office, through the disastrous unraveling of Lyndon Johnson's leadership. The story is taken up to Richard Nixon's ascendancy in 1968, and almost nobody comes out looking good; indeed, if Halberstam's is the last word, these men are, with few exceptions, corrupted beyond redemption. Since Halberstam almost certainly will not have the last word, the book is important as a well-informed reinforcement of most of the critical stereotypes of the men and decision-making machinery responsible for the Vietnam debacle. Halberstam's failure, again with few exceptions, to challenge the stereotypes that have become the conventional wisdom among the war's opponents may for some readers raise suspicions about Halberstam's own critical faculties. Others may receive the book as dismal confirmation of the media's accuracy in conveying the personalities and processes that produce official madness. In any case, this will no doubt be rated as one of the more important studies issuing from the war, and it will receive further attention in these pages.

The Denominational Society
by Andrew M. Greeley
(Scott, Foresman; 266 pp.; \$6.95)
Unsecular Man
by Andrew M. Greeley
(Schocken; 275 pp.; \$7.95)

The first is a textbook, but an unconventional textbook in that it makes no pretense of dispassionate objectivity. It is, rather, a vigorously argued interpretation of American religion, following the line pressed in Will Herberg's classic *Protestant, Catholic, Jew*, and adding, as might be expected from the Director of the National Opinion Research Center's unit on ethnicity, a strong ethnic component. Notable and consistent is Greeley's complaint against those who dichotomize religion as cultural or prophetic, comfort or challenge, authentic or complacent. With hard data and commonsensical warrant, Greeley contends American religion is all of these and more. Which leads into the theme of the second book, *Unsecular Man*, a book that will no doubt receive wider attention and to which we plan to return in the pages of *Worldview*. With provocative overstatement, Greeley claims the religious factor has not significantly diminished since the Ice Age. The thesis assumes, of course, a wide definition of religion as symbol-making, a definition for which Greeley is particularly indebted to the work of Clifford Geertz. Before professional religionists start cheering, however, Greeley cautions that the persistence of *homo religiosus* does not necessarily mean the continued vitality of Western religious institutions as now constituted. Altogether it is a refreshingly, and sometimes outrageously, contentious book, which poses a serious challenge to the secularization theories that have been elevated to the level of antireligious orthodoxy in recent years. It will be most painful reading to secularized liberals who have succeeded for so long in disguising their religious belief systems. Recommended as a very important argument, to which Father Greeley's article in this month's *Worldview* is an interesting complement.

The Politics of a Guaranteed Income
by Daniel P. Moynihan
(Random House; 579 pp.; \$15.00)

Of course this account of what happened to the "Nixon-Moynihan" Family Assistance Plan represents a construction of reality very favorable to the new ambassador to India, but one should be open to the possibility that both truth and Dr. Moynihan may be served simultaneously. In any case, this book offers an exceptionally thorough, informed and droll report on the varieties of idiocy and wisdom that go into the making of public policy. The connections between international and domestic events are dealt with rather superficially (the Cambodian invasion, for example, is viewed as a distracting sideshow to the main event of getting Family Assistance through Congress), and thus the reader is denied the feel of the overall exercise of power and impotence in the White House. But Moynihan has chosen to tell the more limited story of events in which he was most intimately engaged, and he tells it very well indeed. Religious and other leaders who succumbed to the pressures of the National Welfare Rights Organization and reversed their initial support for FAP should welcome Moynihan's detailed and sympathetic critique of their behavior. If he is right—and he makes a strong case—there is an urgent need to reexamine the uses of moral rhetoric and pressure in the attempt to influence government policy. . . . An important book, unfortunately overpriced, that touches on issues much larger than the title suggests.

American Judaism:
Adventure in Modernity
by Jacob Neusner
(Prentice-Hall; 170 pp.; \$8.95/\$3.50)

Ethnic group or religious community? The Professor of Religious Studies at Brown University says that the question is a perennial one

and that there is good reason for thinking it will be handled at least as well in modern America as it has been elsewhere; probably better. A thoroughly sensible book that, unfortunately, never gets around to very precise definitions of concepts such as modernity and secularity but, fortunately, does offer a rich variety of contemporary Jewish reflections on the phenomena, however defined. An excellent introduction for churchmen interested in Jewish-Christian dialogue, however defined. (Whoever designed the type, ugly and difficult to read, is no friend of Neusner's.)

National Liberation Fronts

1960/70

edited by Donald G. Hodges
and Robert Elias Abu Shanab
(Morrow; 350 pp.; \$8.95)

Chiefly a collection of documents by individuals, gangs and organizations who style themselves as liberators. The editors, both in the employ of Florida State University (Department of Philosophy), offer inanely adulatory introductions to each continent's "struggle." This said, the book is nonetheless useful for bringing together some statements that have had enormous influence in anti-imperialist circles: "Create Two, Three . . . Many Vietnams" by Che Guevara; "On the Strategy and Tactics of People's War" by Lin Piao; "For South Korean Revolution and Unification of the Fatherland" by Kim Il Sung; "A Framework for National Unity" by the Palestine Liberation Organization; "Conclusions and Perspectives" by Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); the "General Declaration" of the First Conference of the Organization for Latin American Solidarity (OLAS); and so forth. Included too are various statements by U.S. and Quebec revolutionary groups. Tedious reading to be sure (unless your tastes run toward "Resolutely Carry Out People's War" by the Central Committee of the Thai Commu-

nist Party), but libraries should stock this book to help us remember what it was like when people like Messrs. Hodges and Abu Shanab did not seem such pathetically anachronous figures.

The Black Preacher

by Charles V. Hamilton
(Morrow; 246 pp.; \$7.95)

A very sympathetic survey by the author (with Stokely Carmichael) of *Black Power*, reflecting a widespread reappraisal among black Americans of the church's role in social change. Now teaching political science at Columbia, Hamilton interviewed black clergy around the country and gained considerable insight into what he respectfully terms "the business of religion." While this report rings true, it also offers little new in terms of analysis. Indeed, many readers will find his advocacy of "relevance" and "social engagement" somewhat dated, especially since it is assumed among middle-class whites and in the media that the social action thing has been "done." Hamilton correctly sees, however, that the agenda for the black community is not so vulnerable to faddism and is therefore probably on target by urging black preachers to become more articulate and forceful in pressing the social implications of the Gospel. His book is a fine introductory profile of a much misunderstood and underestimated figure in American life.

Frederick Denison Maurice by Olive J. Brose

(Ohio University Press; 308 pp.; \$12.50)

F. D. Maurice is best remembered in connection with the short-lived emergence of "Christian Socialism" in mid-nineteenth-century England. Professor Brose of Columbia prefers to focus on Maurice as a theologian to whom social reform was somewhat incidental. He was, she contends, a

political conservative at least, probably a reactionary. Maurice "was the [Edmund] Burke of the Church of England." His theology did contribute to an "incarnational" thrust in English religion that was later associated with intensive social reform. That contribution, plus his mistaken and temporary endorsement of "Christian Socialism," has given Maurice a perhaps undeserved place on the honor rolls of Christian radicalism. Brose's treatment is nonetheless sympathetic to Maurice and offers a wide-ranging view of nineteenth-century English intellectuality as refracted through the mind and personality of a truly extraordinary churchman.

Things to Come

by Herman Kahn
and B. Bruce-Briggs
(Macmillan; 262 pp.; \$6.95)

Claims that this style of "futurology" is a science constitute little more than excusable trumpery. Excusable because, in fact, it is both useful and interesting to have intelligent types pool their information, biases and intuitions in a disciplined effort to say where we are and where we might be going. There is hardly a subject of public interest—ranging from foreign aid to the United Nations, the state of religion and the future of the university—that does not come in for consideration by the team at the Hudson Institute (though for some reason the growth of multinational corporations and their influence on international affairs and national sovereignty is given little attention). Their claims to the contrary, the team shows little "objectivity" in dealing with, for examples, the American counterculture or what might make for an "acceptable" ending to the Vietnam war. Nonetheless they too are among the brightest and the best; and their errors and accuracies will be referred to later on in order to illustrate what, at the beginning of the 1970's, it was possible for intelligent people to believe about the fu-

ture. The point of reading such things now is to join the game of matching scenarios; a game recommended for fun and possible profit.

**Civil Disobedience
and Political Obligation**
by James F. Childress
(Yale University Press; 250 pp.; \$7.95)

We're some months late on this one, but perhaps just as well, since it is now possible to relate it to the subsequently published and much-discussed *A Theory of Justice* by John Rawls. The relationship is as clear as it is complex. Professor Childress of the University of Virginia basically follows, as does Rawls, a contract theory approach to political obligations and advocates, as does Rawls, the idea of justice as "fairness." Unlike Rawls, Childress wants to be explicit about the metaethical (theological, anthropological) context within which political obligation can be conceived in a distinctively, if not exclusively, Christian way. Whether he in fact, and not just in intention, moves beyond Rawls is for the reader to judge. What he does do is to offer a closely reasoned analysis of past and present Christian thinking about political obligation. At one point in *A Theory of Justice* Rawls confesses that many of his assumptions are contingent upon a metaphysical framework but that it would take him too far afield to deal with that framework in detail. Childress declares his readiness to venture afield, and the result is a demanding and highly suggestive book that has an importance far beyond the late sixties' fashions of civil disobedience which may have been its immediate occasion.

In March
"Containment &
Change: 1966 & 1972"
Richard Shaull

Correspondence

[from p. 2]

seek an end to the fighting. As I implied in the August *Worldview*, it became clear to them that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese were disposed to challenge the blockade because of larger issues at stake in their relations with the U.S. Sensible discussion is unlikely to be helped by those who insist upon pretending that none of this ever happened. Of course bombing was seemingly ineffective so long as the North Vietnamese had access to virtually unlimited supplies from the Chinese and the Soviets, and this opened the door to those who imply that wars are "moral" when they involve infantrymen and "immoral" when they include airplanes. This most recent application of air power, however, is the first application during this ghastly war which conforms even in part to what an air power "expert" might recommend. Taken together with what seem to have been tacit agreements between Nixon, the Chinese and the Soviets, it paved the way to our disengagement from South Vietnam (and theirs also).

In the early 1950's I had the good fortune of having as a professor a distinguished Japanese scholar who had spent World War II as the editor of a Tokyo newspaper, and I never will forget his analyses of the effect of bombing. Correctly or incorrectly, he credited the incessant firebombing of Tokyo (not the atomic bombs, which he thought to have been superfluous) with having discredited the Japanese military in the eyes of the public and, more important, made it possible for the emperor, for the very first time, to step forward himself, in effect recapture Japanese society from its military, take charge of the surrender, and prevent the land war from reaching Japan itself. I make no assertions here about moral and immoral bombing, whatever those categories may

be, but I do insist that it is absurd to argue that air power *never* can have an effect at all on the outcome of war. Depending upon the entire set of circumstances, *strategic* air power (as in Japan) and *tactical* air power (as in Vietnam now) do indeed have an effect. The McLellan/Busse focus on Iwo Jima and Okinawa is absurd unless they mean to suggest we should not have bombed or shelled at all; this would change "absurd" to "idiotic."

Without being overoptimistic, I would guess we are turning a corner, and much in the way Nixon has described it. Given the global necessity to cope with the growth crisis, war will soon be seen as anachronistic and irrelevant. At the same time, we may have to credit fearsome weapons with having brought that about. If both we and the Soviets, for example, actually were able to fend off a thermonuclear attack without great damage, Nixon might not have gone to Moscow. We should have learned during the '60's, but Ramsey has not, that "graduated," "moral" or carefully designed "countercombatant" deterrents, let alone "flexible response," are concepts which lure the naive into believing that some wars can be made small enough, safe enough or cheap enough to be defined as "moral." That's how we got into Vietnam, and it is time to decently bury such thinking.

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To the Editors: In "The Myth of Air Power" Professors David S. McLellan and Walter Busse state, in support of the claim that air power is too costly in terms of destruction of our own and allied forces: "The U.S. has lost almost 1,000 aircraft reputedly worth ten times the damage inflicted on North Vietnam by the 1965-68 bombings." (It is assumed that the figure given above represents a projection from the 928 given in a Congressional Research Service report prepared in 1971 for