

ing building set the fire all by himself—but merely exploited a political windfall for their own purposes. Having done research of my own on the subject, I cannot agree with Mommsen. Even Goering admitted in his postwar interrogations that the Nazi leaders themselves suspected that the fire had been the work of hotheaded stormtroopers—the Berlin units were notoriously unruly—trying to force the pace of the revolution.

The three remaining essays in the book are valuable case studies of the character of Nazi rule once consolidated: an article on how the approved artistic style was determined, another on the expanding role of the S.S. above both party and state and a fascinating analysis of Goebbels's 1943 speech demanding total war. This last article is especially recommended to anyone interested in psychological techniques of mass manipulation.

German historians are noted more for the soundness of their research than for felicity of style. Some of the essays in this collection, it must be admitted, "read themselves like leather," as the Germans would say. With his wooden style and tin ear for idiom, the translator offers no help as far as readability is concerned. His work is at least accurate, though, and he had the wit to retain original German terms (e.g., for government agencies) along with their English translations.

In a recent series of three articles in the *New York Review of Books* the British historian Geoffrey Barraclough complained that we must abandon the straight political approach to recent German history and strike off in new directions. Where has he been? The ten essays in this book, not to mention the many others that have appeared in the *Quarterly*, show that the Germans have already been doing what he advocates for nearly twenty years!

*From Republic to Reich* is an informative and stimulating book for Americans interested in Nazism in particular or totalitarianism in general. It is also a well-deserved tribute to a great German periodical.

## Dragon by the Tail by John Paton Davies, Jr.

(Norton; 448 pp.; \$10.00)

## Journey Between Two Dragons by Seymour Topping

(Harper & Row; 459 pp.; \$10.00)

## Twentieth Century China by O. Edmund Clubb

(Columbia University Press; 526 pp.; \$12.00/\$3.95)

### Richard C. Kagan

In 1971 President Nixon suddenly reversed our twenty-two-year policy of hostility toward Red China, and, in a trice, American politicians and journalists who supported the earlier line were eagerly jetting to Asia. Books filled with analyses of the earlier China policy, diaries, sympathetic accounts and memoirs from previously silent observers suddenly proliferate. *Dragon by the Tail* provides us with a fine account, for the first time, of the American mission to Yenai (the Chinese Communist area) during World War II. *Journey Between Two Chinas* details the Nationalists' collapse in Nanking, recapitulates America's efforts to harass the People's Republic from bases in Taiwan and Southeast Asia and presents new information on the attempts of our last Minister to China, Leighton Stuart, to establish contacts with the new government in Peking.

The authors of these books expose many of America's errors in dealing with China (and Vietnam). John Paton Davies, a Foreign Service officer from 1931-1955, with extensive service in China, publicizes Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai's desire to visit Washington in 1944 to work out military cooperation and postwar economic aid. His account of Ambassador Hurley details the vindictive self-centeredness of a man who was blind to realities in China and silenced those who disagreed.

Davies's account of General Chenault and his relations with the Chinese secret police chief Tai Li should be read with Tuchman's work on Stilwell. Davies and Tuchman effectively counter the myths of air power and dispute the importance of the Flying Tigers. Seymour Topping—a reporter in China and Southeast Asia from 1947-1951—informs us of KMT brutality, French duplicity and embezzlement in Vietnam, and recapitulates the history and drastic consequences of America's attempt to contain China.

These two books are a direct result of Nixon's visit. They are possible only because Nixon has dispelled years of fear within the Foreign Service community. As late as 1969 Davies refused to be a member of a panel of the Association for Asian Studies on the effects of McCarthyism on that discipline. John Service, like Davies a victim of the McCarthy purges in the State Department, also refused to participate. After Nixon's trip Service told me that he had been afraid in 1969 and that only now would he participate in such a criticism.

Topping's and Davies's works are the tip of the iceberg. Much remains to be revealed. But what is significant is that these men have personalized their experiences in China. Their writings are neither history nor politics; their purpose is not to re-

construct the past or to affect the present. Both are the backwash of years of frustration, neglect and personal regrets. For example, Davies ends his rather melancholy story by claiming:

The truth of the matter is that China has been since the fall of the Empire a huge and seductive practical joke. The western businessmen, missionaries and educators who had tried to modernize and Christianize it failed. The Japanese militarists who tried to conquer it failed. The American government which tried to democratize and unify it failed. The Soviet rulers who tried to insinuate control over it failed. Chiang failed. Mao failed.

It appears that he is projecting his own feelings. After all, aren't Chiang and Mao Chinese? All losers, no winners?

But given the above reservations, what do these works contribute to an understanding of China—and of the United States?

Davies's book is most significant regarding the U.S. military mission to Mao's guerrilla base in Yen-an in 1944. For the first time Davies publishes the journal of his trip. This includes his impressions of Mao Tse-tung, of Hurley's arrival in Yen-an and the nature of the Communist-run areas. More generally the book is most enlightening regarding U.S. relations with Chiang Kai-shek and with the Communists. The descriptions present a China run by a family dictatorship and inspired by a moralistic and socially irrelevant fusion of traditional Confucianism and modern fascism. The only viable force was the Communists, and the only practical solution was to find some way of working with them to our mutual advantage.

The United States Government is depicted as being totally absorbed in a global war in Europe and unmindful of Asia. When China refused to respond to our global plans American officials became angry, hurt and vindictive. Ambassador Hurley prevented any criticism of Chiang Kai-shek and would not entertain Mao's

historic suggestion to enter into economic and military relations with the United States. Hurley took out his anger on his staff. Bringing the argument to the domestic front, he joined with Joe McCarthy in attacking the China specialists for selling out China. The background to this whole macabre domestic story is discussed dispassionately in *Dragon by the Tail*.

The most startling revelation of Topping's book is contained on pages 83-89 and tells of the receipt by Ambassador Leighton Stuart of an invitation from Mao to visit Peking in the spring of 1949. The State Department took one month to reply: negative. What is less earthshaking but more insidious is that the last three chapters of Stuart's memoirs, *Fifty Years in China*, which were written by Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, who was chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department during World War II and up to 1947, deal more kindly with Chiang than Stuart's diaries and do not mention Mao's invitation at all.

Topping also gives us a look at the covert American operations against China based in Indochina. Only the American public has been denied knowledge of this counterinsurgency warfare. But the Chinese have been concerned about it for a long time. This in part explains why the bombing of North Vietnam in 1965 created a great shock in Peking. Was this the beginning of further and more extensive harassment? Cities were partially evacuated, civil defense shelters built, and a major military policy debate occurred which helped fuse the Cultural Revolution.

Topping's visit to China is most informative when he is describing what he saw and relating what people said (the chapter on China's attempt to manage pollution is particularly valuable). However, caution is necessary when he begins to analyze or provide a background briefing. For instance, in his account of Canton much space is given to a rather pedestrian economic history. Of the comment by an old man that "shopkeepers suffered much [several

years ago]" Topping uncategorically claims, "I understood his complaint." This gives him license to spend three pages on the Red Guards and economic conditions. I found most of these asides to be either misleading or better done in other works.

Perhaps most enraging to me was Topping's obvious nineteenth-century prejudices. We are told that "the Chinese are a highly sexed people" and that because of the Communist Party's puritan attitudes toward sex the Chinese were probably "having considerable psychological problems in wrestling with the temptation to promiscuity." In Canton, upon hearing "unrestrained laughter" from a restaurant, Topping tells us that he "was reassured . . . that the Cantonese zest for sensual pleasure was still there." Like many other pre-Revolution correspondents in China he seems saddened that Shanghai has "lost its glitter and bustle," and "those slim beautifully coiffured Shanghai girls . . . [have] been replaced by crowds in blue and gray tunics over baggy trousers." It seems reassuring to him to note that the coeducational Red Guards promoted a rise in population rates. This, however, is untrue.

If you want a well-balanced, readable history of modern China, then turn to O. Edmund Clubb's new edition of *Twentieth Century China*. Clubb was our last major Foreign Service officer in China after the Revolution. He has often taken the opportunity, in journals and at conferences, to criticize American policies. He participated in the 1969 panel on the effects of McCarranism on Asian Studies and there coined the chilling term "psychic preventive detention" to describe McCarthy's effect on China specialists and Foreign Service officers. Perhaps because he has been able to balance his political and professional life, he has written a fine scholarly work on China. Contrary to Davies's mordant view that China is a huge practical joke and an American nightmare, Clubb sees "Mao's China as leaving a permanent mark on China and adjusting to the international world."

The most original and unique contribution is Clubb's discussion of the warlords and their relations with the revolutionaries. His sections on Sino-Soviet relations are thorough and well researched. The only major fault

of the book, in my opinion, is that Clubb sees Mao as an interpreter of Chinese tradition. But the debate over whether Chinese communism is "traditional" or "modern" will not be resolved easily.

## Assassination and Terrorism by David C. Rapoport

(Canadian Broadcasting Corp.; 88 pp.; \$2.00 [paper])

### Wendell J. Coats

Political, as distinct from military, homicide is the theme in this brief but useful survey, which is essentially an expansion of six lectures given on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation network November-December, 1970. The author suggests two broad categories: Individual assassination, in which the death of the designated victim appears as the immediate intended effect; and multiple assassinations, in which the death of any single victim appears only as a part of a broader campaign of terror intended to change the entire political structure.

For Professor Rapoport terrorism (as distinct from terror tactics) is a relatively new concept but one which he finds characteristic of an identifiable movement in the revolutionary process. In keeping with this view he carefully limits his survey of terrorism to the early stages of revolutionary warfare—to the stage at which the revolutionaries have developed true military forces, and terror as an intended effect becomes ancillary to the goal of attrition in the opposing forces and to the elimination of opposition where the revolutionaries are in control.

Following Munich (September, 1972) his final words are all too prophetic: "Future terrorists may demonstrate that the ambivalent society is not confined to colonial situations. [The *ambivalent* society as a precondition for terrorism is for Professor Rapoport a problem of generations, not class, just as the *corrupt* society was a problem of generations for Ne-

chayev.] Terrorism has been successful enough to inspire fresh attempts again and again in other countries. All of us will see a lot more terrorist activity before we see less."

Professor Rapoport has found even in England, a nation noted for "playing the game," an increasing interest in assassination as a means of preventing war. This is hardly surprising at a time when organized warfare has become identified, not with the idea of defense and the restoration of peace, but with the notion of overkill and indiscriminate destruction through limitless quantities of firepower. Since Classical times, of course, men have been concerned with ways to limit or circumscribe what appear as arbitrary or unjust actions by the head of state. Both assassination and revolution, as well as, or in conjunction with, the notion of a higher law, have been justified under various conditions and at various times for this purpose, but the author significantly questions whether Sir Thomas More, if he had lived near the end of the Reformation instead of its beginning, would have supported the case for utopian assassination to insure a more peaceful world.

For most of us today the very idea of assassination is repugnant; it carries with it the notion of an unprovoked assault without warning upon an unsuspecting, innocent victim—a totally dishonorable, or at least unchivalrous, act. Observing that the ideal of honor had its ori-

gins among the barbarian and pagan tribes of northern Europe, Professor Rapoport does not in the brief space of these lectures develop the notion of honor as a characteristic of class or corporate identification. He does conclude, however, that if the sole animating force in Western civilization had been the notion of honor, assassination would be virtually "unthinkable."

Viewing the history of Western thought as a whole, the author finds three major justifications for assassination: First, an instrumentalist approach in which the moral value depends entirely upon the end achieved, a typical Greek and Roman view; second, acceptance of assassination as evil but justified at times to prevent a greater evil, a typical Christian approach; and third, a belief that assassination is always good in itself regardless of the end achieved. The last is a modern terrorist position. Given the above, the basic questions remain: What, in concrete situations, induces the assassin(s) to act, and what influence do the attitudes prevalent in a society have upon the actions of those bent upon assassination?

Contrasting Classical with Christian attitudes, the author highlights the Greek and Roman belief that citizens had an obligation to kill a tyrant or one who aimed at tyranny. After the deed no further justification was required. The tyrant had lost all rights—a view not so different from the Classical view that in war the enemy *qua* enemy had lost all rights. But for most Christians tyrannicide is always wrong, although justifiable at times—never justifiable, however, if the victim is only suspected of aiming at tyranny. In other words, for the Christian, assassination may become a right, but never a duty, and anyone who claims that right is obliged to submit himself to judicial inquiry afterward. Our attitudes today are determined in great part by the Christian tradition.

Relating the attitudes of people toward assassination to their understanding of the status of their enemies, Rapoport deals essentially with the *jus in bello* without address-