

The most original and unique contribution is Clubb's discussion of the warlords and their relations with the revolutionaries. His sections on Sino-Soviet relations are thorough and well researched. The only major fault

of the book, in my opinion, is that Clubb sees Mao as an interpreter of Chinese tradition. But the debate over whether Chinese communism is "traditional" or "modern" will not be resolved easily.

Assassination and Terrorism by David C. Rapoport

(Canadian Broadcasting Corp.; 88 pp.; \$2.00 [paper])

Wendell J. Coats

Political, as distinct from military, homicide is the theme in this brief but useful survey, which is essentially an expansion of six lectures given on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation network November-December, 1970. The author suggests two broad categories: Individual assassination, in which the death of the designated victim appears as the immediate intended effect; and multiple assassinations, in which the death of any single victim appears only as a part of a broader campaign of terror intended to change the entire political structure.

For Professor Rapoport terrorism (as distinct from terror tactics) is a relatively new concept but one which he finds characteristic of an identifiable movement in the revolutionary process. In keeping with this view he carefully limits his survey of terrorism to the early stages of revolutionary warfare—to the stage at which the revolutionaries have developed true military forces, and terror as an intended effect becomes ancillary to the goal of attrition in the opposing forces and to the elimination of opposition where the revolutionaries are in control.

Following Munich (September, 1972) his final words are all too prophetic: "Future terrorists may demonstrate that the ambivalent society is not confined to colonial situations. [The *ambivalent* society as a precondition for terrorism is for Professor Rapoport a problem of generations, not class, just as the *corrupt* society was a problem of generations for Ne-

chayev.] Terrorism has been successful enough to inspire fresh attempts again and again in other countries. All of us will see a lot more terrorist activity before we see less."

Professor Rapoport has found even in England, a nation noted for "playing the game," an increasing interest in assassination as a means of preventing war. This is hardly surprising at a time when organized warfare has become identified, not with the idea of defense and the restoration of peace, but with the notion of overkill and indiscriminate destruction through limitless quantities of firepower. Since Classical times, of course, men have been concerned with ways to limit or circumscribe what appear as arbitrary or unjust actions by the head of state. Both assassination and revolution, as well as, or in conjunction with, the notion of a higher law, have been justified under various conditions and at various times for this purpose, but the author significantly questions whether Sir Thomas More, if he had lived near the end of the Reformation instead of its beginning, would have supported the case for utopian assassination to insure a more peaceful world.

For most of us today the very idea of assassination is repugnant; it carries with it the notion of an unprovoked assault without warning upon an unsuspecting, innocent victim—a totally dishonorable, or at least unchivalrous, act. Observing that the ideal of honor had its ori-

gins among the barbarian and pagan tribes of northern Europe, Professor Rapoport does not in the brief space of these lectures develop the notion of honor as a characteristic of class or corporate identification. He does conclude, however, that if the sole animating force in Western civilization had been the notion of honor, assassination would be virtually "unthinkable."

Viewing the history of Western thought as a whole, the author finds three major justifications for assassination: First, an instrumentalist approach in which the moral value depends entirely upon the end achieved, a typical Greek and Roman view; second, acceptance of assassination as evil but justified at times to prevent a greater evil, a typical Christian approach; and third, a belief that assassination is always good in itself regardless of the end achieved. The last is a modern terrorist position. Given the above, the basic questions remain: What, in concrete situations, induces the assassin(s) to act, and what influence do the attitudes prevalent in a society have upon the actions of those bent upon assassination?

Contrasting Classical with Christian attitudes, the author highlights the Greek and Roman belief that citizens had an obligation to kill a tyrant or one who aimed at tyranny. After the deed no further justification was required. The tyrant had lost all rights—a view not so different from the Classical view that in war the enemy *qua* enemy had lost all rights. But for most Christians tyrannicide is always wrong, although justifiable at times—never justifiable, however, if the victim is only suspected of aiming at tyranny. In other words, for the Christian, assassination may become a right, but never a duty, and anyone who claims that right is obliged to submit himself to judicial inquiry afterward. Our attitudes today are determined in great part by the Christian tradition.

Relating the attitudes of people toward assassination to their understanding of the status of their enemies, Rapoport deals essentially with the *jus in bello* without address-

ing specifically the *jus ad bellum*. Yet it was acceptance of the restrictive notion of the *jus ad bellum* which reserved to the political sovereign, for both Greek and Roman as well as Christian, the exclusive right to declare war and thus establish the status *enemy* in concrete situations. Historically it is this pattern—the pattern of reserving to the sovereign political authority exclusive jurisdiction over the use of force in dealing with public enemies, so identified—which has been of critical importance to the maintenance of both internal and external order.

Recognizing the close relationship between the assassin and the terrorist, including the fact that the law generally does not distinguish between them, Rapoport structures his survey upon the further recognition that there are also profound differences between them. These differences, he says, are best seen by focusing on the meaning of their actions rather than on the acts themselves.

In the case of assassination, justification rests ultimately upon the actions or status of the victim. He is assassinated because he is who he is. In the case of terrorism, however, the guilt or innocence of the victim is irrelevant. The terrorist kills indiscriminately insofar as his individual victims are concerned.

In his mind the assassin destroys men who are corrupting a system, while the terrorist destroys a system which has *already* corrupted everyone it touches. The vastness of this difference and the variety of ensuing consequences simply cannot be overestimated. . . . Assassination is an incident, a passing deed, an event; terrorism is a process, a way of life, a dedication. At most assassination involves a conspiracy, but terrorism requires a movement, since fear dissipates unless the pressure continues to exist over long periods of time.

Since the success of the terrorist campaign rests ultimately upon severe government repression and retaliation and the resulting public

reaction, its control "is *primarily* a task for policemen not soldiers." The government can afford to be patient, maintaining its legitimacy—"using the *minimum* force necessary to restrain illegal acts."

After this impressive survey of political homicide we have reason to look forward to the more definitive text Rapoport promises in the preface.

Inside Number 10 by Marcia Williams

(Coward, McCann & Geoghegan; 385 pp.; \$7.95)

Suzanne Haire

Marcia Williams, Harold Wilson's longtime private secretary and political assistant, has written her side of the story of the last two Labor governments. It is a glossary to the history of the six Wilson years, ending in unexpected defeat in the 1970 General Election. Observed from a vantage point inside No. 10 Downing Street, her memoirs describe the ups and downs, especially the downs, the constant crises that bedeviled that administration. In the final chapters, with some inescapable hindsight, she sums up the government's achievements and failures and sketches an immensely shrewd portrait gallery of the hopeful contenders to the Party's leadership—the very stuff of fascinating political speculation.

Whenever Britain returns a Labor government, hopes rise high among its supporters that at last the stuffiness will be knocked out of the British shirt, that Disraeli's "two nations," the divisive class system, will finally be laid to rest. But, as Mrs. Williams points out time and again, nothing can be further from the truth. Although the voters may put Labor into office once in a while, real power remains in the hands of the Civil Service, the permanent "Establishment," staffed by the hand-picked sons (women are not wel-

come and must resign on marriage) of the middle and upper-middle classes, with their Public School ties, Oxbridge affiliations and Conservative backgrounds. Mrs. Williams recounts how in 1964, when the newly elected Prime Minister entered No. 10 for the first time, a handful of the permanent staff gave him a very cool reception indeed; there was no applause. A parliamentary majority of only five, she says, does not seem to entitle a Socialist prime minister to any enthusiasm from the "mandarins." The climate eased somewhat after the 1966 election, when Labor gained a sizable majority.

The euphoria of being back in office after thirteen years in Opposition made Labor ministers underestimate the seriousness of the problems confronting them. On the very first day of his premiership Wilson was told of Khrushchev's fall and of the Chinese nuclear bomb. But undoubtedly the most crippling problem that plagued him throughout his tenure was the economic one due, in large measure, to the £800 million deficit left behind by the outgoing Conservative government. Many have argued that Wilson, pleading this "inheritance," should have devalued the pound at once. But devaluation in Britain at that time was a dirty word, and when it was finally enacted in 1967 it created agonizing heart-searching for the government and its supporters and elicited savage criticism from the Tories and the press.

Marcia Williams describes the shock effect on Wilson. He was so perturbed at the thought of devaluation, she says, that "he would eat his lunch and then get up from the table in a contemplative way. If the dreaded word was spoken, he got up and proceeded to walk up and down very quickly, rehearsing the arguments for and against. . . ." It is worth noting how the present Conservative government has taken the stigma out of devaluation by using a simple euphemism: since Tories "floated" the pound last June it has sunk to its lowest parity ever. Despite all the economic woes, by 1970 the Wilson government had