

terests" must be permitted to be "carried to excess which would be harmful to Mankind." All of this would be cared for by a Mankind Political Party (not parties in the plural, note, but *one* party).

Why this monism? The answer Hirschfeld gives us is that "To be effective, this demand must be backed by Mankind education, Mankind motivation and Mankind discipline. The only means of creating, developing and maintaining such support on a substantial scale is through a tightly controlled party system." There would be the inevitable Platonic ruling élite, called a Mankind Philosophy, and the Party would set up a "special advisory group to plan the formation of a Mankind Philosophical Council." There is something for everybody, Thomists, Marxists and fascists alike, so long as they remain "Believers" organic to the "Party Teams" having liaison with "anticipated collaborators outside the Party." The issues taken up would have to "submit to the leadership group for its decision," and they would have "routine activities," all relating to "service for Mankind." In this way, we would witness the triumph of Mankind (in another age called the Triumph of the Will) and realize a society of "justice, order and peace," in which the people, who on earlier pages are declared insipid and downright cowlike in nature, "could live in security and equality, in freedom and dignity." The work ends in this *Götterdämmerung* of intellectual pretense. What does not end is the lingering suspicion that this intellectual pretense disguises a bankrupt demand for universal order not far removed from the dreams of tyrants of yesteryear.

Scratch this book, even gingerly, and one finds a fascist tract for our times. I realize, of course, that even suggesting that a civilized person who writes a book in the English language is capable of subscribing to, much less prescribing, a repugnant ideology is somehow unthinkable, an exercise in hyperbole on the part of this reviewer. It is far nicer and more convenient to de-

scribe a work as controversial. However, this is a fascist text. It overtly argues on behalf of élitist principles; it asserts the worth of leadership principles as above good and evil; it conceives of all real interests, national, racial or cultural, as limitations; and it argues for a world order that is fixated in heavy bureaucratic rhetoric. The political manifesto of "Mankind" carries behind it a fanaticism and a dogmatism no less dangerous than any doctrine based on the *uebermensch* principles.

This volume utterly confuses, and has contempt for real interests or ideas other than universal interests. It denies that community themes, local issues, ethnic considerations, racial views and religious differences do not so much have to be overcome but rather orchestrated. This book is, in short, a mighty assault on democratic politics and a desperate search for certainty that

is bound to be picked up precisely as the militaristic framework gains ground on a worldwide basis. In short, the book is profoundly bureaucratic in tone, design and content. It is more a reflection of the malaise of malcontented individuals feeding off the tarnished status system of academic life than a serious coming to grips with the desires and dreams of mankind—a word which, by the way, needs no "Inc." to make it an object of respect and research.

(Under no conditions or circumstances is this review to be incorporated in any future editions of *The People*. All rights to this review are reserved by the author. This note is made imperative by the publisher's alarming statement that "this book is being published in a first-cycle edition. . . ." My review is expressly prohibited from appearing in any second or subsequent "cycles" of Hirschfeld's book.)

Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT by John Newhouse

(Holt, Rinehart & Winston; 302 pp.; \$7.95)

A Farewell to Arms Control? by Elizabeth Young

(Penguin; 256 pp.; \$2.25 [paper])

Michael Mandelbaum

At the beginning of his remarkable account of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks John Newhouse cites the motto that a British civil servant between the two world wars displayed on the wall behind his desk: "If you know what you think, you don't understand the problem." It is difficult to know what to think about SALT because the talks took place in strict secrecy. Only a few cryptic official announcements and an occasional tidbit leaked to the press gave the public any glimpse at all of what was happening.

Now, through "innumerable private conversations," Newhouse has managed to reconstruct the course of events from SALT's origins in the Johnson Administration—inspired by Robert McNamara's growing distaste for an unchecked arms race, and spurred by the initiative of a young defense intellectual then serving in the Pentagon named Morton Halperin—to a ceremony in St. Vladimir Hall in Moscow on May 27, 1972. There Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed what turned out to be the next-to-last draft of a

treaty in which the United States and the Soviet Union pledged to deploy antiballistic missiles at only two sites in their respective countries, and agreed to freeze their stocks of offensive strategic nuclear weapons at current levels. *Cold Dawn* is an admirable piece of investigative reporting.

SALT is difficult to understand, too, because the issues at stake are even more complicated than the boundary disputes, the haggling over reparations and the disarmament proposals that dominated interwar international relations. The substance of SALT, as Newhouse points out, "is a mix of weapons systems (the hardware of the nuclear age that nobody intends to use) and strategic doctrine (the theology of the specialists in the nuclear age)." But different parts of the government participate when arms control policy is drawn up, and the armed services and various agencies concerned with foreign policy, defense and disarmament each have their own doctrinal preferences and loyalties to particular weapons systems. Recently, especially since the 1969 controversy over the antiballistic missile system (ABM), strategy and arms control have become entangled in Congressional politics. And finally, the essence of SALT is political. It is "a semipermanent part of great power relations."

The treaty to limit ABMs illustrates the interrelationships that make up SALT. It enshrined the doctrine of "assured destruction" as the foundation of nuclear stability. By renouncing any attempt to defend its cities, each side offers its population as a kind of hostage to the other. Since both the United States and the Soviet Union know that their societies cannot survive a nuclear exchange, runs the logic of assured destruction, neither will dare start one. The Soviets, however, wanted to ban ABMs, not merely because of their faith in assured destruction, but also because the United States was far ahead of them in building and operating ABMs.

The United States, in turn, came to its ABM position in a roundabout

way. In 1967 Secretary of Defense McNamara reluctantly authorized a "thin" ABM system, to defend, he said, against China's infant nuclear arsenal and to form the core of a "thick" system to protect American cities against the Soviet Union in case the United States should decide to construct one later on. But behind the decision lay Lyndon Johnson's fears that Republicans might question the adequacy of his Administration's defense efforts during the upcoming election year. He remembered that in 1960 the Democrats had reaped some political profit from the charge that the incumbent Republicans had allowed a "missile gap" to open up. He also wished to please the armed forces, especially the Army, which looked favorably upon ABM.

The Nixon Administration inherited the Johnson ABM program, but found itself in a changed political climate: ABM came under heavy criticism on doctrinal and technical grounds. The Administration decided on a different system, one that would protect American missile sites rather than cities. This switch did not mollify all of ABM's critics. It made ABM strategically more acceptable, bringing it into line with the doctrine of assured destruction, but technically more dubious: The hardware to guard cities didn't seem suitable to protect weapons. But the Administration claimed that it needed "Safeguard," as it called the revised system, as a "bargaining chip" in negotiations with the Soviets, and by a close vote the Senate approved it.

The American position was finally settled, but that was only the beginning. Protracted discussion with the Soviets followed first about whether an ABM agreement would be linked with a restriction on offensive missiles, then about how many ABMs would be permitted and where they could be located, and finally about the technical details of radar systems that might blossom into full-fledged ABMs.

It is no wonder that the language of theology creeps into *Cold Dawn*. Newhouse treats SALT as a body of

esoteric doctrine, and refers to those who follow it closely as "initiates." He asserts that "thinking correctly about SALT is one of those civic duties," and he makes a brave effort to untangle all the strands for the lay person. He is not always wholly successful, but a simpler account of such a complicated subject might have been a less accurate one. As A. J. Liebling once noted, the only way to make pea soup completely clear is to omit the peas.

The book is not only an excellent primer for nuclear politics, it is a valuable source of information about the Nixon foreign policy as well. It shows the National Security Council at work, with its ringmaster, Henry Kissinger, coordinating the various government bureaucracies and slipping off occasionally to work out the most delicate problems in private talks with Soviet leaders. And it sheds light on the origins of two of the Administration's obsessions. One is leaks of information. Several crucial and ostensibly secret matters did become public. None seriously hampered the talks. But they created grave concern, especially the "July twenty-third leak," named for the date in 1971 when the *New York Times* printed details of a new American negotiating position. This was only a few weeks after the *Times* had published the Pentagon Papers. A few days later Mr. Nixon summoned Egil Krogh, who had recently received his commission as head of the White House "plumbers," and told him to move ahead "with the greatest possible urgency." Krogh did, with consequences that are now well known.

The book also makes some sense of Mr. Nixon's often stated insistence that the United States must "negotiate from strength" with the Soviet Union, using new weapons systems as "bargaining chips." Newhouse's account provides some support for the view that without the controversial Safeguard as such a bargaining chip no limitation on offensive weapons would have been imposed, and perhaps no SALT agreement of any kind would have emerged.

And the book is a fascinating story.

Cold Dawn takes the reader into a kind of looking-glass land. Rules govern it that might have come from the Red Queen, like the apothegm of the assured destruction school of strategy: "Offense is defense, defense is offense. Killing people is good, killing weapons is bad." Mysterious characters pop up, like Colonel Leonid Vasilyevich Smirnov, the man in charge of the Soviet nuclear weapons program, "whom the Americans had never seen and didn't expect to see," but who appeared at the final round of talks, during Nixon's visit to Moscow, and did most of the talking for the Soviet side. There is even a climax filled with suspense, excitement and a touch of slapstick, as American officials rush around Moscow trying to iron out all the details of the agreement in time for the two leaders to put their names on it at the designated moment. And the reader emerges from the labyrinth of SALT, as from looking-glass land, not knowing quite what to make of it all. At the end of the book Newhouse affirms that "knowing what and how to think about SALT is no easier after agreement than before."

One way to gauge the significance of SALT is to draw out the parallel that Newhouse suggests with the Congress of Vienna, which convened after the Napoleonic wars. Both brought together the major powers of the international system. In both cases nations with different domestic political systems found themselves forced together by a fear greater than their mutual antipathy: in the nineteenth century, the fear of revolution and a revived France, and in the twentieth, the fear of the terrible power of nuclear weapons. Both sets of negotiations involved delicate and detailed adjustments: in Vienna, adjustments of territory, and in SALT, adjustments of the contours of the two nuclear arsenals. In each case the details of the adjustments mattered less than the habit of making them and the overall principle of balance (or, as it is called in SALT, "parity"). And both the Congress of Vienna and the SALT negotiations represent the

search for stability in world politics. The participants in both cases were not trying to usher in a new system of international relations, but to preserve the existing one.

This disturbs Elizabeth Young. She devotes a major part of her book, *A Farewell to Arms Control?* to flaying the United States and the Soviet Union for clamping down on what she calls "horizontal proliferation"—that is, the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries—while rushing ahead pell-mell with "vertical proliferation"—the growth of their own nuclear stockpiles. This point has often been made by the French, who are particularly sensitive to big-power hypocrisy. In fact, Mrs. Young examines the reasons why France and China decided to acquire nuclear weapons with greater sympathy than is usually found in the English-speaking world. (She is British.)

She makes a useful distinction between those who have pressed for arms control because "they wished to see the elimination of nuclear weapons, and those who wished to enhance the stability of the central strategic balance." The second group has clearly carried the day in SALT. Mrs. Young finds the goal of the

first more attractive. Many will agree with her. She also detects signs that the growing awareness of how fragile the environment is, "the sense of one physical world, of one system vulnerable to misuse," is starting to bend the energies of governments toward achieving it. This is not persuasive.

The current stage of SALT is grappling with the problems of putting limits on the quality, as well as the number, of offensive missiles, with the hope of ultimately reducing the nuclear arsenals of the two sides. But no round in the foreseeable future will do away with them altogether. For SALT, as Newhouse says, "goes to the knuckle of security." And where security is at stake, the guardians of the state invariably find that caution is the essence of wisdom, a discovery illustrated by a story that is popular in Israel: A visitor to Jerusalem asks his host whether Israel's armed might doesn't contradict biblical teachings. The Israeli replies: "It's true that the Bible says that on the day of days the lion shall lie down with the lamb. But," he continues, "it's not the day of days yet. And even then," he adds, "I'd rather be the lion than the lamb."

The Failure and the Hope by Will D. Campbell and James Y. Holloway

(Eerdmans; 266 pp.; \$3.95 [paper])

Benton Johnson

This is a collection of essays that originally appeared in *Katallagete* (*Be Reconciled*), a periodical published by the Committee of Southern Churchmen, which is an interracial organization of Protestants and Catholics living in the South who are trying to do something as Christians to put an end to the conditions that sustain racism and oppression. The collection contains seventeen essays, of which five were written by the editors. Among the other contributors

are the late Thomas Merton; the Catholic novelist Walker Percy; John Howard Griffin, author of *Black Like Me*; and Fannie Lou Hamer, founder of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

All but one of these essays were written after the high-water mark of the Southern civil rights movement in 1965. Perhaps this is why their dominant tone is postliberal, both theologically and politically. As Campbell and Holloway put it, a