

Revolution/Counterrevolution in Portuguese Africa

Lawrence Nevins

The assassination of Amílcar Cabral in January, 1973, was reported in the American news media, but there was no follow-up, and few Americans recognize Cabral's name, or even the name of Portuguese Guinea, the small colony he had hoped to lead to independence.*

From a geographical point of view the obscurity of Portuguese Guinea might seem well deserved. Wedged between Senegal and the independent Republic of Guinea, it is about 40 per cent the size of Portugal, but its population is less than that of the city of Lisbon. Mostly hot and humid, much of the colony is covered by bayous and salt-water swamps. The people, who until recently were about 99 per cent illiterate, are divided into a number of traditionally antagonistic groups that are religiously, culturally and linguistically distinct.

Cabral's revolutionary party, the African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), champions the independence of both Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands. Jointly administered at one time, the two places are over four hundred miles apart and have little in common.

Uninhabited when discovered by the Portuguese in 1460, the Cape Verde archipelago became a kind of Portuguese West Indies at the eastern end of the Atlantic. A plantation economy developed, hampered by the general aridity and periodic drought that still make life difficult. The present inhabitants are Portuguese and Creole-speaking people of mixed African and European ancestry.

The true link between the Islands and Portuguese Guinea consists of the several thousand people of Cape Verdean origin who now live in Portuguese Guinea. A small group, even by Guinean standards,

they are an important element in the local society and prominent in the leadership of the PAIGC. Cabral's father was Cape Verdean.

The PAIGC does not have a foothold in the Islands, but for some years now it has claimed to control about two-thirds of Portuguese Guinea; more recently it claims to control three-fourths. The Portuguese, while admitting the existence of what they call zones of double control, believe the situation was less favorable to them several years ago and now claim they have effective control of most of the colony.

In any case, most observers agree that the PAIGC is the African liberation movement most likely to succeed. It began military operations against Portugal in January, 1963, after first having cultivated the support of the peasantry. As leader the late Amílcar Cabral was a genial Marxist-Leninist who modified his ideology to take into account the peculiarities of the country. Trained as an hydraulic engineer, he had at one time been employed by the colonial government. Cabral understood the peasants would not support armed rebellion for the sake of abstractions; the movement would have to provide services for the people illustrating the value of sacrificing for independence. The opportunity to do this was created by the colonial government's failure to provide even the most elementary assistance to the population.

LAWRENCE NEVINS, who spent considerable time studying and living in Brazil and Portugal, has contributed to a number of periodicals dealing with Portuguese affairs.

*Guinea is a variant of the name of the ancient empire of Ghana. Early Portuguese explorers, and other Europeans who followed, applied the name to the entire Atlantic coast of black Africa. Three African countries now bear the name. The largest, always referred to by its full title in this article, is the Republic of Guinea. Smallest, and least known, is Equatorial Guinea, which consists of the former Spanish colonies of Rio Muni and Fernando Po. It became independent in 1968. Portuguese Guinea is often called Guinea-Bissau, especially by those who favor its independence.

As far as most of the people were concerned, the government's chief functions before the rebellion had been the collection of taxes and the sanctioning of abuses.


In areas it controls the PAIGC seeks to establish schools, cooperatives, clinics and responsible civil administration. On the other hand, much the same might now be claimed of areas Portugal still controls. As in Angola and Mozambique, the authorities in Portuguese Guinea try to undermine the revolutionary movement by fostering their own program of socioeconomic reform.

The liberation movements in Portugal's other African colonies, Angola and Mozambique, also claim to control large areas. Indeed, the regions in which they are reported to operate are larger than Portuguese Guinea; they also, in the main, are remote from major population centers. The insurgent armies in these places are hampered by vast distances that must be traversed on foot. As ordinarily is the case in guerrilla warfare, there is no regular front, and it is difficult for the guerrillas to provide permanent protection for the peoples upon whom they rely for support. In all three colonies the Portuguese attempt to regroup the residents of the war zones in new settlements under their control.

Guerrilla war in Portuguese Guinea requires less marching, and the abundance of waterways facilitates the use of small boats. Even if the PAIGC did not effectively occupy territory within the colony, it would be able to mount attacks upon it from the neighboring republics of Guinea and Senegal. This constitutes Portugal's excuse for the particular difficulty of the war there:

The loss of Guinea to the PAIGC would be a severe blow to Portuguese morale. A subsidiary of Exxon is drilling for oil, but unless the oil strikes are immense, the colony's loss could only mean a healthy gain for Portugal's budget. The money and blood already expended far exceed any economic advantage Portugal might reasonably expect. The real motives behind Portugal's continued resistance to the PAIGC are patriotic pride, the military's self-esteem and the domino theory—i.e., the fear that as Guinea goes, so go Angola and Mozambique.

Last year a United Nations mission, consisting of an Ecuadorian, a Swede and a Tunisian, toured the liberated areas in Portuguese Guinea. Like most visitors they were impressed with what they were shown. It has been suggested that they were led by the nose through Potemkin villages in the Republic of Guinea. As a Lisbon paper put it: "Straw huts look the same when seen from either side of the frontier." Such charges need not be taken too seriously except as a symptom. Although travelers to guerrilla areas do tend to be sympathizers or journalists smitten by the romance of it all, the guerrillas



Portugal's African Colonies

in Guinea and the other Portuguese colonies have entertained a number of visitors who have written credible accounts.*

Obviously, critical accounts of colonial wars are almost nonexistent in the Portuguese press, but what is printed is important as a reflection of attitudes current among the ruling groups. Between August 28 and September 2, 1972, the *Diário de Lisboa* published a six-article series about the war in Guinea. Its author, Avelino Rodrigues, began by remarking how "African" and alien Guinea's capital, Bissau, had seemed on seeing it for the first time. This might seem an odd observation, but visitors to Luanda, Lourenço Marques and a few other places in Angola and Mozambique are often surprised by their "European" atmosphere. Portuguese Guinea has few European settlers; it is an African country inhabited by Africans.

Much of the series is devoted to polishing the pro-consular charisma of General António Spínola, a monocled old party often photographed in camouflage combat fatigues. Rodrigues describes himself as a kind of Portuguese Sancho Panza, forever afraid of being hit by something, a comical contrast to the stoic calm of the general.

He accompanied Spínola on a helicopter flight to a combat zone where they met troops returning from

*Visits to liberated areas in Portuguese Guinea are described in two books: Gérard Chaliand's *Armed Struggle in Africa: With the Guerrillas in "Portuguese" Guinea* (New York and London, 1969) and Basil Davidson's *The Liberation of Guiné* (Baltimore, 1969).

an operation. The guerrillas, they were told, had fled into the forest at the arrival of the troops, but the helicopter hovered protectively overhead, just in case the enemy was still around. The soldiers claimed to have found a storage depot they had destroyed, burning tons of rice. Their only spoils were a letter from Havana with family photographs. They also had captured seven women, one old man and two children—all Balantas. The Balantas are Portuguese Guinea's largest tribe and the one most sympathetic to the PAIGC. In the past the Balantas had been victimized both by the Portuguese and the Muslim Fulas, the tribe most sympathetic to the government.

General Spínola, according to the story, assured the captives they need not be afraid; they would be returned to the place from which they had been taken after being shown what the government had been doing for the Balantas. The prisoners' faces revealed they still feared the worst.

But the general insisted they be calm; and, noticing a little six-year-old girl carrying a yellow puppy in her arms, he added, pointing to it with his cane: "The girl may also take the dog."

The six stars shone on the camouflage, the monocle softened under the restless right brow. I recalled then that some time ago a French magazine had presented this war chief as "the last romantic general." Perhaps this may be the reason, I thought, on watching the child fix two big grateful eyes on the "great man," while a trace of a smile cleared the old man's face, and the women dropped their masks of terror.

Upon the completion of their Cook's tour some days later General Spínola received the same group at the Governor's Palace in Bissau. They ingenuously confided that had he been in charge earlier there would have been no war, and if the others, back in the woods, knew what he was doing, the war would soon be over. To which the general replied: "Now you already are able to distinguish truth from lies. Return to the forest and tell the other Balantas what you saw in your land and how life now is better than before." The women requested money for shopping in Bissau. In addition to money, they were given Japanese transistor radios so they could hear the government's gospel in the forest. The general himself demonstrated how to operate them, while, we are told, a young woman instinctively swayed to the music.

Spínola later remarked to Rodrigues: "They ask for so little, they are easy to satisfy. The trouble is the PAIGC provokes them to increase their demands as fast as we respond to them in order to create new grounds for dissatisfaction." Then he harshly concluded: "If we are not stupid, we can work wonders in Africa because the Africans believe those who respect them and treat them with justice."

The General openly admitted that the Balantas and Mandingas originally had adhered to the PAIGC because of genuine grievances. At a Congress of the People, the meeting of representatives of the various ethnic groups the government sponsored in July, 1972, he told the Balantas: "The government knows that the PAIGC recruited its first elements among the Balanta people. Even today the Balanta people continue to furnish the PAIGC with the majority of its fighters. But the Balantas know that the government is bringing about all the ideals for which the PAIGC fought. Many of you continue to betray the government, contacting and aiding the enemy. But the government does not want to force anyone, let alone the Balanta race, to choose the way. You already had the opportunity to verify which side promotes justice and the happiness of the Balanta people."

Such statements strike a very different tone from the Lisbon propaganda handouts, which regularly refer to the insurgents as terrorists under alien influence. But Spínola's statements are a partial reflection of changing opinions within Portugal's ruling groups on how to meet the colonial challenge.

There are those who would like to get out of Africa immediately and concentrate on integrating Portugal into the new European economic system. Others still hope to maintain some form of old-style colonial empire. The dominant thrust seems to be toward trying to modernize the colonies, socially as well as economically, while holding off the nationalists for as long as possible and preparing face-saving escape hatches, just in case. Keeping in mind the last possibility, recent measures provide for local assemblies, autonomous financial status and abandonment of the pretense that the colonies are overseas provinces.

What are the government's social achievements in Guinea? Rodrigues tells us that it has undertaken the reorganization of part of the rural population in new villages, or, as we would say, strategic hamlets. This is supposed to facilitate social development. In many places the new houses are made of zinc. Less cool than traditional dwellings, we are informed, the zinc houses are status symbols because they resemble the houses of the whites; in the past, among the natives, only the chiefs had zinc houses. "In the dry season of 1972 alone, the army constructed 1642 zinc houses and 698 thatched houses, besides 42 schools and five clinics."

Rodrigues described a model program undertaken among the Manjaco people. Improved seed and breeding stock were made available to the peasantry. We are told the natives feared that the imported Dutch bulls would overwhelm their minuscule cows. The plow and animal traction were introduced—the oxcart apparently being a great leap forward. Elec-

tric power and potable water were being brought in. In addition, Spínola is depicted as traveling through Guinea evangelizing about the virtues of practicing democratic methods—an activity not entirely consistent with the political life in Portugal itself over the last half century.

One cannot help being skeptical about the quality of social reform promoted by an army in time of war. In light of other recent experience it is hard to believe that strategic hamlets, created at the instigation of foreign troops, are likely to be successful at winning hearts and minds. It is true, however, that Africans are fighting at the side of the Portuguese. Indeed, General Spínola is promoting what he calls Africanization of the struggle; and, it is claimed, blacks bearing arms for Portugal—as regulars, militia and home guards—outnumber the PAIGC army. This is not untypical of wars of national liberation, which frequently assume the character of civil wars.

At least one major ethnic group in each of Portugal's three African colonies has generally supported the colonial government. The revolutionaries themselves have often been divided by essentially tribal antagonisms. At times, especially in Angola, this has led to bloodshed between contending nationalist factions. The fact is that the experiences of the populations of Portuguese Africa have been extremely varied. Some peoples, even in little Guinea, were "pacified," or brought under effective Portuguese administration, in the lifetimes of men still living; others have been subjugated to Portugal for centuries. Some have always lived among Europeans; others seldom see one. Some have tribal connections in other countries; others do not. Some live in zones of intense guerrilla activity; others, in vast regions of Angola and Mozambique, are remote from the areas of guerrilla warfare. In addition, the original tribal cultures were of different degrees of complexity and adaptability to effective social development in a modernizing society.

The colonial social system in Portuguese Africa was cruelly exploitative. Authorities who scorned democracy and liberal social values at home had no intention of fostering them in Africa. Politically conscious natives were faced with a choice of acquiescence to terrible wrongs, or exile or rebellion. When the independence of the neighboring countries made rebellion a viable option the choice was clear for many Africans.

That the national liberation movements grew organically out of local societies does not mean they are wholly representative of those societies. Their supporters, in the main, are illiterate tribesmen, until recently isolated from the modern world. The catalysts of rebellion were the small educated élites and emerging sophistication among the uneducated and semieducated masses. But the gaps between the edu-

cated, semieducated and uneducated are real and—partly due to ethnic heterogeneity—not easily bridged. Thus the adherence of comparatively naive people to a cause is not always consonant with what the leaders of the cause believe the struggle to be about. The PAIGC counters this problem with a program of continual political indoctrination. Reinforced by its military power and organizational competence and by the population's well-founded fear and resentment of the Portuguese, the PAIGC has been strong enough to promote social changes counter to traditional practices, such as equality for women.



Contradictions within the liberation movements have been highlighted by events surrounding the murders of Amílcar Cabral and Eduardo Mondlane—the latter a former Syracuse University professor who led FRELIMO, the Mozambique Liberation Front. Mondlane died early in 1969, killed in Dar-es-Salaam by a bomb built into a hollowed-out anthology of Plekhanov's writings.

According to the story published by the British weekly *The Observer* (February 6, 1972), it had reached him in a package postmarked "Moskva." Similar booby-trapped packages, addressed to Marcelino dos Santos and Uria Simango, other FRELIMO notables, were intercepted by the Tanzanian police. Interpol discovered that the Japanese batteries used in the bombs bore serial numbers similar to those of a batch of two thousand that had been consigned to Lourenço Marques in Mozambique.

Suspicion focused on Silverio Nungu, a FRELIMO official, and Lázaro Nkavandame, until then a major figure in FRELIMO and a leader of the Makonde, the tribe which has borne the brunt of the fighting in Mozambique. Nungu died after being captured by FRELIMO. FRELIMO claimed he had been trying to defect and had died as the result of a hunger strike. Uria Simango, who also broke with FRELIMO, claimed Nungu was executed. Nkavandame did defect to the Portuguese, fleeing to Mozambique and publicly repenting his support of the rebellion.

FRELIMO now seems stronger than ever, but the

endemic problems of tribalism, regionalism and war weariness, as well as the universal vices of vanity and ambition, are weaknesses the Portuguese have skillfully exploited. The plot that ended in the killing of Amílcar Cabral is a case in point.

The PAIGC is headquartered in Conakry, where Sékou Touré's government allows it to go openly about the business of managing the war. On occasion the war has come to Conakry, as in November, 1970, when the Portuguese launched a commando raid, apparently hoping to overthrow Touré and crush the PAIGC in a smashing double play. The war came to Conakry a second time on the night of January 20, 1973, when Cabral was murdered.

The official story out of Conakry came from the correspondent of *Afrique Asie*, an Algerian-sponsored magazine. According to this account, Cabral and his wife, Ana Maria, were returning from a reception at the Polish Embassy, about eleven at night, when their Volkswagen was stopped close to their residence by a jeep belonging to the PAIGC. Three men stepped out of the vehicle and pointed their weapons at Cabral.

The leader was Inocencio Kani, a Catholic school teacher who had joined the PAIGC when it was founded. He had been sent to the Soviet Naval Academy and returned to join the triumvirate which headed the PAIGC navy. In 1971, accused of being implicated in the sale of a motor, he was provisionally demoted to the command of a patrol boat.

According to the account, Cabral's last words before he was shot by Kani were directed to the two other men. "Why, comrades? If there are differences, they must be argued. . . . The Party has taught us. . . ." Kani ordered the others to finish him off. Mrs. Cabral, still in the Volkswagen, had witnessed the entire spectacle. She was then taken to the PAIGC jail, which was in the hands of the conspirators.

As all this was going on, Aristides Pereira, today leader of the Party, was captured by a group under the command of another PAIGC veteran, an officer who had been wounded twice, hospitalized in Eastern Europe, and who was then supposedly assisting Pereira, in directing the Party's security force.

Pereira was bound and taken to a PAIGC boat in the harbor. Kani and others soon arrived, and the fugitives took to sea in three PAIGC boats. Although the army, navy, air force and police of the Republic of Guinea maintain a generally tight control, PAIGC ships and vehicles were allowed to go about their business unchallenged. When the murder of Cabral was discovered, Sékou Touré ordered the pursuit of the three boats, which were captured at 5:00 A.M. Pereira, however, had been hidden in a munition barge towed by one of the fleeing boats, and was not rescued until almost noon the next day.

During the night a group of men, including two liberated from the PAIGC jail and others who had

fallen into the bad graces of the Party, came to Touré and asked him to recognize them as the new leadership. Shortly after midnight Touré began a formal inquiry, inviting the participation of Samora Machel, a top leader of FRELIMO who was visiting Conakry, and the ambassadors of several friendly countries. The official story emerging from these investigations indicated Portugal had won over a number of key people in the PAIGC, including Rafael Barbosa, a former president of the organization. The Portuguese had recruited agents from among their prisoners, and upon release they operated with some success among the militants in Conakry. The agents argued, and perhaps believed, that Portugal would grant independence to Guinea-Bissau if the Guineans renounced their claim to the Cape Verde Islands. Cabral's insistence that Cape Verde be liberated was given as the reason for the continuing war. Somewhat more crudely, Muslims were told that Cape Verdean and Balanta domination of the movement imperiled Islam.

The death of Cabral, and the hardly less painful confrontation with the weaknesses which had made it possible, will not destroy the PAIGC. Ethnic rivalry and war-weariness have plagued every liberation movement in Portuguese Africa, but the principal organizations have shown remarkable endurance; warfare has continued for over twelve years in Angola, ten in Guinea and nine in Mozambique.

Hundreds of Africans from the Portuguese colonies are receiving technical training in Eastern Europe, independent Africa and elsewhere. The entrance of these people into active service should strengthen the movements. In Portuguese-controlled areas also, Africans are being educated in far larger numbers than ever before; the economy is developing; people are moving about, voluntarily and otherwise; and traditional life-styles are rapidly changing. No matter how these wars end, they have already radically transformed the societies of Portuguese Africa.

If unity is less than total among Africans, the same is true of the Portuguese. According to the tally of the *Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin*, an antiregime periodical published in London, the Portuguese press reported the loss of 2,538 soldiers between 1970 and 1972. The wounded, living reminders of the price of empire, are to be found all over Portugal.

It is difficult for the government to recruit adequate officers, and there are Portuguese Deserters Committees in several European countries. More important, there are hundreds of thousands of Portuguese men—veterans and draft evaders—working abroad. Emigration and war have combined to deprive the economy of the surplus of cheap labor which had been considered a promising resource for rapid industrial development. It has also destroyed

the dream of peopling Angola and Mozambique with white settlers.

The opposition movements in Portugal are not free to openly protest the colonial war. While it is not so authoritarian as progressive countries such as Cuba and North Korea, Portugal is considerably less tolerant of dissenters than is Mayor Daley's Chicago. This has not prevented, however, the development of radical groups engaging in sabotage. These have some newsworthy feats to their credit and have been more than a nuisance to the government, but their ultimate effect will probably be no more than having kept the secret police on its toes.

The ruling groups are divided about how to handle the colonial question; as pressures wax and wane, positions shift. The men who count appear to be thinking in terms of several goals: They wish to retain as much control as possible for as long as possible, they want to exclude the present nationalist leadership from power, they need to safeguard their investments, and they must save face.

The establishment of legislatures in the colonies has opened a way for some kind of eventual withdrawal. If the ground were well prepared and the nationalists sufficiently worn down by fruitless battle and internal struggles, autonomous counterrevolutionary governments might be viable. Pushing this hypothesis one shaky step further, it is not impossible that such an evolution might lead to genuine independence.

There is no reason to suppose that rebel armies will soon be marching into Luanda and Lourenço Marques. At present the insurgent forces in Angola and Mozambique operate in thinly populated regions adjacent to the independent states in which they are based. The PAIGC, on occasion, has been within shooting distance of Bissau, but as things stand it is in no position to take the town.



If the rebels in Portuguese Africa are to win, they must be prepared for a long struggle in the classical guerrilla mode, confining the Portuguese to the towns and isolated fortified points and extending control over rural areas where they must work to politicize the peasantry. The outcome will depend upon the relative competence, courage,

stubbornness and firing power of the contending forces. It will also depend upon another variable—the level of support each side receives from abroad.

The rebellions could not have persisted without foreign assistance. Arms are supplied to the rebels by the Soviet bloc and China, and bases are provided by African neighbors; they receive funds, supplies and moral support from independent Africa and from sympathizers in Europe and America.

The involvement of the non-Communist Left in Europe, including government-affiliated political parties and socially concerned religious groups, may have been accelerated by reports of savage massacres in Mozambique, publicized in July when Portugal's Dr. Caetano went to Britain to celebrate the six hundredth anniversary of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. As of this writing, the accuracy of the initial account of the "Wiryamu Massacre" is still open to question. The Portuguese claim nothing happened at the place indicated in the publicized story. On the other hand, they have announced that their commission of inquiry has uncovered evidence of what they style "reprehensible acts" committed elsewhere in the region. They say the matter is now under investigation and the responsible parties will be brought to justice (*Notícias de Portugal*, August 25, 1973). Another plausible atrocity charge in the British press blames Rhodesian troops operating in Mozambique (*The Observer*, September 2, 1973). The Portuguese claim that FRELIMO is guilty of comparable atrocities—charges which have not provoked any outcry for an international investigation.

World opinion may be a factor in the outcome of these struggles, for, as the nationalists and their sympathizers often point out, Portugal cannot maintain her position without foreign assistance. They believe that, if the major powers enforced sanctions against her, Portugal would give in. I am not so sure. Such a turn of events would infuriate Portuguese ultras and many moderates in places high and low. South Africa would take it as a warning to mobilize all its considerable resources for the final struggle. The Portuguese power élite might in such a situation choose to stick it out with the South Africans.

Portugal is a member of NATO, and it is regularly charged that NATO equipment is used in Africa. Whether or not this is the case, Portugal operates with equipment purchased from Western powers and is a recipient of military and technical assistance which certainly facilitates the conduct of her colonial wars. President Nixon has been exceptionally helpful to Portugal. In return for a naval base in the Azores the United States agreed to make available \$400 million of Export-Import Bank loans, as well as additional millions for various other programs. There is some Congressional resistance to this policy, and it may become stronger in the post-Watergate environment.

The black community in the United States is a

growing pressure group on behalf of African independence. The August, 1973, issue of *Ebony* contains a full-page ad urging a boycott of Gulf because of its activities in Portuguese Africa. The same issue contains a two-page Gulf ad all about additives and oil changes. Exxon has also been running advertisements in various publications proclaiming its good work in the ghetto.

Outsiders concerned about Portuguese Africa generally look at it through spectacles tinted by their vested interests—emotional and material. Supporters of Portugal argue that the colonies are developing economically and socially under the present regime, which is seen as a nonracist administration doing more for its people than the comparable states of black Africa. Less enthusiastic supporters point out that Portugal effectively controls the economically productive regions, and they assume that this situation will prevail for some time to come. Therefore, they argue, refusal to cooperate with the Portuguese is an empty gesture damaging to all parties. Ideological rightists argue that a victory for the “terrorists” would mean a foothold in Africa for the Russians and Chinese—opinions vary as to the *bête rouge*.

Supporters of African liberation contend that the self-determination of nations is a basic human right. Portuguese rule, according to them, is racist, tyrannical and exploitative. Such progress as has occurred in recent years was in response to revolution and is impressive only in relation to the backwardness which preceded it. Moreover, they say, the chief beneficiaries of economic progress have been foreign investors, Portuguese bankers, the government and white colonists.

Whatever will happen will not be what ought to happen. Outside forces lack the will and power to impose a solution. The rulers of Portugal are committed to saving Africa from the Africans for as long as possible, and perhaps a bit longer; and the African revolutionaries have come too far to turn back. Much of modern history is understandable in terms of an equation between the humiliated and the humiliators. Economics defines the limits of possibility, but emotion rules the irrational factors which prevent us from predicting the future by feeding data into a computer. The oppressed or defeated, with sufficient leisure to brood over their calamities, long for revenge, whether or not it will be productive of anything else. The prime example is the Arab world's obsession with Israel.

Portugal, small and economically backward, belongs to both categories—humiliated and humiliator. Empire affords its ruling groups a dream which effaces ignoble reality. For the educated African, subjugation to such a country is humiliating in itself, and would be even if the colonial regime were an overwhelmingly eleemosynary operation—which it is not.

Many of the grievances of Africans are thoroughly reasonable and are not susceptible to reform within the colonial context. It is hard to believe that, even if Portugal were to crush completely all the existing guerrilla armies, new revolutionary forces would not soon reemerge.

Portugal ought to have the courage and sense to negotiate a settlement leading to the independence of her colonies. This will not happen soon. Change will come, but only at the price of more years of misery and wasted lives.