The Road to Peace in the Middle East

Arthur J. Goldberg

In light of the recent war between Israel and Egypt and Syria and the uneasy cease-fire which now prevails, it is entirely natural to inquire whether Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council, adopted on November 22, 1967, following the Six-Day War, remains operative.

In a lecture delivered at Chatham House on April 6, 1971, and in an article published in a recent issue of the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, I stated my conviction that Resolution 242 may ultimately prove to be the basis for a peace settlement in the Middle East. I adhere to this view, despite the recent hostilities still smoldering.

There is an important new development which reaffirms my conviction that the guidelines set forth in Resolution 242 are still relevant. That development is the resolution of the Security Council sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union—Resolution 338, adopted on October 22, 1973—calling for a cease-fire in the early hours of the morning of the following day.

Resolution 338 calls for a cease-fire and also calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire “the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts.” It breaks new ground too. Paragraph three of Resolution 338 declares “that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.”

Egypt and the other Arab states adamantly refused, following the 1967 war, to engage in either direct or indirect negotiations with Israel on the ground that Israel was in occupation of Arab territories. Now this precondition has been abandoned. This is a most welcome development, for it is a simple fact of international life that a refusal to negotiate on this ground is unprecedented and contrary to international custom and usage.

Resolution 338 declares that negotiation between the parties take place “under appropriate auspices.” The world community was not officially advised at the time of the adoption of the Resolution what these auspices would be. It was assumed, in light of all the circumstances, that the United States and the Soviet Union, in consultation with U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, were the “appropriate auspices” defined in the Resolution. This has turned out to be the case.

Negotiations under the auspices of the U.S. and the USSR are not contrary to the spirit and intent of Resolution 242. Under Article 33 of the U.N. Charter the parties to a dispute involving a threat to international peace and security are en-

Arthur J. Goldberg served as Permanent United States Representative to the United Nations from 1965 to 1969 and was Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1962 to 1965.
joined to seek a resolution of their dispute by, among other means, negotiation and mediation. It is, therefore, within the spirit and letter of the Charter and Resolution 242 for the superpowers, all other means having been tried and proved unsuccessful, to take the lead in assuming a mediating role to bring the parties together to negotiate a settlement of their long-standing conflict.

The history of the region teaches, however, that even with the influence and "muscle" of the United States and the Soviet Union the task of achieving peace is formidable. Peace in the Middle East is not, therefore, at hand, but it may be achievable if a common will to peace is shared by the parties and if the superpowers, acting as "honest brokers," do not overplay their hands. It must be remembered they are dealing with sovereign states with pride of their own and internal political problems.

In this article, I wish to offer some general observations about the prospects of achieving a just and lasting peace at Geneva—a task far more formidable than effecting a disengagement of forces.

Perhaps the best way to start is to recall the rationale that guided the United States and many other governments at the United Nations during the long period of debate and negotiations following the Six-Day War and culminating in the unanimous adoption of the critically important Resolution 242 by the Security Council on November 22, 1967. This principle was often stated by me in these words: "To return to the situation as it was on June 5, 1967, is a prescription for peace, but for renewed hostilities."

I believe that this principle was sound then. I believe it is sound now.

I think it is appropriate to recall also what the United States, immediately after the June war, said, at the highest level, about the nature of a peace settlement in the Middle East:

But who will make this peace where all others have failed for 20 years or more? Clearly the parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peace. Sooner or later, it is they who must make a settlement in the area. It is hard to see how it is possible for nations to live together in peace if they cannot learn to reason together ... There is no escape from this fact: The main responsibility for the peace of the region depends upon its own peoples and its own leaders of that region. What will be truly decisive in the Middle East will be what is said and what is done by those who live in the Middle East ... The nations of the region have had only fragile and violated truce lines for 20 years. What they now need are recognized boundaries and other arrangements that will give them security against terror, destruction and war.

Again, I believe that this insight was right then. I believe it is right now.

There was another concept insisted upon by the United States in 1967, namely, that others can and should help, but their contribution should be "to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement." I am also of the view that this remains a sound principle.

I think it essential, in analyzing the prospects of peace in the Middle East, to recall these statements and, importantly, the language and legislative history of Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council.

United Nations resolutions, particularly in recent times, are more honored in the breach than in the observance. Nonetheless, there are several reasons why Resolution 242 may prove to be the framework for the settlement of the Middle East impasse.

The Resolution has been "accepted" by the principal contending parties, although their respective interpretations of the Resolution widely differ. It is the only substantive resolution (excluding calls for a cease-fire) relating to the Middle East accepted both by the parties and the Security Council since the Six-Day War and virtually even before. And, despite recurring threats by both sides to repudiate Resolution 242, their acceptances have never been withdrawn.

Despite pejorative expressions and resolutions in recent times by the General Assembly and other organs generally critical of Israel, and a resolution proposed to the Security Council but vetoed by the United States seeking to reinterpret Resolution 242, the Resolution continues to command the support of the great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. It is true that the Peoples Republic of China, the newly seated U.N. member and permanent member of the Security Council, has condemned the Resolution, but its opposition appears to be largely propagandistic rather than based upon deep-felt opposition to its terms.

King Hussein of Jordan has made all but explicit that he is ready to make a peace agreement provided East Jerusalem is restored to Jordanian rule and the West Bank given back. Whether this could encompass demilitarization of both areas and border rectifications is not clear, although there are intimations that there is negotiating flexibility in these matters. And, of course, there remains the unresolved question of the "Palestinians."

President Sadat of Egypt has declared that if his terms for total withdrawal by Israel are met, he would not balk about concluding a peace agreement with Israel. We have no way of knowing—whether this is President Sadat's only condition, although Secretary Kissinger may be better informed. To those of us not privy to the Secretary's confidential discus-
sions, it seems possible that at the crunch Israel's demands for guaranteed access to the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran for Israeli shipping, tenable and secure borders, the incorporation of Jerusalem and limited absorption of refugees may be deemed by President Sadat to present further and formidable obstacles.

Israel, on its part, seems ready to negotiate a compromise settlement with its Arab neighbors, although its notions of a compromise would seem, in public expression, at variance with those set forth by Arab states. The financial burden of supporting its military establishment in a state of "no peace" and "no war" is straining Israel's economy. Further, several of Israel's most important leaders remain wary of incorporating substantial Arab populations which, in the long run, would prejudice the essentially Jewish character of the state they helped to found and seek to preserve. And the recent war has brought about considerable rethinking of Israel's position both among its leaders and its people.

The United States has indicated that the settlement of the impasse in the Middle East is of high priority on its foreign policy agenda. Further, it has achieved an important though limited success, through Secretary of State Kissinger's efforts in collaboration with the Soviet Union, in bringing about the recent cease-fire. Also, Secretary Kissinger's successful arrangements for exchange of prisoners between Egypt and Israel and for the convening of a peace conference is by no means an insubstantial achievement.

The Soviet Union may be prepared to support a realistic peace settlement involving concessions to Israel bound to be distasteful to its Arab friends. Although Soviet actions preceding and during the recent war were not conducive to peace, it would seem that Mr. Brezhnev's first priority still is a détente with the United States.

Resolution 242 is a carefully—some would say artfully—drafted set of guidelines designed to promote agreement and to assist the parties to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement.

The stated goal of Resolution 242 is the establishment of a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security.

The Resolution expressly and by implication repudiates the concept of an imposed peace and opts for "agreement"—an "accepted settlement" by and between the parties. Thus the experience of the 1957 imposed settlement which followed the 1956 war is not to be repeated. The Resolution contemplates a consensual peace agreement—scarcely surprising in light of the collapse of the 1957 imposed settlement and the shattering of the preexisting Armistice agreements.

Resolution 242, in most explicit terms, rejects the long asserted claims of the Arab countries of the existence of a state of belligerency against Israel. The Resolution recognizes that belligerency cannot coexist with peace.

The Resolution calls for respect and acknowledgement of the sovereignty of every state in the area. Since Israel never denied the sovereignty of its neighboring countries, this language obviously requires these countries to acknowledge the sovereignty of Israel. The legislative history of 242, as reflected in the debates and votes in the Security Council and Special Session of the General Assembly held in 1967, shows that there was little support in the U.N. community for the view that after two decades Israel's very existence could be denied by its Arab neighbors.

The Resolution, in dealing with the withdrawal of Israel's forces, does not explicitly require that Israel withdraw to the lines occupied by it on June 5, 1967, before the outbreak of the war. The Arab states urged such language; the Soviet Union proposed this to the Security Council in June, 1967, as did Yugoslavia and some other nations to the Special Session of the General Assembly which followed the adjournment of the Security Council. But such withdrawal language did not receive the requisite support either in the Security Council or in the Assembly. Indeed, Resolution 242 simply endorses the principle of "withdrawal of Israel's armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict," and interrelates this with the principle that every state in the area is entitled to live in peace within "secure and recognized boundaries." In light of Arab unwillingness to acknowledge Israel's right to sovereign existence, this language, though speaking in terms of all states, is designed primarily to assure Israel's right to secure boundaries recognized by its Arab neighbors.

The notable omissions in regard to withdrawal are the words the and all and the June 5, 1967, lines. In other words, there is lacking a declaration, requiring Israel withdraw from the or all the territories occupied by it on and after June 5, 1967. Rather, the Resolution speaks of withdrawal from occupied territories, without defining the extent of withdrawal. And the notable presence of the words "secure and recognized boundaries" by implication contemplates that the parties could make territorial adjustments in their peace settlement encompassing less than a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories.

The Arab nations, to buttress their claim that the Resolution calls for a complete Israeli withdrawal, say this interpretation of the Resolution's withdrawal language is overly restrictive. They point to the language of the Resolution emphasizing "the...
The Security Council

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts;

3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." This language, the Arab states argue, calls in effect for complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all of the territories occupied by them in the Six-Day War. Further, the Arab states contend that the U.N. Partition Resolution contemplates a complete redrawing of the map of the Middle East. Further, the withdrawal language of the Resolution would seem to indicate that its patent ambiguities, and the differing interpretations of the parties, can only be resolved by an accepted and agreed upon settlement concluded after negotiations between the parties.

The logic of coupling the territorial and secure boundaries concepts is that both territorial integrity and secure and recognized boundaries are to be reconciled in the give-and-take of negotiations between Israel and the Arab states culminating in peace agreements.

The most that can be said of the withdrawal and related language of Resolution 242, in light of its legislative history, is that it neither commands nor prohibits territorial adjustments in the peace agreements contemplated by the Resolution, although it "tilts" in favor of adjustments to secure boundaries for Israel. This is not to say that the Resolution contemplates a complete redrawing of the map of the Middle East. Further, the withdrawal language of the Resolution would seem to indicate that its patent ambiguities, and the differing interpretations of the parties, can only be resolved by an accepted and agreed upon settlement concluded after negotiations between the parties.

In certain matters, the Resolution is less ambiguous than in its withdrawal language. Resolution 242 specifically deals with free passage through international waterways. In precise language it affirms "the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area." This language demonstrates the lack of sympathy of the powers, big and small, with interference with free passage in international waterways. With belligerency at an end, no good reason would exist under international law for denial to Israel of access to the Suez Canal and, particularly, to the Straits of Tiran—whose closing by President Nasser of Egypt was universally recognized and forewarned by Israel to be a *causa bellum*. The Resolution would similarly preclude a blockage of Bab el Mandeb.

It is true that in the early 1950's the Security Council passed a resolution declaring Israel's right to free passage in the Suez Canal and that this resolution was ignored by Egypt. It is likewise true that the understanding negotiated by Secretary-General
Hammarskjöld, that the Straits of Tiran would be open to Israeli shipping as a condition for Israeli withdrawal from Sharm el-Sheikh in 1957, was likewise not honored by Egypt in 1967. But there has been an important change in circumstances: This time, unlike what occurred in the aftermath of the 1956-57 war, there is the possibility of contractual assurances of Egypt ensuring Israel's right to passage through both the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran backed by the guarantee of the superpowers.

The Resolution by its very words, the action of the Security Council and the legislative history have also recognized that Israel, the Arab states and the world community jointly share responsibility to afford better justice to the refugees—the casualties of the 1948, 1956 and 1967 wars. The Resolution does not reiterate the language of prior U.N. resolutions calling for total repatriation or optional compensation for these refugees, a concept long resisted by Israel. Rather, it implicitly recognizes that all must participate in solving this problem—Israel by a more generous policy of repatriation and compensation, the Arab states by ceasing to utilize refugees as political pawns and their camps as breeding grounds for hate and despair, and the world community both by more generous financial assistance and by liberal immigration policies.

The Resolution refers to the utility of the establishment of demilitarized zones in assuring peace and guaranteeing territorial inviolability. The location of the demilitarized zones is left, obviously, to the parties to negotiate.

By design, all of the foregoing provisions of the Resolution are stated in preambulatory language or as principles or guidelines for a peace agreement. The only truly operative parts of the Resolution are the paragraphs requiring the Secretary-General "to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution," and requesting the Secretary-General to report on the Special Representative's progress. These paragraphs strongly support the view, which I have already expressed, that a peace settlement is not to be imposed and that the Resolution is not self-implementing. In fact, it is impossible to see how the Resolution, in light of its terms, can be self-implementing. Rather, its plain meaning is that with third-party assistance, the parties are to negotiate and to agree upon an acceptable settlement peace and peace agreements.

A notable and purposeful omission in the Resolution is any specific reference to the status of Jerusalem and its failure to reaffirm past U.N. resolutions for the internationalization of the city. Resolution 242 thus realistically recognizes the desuetude of the internationalization resolutions and leaves open the possibility of an agreement upon a military Jerusalem under Israeli jurisdiction with some special status for the Arab states with regard to Moslem holy places. Further, the interest of Christians in their holy places would, of course, have to be recognized and safeguarded. In the light of the seemingly intransigent position of Saudi Arabia with respect to the status of Jerusalem, this may develop into the most difficult issue to resolve in the Geneva negotiations.

There is further light on the ambiguities and meaning of Resolution 242 in its legislative history. This history dates back to the days preceding the very outbreak of the war.

In May, 1967, the late President Nasser moved substantial Egyptian forces into the Sinai, ejected the U.N. peacekeeping forces, reoccupied the strategic and previously demilitarized Sharm-el-Sheikh, and proclaimed a blockade of the Straits of Tiran. In so doing, President Nasser disrupted the status quo in the area which had prevailed since the '56-57 war. These were ominous measures, Israel, which under American pressure had withdrawn its forces from Sinai and Sharm-el-Sheikh in 1957, had consistently affirmed that a blockade of its ships and cargoes seeking to pass through the Straits of Tiran would be a cause of war. Moreover, faced with divisional forces of well-armed Egyptian troops on its borders and increasingly provocative statements by Nasser and other Arab leaders, Israel had little choice but to order mobilization of its largely civilian army. Tension in the area became increasingly acute.

It was justified concern which, therefore, prompted the Western powers, including the United States, to take the initiative in convoking the United Nations Security Council in an attempt to avert a conflict by restoring the previous status quo.

These attempts in the Security Council and through private diplomatic channels failed because of Arab objections supported by the Soviet Union. Apparently, whatever the reason, both were ready to risk war rather than reestablish the conditions which had previously prevailed in the area.

When the war did break out on June 5, 1967, attempts were renewed again by the Western powers to bring about an effective cease-fire that very day, in the hope of stabilizing the situation before it changed beyond repair. Whether because of faulty intelligence or prideful unwillingness to face the facts, the Arab states, supported by the Soviet Union, refused to permit a cease-fire resolution to be voted on the first day of the war, even though this was obviously to their advantage. It will be recalled that in the first few hours of the fighting the Egyptian air force was effectively destroyed and the fate of the war thereby determined.

It was only on the second day of the war, after it became publicly apparent that Israel, for all practi-
cal purposes, had already won the war, that agreement was reached in the Security Council on a simple resolution calling for a cease-fire. And even then it took time to get acceptance from Jordan, and even more time to obtain Syrian acquiescence to a cease-fire, although Israeli forces were advancing on their fronts.

The cease-fire resolutions which were ultimately adopted during and following the Six-Day War differed dramatically, however, from previous resolutions of the Council in the Israeli-Arab wars of the preceding nineteen years. In the earlier resolutions the call for a cease-fire was usually accompanied by a demand for a withdrawal of troops to the positions held before the conflict erupted. In June, 1967, however, no withdrawal provisions were incorporated as part of the cease-fire resolutions. This was not an accident but, rather, a result of the reaction by a majority of the Security Council to what had occurred.

As the debates revealed, the requisite majority of the Council was unwilling to vote forthwith with withdrawal of Israeli forces because of their conviction that to return to the prior armistice regime would not serve the goal of a just and lasting peace between the parties. Proof that this was so is provided by the action of the Security Council with respect to a resolution pressed at the time by the Soviet Union. The Soviet delegate offered a specific resolution not only reaffirming the Council's call for a cease-fire but, additionally, condemning Israel as the aggressor and demanding a withdrawal of its forces to the positions held on June 5, 1967, before the conflict erupted. But this resolution of the Soviet Union, although put to a vote, did not command the support of the requisite nine Security Council members.

Israel was not condemned as an aggressor because of the conviction of a majority of the Security Council, shared by world opinion, that President Nasser's actions, particularly the eviction of the U.N. peacekeeping forces, the substantial movement of his troops into the Sinai and the blockade of shipping in the Straits of Tiran, were the causes of the war, regardless of who fired the first shot.

But even more fundamentally, the debates in the Council made it clear that a majority of members felt strongly that something more was needed to assure peace than the fragile Armistice Agreements that had prevailed for the previous nineteen years and had frequently been breached.

In short, the unwillingness to support the Soviet resolution for a withdrawal of Israeli forces to the positions they held before June 5, 1967, was based upon the conviction of a substantial number of the Security Council members that, whatever the extent of withdrawal of Israeli troops, it should this time be in the context of accepted and agreed-upon peace settlements, ensuring secure and recognized boundaries for Israel.

The Soviet Union did not allow the matter to rest with its defeat in the Security Council. It called for a Special Session of the General Assembly which convened on June 17, 1967. It is important to recall that the General Assembly also refused to adopt by the requisite two-thirds majority a resolution offered by Yugoslavia and several other members and supported by the Soviet Union and the Arab states, differing somewhat in tone but not in substance from the prior Soviet resolution, rejected by the Security Council.

With the adjournment of the Special Session of the General Assembly in September, 1967, the matter once again reverted to the Security Council, and again became the subject of further public debate, as well as intensive private negotiations. These finally culminated in the November 22 Resolution 242.

This Resolution, offered by the British Representative, Lord Caradon, stemmed substantially from a General Assembly resolution offered by the Latin American states to the Special Session and a United States resolution offered to the resumed Security Council meeting. The unanimous support for Resolution 242 was the product in considerable measure of intensive diplomatic activity by the United States both at the United Nations and in foreign capitals throughout the world. This is not to say that Great Britain, the various Latin American countries, the Netherlands, Denmark and others were not actively engaged in the negotiations and diplomatic activity, but it cannot be gainsaid that the United States took the primary role in the adoption of the November 22 Resolution.

It should be noted that before the vote on the November 22 Resolution, the Soviet Union offered a draft resolution again calling for withdrawal of Israeli troops to the June 5 lines. It did not, however, press this resolution to a vote. Then, and only then, was the stage set for the adoption of the November 22 Resolution.

It is only fair to say that too much cannot be made of this matter of not pressing a resolution to a vote by the Security Council. The United States itself had resorted to this practice in the Middle East debates. The significance of withdrawing a resolution can only be evaluated by comparing the resolution withdrawn with the one adopted. In this instance, the proposed Soviet resolution differed in tone and approach from the resolution adopted. On the other hand, the United States resolution was closely akin to the final version.

Arab unwillingness to face up to the realities persisted throughout the debates at the Security Council and the General Assembly and until November 22, 1967. The Arab states, during the Special Session of the General Assembly, even rejected a compromise urged upon them by the Soviet Union because the compromise entailed the renunciation
of belligerency and acknowledgement of Israel's right to exist as a sovereign nation with secure borders and with full access to the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Why then did the Arab states accept Resolution 242, incorporating these principles, and why do they still profess acceptance of it? Why did Israel accept, and why does it still adhere to its acceptance?

Having been rebuffed both in the Security Council and in the Assembly, the Arab states belatedly came to the conclusion that the language of Resolution 242 was the best they could hope for from the U.N. They obviously counted on the Resolution's ambiguities to permit them to assert their own interpretation of the Resolution. They also heavily relied upon major Soviet support both diplomatically and militarily. Further, they conceived that the passage of time would erode the support of the United States and like-minded states for Israel.

To a certain extent Arab calculations have been realized. World opinion, overwhelmingly supportive of Israel as the "underdog" at the time of the war, has, in some degree, shifted to a measure of sympathy for the defeated and now "underdog" Arab states. Some countries have watered down their prior support of the Resolution's principles—witness the recent resolution proposed to the Security Council and vetoed by the United States which sought to reinterpret Resolution 242, although purporting to adhere to it. Witness also the abject attitudes of many nations to the Arab oil "blackmail."

The Israelis accepted Resolution 242, interestingly enough, for some of the same reasons as their Arab antagonists. It was the best Israel could hope to get from the U.N. under the given circumstances. They were rightly fearful that their diplomatic support would erode if Israel proved to be intransigent. Like the Arab states, the Israelis concluded that the Resolution's ambiguities permitted them to assert their own interpretation of the Resolution. The Israelis were also unwilling to provoke the Soviets unduly, fearing greater involvement by them in the area—a fear justified by recent events. Most important, Israel, rightly or wrongly, recognized the danger of alienating the United States Government and American public opinion by an overly inflexible position in light of Israel's need for military hardware and economic assistance which has been forthcoming.

The foregoing analysis of the text and legislative history of Resolution 242, for reasons of space, cannot be all-encompassing. Nevertheless, I believe, despite its brevity, it accurately summarizes the spirit, intent and background of 242.

Despite the passage of time since the adoption of Resolution 242 and the recent war and, perhaps, because of these events, I adhere to the view that the Resolution does provide the basis to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement between the parties, provided they will come to share the will and courage to achieve a just and lasting peace, which is the goal of the Resolution. Perhaps my "optimism" is based on the fact that the Resolution gives something to both sides.

I do not, however, wish to minimize the difficulties in achieving a peace agreement. Only strong and secure leaders, buttressed by popular support, can consummate a peace settlement; for peace, if it is to be lasting, necessarily involves compromise and political risks. It is an historical truth that the making of peace often calls for greater courage than the making of war.

My ultimate conclusion is that peace in the Middle East is not at hand but that it is ultimately achievable on the basis of the guidelines set forth in Resolution 242. This assumes that there is a shared desire for peace and a realistic approach to the negotiations at Geneva by both the adversary parties and the superpowers. This is a very large assumption. Whether it is a warranted one, we shall see.