CIA: The Myth and the Madness
by Patrick J. McGarvey
(Penguin; 240 pp.; $1.65 [paper])

The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities
by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.
(Hill and Wang; 212 pp.; $7.95)

Paul W. Blackstock

The importance of intelligence, espionage and covert political operations can hardly be overemphasized in a world which lives under the shadow of thermonuclear holocaust. Each of the nuclear powers rightly regards intelligence as its first line of defense, makes use of espionage as a means of collecting information and employs covert or clandestine political operations as an instrument of foreign policy, usually as a substitute for, or supplement to, the open use of military force. All major powers use counterespionage organizations and methods to thwart the positive intelligence efforts directed at them by their neighbors, and if possible to abort any secret political operations of which they are the targets.

As a result of these factors the United States since World War II has developed a whole complex of organizations, called "the Intelligence Community," of which the central, directing authority is the Central Intelligence Agency, the subject of Patrick J. McGarvey's *CIA: The Myth and the Madness*. More recently, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. has offered a "sober appraisal" of the entire intelligence community, that is, "neither a defense nor a whitewash." Taken together, these two books illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of the literature dealing with intelligence, most of which is made up of glamorized memoirs, sensational revelations or semiofficial apologies.

The serious literature dealing with intelligence is based almost entirely on secondary sources, since governments classify their official intelligence records as secret and attempt to prevent any "unauthorized disclosure of intelligence methods or sources." Unlike diplomatic archives and similar official papers, intelligence records are rarely made available to scholars, and intelligence aides leaving government service are sworn to secrecy for a period of several years. In an extreme case, a former intelligence aide, Victor Marchetti, has recently been enjoined by court order from publishing a second novel based, however indirectly, on his experiences inside the U.S. intelligence community.

Unfortunately, authorized disclosures by intelligence agencies themselves must be used with caution, since they are usually made for mixed security or political warfare purposes. Official revelations about the extent and menace of enemy espionage serve to heighten vigilance and to bolster or tighten internal security. Such disclosures were used extensively by both sides during the cold war. Even in periods of détente public boasting about intelligence exploits or deprecation of hostile intelligence activities serves the public relations interests of counterintelligence bureaucracies, but contributes little to understanding the field. For example, between 1964 and 1970 the USSR published roughly 190 articles extolling the exploits of Soviet intelligence agencies and some 490 articles warning against the machinations of Western intelligence, mainly the CIA. In all fairness, it should be noted that many of the publications of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Internal Security Subcommittee serve a similar warning function in the United States. Since intelligence agencies try to improve their respective images and to blacken those of their rivals, the uninitiated reader would do well to treat all official or semiofficial disclosures with caution and a large dose of skepticism.

But there are other factors which make for built-in bias or slanting in even the most serious literature in this obviously controversial field. Intelligence agencies are tightly closed societies which produce intense parochial loyalties. Officials who retire and later write about intelligence naturally reflect a favorable bias toward their craft and toward the agency in which they served, especially if their careers have been highly rewarding both personally and professionally. In such cases their memoirs tend to read like institutional advertising. Former CIA director Allen Dulles's *The Craft of Intelligence*, and Lyman Kirkpatrick's first book, *The Real CIA* (1968), are good examples of this principle, which, to a lesser degree, applies as well to his recent book on the intelligence community.

On the other hand, there is a growing body of literature produced by former intelligence aides who served at "the working level" or lower echelons, who have become disillusioned with the profession, and especially with the way the intelligence community has been organized and has functioned. Memoirs produced by such authors tend to be highly critical. Even when the purpose of the criticism is to call attention to the need for organizational and functional reforms, books by those whom Allen Dulles used to call "troublemakers" are likely to be dismissed as inconsequential by reviews in the Establishment press. For example, Pat McGarvey's *CIA: The Myth and the Madness* was tersely dismissed as "a useful book as far as it goes" in an anonymous twenty-line review in the *New York*

Times Book Review (March 23, 1973). Both McGarvey's book and Kirkpatrick's on *The U.S. Intelligence Community* are useful as far as they go, and in fact nicely complement each other. Kirkpatrick gives the reader a benign, almost complacent view of intelligence as seen from the top down. McGarvey takes a highly critical look at intelligence as seen from the working level up.

Kirkpatrick begins with a summary of the historical development of the intelligence community, stressing the point that in addition to the CIA it includes the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the code-breaking National Security Agency (under Defense), the Service agencies of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the FBI, the Atomic Energy Commission and even the Treasury Department. The first chapter includes an unexplained organization chart of DIA, and a simplified chart of communications intelligence. But for some strange reason there are no charts of either CIA or the organization of the intelligence community as a whole. A second chapter focuses on the community's accountability and control by the Congress and the courts.

The spotty record of Congressional surveillance of the CIA and the community stems from jurisdictional quarrels among the various committees directly concerned and from the need to restrict information to preserve secrecy. Kirkpatrick's position on this controversial issue is highly ambivalent. His sympathetic review of Congressional surveillance clearly implies that it is adequate. The actual performance record of Congressional committees has led most observers to a different conclusion. For example, Senator Stuart Symington is a senior member of both the Senate Armed Services Committee and its CIA subcommittee. According to McGarvey: "As a senior member of both groups, Symington disclosed that, despite claims that there is a constant congressional supervision of the CIA, the Senate CIA subcommittee did not meet once in 1971." By even the most charitable standards, this is less than adequate.

Both Kirkpatrick and McGarvey are deeply concerned with what the former calls "the crux of the issue of intelligence in a free society: confidence in the men responsible for secret operations." Writing from quite different perspectives the authors at times come up with similar recommendations. For example, Kirkpatrick writes: "The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is required to report twice a year. On such occasions, a brief statement from the White House, as frank as possible within the bounds of security, would be a reminder to the citizenry that men of responsibility and stature had reviewed the work of the intelligence community." Along similar lines McGarvey has previously written:

"To ensure the continuing confidence of the people and its elected representatives the President might seriously consider rewriting the character of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This board could serve as an ombudsman for the people and prepare a yearly unclassified report on intelligence activities under way during the year. Problem areas and the solutions applied could be explained. Moreover, this annual report would provide the President a yearly opportunity to update his thinking on intelligence matters, and, in effect, serve as a vehicle to keep him not only honest, but constantly thinking about the role of intelligence. If the President was required to divulge the sketchy nature of the intelligence on which he based his Son Tay prisoner-of-war-camp raid into North Vietnam, odds are he would have given serious second thoughts to approving the fiasco."

In a third chapter on "Intelligence and National Policy" Kirkpatrick reviews the CIA's excellent estimating record during the war in Vietnam, but sadly observes that so far as the policy-makers were concerned ". . . intelligence estimates became just another opinion, and not a respected one at the highest level of govern-

ment. It is significant that President Johnson omitted reference to any intelligence analyses in his memoir *The Vantage Point,*" an omission which Kirkpatrick notes was pointed out by Chester L. Cooper in "The CIA and Decision Making" (*Foreign Affairs,* January, 1972).

In a fourth chapter entitled "Overseas Operations" Kirkpatrick lumps together both espionage and covert operations, which he describes as "operations ranging from political manipulation to unconventional warfare." Like critics of such operations whom he does not mention (e.g., Roger Hilsman in *To Move a Nation*), Kirkpatrick is obviously disturbed by the problems of management and control raised by covert operations. Nevertheless, his understatement of the facts about them is, to say the least, at times misleading. For example, he writes that during the Eisenhower Administration, when Allen Dulles became Director of Central Intelligence in 1953, the community "moved into a new phase . . . a phase in which political action, or covert operation as typified by the Bay of Pigs . . . was looked upon as a *possible* method for attaining national objectives" (emphasis added). Actually, it was during this period that covert operations became the *primary means* of carrying out the anti-Communist "cold war mission" of CIA, a mission which Allen Dulles extolls through his *Craft of Intelligence.* Writing about CIA in the Allen Dulles era, Roger Hilsman, a former head of State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, concludes: "Covert action was overused as an instrument of policy, and the reputation of the U.S. suffered more and more. . . . Too heavy reliance on the techniques of secret intelligence, in sum, so corroded one of our major political assets, the belief in American intentions and integrity, as to nullify much of the gain." In all fairness it should be noted that after much ambivalence Kirkpatrick also concludes that "covert operations such as the Bay of Pigs should be used only as the last step in escalation of action to be followed by the use of overt military forces. If a nation is unwilling to take the last step, then any plan for covert action must be dropped or, at least, abandoned when it starts to lose its secrecy."

In a chapter on "Domestic Activities" Kirkpatrick gives a summary rundown on political surveillance of individual citizens, especially "New Left activists," by the FBI and Army counterintelligence agencies. The latter clearly exceeded their mission in this regard, although Kirkpatrick never says so directly. The way in which he consistently underplays the important Constitutional issues involved gives one the impression of the blind leading the blind. In a chapter on "Sources of Political Support and Criticism" he flatly asserts that "the congressional committees meet with the CIA several times each session." If true, this must come as a surprise to Senator Symington and other committee members whose experience in this regard has been somewhat different.

Unlike McGarvey, who is rarely at a loss for suggested solutions to the problems which plague the intelligence community, Kirkpatrick has few recommendations and few conclusions, beyond the truisms that the public must somehow have confidence and "faith in the directors of the intelligence and security organizations," and that "the people in a free society must have faith in the institutions as well." For an analysis in depth of the many disturbing questions Kirkpatrick leaves unanswered one must turn to less popular but more rewarding studies, such as Harry Howe Ransom's classic, *The Intelligence Establishment* (1970), and his recent penetrating essay, "Strategic Intelligence" (available in convenient modular form from the General Learning Press, Morristown, N.J.).

For a warmly human, deeply concerned account of what it is like to work in the intelligence community rather than to survey it from the detached, Olympian and often misinformed heights of the front offices, both layman and expert should consult McGarvey's *CIA: The Myth and the Madness* and a forthcoming but still suppressed work by Victor Marchetti and John Marks. Significantly, McGarvey's book is missing from Kirkpatrick's highly selective bibliography.

Super-Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire by Michael Hudson

(Holt, Rinehart and Winston; 304 pp.; $9.95)

Guy F. Erb

Has U.S. government finance capital replaced private finance capital as the dominant international economic force? Michael Hudson thinks so, and asserts that as a result the United States has achieved "universal power over every capitalist country." Yet the book concludes on the note that the United States will probably "for the first time in its history pay tribute abroad for its military activities of the past. America's success in forcing other nations to pay the cost of its overseas wars may prove an empty one." Thus Hudson is confusing about the absolute and relative power of the U.S.

He correctly sees the decline in the relative power of the United States since the apogee of the pax-Americana—1945-51—yet in most of the book he emphasizes the absolute international economic strength of the United States. In his historical review of the postwar period he consistently places the U.S. in the driv-