

ment. It is significant that President Johnson omitted reference to any intelligence analyses in his memoir *The Vantage Point*, an omission which Kirkpatrick notes was pointed out by Chester L. Cooper in "The CIA and Decision Making" (*Foreign Affairs*, January, 1972).

In a fourth chapter entitled "Overseas Operations" Kirkpatrick lumps together both espionage and covert operations, which he describes as "operations ranging from political manipulation to unconventional warfare." Like critics of such operations whom he does not mention (e.g., Roger Hilsman in *To Move a Nation*), Kirkpatrick is obviously disturbed by the problems of management and control raised by covert operations. Nevertheless, his understatement of the facts about them is, to say the least, at times misleading. For example, he writes that during the Eisenhower Administration, when Allen Dulles became Director of Central Intelligence in 1953, the community "moved into a new phase . . . a phase in which political action, or covert operation as typified by the Bay of Pigs . . . was looked upon as a *possible* method for attaining national objectives" (emphasis added). Actually, it was during this period that covert operations became the *primary means* of carrying out the anti-Communist "cold war mission" of CIA, a mission which Allen Dulles extolls through his *Craft of Intelligence*. Writing about CIA in the Allen Dulles era, Roger Hilsman, a former head of State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, concludes: "Covert action was overused as an instrument of policy, and the reputation of the U.S. suffered more and more. . . . Too heavy reliance on the techniques of secret intelligence, in sum, so corroded one of our major political assets, the belief in American intentions and integrity, as to nullify much of the gain." In all fairness it should be noted that after much ambivalence Kirkpatrick also concludes that "covert operations such as the Bay of Pigs should be used only as the last step in escalation of action to be followed by the

use of overt military forces. If a nation is unwilling to take the last step, then any plan for covert action must be dropped or, at least, abandoned when it starts to lose its secrecy."

In a chapter on "Domestic Activities" Kirkpatrick gives a summary rundown on political surveillance of individual citizens, especially "New Left activists," by the FBI and Army counterintelligence agencies. The latter clearly exceeded their mission in this regard, although Kirkpatrick never says so directly. The way in which he consistently underplays the important Constitutional issues involved gives one the impression of the blind leading the blind. In a chapter on "Sources of Political Support and Criticism" he flatly asserts that "the congressional committees meet with the CIA several times each session." If true, this must come as a surprise to Senator Symington and other committee members whose experience in this regard has been somewhat different.

Unlike McGarvey, who is rarely at a loss for suggested solutions to the problems which plague the intelligence community, Kirkpatrick has few recommendations and few

conclusions, beyond the truisms that the public must somehow have confidence and "faith in the directors of the intelligence and security organizations," and that "the people in a free society must have faith in the institutions as well." For an analysis in depth of the many disturbing questions Kirkpatrick leaves unanswered one must turn to less popular but more rewarding studies, such as Harry Howe Ransom's classic, *The Intelligence Establishment* (1970), and his recent penetrating essay, "Strategic Intelligence" (available in convenient modular form from the General Learning Press, Morristown, N.J.).

For a warmly human, deeply concerned account of what it is like to work in the intelligence community rather than to survey it from the detached, Olympian and often misinformed heights of the front offices, both layman and expert should consult McGarvey's *CIA: The Myth and the Madness* and a forthcoming but still suppressed work by Victor Marchetti and John Marks. Significantly, McGarvey's book is missing from Kirkpatrick's highly selective bibliography.

Super-Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire by Michael Hudson

(Holt, Rinehart and Winston; 304 pp.; \$9.95)

Guy F. Erb

Has U.S. government finance capital replaced private finance capital as the dominant international economic force? Michael Hudson thinks so, and asserts that as a result the United States has achieved "universal power over every capitalist country." Yet the book concludes on the note that the United States will probably "for the first time in its history pay tribute abroad for its military activities of the past. America's success in forcing other nations to pay the cost of

its overseas wars may prove an empty one." Thus Hudson is confusing about the absolute and relative power of the U.S.

He correctly sees the decline in the relative power of the United States since the apogee of the pax-Americana—1945-51—yet in most of the book he emphasizes the absolute international economic strength of the United States. In his historical review of the postwar period he consistently places the U.S. in the driv-

er's seat of the Western international system. Confronted with the international monetary events of the late 1960's and the early 1970's, however, Hudson switches to overemphasizing the shift of power away from the United States. He expects the current economic struggle between the United States and Western Europe to turn out unfavorably for the former. In view of the determination with which U.S. policy-makers are pursuing their economic and political objectives, Hudson's expectation seems unlikely. In sum, the author moves from a frequent overemphasis of U.S. power to a conclusion that the U.S. is facing an abrupt decline in its ability to influence other nations, particularly Japan and the countries of Western Europe.

Concentrating on absolute U.S. power while at the same time appearing to rejoice in its relative diminution, Hudson seems to miss changes that have occurred within the group of countries he regards as adversaries of the United States. Some developing countries, for example, have recently gained leverage within the international monetary system by using private capital markets to bypass the official finance capital system upon which Hudson places so much emphasis. For instance, in the last few years the access of about thirty developing countries to Euro-currency and Euro-bond markets has grown tremendously, an event which does not fit into Hudson's analysis. My criticism is not that Hudson has failed to foresee events, but that he has not provided a framework for the analysis of the 1970's.

Indeed, after discussing various international institutions — GATT, World Bank, IMF — his last chapters are little more than a rushed reporting of the events of the late sixties and early seventies. They are a collection of news reports and selective quotes from the annual meetings of the IMF, rather than a drawing together of the elements set out in the earlier chapters. For example, Hudson does not fully explore the relevance for the seventies of his useful insight into the power that the U.S. obtained from its huge external obli-

gations incurred by successive balance-of-payments deficits; the leverage over other nations which the dollar "overhang" represents is still an important element in international economic systems. Furthermore, there may be parallels that could have been explored in America's use of that leverage, and options open to other countries—oil producers and large debtors among the poor countries, to name a couple.

Hudson tends to castigate the United States as the ultimate imperialistic villain, perhaps as a consequence of overemphasizing U.S. power. Although he eschews what he terms the "devil theory of history," he must certainly subscribe to a theory of some lesser demons. How else can one explain the statement that "the United States became the initiator of a broad exploitative move by the industrialized nations against the less developed countries, forcing them to orient their economies to the commercial raw material and strategic needs of the developed nations. He tends to ascribe only a subsidiary imperialistic role to the nations of Western Europe. Their own dominance over many developing countries is almost ignored.

For Hudson, all nations, both developed and developing, merge into one group of adversaries opposing the superimperialistic power of Uncle Sam. This approach ignores the view of developing countries, who see themselves as dependent not only on the United States but on all developed countries. Hudson's failure to include such a poor-country perspective may result from an inadequate mixture of a dialectical approach and one based on an analysis of institutions. He does not maintain the consistent dialectical methodology that characterizes the work of Marxist commentators such as Walter Rodney. Rodney and others who view the "North" from the dependent "South" talk of how Europe (and America) have *underdeveloped* Africa and other poor countries.

At the same time, Hudson fails to use a consistent institutional analysis of international relations. Although he includes chapters on the General

from
FORTRESS PRESS

What does
"America"
really mean?

Some questions.
Some answers.

Defining AMERICA

A Christian Critique
of the American Dream



by
Robert Benne & Philip Hefner

"Defining America signals a major new effort in American religion to come to terms with the hope and the horror in our national experience. The authors have done more than a masterful job of summing up the current discussion about religions; they issue a clear challenge to make the country's bicentennial a revival rather than a requiem for thoughtful patriotism. It is an important book that deserves to be widely read and debated."

Richard J. Neuhaus
Senior Editor, Worldview

Paper — \$3.75

AT BOOKSTORES NOW



Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19129
Purposeful Books of
Contemporary Christian Thought

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the complexities of these institutions are not brought sufficiently into the analysis. In the case of the World Bank, starting from the widely held view that the U.S. dominates that institution, Hudson proceeds to attribute much too much weight to international aid policies and their influence over poor countries. In fact it was not necessary for the U.S. aid program and the World Bank to create a capitalist class in poor countries whose interests coincide with those of the United States. More often than not such a class was already in existence. Aid agencies usually needed to do no more than act consistently with that class in order to foster official and private U.S. interests. The Bank and other institutions have never had the power to "pauperize" the developing nations, as Hudson claims. Their actions, although consistent with governing class interests in both rich and poor countries, were not of sufficient weight to be more than an adjunct of the Western economic system itself.

A further confusion stems from Hudson's occasional assumption that "backward nations" can be identified with their peoples. For example, when he argues that poor countries cannot benefit directly from U.S. and European economic growth, he misses the point that segments of societies in Africa, Asia and Latin America do indeed benefit and have every interest in maintaining a system that allows them to do so. Moreover, by giving so much emphasis to official finance capital, Hudson is unprepared for the preemption of U.S. official actions by events in the private sector or by the flexing of economic muscles by countries with newfound power over the world economy. Very little is said about the major transnational forces that are now interacting with U.S. governmental power. Multinational corporations, private capital markets and the action of "poor" countries that are rich in resources are all factors that challenge the conclu-

sions that are reached by Hudson.

Specific points in the book call into question some of Hudson's treatment of relations among developed and developing nations. First, the outright errors: Special Drawing Rights within IMF are *not* "created by balance of payments deficits," and tariff preferences for the products of developing countries are *not* "illegal for other GATT members." Second, although Hudson certainly objects to the subsidiary role assigned to poor countries by the rich, he himself regards them as "retarded" nations in need of improvements which he has no hesitation in prescribing for them, particularly in the field of agricultural reform. His approach to poor countries, while different from that of the establishment institutions that he criticizes, might be equally unacceptable to policy-makers in

developing countries and probably to their revolutionaries as well.

The volume closes with assertions regarding U.S. actions that amount to little more than a recognition that U.S. policies have been influenced by the preconceptions of establishment figures about America's role in the world economy. Such establishment attitudes were, of course, often based on a too narrow concept of the national interest, but this rather obvious point is not enough to explain changes in the present system. Indeed, what other than establishment attitudes can be expected from most policy-makers in any country? Only rarely do a nation's leaders act with the foresight that views their country's long-run interests as being consistent and not in conflict with the interests of other, especially poor, countries.

The United States and the Origins Of the Cold War, 1941-1947 by John L. Gaddis

(Columbia University Press; 396 pp.; \$12.50)

Robert B. Westbrook

Historical writing on the origins and conduct of the cold war has been dominated since the mid-60's by the "revisionists," a loosely unified group of scholars who rejected the earlier prevailing interpretation of recent Russian-American relations offered by both liberal moralists and liberal realists. According to this interpretation, American policy-makers reluctantly shouldered the burdens of international responsibility during World War II and sought to establish a world order of peace and prosperity, only to be thwarted by the aggressive imperialism of the Soviet Union. Slowly and reluctantly, in response to Soviet provocation, American officials moved away from a policy of cooperation with the Russians to the policy of containment embodied in the Truman Doc-

trine and in the Marshall Plan.

In challenging this interpretation, the revisionists have argued that "American policy was neither so innocent nor so nonideological; that American leaders sought to promote their conceptions of national interest and their values even at the risk of provoking Russian fears about her security (as formulated by Barton J. Bernstein in *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration*, [1970]). The initiative behind many of the conflicts of the cold war, the revisionists suggest, lay not with the Russians but with the United States. While the Soviets appear to have been motivated by a cautious and limited concern for national security, American policy-makers were guided by an ideology which sought to reconstruct the world according to