

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the complexities of these institutions are not brought sufficiently into the analysis. In the case of the World Bank, starting from the widely held view that the U.S. dominates that institution, Hudson proceeds to attribute much too much weight to international aid policies and their influence over poor countries. In fact it was not necessary for the U.S. aid program and the World Bank to create a capitalist class in poor countries whose interests coincide with those of the United States. More often than not such a class was already in existence. Aid agencies usually needed to do no more than act consistently with that class in order to foster official and private U.S. interests. The Bank and other institutions have never had the power to "pauperize" the developing nations, as Hudson claims. Their actions, although consistent with governing class interests in both rich and poor countries, were not of sufficient weight to be more than an adjunct of the Western economic system itself.

A further confusion stems from Hudson's occasional assumption that "backward nations" can be identified with their peoples. For example, when he argues that poor countries cannot benefit directly from U.S. and European economic growth, he misses the point that segments of societies in Africa, Asia and Latin America do indeed benefit and have every interest in maintaining a system that allows them to do so. Moreover, by giving so much emphasis to official finance capital, Hudson is unprepared for the preemption of U.S. official actions by events in the private sector or by the flexing of economic muscles by countries with newfound power over the world economy. Very little is said about the major transnational forces that are now interacting with U.S. governmental power. Multinational corporations, private capital markets and the action of "poor" countries that are rich in resources are all factors that challenge the conclu-

sions that are reached by Hudson.

Specific points in the book call into question some of Hudson's treatment of relations among developed and developing nations. First, the outright errors: Special Drawing Rights within IMF are *not* "created by balance of payments deficits," and tariff preferences for the products of developing countries are *not* "illegal for other GATT members." Second, although Hudson certainly objects to the subsidiary role assigned to poor countries by the rich, he himself regards them as "retarded" nations in need of improvements which he has no hesitation in prescribing for them, particularly in the field of agricultural reform. His approach to poor countries, while different from that of the establishment institutions that he criticizes, might be equally unacceptable to policy-makers in

developing countries and probably to their revolutionaries as well.

The volume closes with assertions regarding U.S. actions that amount to little more than a recognition that U.S. policies have been influenced by the preconceptions of establishment figures about America's role in the world economy. Such establishment attitudes were, of course, often based on a too narrow concept of the national interest, but this rather obvious point is not enough to explain changes in the present system. Indeed, what other than establishment attitudes can be expected from most policy-makers in any country? Only rarely do a nation's leaders act with the foresight that views their country's long-run interests as being consistent and not in conflict with the interests of other, especially poor, countries.

The United States and the Origins Of the Cold War, 1941-1947 by John L. Gaddis

(Columbia University Press; 396 pp.; \$12.50)

Robert B. Westbrook

Historical writing on the origins and conduct of the cold war has been dominated since the mid-60's by the "revisionists," a loosely unified group of scholars who rejected the earlier prevailing interpretation of recent Russian-American relations offered by both liberal moralists and liberal realists. According to this interpretation, American policy-makers reluctantly shouldered the burdens of international responsibility during World War II and sought to establish a world order of peace and prosperity, only to be thwarted by the aggressive imperialism of the Soviet Union. Slowly and reluctantly, in response to Soviet provocation, American officials moved away from a policy of cooperation with the Russians to the policy of containment embodied in the Truman Doc-

trine and in the Marshall Plan.

In challenging this interpretation, the revisionists have argued that "American policy was neither so innocent nor so nonideological; that American leaders sought to promote their conceptions of national interest and their values even at the risk of provoking Russian fears about her security (as formulated by Barton J. Bernstein in *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration*, [1970]). The initiative behind many of the conflicts of the cold war, the revisionists suggest, lay not with the Russians but with the United States. While the Soviets appear to have been motivated by a cautious and limited concern for national security, American policy-makers were guided by an ideology which sought to reconstruct the world according to

their own, American specifications.

Criticism of the revisionist interpretation has heretofore been largely confined to petulant essays and reviews in scholarly journals. Such criticism was scarcely impressive when compared with the substantial amount of research and writing being done by the revisionists. However, John L. Gaddis's *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War* offers a new, more substantial, challenge to the revisionist interpretation. Rather than simply launch a sustained attack on the revisionists, Gaddis argues a case of his own, which acknowledges, in passing, the revisionist contribution to the understanding of the origins of the cold war, yet attempts to broaden the perspective to include contingencies he feels the revisionists have ignored or slighted.

"Revisionist historians," Gaddis writes, "have performed a needed service by stressing the influence of economic considerations on American diplomacy, but their focus has been too narrow: many other forces—domestic politics, bureaucratic inertia, quirks of personality, perceptions, accurate or inaccurate, of Soviet intentions—also affected the actions of Washington officials." Confining pointed criticism of particular revisionist interpretations for the most part to his footnotes, Gaddis attempts by force of argument rather than stridency of tone to revise the revisionists and advance what will probably come to be labeled the "postrevisionist" interpretation.

Common to both revisionism and postrevisionism is a feeling that the cold war was in some sense a tragedy, that is, a complex interacting of the internal character of the protagonists and external events. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.—a weathervane for what is new yet safe in American liberalism—has remarked (in *The Origins of the Cold War* [1970]), substantial agreement has been reached among historians of the period "(a) that neither Moscow nor Washington was exclusively responsible for the Cold War, and (b) that the Cold War resulted in great part

from an almost inexorable clash between two conceptions of international security. Each side, in short, was possessed of its own particular *hamartia*, or tragic "flaws," which limited its capabilities to respond effectively to the situation at hand and set the stage for the clash of the two main characters in the drama.

While sharing this tragic perspective, revisionists and postrevisionists by no means write the same play. Many questions must be resolved. What was the American *hamartia*? the Soviet *hamartia*? Whose internal constraints were more limiting, or, alternatively, who was in the best position to transcend such limitations for the good of all? Is America or Russia to play the Promethean character who attempts to shape the world to his will? And who is to play Creon, whose limitations lie in his obsessive concern for the security and protection of the State? The different answers revisionists and postrevisionists supply for these questions have given form to two quite different tragedies. The student of cold war historiography, like Dionysus passing judgment on Aeschylus and Euripides, must decide whether the liberal or the radical is more deserving of the title of master tragedian.

Gaddis is an excellent Aeschylus. His writing style is smooth and polished, and he affects a moderate, restrained tone which compares favorably with the gnashing, discordant prose of Gabriel Kolko, the most prolific (and in some circles, infamous) of the revisionists. He concludes his book with a concise précis of his tragedy:

"The Cold War grew out of a complicated interaction of external and internal developments inside both the United States and the Soviet Union. The external situation—circumstances beyond the control of either power—left Americans and Russians facing one another across prostrated Europe at the end of World War II. Internal influences in the Soviet Union—the search for security, the role of ideology, massive postwar reconstruction needs, the personality of Stalin—together

JAMES ARMSTRONG'S WILDERNESS VOICES



"There have been voices—some gentle, some strident—that have spoken words of protest, judgment, and renewal. There have been voices crying in the wilderness, calling for reconsideration of values and direction."

Intending to produce reform with his realistic outlook, James Armstrong relates modern messages of well-known and controversial men and women, including:

Charlie Chaplin and *Modern Times*;
Angela Davis and *Sin*; and
John Steinbeck and *Hope Beyond Survival*.
Paper, \$3.50.

at your local bookstore
abingdon

with those in the United States—the ideal of self-determination, fear of communism, the illusion of omnipotence fostered by American economic strength and the atomic bomb—made the resulting confrontation a hostile one. Leaders of both superpowers sought peace, but in doing so yielded to considerations which, while they did not precipitate war, made a resolution of differences impossible."

Perhaps the main thrust of the book is an attempt to redefine the American *hamartia*—those internal restraints which shaped the American response to the external world situation during and immediately after the Second World War. "If there is a single theme which runs through this book," he says, "it is the narrow range of alternatives open to American leaders during this period as they sought to deal with problems of war and peace." Gaddis concentrates on two such restraints he sees as determinative of American policy: the peace aims formulated on the basis of a particular reading of the

past and the impact of public opinion and domestic politics on policy-makers' attempts to implement their goals. Though he discusses other restraints—bureaucratic inertia, quirks of personality, the illusion of omnipotence—it is these two factors which run throughout his analysis and are, I think, most deserving of consideration.

Much of American planning for peace, Gaddis argues, was shaped by a preoccupation with the "lessons of the past," particularly those lessons taught by World War I and the world depression in the 1930's. Thus, in formulating the aims for peace in World War II, American policy-makers sought goals they felt would remedy past mistakes. They arrived at four major objectives. First, Germany and her allies had to be defeated completely, disarmed and occupied. Second, in order to change the "political and economic conditions which had spawned the totalitarians of the 1930s," efforts must be made to promote self-determination and to prevent future depressions through multilateralism in international economic policy. Third, a new collective security organization must be developed to insure the protection of international order. Finally, the Grand Alliance with Great Britain and the Soviet Union must survive victory if peace was to be secure.

American determination to press the second of these aims brought about a confrontation with the Soviet Union (whose own reading of the past left little room for self-determination and multilateralism) over Eastern Europe and the economics of recovery which shattered the Grand Alliance and led to the cold war. Soviet and American policy-makers, in short, came into conflict when the policies dictated by their respective historical viewpoints were found to be antagonistic.

In his emphasis on the preoccupation of American officials with the past Gaddis seems to me to be attempting (perhaps unconsciously) to avoid confronting the ideological component of American foreign policy. No doubt American policy-

makers were affected by their reading of history; such men are often the most fanatic (and unsophisticated) "users" of history. The important question, however, is to what end they applied this historical perspective. Gaddis's answer is a weak one. The ultimate objective of American policy, he says, was to insure world peace by eliminating the conditions which would encourage future wars. If this sounds pious, it is. Moreover, it is strangely out of keeping with the realistic, "nobody's innocent" tone of most of the book. To the important questions asked by the revisionists—why self-determination? and why multilateralism?—Gaddis's answer, "to secure peace," "prevent future wars," is distressingly incomplete and unsatisfactory.

"Peace" is not an unloaded word. Gaddis himself admits that Russia and the United States held different notions of what constituted a viable peace, and he readily acknowledges that Soviet notions of "peace" were congruent with their notions of how best to protect Soviet power. However, he is curiously unwilling to see that American notions of "peace" harbored implicit and explicit ideas on what best suited the maintenance and extension of American power. Like American policy-makers themselves, Gaddis seems reluctant to admit that American "universalism" was cut from the same cloth as the "crasser" theories of balance of power and spheres of influence. As such he can write that Soviet policy in Eastern Europe was a threat to American notions of "peace" rather than American notions of a world order congruent with the fullest exercise of American power. By stating American goals in terms of "peace" and "war prevention" Gaddis avoids a discussion of the ideology underlying these less than neutral terms. Self-serving ideology, for Gaddis, is a component of the Soviet *hamartia*, but it has no place in the American character (with the exception of anti-communism, which, because of its negative formulation, seems to be the only kind of ideology Gaddis will acknowledge American officials to have possessed.)

Further evidence of Gaddis's avoidance or misunderstanding of this question can be seen in his indictment of the revisionists for overemphasis on economics and a tendency toward economic determinism. My reading of the revisionists suggests that they (with the exception of Kolko) do not think of "economics" in the narrow terms Gaddis implies but as the major component of an ideology supportive of American power. Rather than viewing American leaders as looking back over their shoulder, preoccupied with past mistakes, the revisionists see these policy-makers as forward-looking agents of American power, anxious to make the best of a fluid situation by knocking down the pre-war barriers to American interests and establishing a new world order in accordance with the ideals of an expansionist ideology.

Given this ideological preoccupation with American power, it is easier to understand the formulation and prosecution of American peace aims than Gaddis's pious invocation of "peace" and "war prevention." Seen in this light, self-determination and multilateralism become the keys the United States used to unlock the doors that had barred American influence in the colonial empires and others areas where bilateralism inhibited such penetration. Thus Washington demanded access to the Middle East and the Danube basin but denied incursions upon its own special preserve, Latin America. The United Nations was seen as a convenient and subtle way to enforce the American will, and attempts to stock the Security Council with such "major powers" as Brazil and Chiang Kai-shek's China indicate that such was the aim. The Grand Alliance was valuable only insofar as the United States could achieve "cooperation" on its own terms. Success was achieved with Great Britain, but Russia was unwilling to accept the American worldview or bow before American power—economic or atomic. The Grand Alliance collapsed, not because self-determination and multilateralism contradicted cooperation, but because the United States

was unable to convince or to coerce the Soviets into believing they meant the same thing. The goal was not simply a stable peace but a stable peace that guaranteed American hegemony. America was Prometheus.

In his analysis of the restraining influence of public opinion on American policy-making Gaddis makes his most original contribution to cold war historiography. Here he has pointed to a real gap in the revisionist interpretation of the pre-Truman Doctrine period, which tends to concentrate on the ideological limitations of American policy-makers and often excludes consideration of domestic opinion and Congressional pressures. The public and their representatives, Gaddis argues, had at least a negative influence on foreign policy, and "while these influences may not have determined the specific direction of diplomatic initiatives, they did impose definite limitations on how far policy-makers could go." Such policies as "the delay in opening the second front, non-recognition of Moscow's sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, the denial of economic aid to Russia, and the decision to retain control of the atomic bomb can all be explained far more plausibly by citing the administration's need to maintain popular support for its policies rather than by dwelling upon requirements of the economic order."

Gaddis's point is well taken—public opinion is always a consideration in a formal democracy. However, his use of such opinion as an independent variable which cramped the style of officials misses the character of the public viewpoint in foreign policy. Is it not more realistic to see public opinion on foreign policy as shaped by, rather than as shaping, the efforts of policy-makers? After all, in foreign policy there are few if any independent sources of information available to the general public; one relies on what can be squeezed out of public officials.

In this sense one could view many of the difficulties the Roosevelt and Truman administrations had, not as concessions to public concern, but as failures of public relations. Gaddis

gives several examples of the concern of policy-makers to "educate" the public about such issues as Eastern Europe and the bomb, and Roosevelt's snow job on the Declaration on Liberated Europe was masterful. Also it would seem that American leaders did not exploit as fully as they might the public relations value of such considerations as the economic advantages of trade with Russia and the necessity for Russian aid in defeating the Japanese. From this perspective, Stalin's remark to Roosevelt that the American public "should be informed and some propaganda work should be done" is not as facetious as some would have us believe.

Gaddis cannot refrain from concluding his story without offering some reflections on the tragic flaws of the Soviets and comparing them with his list of American limitations. Even if American officials had been free of restraints, he suggests, a settlement with the Soviets would have been unlikely.

"Accomplishment of this task required not only conciliatory actions by Washington but a receptive attitude on the part of Moscow. The latter simply did not exist. Traditional mistrust of foreigners, combined with ideological differences, would have militated against a relationship of mutual trust with the United States regardless of who ruled Russia. Stalin's paranoia, together with the bureaucracy of institutionalized suspicion with which he surrounded himself, made the situation much worse."

Obviously, the tragic flaws of the Soviets are more fraught with normative overtones than the *hamartia* of the United States (compare "paranoia" with "quirks of personality"). Furthermore, Gaddis suggests, because of the nature of the Soviet system, Stalin's "absolute powers did give him more chances to surmount the internal restraints on his policy than were available to his democratic counterparts in the West."

In assessing Gaddis's interpretation on this point, one might wonder to what extent a paranoid dictator presiding over a bureaucracy of in-

stitutionalized suspicion is at all free. Harry Truman himself allowed that "a dictatorship is the hardest thing in God's world to hold together." Gaddis makes too facile a connection between the absence of Anglo-Saxon institutions in Russia and the absence of significant or meaningful debate on important issues. Moreover, the available evidence suggests that Russian foreign policy was remarkably free of paranoid behavior and ideological rigidity—evidence that Gaddis himself presents. No, it would seem that the Soviet *hamartia* was, in contrast to the Promethean nature of American hubris, a rather conservative preoccupation with national security. Russia was Creon.

Ultimately, however, it is not Gaddis's speculations on Soviet policy but his shortsighted analysis of American aims and intentions which makes his account unsatisfactory. His "restraints" fail to explain the Promethean, aggressive and, in the end, coercive nature of American policy toward not only Russia but Great Britain as well. Slighting the ideological content and unity which terms like "self-determination," "multilateralism," "collective security" and "cooperation" held for American officials, he misses the hubris of American policy and thus orchestrates a less convincing tragedy than his revisionist opponents.

CONTRIBUTORS

NAOMI CHAZAN, instructor in African Studies at Hebrew University, Jerusalem, has taught at the University of Ghana.

PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK, a member of the Department of Government and International Studies, University of South Carolina, served as an intelligence specialist in Army G-2 and as a psychological warfare specialist in the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare.

GUY F. ERB is Senior Fellow at the Overseas Development Council, Washington, D.C.

ROBERT B. WESTBROOK is a graduate student in history at Stanford University.

WENDELL J. COATS (Briefly Noted) is a Major General in the U.S. Army (Ret.).

Briefly Noted

This Vast External Realm by Dean Acheson

(Norton; 297 pp.; \$9.95)

Ethics in foreign affairs is a matter of strategic connection to larger policy goals. The President must of necessity resist any effort by the Congress to make itself a partner in foreign policy. Good policy and its implementation are achieved through personal relations among wise men in power, not by a systems approach that would endlessly restructure the decision-making apparatus. The imperious Now must make way for reflection about long-range aims. There are few surprises in this collection of speeches and essays by the late Secretary of State. The present Secretary will, when he retires to writing, not likely surpass Acheson in grace of expression. One hopes his writings will, in, say, 1987, seem not quite so lacking in philosophical depth nor so shortsighted in perceiving the directions of our era. This collection reflects a man who did not suffer fools gladly, which is no doubt a virtue, but was also too ready to think anyone who disagreed with him a fool. It is a grievous flaw.

Holy Man by Gavan Daws

(Harper & Row; 292 pp.; \$8.95)

In 1873 Father Damien de Veuster, a Belgian priest, began work on the island of Molokai in the Hawaiian chain among hundreds of lepers. He died of the disease in 1889. This is his story. It requires definitions of devotion that transcend our current propensity for psychologizing or politicizing. Such new (rediscovered?) definitions will have to include a sense of the holy in human life. The book is another highly readable entry in what appears to be a revival of publishing interest in the nineteenth-century missionary endeavor.

The Discovery of Peace

by R. V. Sampson

(Pantheon; 206 pp.; \$6.95)

The author is currently Lecturer in Politics at the University of Bristol, and some time back his *The Psychology of Power* received very favorable attention also in this country. The present book focuses chiefly on Leo Tolstoy and is an eloquent restatement of a pacifism born from the conviction "that love is good, imperishably good, and that power is evil." From this "indestructible truth" Sampson urges, quite logically, a repudiation of politics and a search for personal renewal in "values which are desirable for their own sake and attainable by all alike." Seldom is the pacifist case set forth in such distinguished fashion.

George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945

by Forrest C. Pogue

(Viking; 683 pp.; \$15.00)

Third of a projected five-volume biography of General Marshall, this one covers the period from the Casablanca Conference to the end of the war in Europe and presents an appealing picture of a very great American soldier. Pogue does a remarkable job of tracing Marshall's personal growth and increasing stature at home and abroad. He successfully sustained his basic strategic "Europe first" position by drawing upon his growing prestige and his authority as Army Chief of Staff to insure adequate resources and backing for the commanders fashioning victory in Europe, resisting successive efforts to delay preparations for a cross-Channel operation and yet supporting fully the diversion at critical periods of limited resources to the Pacific, North Africa and the Mediterranean.

Pogue also deals admirably with revisionist views that have questioned the need for cross-Channel operations and continued military cooperation with the Russians to bring the fighting in Europe and

against Japan to an early and successful conclusion. It is understandable that General Marshall's attitudes and actions may now be viewed in a different light. His determined quest for decisive military ground action to bring the fighting to an early end, his practice of selecting a commander, backing him and then holding him responsible, his policies on troop rotation, morale, race and press relations, to name a few—all these are the seeds of later controversies that would swirl in and around the Armed Forces in the postwar decades, growing in intensity as the Vietnam war dragged on.

—Wendell J. Coats

An Ethic for Christians and Other Aliens in a Strange Land

by William Stringfellow

(Word; 156 pp.; \$5.95)

A furious homily based upon the New Testament Book of Revelations, with the American Empire playing Babylon to the gospel's New Jerusalem. Although the cataloging of evils is conventional enough and the nostrums advocated are hardly novel, Stringfellow combines, here as elsewhere, radical politics with deeply rooted religious faith, coming up with a "Christian radicalism" that does not sacrifice the first word to the second. The book is one of several for which Word publishers have enlisted name religious writers. Word, based in Waco, Texas, has been stunningly successful in feeding the apparently insatiable appetite for books among American fundamentalists, a market which is never mentioned in the "mainstream" reviews, although its moderately successful books frequently outsell several times over the "best sellers" listed in, for example, the *New York Times Book Review*. The hope, one supposes, is that publishing writers such as Stringfellow will both make Word more "respectable" and also broaden the horizons of conservative evangelicalism. Nothing wrong with that.

A shot against cancer?



One day the scariest thing about cancer may be the needle that makes you immune to it.

The theory: build up the body's defense to fight off a disease naturally.

Dramatic research in this direction is going on right now.

Scientists are working on mechanisms to make the body reject cancer.

And the promise for the future is staggering.

Wouldn't you feel good knowing you contributed to the research?

Feel good.

Please contribute. Your dollars will help further all our cancer research.

We want to wipe out cancer in your lifetime.

**American
Cancer Society**

THIS SPACE CONTRIBUTED BY THE PUBLISHER

The War at Home

by Thomas Powers

(Crossman; 347 pp.; \$8.95)

Fearing that the story of the antiwar movement may be cut out of history, the Pulitzer Prize winning author traces the movement from its beginnings up to President Johnson's announcement that he would not run for reelection. The tale is, for the most part, competently told, although there are some puzzling omissions and an excess of information familiar to every moderately conscientious newspaper reader. The chief point, made in different ways, is that "the opposition to the war did not cause the failure [of American policy in Vietnam]; it forced the government to recognize the failure."

The New Agenda

by Andrew M. Greeley

(Doubleday; 310 pp.; \$6.95)

The new agenda in question is for Christianity in general and Roman Catholicism in particular. Greeley offers a competent summary of questions currently disturbing Catholics, a lively polemic against the answers given by what he terms the self-styled liberated Catholic élites, and an altogether too facile synthesis. On too many questions Greeley makes judgments where he is simply not well informed. It will, for example, come as an unpleasant surprise to Wolfhart Pannenberg to discover that his work follows "the psychological or existential approach to religion," which, says Greeley, he is pursuing "in very distinguished fashion." This is a little more outrageous than describing Dean Rusk as a militant leader of the antiwar movement in the sixties. The book is, unfortunately, pockmarked by such errors. It is truly unfortunate, because many of the main arguments Greeley makes should be taken seriously. It is usual, and maybe unfair, to criticize Father Greeley for the speed with which he spawns

new volumes, bringing out as many as five a year. We would not urge him to slow down, lest we be deprived of one of our more spirited religious and cultural critics, but an investment of energy in more careful research and argument would be welcomed. Foreword by Gregory Baum.

Correspondence

[from p. 47]

1973, war General M. Peled's general position has emerged vindicated.)

But Professor Voss's more fundamental misunderstanding is revealed in his final remarks that the October, 1973, war was "a threat to [the Israelis'] very existence" and that the Syrians and the Egyptians "sent their planes across Israel's [sic] borders to destroy her . . ."! Behold, a new annihilation myth is born.

A final point. Professor Voss, laying great stress on Nasser's closing of the Strait of Tiran, says this action was "in reality the first aggression, the *casus belli*, recognized as such by international law." Not every international lawyer would be so certain. Roger Fisher of Harvard, for example, says the question is debatable. In a letter to the *New York Times* he wrote: ". . . I, as an international lawyer, would rather defend before the International Court of Justice the legality of the U.A.R.'s action in closing the Strait of Tiran than to argue the other side of the case, and I would certainly rather do so than to defend the legality of the preventive war which Israel launched . . ." (June 11, 1967).

Joseph L. Ryan, S.J.

Center for the Study of the
Modern Arab World
Beirut, Lebanon