surely correct in including the early Christian movement as part of Jewish history, I think he overdoes it.

The plot centers on Palestine, as well it should. One cannot but wonder, however, whether the ebb and flow of events in Palestine was felt with equal intensity by the Jewish communities in the great cities throughout the Empire. The question is unanswerable because of the paucity of literary evidence (after Philo) from the diaspora. Nonetheless, a fuller and more nuanced picture of diaspora Judaism would have been possible. What really happened to diaspora Judaism after the defeat of Bar Kochba in 135 C.E.? Unintentionally (it seems), Grant gives the impression that after 135 C.E. Judaism is winding down. He mentions some cases where the Jews increased in numbers and influence, but his remarks are sketchy and superficial. Consequently we get no assessment of the place of the Jews in the Roman world after 135 C.E. except as an interlude before the triumph of Christianity.

Which raises another point. Grant overestimates the significance of Christianity and ignores the rich material from Christian sources on Judaism during this period. By the end of the second century, he says, the Christians had begun to outnumber the Jews. This is most unlikely. In Grant’s account Christianity outdistances Judaism at too early a date, and the several centuries of conflict and rivalry between Christians and Jews before (and after) Theodosius I are overlooked.

Toward the end Grant raises the question: Why did Christianity, rather than the Judaism from which it originated, become the successor to the pagans and the dominant faith in the Western world? While no doubt an important question, it is hardly appropriate to this book. The book has not prepared the way for an answer. There is little or no consideration of the religious complexity of the Roman Empire and no attempt to provide the resources out of which the matter could be discussed. A more appropriate question might have been: How did Judaism, after the catastrophic experience in the first and second centuries, manage to survive as a people and a religious movement and establish a new modus vivendi with Rome? How, under such adverse circumstances, were the Jewish people able to find new hope and to redirect their piety and practice around new religious symbols? Grant does remind us that Israel lived on in spite of adversity, that she lives today, and, with the re-establishment of the State of Israel, the “tribulations described in the foregoing pages have at last received at least a measure of recompense.”

The Real World of 1984: A Look at the Foreseeable Future by Richard N. Farmer

The Coming Dark Age: What Will Happen When Modern Technology Breaks Down? by Roberto Vacca

Richard Luccke

Strikingly different technological futures are here projected by an American professor of international business who has had management experience in the Middle East and has a penchant for tinkering with vintage autos, and by an Italian systems expert who has agrieved misgivings about the competence and dedication of his colleagues throughout most of the industrialized world. The writers are remarkably alike, however, in not really expecting any decisive political or cultural intrusions, for better or for worse, on the techno-futures they project.

One is reminded of Henry Brooks Adams’s prediction in his autobiography of 1907 that industrial energy would become godlike by comparison with any former creature of nature and that its human agents would become “as dumb as their dynamo.” Nationalization or socialization would not alter the basic realities: politics would become increasingly “a struggle not of men but of forces.”

That sober prophecy is not so much repeated as exemplified in the books before us. Both view politics as mostly impotent in bringing or avoiding their futures. The scenarios they describe, even though different, can serve to qualify one’s understanding of present issues bearing on development. But one discerns only indirectly what sort of societal activity might help us avoid the perils which threaten Mr. Farmer’s tolerable future or might help us achieve some tolerable alternative to Mr. Vacca’s perilous future.

Richard Farmer traces an expansion of concrete human choices replacing the overruling necessities which circumscribed the life of the Indiana sod farmer and Chicago industrial worker of 1884. He underscores the unprecedented options vocations, avocations, locations, personal contacts, family relations) of the metropolitan dweller of 1974. Add TV telephones, cable and the home communications console of 1984, and we may begin to get nervous about all the choices. But the prospect is not that of Orwell’s 1984 nor that of the urban planners of the 1960’s. Actually, suburban
sprawlers are having a fairly good time; the city proper is not serving many functions for them (transport, manufacture, commerce, entertainment, wholesaling, conventions are all being supplied outside city limits); people who don't have to simply aren't choosing density. Cities that remain in 1984 or 2004 (New York is a special case and will last much longer, European cities a half-century longer) will find "urban crises" diminished.

Rapid Transit, despite present plans by city administrators, will prove a losing proposition. A billion-dollar system costs taxpayers $50 million annually in interest payments alone, for which amount one could chauffeur the carless. The automobile will become lessnoxious through the use of hydrogen fuel that burns to water, through antipollutant and recycling measures, through toll devices which fill up empty cars and divert singles to jitney-taxis, above all through increasing trade-offs between communications and travel. There will be less commutation as people work at home. Other pollution diminishes as newspapers and other pulp yield to the home console. Crime diminishes for lack of victims and, interestingly, for lack of police and lack of laws against victimless crimes as people defend themselves in scattered homes powered by private fuel-cell generators. School problems diminish as schools become competitive rather than compulsory and as learning shifts to electronic media.

Mr. Farmer clearly relishes the ingenuity which might go into developing the "freedom instruments" which people, when all is said and done, actually choose for themselves. But he knows there are some ifs along the way: "if we use some common sense about energy policies and auto use and design." He names three developments which could shelve the whole thing backward: if the energy-use system proves ecologically unviable, if there is some form of total war, or if there is some form of mass mind control. He admits that in the "real world" we are all choosing there will be fewer jobs for the young, the old will find themselves separated, and the poor (at least 10 per cent of us, he modestly judges) will simply be losers. It's the price we pay for turning from politics to mechanical independencies.

Later, he lets himself imagine, for a paragraph, other possible results of such privatism: cities actually going broke, an end to international agreements and so forth. He sees no way of going back to the ethnic communities of the 1930 city. "Surely there are other ways that can restore the sense of community..."

In the end this may be the most critical political question of all, since the very survival of the nation will depend on how we figure it out." But then we get a scenario in which the real man of 1984 switches off all the bad news to dial the code number on his TV console for chess fans.

Roberto Vace (whose translator is British theologian J. S. Whale)
points not merely to individual "freedom instruments" but to overloaded and uncoordinated technological systems which are to support them. He points not merely to a possible failure of energy but to a virtually predictable failure of performance in the production-pollution-transport-communications-service systems—and does so with reference to the Apocalypse of St. John. Exponential growth may fail to ease off at the knee of the curve toward world stability and overturn backward. The coming overshoot will result in a subsequent undershoot, producing a Dark Age with a drastic reduction in population and a need to rebuild civilization.

The prediction is all but certain, because present planners employ linear principles with deficient mathematical models and insufficient provision for multiple feedback loops. All this in the face of exploding population. The imminent overload is charted in system after system (electricity, traffic, communications, waste and water). There are no visible countervailing forces: War has never succeeded in reducing population in the measure required; political protest knows nothing of planning (except, perhaps, in Mao's China); industrial management is venal and phlegmatic. Theorists like E. J. Michan and members of the Club of Rome, who decry side effects of present growth and propose legal measures to preserve the rights of people in enclaves, have not fully assessed the trends. They seek amenities in a boxcar that is headed for Dachau.

The most memorable passage is a scenario (one of many that are possible—one cannot predict the place and the hour) for New York City. Two traffic standstills of a now familiar sort (roads and railroads) lead to a failure in the control tower for air traffic; a plane strikes power lines; overload leads to shutdowns in the back-up system for seven states; fires break out as a result of emergency measures taken in the subzero weather; engines are not able to traverse highways blocked with abandoned cars; communications are jammed; looting begins; waste accumulates; plague breaks out. Massive death ensues and spreads. José, who is used to survival at poverty levels, survives John Doe. The most highly industrialized nations are first to fall. A nation like Sweden, with a rationalized population distribution and strong technical back-up systems, might conceivably regain an influence it knew only in the tenth and seventeenth centuries.

Mr. Vacca calls for high discipline and morality in systems-developers, who should read the rule of St. Ignatius. He goes further, advocating the formation, before the knock-out, of technological fraternities, which, like monastic communities, could preserve knowledge and instruments through the Dark Age for the renaissance to come. He makes his closing appeal to the individual, who has a capacity to learn, rather than to plummeting societies and governments.

What is a man to do—besides build a family bunker? Both books leave the reader alone with this question. Yet no reader is alone in wondering whether the "enrgy crisis" has not opened a way for someone to speak, even at high levels, about cooling the wheels of the society, as the birthrates have cooled at present. Mr. Farmer's lone plaint about there being no return to 1930 communities points to some immediate tasks of community creation. That would seem a way to uncover some neglected and eminently replaceable sources of energy in people themselves. It would serve to reunite previously separated questions of knowing, doing and making. It need not mean an end of development, but growth in a new dimension: sideways. It need not mean an end of technology, but a return to its basic sense: that of an art or rationale bearing on what sort of things ought to be made. If there is no way of joining what we now know with what we now do, then we have lost not only our virtue but (borrowing from Vacca) our savoir faire.

**Witness to History, 1929-1969**

by Charles E. Bohlen

(W.W. Norton; 562 pp.; $12.50)

Gerald Freund

To be outstanding in one's profession in America can be a brutalizing experience. Years of training and hard work lead to moments in the sun followed by an eclipse of recognition, which is revived, if ever, only posthumously. It happens to baseball players such as Ty Cobb. It happens to popular performers such as Veronica Lake, who, once pinned to the walls of countless bachelor dens, disappeared into obscurity and died scratching out a living as a waitress.

And it happens in the establishment professions. They are almost as heartless to some of their best as is the general public toward its erstwhile idols. Charles Bohlen is not a forgotten man. With luck, history will give him a place among the most devoted and creative of public servants. His recent death, like that of the late Llewellyn Thompson, was duly noted in the press. George F. Kennan, another of that small number, is respected for his remarkable autobiographical and historical volumes.

Nevertheless, the caliber and the creativity of these men and their contributions are known only to a diminishing circle of scholars and public servants. It seems likely that their full value will be established and extolled only years after their