points not merely to individual "freedom instruments" but to overloaded and uncoordinated technological systems which are to support them. He points not merely to a possible failure of energy but to a virtually predictable failure of performance in the production-pollution-transport-communications-service systems—and does so with reference to the Apocalypse of St. John. Exponential growth may fail to ease off at the knee of the curve toward world stability and overturn backward. The coming overshoot will result in a subsequent undershoot, producing a Dark Age with a drastic reduction in population and a need to rebuild civilization.

The prediction is all but certain, because present planners employ linear principles with deficient mathematical models and insufficient provision for multiple feedback loops. All this in the face of exploding population. The imminent overload is charted in the system after system (electricity, traffic, communications, waste and water). There are no visible countervalences: War has never succeeded in reducing population in the measure required; political protest knows nothing of planning (except, perhaps, in Mao's China); industrial management is venal and phlegmatic. Theorists like E. J. Michal and members of the Club of Rome, who decry side effects of present growth and propose legal measures to preserve the rights of people in enclaves, have not fully assessed the trends. They seek amenities in a boxcar that is headed for Dachau.

The most memorable passage is a scenario (one of many that are possible—one cannot predict the place and the hour) for New York City. Two traffic standstills of a now familiar sort (roads and railroads) lead to a failure in the control tower for air traffic; a plane strikes power lines; overload leads to shutdowns in the back-up system for seven states; fires break out as a result of emergency measures taken in the subzero weather: engines are not able to traverse highways blocked with abandoned cars; communications are jammed; looting begins; waste accumulates; plague breaks out. Massive death ensues and spreads. José, who is used to survival at poverty levels, survives John Doe. The most highly industrialized nations are first to fall. A nation like Sweden, with a rationalized population distribution and strong technical back-up systems, might conceivably regain an influence it knew only in the tenth and seventeenth centuries.

Mr. Vacek calls for high discipline and morality in systems developers, who should read the rule of St. Ignatius. He goes further, advocating the formation, before the knock-out, of technological fraternities, which, like monastic communities, could preserve knowledge and instruments through the Dark Age for the renaissance to come. He makes his closing appeal to the individual, who has a capacity to learn, rather than to plummeting societies and governments.

What is a man to do—besides build a family bunker? Both books leave the reader alone with this question. Yet no reader is alone in wondering whether the "energy crisis" has not opened a way for someone to speak, even at high levels, about cooling the wheels of the society, as the birthrates have cooled at present. Mr. Farmer's lone plaint about there being no return to 1930 communities points to some immediate tasks of community creation. That would seem a way to uncover some neglected and eminently replaceable sources of energy in people themselves. It would serve to reunite previously separated questions of knowing, doing and making. It need not mean an end of development, but growth in a new dimension: sideways. It need not mean an end of technology, but a return to its basic sense: that of an art or rationale bearing on what sort of things ought to be made. If there is no way of joining what we now know with what we now do, then we have lost not only our virtue but (borrowing from Vacek) our savoir faire.

*Witness to History, 1929-1969*  
by Charles E. Bohlen  
(W.W. Norton; 562 pp.; $12.50)

Gerald Freund

To be outstanding in one's profession in America can be a brutalizing experience. Years of training and hard work lead to moments in the sun followed by an eclipse of recognition, which is revived, if ever, only posthumously. It happens to baseball players such as Ty Cobb. It happens to popular performers such as Veronica Lake, who, once pinned to the walls of countless bachelor dens, disappeared into obscurity and died scratching out a living as a waitress.

And it happens in the establishment professions. They are almost as heartless to some of their best as is the general public toward its erstwhile idols. Charles Bohlen is not a forgotten man. With luck, history will give him a place among the most devoted and creative of public servants. His recent death, like that of the late Llewellyn Thompson, was duly noted in the press. George F. Kennan, another of that small number, is respected for his remarkable autobiographical and historical volumes.

Nevertheless, the caliber and the creativity of these men and their contributions are known only to a diminishing circle of scholars and public servants. It seems likely that their full value will be established and extolled only years after their
death by a society that eats its wisest members.

Charles Bohlen earned a place in a distinguished group that served from the 1920's through the postwar period, into and beyond the cold war. He was among the best minds and steadiest hands guiding an uncertain ship of state—an ungraciously, overgrown adolescent nation, whose muscle often threatened, even as it sought to safeguard, the balance of power.

In his memoirs Bohlen tells of his apprenticeship in the days when the Foreign Service invested in the training of a chosen few in languages, history, culture and experience. The Service built human resources which were to pay off many times the money spent on their superior education. The peripheral lands bordering the Bolshevik giant were Bohlen's training ground. He served in secondary embassies which were windows on the Soviet Union, with whose fate his career was to be intricately bound. Bohlen's chronological account of his official missions and involvements has little of the scholar's touch and even less of the felicitous literary craft of his friend and colleague George Kennan. But Bohlen was a keen judge of men, and offers a candid view of the untouchable famous that brings them down to human size.

One of the most interesting chapters concerns the Yalta Conference, where Bohlen was at Roosevelt's side in just about every meeting. There is a note of defensiveness in his account, which is understandable if one recalls that he was later to come under merciless attack from Senator Joseph McCarthy for his role at Yalta. (He weathered that attack without taint, even though the then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was prepared to turn his back on Bohlen if the right-wing extremists in Congress had insisted on his scalp.)

Bohlen rightly describes Yalta as "undoubtedly the most controversial conference in U.S. history." He does not deny that Franklin Roosevelt was ill before his arrival, but refutes insinuations that the President was faltering in his responsibilities. Bohlen is critical of the inadequacies of prior staff work, particularly with respect to the Kurile Islands issue.

He deals, one by one, with the painful controversies at the conference and explains why each decision taken at Yalta was the best that could be done in the circumstances.

He deals pointedly with the role of Alger Hiss at Yalta. He writes that he can "testify with certainty that Roosevelt never saw Hiss alone" during the conference and, even more tellingly, that Hiss distinguished himself at Yalta with a memorandum that argued against Stalin's proposal for admitting the Soviet republics to United Nations membership. The imminent release for scholarly use of FBI files on the Hiss case may further clear the air concerning his supposedly ambiguous role in government. One hopes that Alger Hiss himself will let us have, out of his experience and sensitively trained mind, an account both personal and scholarly of his State Department career, abortive as it was.

Throughout these memoirs Bohlen pays tribute to George Kennan and adds to the already abundant evidence of this man's remarkable talents and prescience. There is, for example, an excerpt from a letter Kennan delivered to Bohlen at Yalta, in which he foresees an unavoidable conflict between the Western Allied need for stability and national integrity in Europe and the predictable Soviet postwar push westward. The analysis here, as so often before and again in later years, is masterful. But the alternative program Kennan proposed was awkward and probably unrealizable, as Bohlen points out. This was also the case with Kennan's proposals on later occasions.

What is manifest in reviewing the historic data about Yalta and later events in U.S.-Soviet relations is that the minds of a handful of Foreign Service officers, among whom Bohlen and Kennan stand out, were far superior to the intelligence, skills and tactics of their elected and appointed superiors. (There was one notable exception: George C. Mar-
shall, whom these men, as well as
President Truman, revered at the
time and in memory.)

Where, among whiz-kids in the
Pentagon, the funded researchers in
universities and in the demoralized
hallways of the State Department,
are the budding Bohlens and Ken-
nans of today? Computers lack
hearts, and skilled technicians fre-
quently lack the education, as well
as the precious gift of a sense of
humor. The need for a new gener-
ation of devoted public servants of
the kind that Bohlen writes about
with modesty, tact and candor is all
the greater in a time when the Ex-
ecutive Branch has lost creditability
while the Congress reasserts its pre-
rogatives but fails to demonstrate
that it can now, any more than in
the past, offer foreign policy guid-
ance. The greater honor to the Boh-
len and Kennans would be to revive
the systematic selection and human-
ized training of men and women
who will emulate them in the years
ahead.

Building a New Japan: A Plan for Remodeling
the Japanese Archipelago
by Kakuei Tanaka
(Simul Press [Tokyo]; 228 pp.; $12.50)

Koji Taira

By the time this review is published it
is at least possible that the author
of Building a New Japan may have
resigned from his post as Prime
Minister. A December, 1973, public
opinion poll showed that the propor-
tion of the Japanese public approv-
ing his government had sunk to 20
per cent. Past prime ministers have
usually given up their governments
shortly after their popularity hit that
low mark.

Japan is suffering from an acute
oil shortage due to the Mideast crisis
and a runaway inflation at 20 per
cent per annum. Until the oil crisis
sobered them, the Japanese were liv-
ing in a dream world of permanent
economic growth at more than 10
per cent per annum, doubling the
GNP every six or seven years. Now
the Tanaka cabinet, reconstituted in
November, 1973, has suspended the
"Remodeling Plan" and reduced the
projection of the 1974-75 growth
rate to a mere 2.5 per cent. The
once seemingly invincible yen, which
stood at 265 yen to a U.S. dollar
only a few months ago, has since
considerably depreciated. When the
Bank of Japan withdrew its yen-
propping operations on January 7,
1974, the price of the dollar prompt-
ly rose to 299 yen in Tokyo, sending
ripples of currency crises throughout
the world. Japan's "economic mir-
acle" has vanished.

Is the book then obsolete? Not
quite yet. To the extent that Build-
ing a New Japan relies heavily on
rapid economic growth, its credibil-
ity is seriously damaged by the cur-
rent difficulties. Nevertheless, the
vision of "remodeling" Japan itself
can still be considered basically
sound. And if this can be under-
taken independently of economic
growth, so much the better. The end
result will be revolutionary, a totally
different Japan—economically, socia-
ly, politically, even culturally—from
the Japan of today.

That such far-reaching changes
are envisioned is clear from the ma-
jor arguments the book propounds.
First, Tanaka strongly condemns the
rapid growth and urbanization that
characterize present-day Japan. The
processes of economic growth in the
past hundred years have produced
there an appalling degree of con-
centration of output and people in
polluted, overcrowded urban centers
along a narrow stretch of land on
the Pacific seaboard and on the coast
of the Inland Sea. Other areas of
Japan have been left economically
retarded, culturally deprived and de-
populated. Second, Tanaka's sweep-
ing criticism of Japan's present sta-
tus is coupled with a determination
to reverse the historical forces and
tendencies in order that income,
power and privileges may be evenly
shared by all parts of Japan. This
vision represents a far-reaching egal-
itarian revolution on a scale unpre-
cedented in Japanese history.

Let us take a look at this "remod-
elled Japan." Its basic social unit is
a "new community," which is visual-
ized as a circular space. At the cen-
ter is a core city full of elegant
high-rise buildings, where commer-
cial, service, educational and cultural
facilities are concentrated. A few
satellite towns are developed prin-
cipally for residential purposes at
some distance from the core city.
Manufacturing plants are huddled
together in a couple of "industrial
parks" at both ends of a diameter
drawn across the community terri-
tory. Much of the community space
is filled with farms, hamlets, forests
and recreational areas. An intercom-
munity railroad and highway go
through the center of the commu-
ity, with an airport located farther
out toward the perimeter.

The new community, spatially
and economically structured in this
way, is expected to accommodate
some 250,000 people, more or less.
Serviced by a computerized network
of fast trains supplemented by motor
vehicles and airplanes, no commu-
nity is beyond one day's travel from
any other. The present Japanese po-
litical structure, which parcel out
the country into 47 prefectures, is
restructured with a small number of
intermediate governments between
prefectures and national government.

In order to move in the direction
outlined so far, a policy of industrial
relocation is proposed. The policy
expels major industries from the
present megalopolises—Tokyo, Osaka
and the few others—and slots them
into different locations by type of