admitted to a university, 'standards' will decline. The new faculty may teach at lower levels of abstraction, and the new students may sometimes be unable to comprehend what the incumbent faculty is teaching; and insofar as the newcomers can affect the teaching program or the intellectual climate, the levels of both will be lowered, at least from the perspective of the incumbents." Such are the costs. There are gains as well: "For the newcomers, who will have a chance to teach and learn at higher intellectual levels than before, the standards will be raised, and the real issue is whose perspectives are to be favored."

Precisely. I have taught at Columbia. I now teach the Open Admission students of the City University. With many individual exceptions, my new students read less and write worse than their predecessors. However, most of them will read far more and write much better than they would have if Open Admissions had not encouraged them to take a shot at a college degree. Here and elsewhere egalitarians concentrate upon the newcomers whose status and opportunities increase. With similar sincerity, anti-egalitarians bewail the "collapse" of traditional values and standards.

*More Equality* evaluates with candor both costs and benefits of egalitarian policies. Gans is not in the end cheerful about the immediate political prospects for egalitarian change. In the future, as in 1972, Middle Americans may prefer to ally themselves with their "superiors" instead of their "inferiors." Incited by conservative politicians, they may persist in the view that the rich deserve their wealth and the poor merit their poverty. Traditional campaigns against welfare cheaters, drug pushers and student radicals may divert them from the deeper roots of social pathology and from identification of the burdens which inequality imposes upon them as well as the poor.

The outcome is not predestined. There is a genuine hunger for equality, however defined, identifiable in phenomena as disparate as the Lordstown syndrome, the women's movement, the spread of faculty unions in universities, the democratization of churches and schools and the resistance of professional athletes to the reserve clause, the modern version of chattel slavery. To quote Gans on a final occasion:

> If all these demands are looked at together, they mean more income for some and higher costs for others; more rights for some and fewer privileges for others; more power for some and less control for others. And if the demands grow into significant political pressures that have to be satisfied, the eventual outcome will have to be greater equality, although not necessarily for all those demanding change, nor of a kind that necessarily coincides with their demands.

Even with the help of Watergate and the hope of impeachment, 1974 is not a happy year for partisans of equality. In *More Equality* Gans exemplifies a style of thought, pragmatic and realistic, which should serve the cause of equality well. Equality is not the only value, even for its admirers. Progress toward equality along any of its dimensions—income, wealth, power, occupational status and hierarchical position—involves costs to those who lose money or esteem as well as to the larger community if work and investment incentives are gravely impaired. Gans discusses these issues seriously and frequently offers ingenious solutions.

For even the glum, the prospects of more equality ought to seem slightly better after than before reading Gans.

# The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace edited by John Morton Blum

(Houghton Mifflin; 707 pp.; $15.00)

## Norman Markowitz

For a man who spent most of his life in search of a middle path to the creation of a just and abundant society, Henry Wallace was assigned a curious fate in American history. Seen by his supporters as both New Deal philosopher and prophet of a better world in the 1930's and the 1940's, Wallace was vilified by conservative businessmen and politicians during World War II as a crackpot champion of TVAs on the Danube, free milk for the "Hottentots" of the world, and other assorted programs to subvert American capitalism. After the war his attempt to revive the goals for which he stood—support for an end to colonialism and imperialism through the construction of a workable United Nations organization, peace and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the extension of New Deal planning and social welfare programs at home and abroad—were met with bitter denunciation by the Truman Administration, the mass media and, during his 1948 Progressive Party Presidential campaign, by many of

his former New Deal colleagues and liberal admirers.

Although Wallace ceased to play a significant role in public life after 1948 (except as a negative reference symbol to congressional witch-hunters and eternally vigilant cold warriors), variants of ideas that he had championed in the 1930's and 1940's reappeared in President Eisenhower's Food for Peace program, Soil Bank, and Summit conferences. They also emerged in President Kennedy's Peace Corps, Alliance for Progress and Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and in President Johnson's Great Society program. Finally and most ironically, the goal for which he sacrificed his political career, economic and political cooperation with the Soviet Union, has moved forward through the leadership of his old antagonist and baiter, Richard Nixon. It would thus be easy to hail Wallace as a prophet. It would also be somewhat superficial, since the programs which bear a similarity to his ideas developed out of the changing strategies of a cold war he had tried to prevent.

Since the men who destroyed Wallace a generation ago were New Dealers and liberals like himself (and to a large extent these men remain a vital part of the American intellectual and political establishment, wedded to sentimental memories of Harry Truman, and, for the most part, unwilling to see that the disasters of the 1950's and the 1960's were rooted in the Truman policies), it is understandable that Wallace's rehabilitation has been as long delayed as that of the Old Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union. For liberals to come to terms critically with what Wallace represented means to deal critically with what they as liberals once were and now are, to search for his faults and theirs in the napalmed remnants of the "Century of the Common Man."

Fortunately, the publication of Wallace's wartime diaries, smoothly edited by Yale historian John Morton Blum, permits the late Vice President to speak for himself and readers to glimpse both the savage political infighting and the colorful personalities of the wartime Washington scene. Although they provide practically no insight into Wallace's private life and little that a student of the recent historical literature would find significantly new about his role as Vice President and Secretary of Commerce, the diaries challenge the most common cold-war stereotypes about their author, showing that Wallace was not a mystic, and not a dupe of anyone (save, at times, Roosevelt, Truman, and his own hopes).

Among other things, the diaries expose, more than most other wartime sources, the depth of distrust of communism and Russia among businessmen and politicians, and the engagement of the FBI in the kind of political suppression of dissent that laid the foundation for the Truman-McCarthy period. William Shirer, for example, told Wallace in early 1942 that "every week the FBI called [him] up half a dozen times or so asking whether or not such a man had made such and such a statement which was supposed to be favorable to the Russians. One FBI man had called [him] with regard to a man who was reported to have been overheard to say, prior to December 6, 1941, that he hoped the Germans would not be able to take Moscow." While Roosevelt, the diaries show, did not share such attitudes, enough businessmen, politicians, and bureaucrats did to make Wallace fear a postwar reaction that could abort the opportunities created by the war to link American prosperity and reform to a New Deal for the world.

While Wallace was uninterested in the day-to-day management of politics (indeed, his years as Vice President and Secretary of Commerce were like an endless Ides of March), his judgments about the men who held power over him were often penetrating. About Roosevelt's personality he wrote in 1940 that "the predominant element . . . is the desire to be the dominating figure, to demonstrate on all occasions his superiority. He changes his standards of superiority many times during the day. But having set a particular standard for the moment, he then glories in being the dominating figure along that particular line." Roosevelt's constantly shifting standards, and the cult that developed around his "dominating" personality, eventually helped to defeat Wallace's bid for renomination as Vice President and to provide a shaky foundation for the postwar world.

Of Harry Truman, the man who had replaced him on the ticket in 1944, Wallace at the time noted in his diary, "he is a small opportunistic man, a man of good instincts but, therefore, all the more dangerous. As he moves out more in the public eye, he will get caught in the webs of his own making . . . ." Still, Wallace, as the diaries show, was a captive of Roosevelt's personality during the war and a victim and scapegoat in 1946 of an international web of Truman's own making.

Why did Wallace fare so badly? Blum, in his introductory essay, has few answers to that question, except for an elegant restatement of Leo Durocher's old maxim, "nice guys finish last." Although he dedicates the diaries to the Century of the Common Man, Blum ignores both the radical content of Wallace's program for the postwar world and the deep contradictions within that program. Thus, Blum stays clear of the populist appeals and technocratic methods in Wallace's attempt to define World War II in terms of an international people's revolution against tyranny and poverty (the peoples revolution, both friends and foes rightly realized at the time, was the major theme of the Century of the Common Man speech). Also Blum fails to analyze effectively the complex effects of World War II on American politics and diplomacy, preferring instead to deal with the home front in clichés about the revival of conservatism and to portray Wallace as a lonely prophet instead of as the major spokesman produced by the war for the left of the New Deal coalition.

Like Wallace himself, Blum doesn't seriously question the contradiction between the monopolistic

aims of American corporate capital and Wallace's hopes for progressive capitalism and a world mixed economy under the umbrella of the United Nations. Rather, Blum confuses the consciousness of the businessmen and Democratic Party bosses with those of the people, and notes that by 1944 Wallace had gone well beyond the American political "consensus." (The "consensus" that defeated Wallace at the Democratic Convention in 1944, and which Blum doesn't really examine, was as open and as democratic as the Presidential election of 1972.) Finally, Blum's sympathy for the more conservative aspects of Wallace's foreign policy ideas shows the influence of the Vietnam war and the Nixon-Kissinger "Generation of Peace" upon American establishment thinking. It does not take into account a serious appraisal of the consciousness of the American people and the different sectors of the American establishment in 1945, the effects of the Depression, the New Deal and the War upon the shaping of that consciousness, and the limited choices open to America domestically and internationally.

Wallace deserves better than Blum's glib and skillful attempt to restore him to the New Deal pantheon. In retrospect, one might argue that the diaries, like his public statements and private correspondence, show that Wallace, more clearly and courageously perhaps than any other public figure of his generation, sought to apply the true lesson of Munich—that a policy of encircling the Soviet Union bred war. Whatever his private ambivalence, Wallace publicly saw the challenge in the international social revolution created by the war, while others saw only the dangers to American business at home and abroad.

But Henry Wallace in the late 1940's sounded like a dangerous radical to the men who owned America's wealth and had little love for the New Deal. From their viewpoint we had emerged from the war with a doubling of the Gross National Product, an incredible expansion of plant capacity, the atomic bomb and Harry Truman in the White House.

The war economy, not the New Deal, had solved America's Depression problems, and the war economy in peacetime provided for capitalism the best short-range answer to both the accumulation of profit at home and the building of opposition to the political and social revolution raging in the colonial world. Wallace, as the diaries amply show, realized from the beginning that the American empire created by the cold war couldn't last, although it seems now to be ending with the whimper of oil shortages, chronic unemployment and inflated prices, rather than with the nuclear bang he feared.

His "Century of the Common Man" was never seriously tried, largely because it ran into the very real collision between an imperialistic capitalism and the revolutionary Common Man through the world. To the problems which grew out of that collision, and to the greater problem of the contradictions between capitalism as a system and social and economic justice in America and the world, Wallace had no real answer. Like liberals before and after him he had never asked the right questions.

## The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro: An Essay in Contemporary History by Maurice Halperin

(University of California Press; 370 pp.; $12.50)

### James M. Daniel

On January 2, 1964, as Cuba celebrated the fifth anniversary of the triumph of the Castro revolution, Fidel and his people could feel proud. The nation had survived a series of challenges and perils, including the Bay of Pigs, the American economic blockade and the missile crisis. In this work Professor Halperin relates the story of that period, adding what might be called "flash-forwards" to comment briefly on subsequent events, such as the course of Cuban-Soviet relations in the late 1960's, the ill-fated Cuban-sponsored guerrilla band in Bolivia led by Ernesto "Che" Guevara, and the imposition of ideological control on artists and intellectuals.

This is unquestionably one of the most useful and informed works on the Cuban experience to appear since 1959. Professor Halperin was at the University of Havana from 1962 to 1968 as a visiting professor, knew personally a number of the leading figures in the Cuban regime, and observed at first hand many of the events of which he writes. He is at present preparing a second volume which is to cover the second five years of the Castro regime.

When one speaks of the "Castro regime," the term is to be taken literally, since power is entirely in the hands of the often erratic but politically shrewd prime minister. Professor Halperin shows a good understanding of Fidel's character and personality, so important for an understanding of the operation of the Cuban government since 1959, as well as of its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. In the words of the author, ". . . it must be clearly understood that [Castro's] personality, style and leadership have dominated the Cuban Revolution. . . ." And, again: "Like all successful political leaders . . . [Castro] has been a discipline of Machiavelli, capable of inconsistency, opportunism, and deceit, but not for their own sake and always