

aims of American corporate capital and Wallace's hopes for progressive capitalism and a world mixed economy under the umbrella of the United Nations. Rather, Blum confuses the consciousness of the businessmen and Democratic Party bosses with those of the people, and notes that by 1944 Wallace had gone well beyond the American political "consensus." (The "consensus" that defeated Wallace at the Democratic Convention in 1944, and which Blum doesn't really examine, was as open and as democratic as the Presidential election of 1972.) Finally, Blum's sympathy for the more conservative aspects of Wallace's foreign policy ideas shows the influence of the Vietnam war and the Nixon-Kissinger "Generation of Peace" upon American establishment thinking. It does not take into account a serious appraisal of the consciousness of the American people and the different sectors of the American establishment in 1945, the effects of the Depression, the New Deal and the War upon the shaping of that consciousness, and the limited choices open to America domestically and internationally.

Wallace deserves better than Blum's glib and skillful attempt to restore him to the New Deal pantheon. In retrospect, one might argue that the diaries, like his public statements and private correspondence, show that Wallace, more clearly and courageously perhaps than any other public figure of his generation, sought to apply the true lesson of Munich—that a policy of encircling the Soviet Union bred war. Whatever his private ambivalence, Wallace publicly saw the challenge in the international social revolution created by the war, while others saw only the dangers to American business at home and abroad.

But Henry Wallace in the late 1940's sounded like a dangerous radical to the men who owned America's wealth and had little love for the New Deal. From their viewpoint we had emerged from the war with a doubling of the Gross National Product, an incredible expan-

sion of plant capacity, the atomic bomb and Harry Truman in the White House.

The war economy, not the New Deal, had solved America's Depression problems, and the war economy in peacetime provided for capitalism the best short-range answer to both the accumulation of profit at home and the building of opposition to the political and social revolution raging in the colonial world. Wallace, as the diaries amply show, realized from the beginning that the American empire created by the cold war couldn't last, although it seems now to be ending with the whinper of oil shortages, chronic

unemployment and inflated prices, rather than with the nuclear bang he feared.

His "Century of the Common Man" was never seriously tried, largely because it ran into the very real collision between an imperialistic capitalism and the revolutionary Common Man through the world. To the problems which grew out of that collision, and to the greater problem of the contradictions between capitalism as a system and social and economic justice in America and the world, Wallace had no real answer. Like liberals before and after him he had never asked the right questions.

The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro: An Essay in Contemporary History by Maurice Halperin

(University of California Press; 370 pp.; \$12.50)

James M. Daniel

On January 2, 1964, as Cuba celebrated the fifth anniversary of the triumph of the Castro revolution, Fidel and his people could feel proud. The nation had survived a series of challenges and perils, including the Bay of Pigs, the American economic blockade and the missile crisis. In this work Professor Halperin relates the story of that period, adding what might be called "flash-forwards" to comment briefly on subsequent events, such as the course of Cuban-Soviet relations in the late 1960's, the ill-fated Cuban-sponsored guerrilla band in Bolivia led by Ernesto "Che" Guevara, and the imposition of ideological control on artists and intellectuals.

This is unquestionably one of the most useful and informed works on the Cuban experience to appear since 1959. Professor Halperin was at the University of Havana from 1962 to 1968 as a visiting professor, knew personally a number of the leading figures in the Cuban regime,

and observed at first hand many of the events of which he writes. He is at present preparing a second volume which is to cover the second five years of the Castro regime.

When one speaks of the "Castro regime," the term is to be taken literally, since power is entirely in the hands of the often erratic but politically shrewd prime minister. Professor Halperin shows a good understanding of Fidel's character and personality, so important for an understanding of the operation of the Cuban government since 1959, as well as of its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. In the words of the author, ". . . it must be clearly understood that [Castro's] personality, style and leadership have dominated the Cuban Revolution. . . ." And, again: "Like all successful political leaders . . . [Castro] has been a disciple of Machiavelli, capable of inconsistency, opportunism, and deceit, but not for their own sake and always

weighing anticipated profits against costs in any political operation."

One may ask, then, how Fidel differs from the classical, old-style tropical dictator—the Dominican Republic's Generalissimo Trujillo or Nicaragua's Anastas Somoza. The answer lies partly in the decision

of Castro to change radically Cuba's primary international political and economic relationships from reliance mainly on the United States to reliance on the Soviet Union. It becomes clear that, once relations with the United States deteriorated, Castro sought Moscow's support and

assurance of protection. Thus, Professor Halperin points out that "by the beginning of 1961 . . . the Cuban economy . . . was already a socialist economy." But the Soviet Union was reluctant to acknowledge the fact, as this would imply a commitment to defend Cuba. Castro's announcement on December 1, 1961, "I am a Marxist-Leninist and shall remain a Marxist-Leninist until the day I die," was an attempt on his part to obtain the Soviet Union's recognition of Cuba as a socialist state, but it was not until May, 1963 (during the reconciliation of Castro and Khrushchev after the missile crisis), that such recognition was forthcoming. In any case, whether Castro decided to follow the route of socialism because of political expediency or conviction (and it seems likely that the former was a more important factor than the latter), Cuba was, and remains, his personal *hacienda*. In this regard he may fairly be compared with the Trujillos and Somozas.

Despite Cuba's heavy dependence on assistance, both moral and physical, from the USSR, Castro has not hesitated to tweak the Russian bear's nose, and Professor Halperin ably clarifies the sometimes bewildering ups and downs of Cuban-Soviet relations. These, of course, reached a low point at the time of the missile crisis, when the negotiations concerning the missiles were held between Kennedy and Khrushchev and Castro was not consulted. Khrushchev sent Anastas Mikoyan to Cuba to smooth ruffled feathers, and by April and May, when Castro made a triumphant trip to the USSR, all was well once more.

In the incidents of friction with the Soviet Union, Castro has sought to show his independence and to demonstrate that Cuba is not merely a satellite of Moscow. For example, at a time in the mid-1960's when the USSR was preaching peaceful coexistence (and trying to persuade Castro to follow that line), Fidel continued to provide support to guerrilla groups in various countries, often in opposition to the local Communist Party. In Colombia the

JUDAISM

Robert Gordis, Editor

. . . dedicated to the exploration and discussion of the religious, ethical and philosophical content of Judaism and its bearing on the problems of modern society.

In the Spring '74 Issue

ZALMAN SHAZAR—THE MAN AND THE WRITER

Avraham Kariv

KARL MARX AND THE JEWS

Lawrence S. Stepelevich

MAN IN A TECHNOLOGICAL AGE

Samuel E. Karff

WOMEN IN THE MINYAN

Phillip Sigal

RE-APPRAISING MAIMONIDES

H. Joel Laks

□

JUDAISM Quarterly is published by the American Jewish Congress
15 East 84th Street, New York, N.Y. 10028

Annual Subscription \$8.00

JUDAISM—15 East 84th St., New York, N.Y. 10028

I enclose \$8 for an annual subscription to JUDAISM starting with the Spring '74 issue.

Name

Address

City and State.....Zip.....

Communist Party was urging groups affiliated with it to give up guerrilla warfare while, simultaneously, Cuba was sponsoring the organization of new groups. In this respect, Castro's thinking at the time was closer to Mao's than to Moscow's, and he quite cleverly played the one against the other—never going so far as to alienate Moscow altogether. After all, his very existence depended on the USSR.

At the same time that Castro was growing more dependent on the Soviet Union and was organizing "his" Communist Party, his speeches included frequent, although tentative, feelers to President Kennedy, and later to President Johnson, suggesting a renewal of relations between Cuba and the United States. From the evidence that Professor Halperin presents, it appears that an indirect dialogue, through French journalist Jean Daniel, was being established between Castro and President Kennedy precisely at the time of the President's assassination. At the President's request, Daniel had spoken with Kennedy in Washington, and it was hinted that the United States might entertain the possibility of improved relations with Cuba. From Washington, Daniel went to Havana, where Fidel seemed to welcome the President's remarks. In the midst of the journalist's interviews with Castro, news of Kennedy's assassination was received.

In the early 1960's one of the most confusing situations to those following events in Cuba was the interplay among the 26th of July Movement (which was not organized as a political party), the anti-Communist Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil and the Partido Socialista Popular (as the Communist Party called itself). The PSP was the best organized of these and early sought to dominate the labor unions and the government itself. This led, in 1962, to a purge of many "old" Communists from these organizations in order to reaffirm Fidel's supreme position, not only in government but in every area of Cuban life. Finally, in 1965, a "new" Com-

munist Party was created, with Fidel at its head, and a Central Committee, composed primarily of appointees from the 26th of July Movement. Naturally, the relations between Fidel and the "old" Communists also depended on the relations between him and Moscow, but in the final analysis Fidel's political maneuvers have had the purpose of maintaining power in his own hands. Professor Halperin's clarification of the intricacies of these maneuvers is fascinating and extremely helpful.

In the early years of the revolution it appeared that the solution to the problem of monoculture—the dependence on a single product (in this case sugar) for a large share of foreign currency earnings—was industrialization, and Moscow was willing to provide financing. If the crash industrialization program had been a success, it would have been a powerful argument for Castro-style revolution in many Latin American countries which were locked into the problem of monoculture.

As it turned out, things went very badly. The year 1962 was proclaimed "The Year of Planning," and Czech technicians were brought in to oversee what was intended to be a rapid industrialization of the country. With them they brought a rigid system of centralized planning which was already being questioned by economists in Eastern Europe. In addition, Castro's sometimes capricious personal interference caused problems, as did the inexperience of the Cuban "technician." In the meantime, sugar production was neglected, and output was declining. By the mid-1960's, Castro became disillusioned with the industrialization program and concluded that it would be necessary to concentrate once more on sugar production. The decision led to the goal of producing ten million tons of sugar in 1970. Despite the monumental effort that year, when workers of all kinds and students were pressed into service cutting cane, production fell 1.5 million tons short of the goal, while the shift of workers to the fields caused a serious drop in production

in other sectors of the economy. Meanwhile, Soviet aid shored up the shaky economy, as Halperin points out: "As a result [of Soviet aid], it took nearly a decade of steadily declining production, mainly the result of incredible planning failures and gross mismanagement, for the Cuban Revolution to reach the point where drastic social revolutions generally begin: with austerity, discipline, and the complete regimentation of all social, political, and intellectual activity by the central authority."

One of the more interesting aspects of the Castro regime has been its attitude toward intellectuals and artists. In the early years of the revolution considerable latitude was permitted, and leftist intellectuals of Latin America and Western Europe applauded the fact that a Marxist society need not stifle freedom of thought and creativity. In fact, this was an aspect of the Cuban revolution that attracted many Latin American intellectuals, who saw in it a model for their own countries. It was a considerable shock to them, therefore, when Heberto Padilla was sharply criticized in late 1968 for a prize-winning volume of poetry which was labeled "antirevolutionary." Halperin attributes Castro's decision to restrict the intellectuals to a need for closer ideological and political identification with the Soviet Union. His policy of supporting revolution abroad had failed, as had his domestic economic policy. Whatever the reasons, the shift in the government's attitude was abrupt, and continued to harden, so that in early 1971, Padilla was arrested and soon wrote a confession to being guilty of the counterrevolutionary charges. The document, recalling the Stalin era, created a furor among intellectuals who had previously supported the Castro regime. They now began to look more seriously toward Chile, where Salvador Allende was beginning his experiment of transforming the country into a Marxist state by constitutional means. Whether Castro can regain his support among Latin American

intellectuals alienated by the "Padilla affair" is doubtful.

Some questions concerning the second five years of the revolution remain unanswered, and undoubtedly they will be clarified in Halperin's forthcoming volume. The relationship between Fidel and Che Guevara from 1964 until Che's death in Bolivia in 1967 continues to be a puzzle, Halperin indicates that Che seemed to be thinking of "disengagement from Cuba's domestic affairs" by late 1964, but whether

there was an actual rift between him and the Cuban leader is not clear. Another puzzle is why Castro never sought to confirm his power through free elections, which he would have won overwhelmingly in 1959, and likely would win by a handy majority today. Perhaps he simply feels that elections are superfluous. These are among the unanswered questions. This excellent first volume holds the promise of an equally well-researched, thoughtful and helpful second volume.

"false consciousness." And, of course, it is easy to express disillusionment with the postwar politics and policies of Harry Truman. The question remains, however, whether Wallace would or could have made a difference for this nation and for liberalism if he had inherited the Presidency instead of Truman, or even if he had been a more potent political force.

To lump Wallace and Truman together because they were not socialists does a disservice to Wallace. The struggle of the late 1940's was to define what liberalism meant. Wallace attempted to refurbish a materialistic liberalism, and advanced the belief that this nation had to develop a communitarian creed and social purpose. He wanted to make the system work for the interests of the common man rather than for the greater glory of corporate profits. He proposed far-reaching changes in the economic system: planning boards, the representation of consumers, government ownership of various defense industries, equitable taxation and extensive social welfare programs. He preached a social code of cooperation instead of "rugged individualism." He was an early spokesman of environmental concern, advocated détente before it became fashionable, and held that the United States must take its stand with, not against, those "winds of change" sweeping the Third World. His political demise meant, if analytical concepts are going to be used, the rise of what has been termed "corporate liberalism" rather than a liberalism concerned with social welfare. If there are different roads to socialism, there are also different roads postwar liberalism might have taken.

In viewing the postwar world we are struck by the failure of liberals as individuals, as well as by the failure of liberalism as a concept. Idiosyncratic as well as systematic variables must be put into the equation that charts a nation's course. FDR's temporizing and Truman's appointment of mediocre cronies and big-businessmen were functions of their own personalities as well as

The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry Agard Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941-1948

by Norman Markowitz

(Free Press; 369 pp.; \$8.95)

Joseph Capalbo

Henry Wallace—horticulturist, farm magazine editor, Secretary of Agriculture, Vice President, Secretary of Commerce, *New Republic* editor and Progressive Party Presidential candidate—ranks as one of the more interesting political figures in this nation's recent past. Long maligned and until now long forgotten, a Wallace revival seems to be taking place, and Norman Markowitz's study is one of its more recent evidences.

This book is a useful rendering of Democratic liberal-labor politics in the World War II and postwar eras. It is a needed counterbalance to those "establishment" histories which have idealized Roosevelt and made Truman into something much more than he was. While Wallace comes out better than Truman in this narrative, Markowitz's aim is not to defend the former and attack the latter, but to demonstrate what he believes is the bankruptcy of "social liberals": those who accept capitalism although wanting to make it more humane; those who would play at pluralist politics. Thus we

encounter phrases such as "reformers were caught in the paradox of condemning social injustice while upholding capitalism as a system," or "Truman's failures cannot be separated from the greater failure of New Deal Broker State politics." Wallace, like Roosevelt and Truman, would have been doomed to failure in his quest for social justice, since he "also delineated liberal false consciousness by defining that vision in capitalist terms," and thus "it is doubtful that the progressive capitalism of Henry Wallace could give Americans either security or freedom." Henry Wallace, so often criticized by Republicans and Truman Democrats, now gets his comeuppance from a democratic socialist.

It is not surprising that Wallace should be critiqued from both Left and Right, for "social liberals" have long been held suspect by both ends of the political spectrum. It is hard to defend Wallace's "false consciousness" against those with "correct consciousness," since by defending it one is merely displaying his own