

other suicide attempt eight years earlier. He had a case history of mental illness and often thought that various parts of his brain were fighting each other. The police determined that K had left his home at 7:20 in the evening, and though much was made by the Greek community that his watch had stopped at 11 P.M., police tests showed it had simply run down at that time. The Greek exiles made much of K's death and loosely cast suspicion about concerning perfectly innocent persons. Some even made the headlines in the Danish press by stating they had proof of his murder. The facts are that K committed suicide. The story of K is not on a level with that of Z.

Vassilikos's fictionalized version of the death of K is nonetheless gripping. The tension mounts unbearably and the denouement is swift and sudden, with everything falling neatly into place. I wouldn't be surprised if Costas Gavras buys K as a film property and makes it a part of a political trilogy—from Z, to

State of Siege, to K. The dictators may have the upper hand now, but in the darkness lies the dialectic of the sunrise.

I should point out to American readers that the American publishers of Vassilis Vassilikos have done them a great disservice. In Part II of *The Harpoon Gun* six of his more powerful short stories that were a part of the French edition (*Le Fusil-Harpon*, Gallimard) have been dropped. Why? Vassilikos deserves better.

Vassilis Vassilikos is undoubtedly one of the best contemporary writers to have come out of Greece in recent years. For his sake and for the sake of all his countrymen we can hope that he and all his fellow exiles will be able soon to go home again, no longer to be forced to walk along foreign paths. "Every land is cold when it is not one's own country." The sorrow of Vassilikos is reflected in the title to one of his shorter stories: *Ça ne peut pas durer*. Perhaps one can add, *Ça ne doit pas durer*.

and Burma), the relation of the Roman Catholic Church to revolution (from the French Revolution to the Spanish Civil War), and to the most recent religious legitimations of revolutionary change (Muslim, Buddhist and Catholic). A final section summarizes some of the major findings. Lewy is not out to make spectacular points (indeed, the tone throughout is refreshingly sober and factual), and his conclusions are anything but sensational. In the main he lists conditions (such as those existing when a colonial people is struggling for a sense of collective identity) that are conducive to the rise of millenarian revolts, and characteristics that commonly pertain to such revolts (such as the more or less ubiquitous feature of charismatic leadership).

Scholars will undoubtedly argue about Lewy's conclusions, as they might question the logic of some of his selections. For example, the only Muslim developments discussed at any length are the revolt of the Mahdi in the Sudan and the Nasserite revolution in contemporary Egypt. Islam, which has spouted one millenarian movement after another over the centuries, might well have been given more extensive treatment. So might the millenarian movements of the Christian Middle Ages. But whatever the criticisms, there can be no doubt about the scholarly standards of Lewy's book. It is certain to become a major point of reference.

The general reader is likely to be impressed with something only indirectly connected with the topic of millenarianism proper—namely, the pervasiveness of religious motives and themes in contemporary social change, especially in the Third World. Nor is this impression due to any terminological tricks on Lewy's part: He explicitly excludes from his purview such quasi-religious phenomena as Marxism or nationalism; when he speaks of religion, he does so in the conventional sense and almost entirely in terms of the great world religions. Thus the present book has considerable relevance to the current debate concerning secu-

Religion and Revolution by Guenter Lewy

(Oxford University Press; 694 pp.; \$17.50)

Peter L. Berger

Millenarianism has always been a fascinating topic. In an age of revolutions it is also a timely topic. Historians, social scientists, philosophers and theologians have devoted much attention to it in recent years. The present book constitutes a weighty entry, almost seven hundred pages of closely packed data and argument, by an historian whose best-known work to date has been on the German Catholic Church under Nazism. In the preface Lewy (who teaches at the University of Massachusetts) explains the connection between this book and his earlier interest: Having studied a situation in which religion reacted

in a mainly passive way to a revolutionary movement, he wanted to look at cases where religion took a more active role. The result of his shift of focus is impressive.

Only the first part of the book deals with millenarianism in the narrower sense of the term. After a rather brief discussion of the relation of the major world religions to social change, Lewy discusses a number of classical millenarian movements, ranging in time and space from the Maccabees to the Cargo Cults of modern Melanesia. Later sections of the book are devoted to the place of religion in recent anticolonial revolts (in India

larization. As has become increasingly evident, there are good reasons to be skeptical about the alleged progressivity and irreversibility of secularization even in Western societies. Skepticism is not quite the right word with regard to Third World countries. Many of them are in the grip of a massive Muslim resurgence. Hinduism and Buddhism continue to be vital and politically potent forces in other countries. Revolutionary and millenarian movements of mainly Christian inspiration continue to sweep across Africa and Latin America. There is no likelihood that this importance of religion in the most rapidly changing areas in the world is about to decrease.

Lewy carefully refrains from making value judgments of his own. For example, an extended discussion of the Catholic Left and its "theology of revolution" in Latin America puts rigorous brackets around the ques-

tion of how all of this is to be judged on moral or political grounds. Lewy neither praises nor condemns. He slips toward the very end, though. It is worth quoting from his last paragraph:

Whether this new positive relationship of religion and revolution will indeed promote human liberty and happiness is, of course, a question nobody can as yet answer, and the currently fashionable romanticizing of revolution is undoubtedly premature Whereas some revolutions in history have led their people to a better life, others have merely substituted a new despotism for old oppressions. The new is not necessarily preferable to the old just because it is different. The ultimate test, surely, is not prophetic indignation at injustice or good intentions but performance and results.

The Indispensable Enemies: The Politics of Misrule in America by Walter Karp

(Saturday Review Press; 308 pp.; \$8.95)

Henry Plotkin

All that is meant by Watergate provides those with a penchant for conspiracy theories of history with a field day. It confirms the worst fears of the American Left (and Right) about the cabal of conspirators controlling the reins of power, and, in addition, supplies actual faces and names to the faceless and nameless unseen enemy. An Ehrlichman snarling at the benevolent Sam Ervin, a Haldeman, cool and crew-cutted, giving robotlike answers, a Hunt, child of the cloak-and-dagger culture of the cold war plotting political espionage, a Mitchell, pompous and arrogant, caught in half-truths—all serve to reify the Ameri-

can power structure in a way that even the most paranoid must feel both rational and gratifying. In one sense Watergate represents the logical conclusion of an era—an era which sought to alleviate its own misery and uncertainty by believing in some external enemy that can be blamed.

If Watergate represents a logical end, Walter Karp's *Indispensable Enemies* can be seen as part of an earlier era. Karp wants to explain why political misrule has historically predominated in the American polity. While Watergate may give flesh to theories of conspiracy, it does not provide a general framework extend-

ing beyond the Nixon Administration. In this sense Watergate is the exception; Walter Karp's attempt is to provide us with the rule.

In the academic community the effort to uncover the wielders of power in American society has become a small industry. Traditionally, this debate has been between two points of view. One sees power as widely dispersed among many groups and attributes this to the "genius" of the Madisonian system; the other, from a European perspective, sees power as centralized. The latter group, the Elite theorists, divide as to whether oligarchic power is historically inevitable or merely contingent.

Walter Karp tries to move beyond both groups to develop a new explanation of the American power structure. The argument is quite straightforward: Collusion between the two political parties to retain control is the key to understanding the power structure. The goal of the party regular is to hold on to his power, *not* to win an election which might introduce reform elements not loyal to the party. Karp explicitly rejects the "rational" explanation of party behavior offered by people like Downs and Rossiter and insists that ". . . both national parties are ruled by syndicates of state bosses." These state bosses, rather than serving as "the handmaidens of democracy" or the "interest articulators and aggregators" of their constituencies, have interests and goals of their own. They are the primary political force in American society.

Karp's theory is a conspiracy theory. He asserts: "When it can be established that a number of political acts work in concert to produce a certain result, the presumption is strong that the actors were aiming for the result in question. When it can be shown, in addition, that the actors have an interest in producing those results, the presumption becomes of fair certainty." This "commonsense" approach to the subject allows Karp to range back and forth throughout the book from specific acts to general theory (conspiracy). There is no systematic attempt to