

on submarines established by the protocol for the United States and the USSR—950 for the USSR and 710 for the United States—includes ballistic missile launchers on all nuclear-powered submarines and launchers for modern ballistic missiles which may be deployed on diesel-powered submarines. In addition, the United States clarified the definition of a modern ballistic missile as one deployed on a nuclear-powered Soviet submarine since 1965.

Contributors to the volume are in general agreement that the problems of SALT-II are far more formidable than those of SALT-I. According to Herbert Scoville, the "verification precedents" established in SALT-I may ease the problems of verifying compliance with future strategic arms limitation agreements. Yet SALT-II deals not only with quantitative restrictions, but also qualitative aspects of strategic systems. Scoville cites the capacity of both superpowers to detect the flight-testing of MIRV. This type of verification will of course assist only in detecting the deployment of new generation MIRV capabilities. However, it may also be possible, as Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has suggested, for the United States to verify Soviet compliance with a permanent agreement placing numerical limits on the deployment of MIRV.

Another set of problems facing the United States in SALT-II: the implication of SALT for alliance relationships. In presenting a European view, Ian Smart suggests that SALT-II affects Western Europe more than SALT-I to the extent that it raises "broad political questions" about U.S. policy and has potential implications for the military balance in Europe. Europeans would prefer to consider the so-called forward-based systems (FBS) in the context of mutual force reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact than in SALT, if they must be considered at all. According to Morton Halperin, neither the Japanese government nor the principal elites in Japan have been concerned about SALT. However, it should be

added, Japanese perceptions of the erosion of U.S. security guarantees resulting from Soviet-American arms control agreements might increase the incentive for Japan to build a national nuclear force. As long as the Sino-Soviet rift continues, and Japan maintains a foreign policy of "equidistance" between Moscow and Peking, Japan will probably hold open, but not necessarily exercise, its nuclear option with or without a SALT-II agreement.

Central to SALT-II, from the American perspective, is the development of a mutually acceptable definition of "essential equivalence." Addressing himself to this problem, George Rathjens describes, compares, and contrasts the capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States. He concludes, somewhat pessimistically but also correctly, that the prospects for major restrictions in existing forces are not great. He also concedes that the Soviet Union "now appears to be in a better bargaining position than the United States for SALT-II, and with time, its position is likely to improve further." SALT-II is likely either to produce occasional agreements of limited value or to degenerate into formalistic efforts such as those of the Committee on Disarmament. As Morton Halperin points out, however, the lack of progress in SALT-II will be applauded by China because a SALT-II agree-

ment, symbolizing and contributing to a Soviet-American détente, would increase the possibility that the United States would refrain from action against the Soviet Union in the event of Sino-Soviet war.

In a concluding chapter Mason Willrich suggests that, above all, the meaning of SALT is political. Without SALT, the prospect for wider adherence to the NPT is much less certain. Unfortunately, even with SALT the prospects for nuclear proliferation will not be greatly diminished because of recent developments such as the Indian atomic detonation of April, 1974, the rising price of oil (making the use of atomic power for energy needs more feasible), and the vast increase in financial power in the hands of oil-producing states (making it possible for them to purchase or manufacture nuclear weapons). But the political meaning of SALT lies ultimately in the fact that the dampening of strategic-military competition is crucial to the overall détente between the superpowers. To the extent that they succeed or fail, SALT will be symbolic of an improving or a deteriorating Soviet-American relationship. Without a SALT agreement that satisfies American requirements for "essential equivalence," it is doubtful that the United States can, or should, move toward a détente relationship with the Soviet Union in other sectors.

Heirs Apparent: What Happens When Mao Dies? by Ching Ping and Dennis Bloodworth

(Farrar, Straus and Giroux; 236 pp.; \$7.95)

Richard M. Pfeffer

It is hard to apprise readers unfamiliar with Pekingology of the quality of this book. What we have here is a series of brief, often desultory, biographies of several dozen of China's top leaders, interspersed

with scenarios of past, present, and future power struggles among them. As for the coming succession, the authors wishfully and not unexpectedly conclude that the political heirs to Mao Tse-tung will be "men like

Chou En-lai . . . at the head of a collective leadership' combining the civilian pragmatists loyal to the Prime Minister and [what the authors fetchingly call] the Red warlords of China's military regions."

At its best Ching Ping's and Dennis Bloodworth's book is perceptive and informative on aspects of the very complex personal and power relationships among China's leaders. At its worst the book is trivial and disrespectful in a pseudo-objective fashion that masks biases that are profoundly anti-Chinese, anti-Communist, and most assuredly anti-Maoist. Unfortunately, the book, whose authors unabashedly look forward to a revisionist future for China, is only sometimes at its best.

For the most part, *Heirs Apparent* is a particularly bad book, itself heir apparent to a tradition of analysis that has consistently, if not intentionally, misunderstood Chinese politics. Even calling it "bad" is a bit like calling a Gila monster "unattractive"—it somehow fails to capture the essence of the beast. The book frequently merits "insufferable." But that smacks so of subjectivism. Each of us, after all, differentially suffers half-truths, irrelevance, superciliousness, anecdotalism, dullness, para-journalism, and gimmickry. Yet more objective-sounding pejoratives, like "unprofessional" or "unsubstantiated," pale before the work they are intended to describe.

The tone and quality of *Heirs Apparent* is epitomized by its lively chapter titles. The first six are: "Ladies First," primarily about Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing, of course; "The Brain and the Trigger-Finger," about two of Shanghai's top national leaders; "The Five Smiles of Chou En-lai," which informs us that Chou is a first-rate dissembler and survivor par excellence; "Li Hsien-nien: The Money God"; "The Nuclear Monk"; and "Cloak and Dagger," which, no doubt you've already guessed, is about the leader of China's "all-pervasive . . . secret police," K'ang Sheng.

The authors refer to Chinese leaders by their supposed nicknames,

to spare us slow-witted readers the confusion of their very difficult Chinese names—they do all sound alike, don't they? The incredible result of this all-too-ingenious device is to compound the confusion. Thus we learn that Nieh Jung-chen, say, has privately been called the "Profligate Monk" by at least someone at some time in his life. Thereafter we see Nieh Jung-chen (do you still remember the name?) referred to as "Nieh, the Profligate Monk." He is

also the "Nuclear Monk," because this particular Profligate Monk has managed China's nuclear development program. We further learn that he has associated with the likes of "Ch'en the Bald" (former Foreign Minister Ch'ien Yi), the "Speechless Rustic" (former People's Liberation Army Chief-of-Staff Huang Yung-cheng), and "Slow March" Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien (a top military leader).

The authors evidence a seeming.

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desire to ridicule Chinese politics. Again the use of nicknames is illustrative. To refer publicly to important leaders of China by such nicknames serves to degrade those leaders and Chinese politics. It is as if, in a book about the future of American politics, our leaders were referred to as "Tricky Dick," "Clean Gene," and "Jack the Zipper." Disrespectful enough for an American audience to read, but imagine, if the shoe were on the other foot, how a Chinese audience would understand American politics through such a medium.

The use of the indecent nickname for former President John F. Kennedy is precisely the sort of material for which Ching Ping and her journalist-husband appear to have a penchant. In helping us to understand the likely succession patterns in Peking *Heirs Apparent* dutifully informs us that Ch'en Yi, who is unlikely to succeed anyone, since he died well before the book was published, "regarded love as an art, and composed songs to express it." We further learn that in puritanical Yenan, sacred home of the Chinese Revolution, on those hot, muggy summer days for which the northern part of Shensi province is so famous, the revolutionaries of "both sexes would strip off their clothes and jump into the Yen River to bathe." And that "beside the river was a hill covered with thick bushes and here, during the cooler nights, pair after pair of comrades could be remarked upon the ground, engaged in a pastime popularly known as 'guerrilla training' whose climax—get it?—"was the inevitable 'liberation.'" Still, we should be grateful for small favors. The mocking image of comrades copulating behind the bushes is at least a corrective to the conventional stereotype of nonfornicating revolutionaries.

Heirs Apparent is often unseemly and more often irrelevant. It is also grossly misleading—not just in the sense that any book making problematic predictions about forthcoming successions inevitably must be, since its speculations become outdated even before publication. *Heirs*

Apparent is misleading on a much grander scale. It misleads the reader into thinking that Chinese politics is little more than the politics of total cynicism and pure expediency, reducible to a series of conflicts among self-interested factions and ambitious and conniving personalities. While such factors doubtless do play an important role in the politics of China, as elsewhere, neither the succession matter nor any other major political issue in China can be understood exclusively or even primarily in those terms. Chinese politics can only be understood in the context of the great revolution of which it is an intimate part. The continuing political struggles are an integral part of China's continuing revolution. Analyses that do not relate the power struggles to the substantive issues of the revolution miss the essence of Chinese politics.

Ching Ping's and Dennis Bloodworth's book is written as if politics in China were the same as politics in Saigon or in Singapore, where they live. But Peking is not Saigon, nor Singapore, nor Taipei for that matter, and the modes for understanding the corrupt, élitist, and

client-patron-dominated politics in those areas are inadequate for understanding politics in the People's Republic.

Nevertheless, as *Heirs Apparent* so aptly illustrates, that is precisely the way Pekingology has tended for more than a generation to misunderstand Chinese politics. Pekingology has typically failed to confront one small fact about Chinese politics: that China has been undergoing a revolution. But then Pekingology, a child of the cold war, never placed understanding Chinese politics nearly so high on its list of priorities as propagandizing the American people.

So it is not enough to call *Heirs Apparent* a "bad" book. The book is part of an ideological tradition of journalism and scholarship that has served the perceived needs of "Free World" foreign and domestic policy. For those who remain unconscious of these facts of life and for those who wish to perpetuate such policies, *Heirs Apparent* will be received with some embarrassment and much self-righteous glee. Were I stranded alone on a desert island with this one book, I would rather read my own palm.

Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970's edited by Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tökés

(Free Press; 401 pp.; \$12.95)

Paul A. Goble

The USSR and Western Soviet studies have both entered a new post-totalitarian era, but in neither case has the transition been easy or complete. Both Soviet society and its students have followed a typically Russian course. First, they announce a radical new direction, then overshoot the mark and despair of its consequences, and, finally, retreat to something much like what had gone on before, only changing the names to protect the guilty. One

regrets this pattern within the Soviet Union with its attendant repression, but can only welcome it in Soviet studies, for it is leading to an understanding of the Soviet Union unencumbered by the dogmatic application of either totalitarian or Western social science models. The ten essays in *Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970's* reflect the magnitude of these changes in both Soviet society and those who study it from the outside.

Since the death of Stalin in 1953