The sobriety of Tsirkas's message is complemented by vivid description and rich language. Yet the compactness of style is flawed by a lack of organizational cohesiveness. Drifting Cities is presented as a trilogy of three cities sharing a common condition. But Tsirkas at times confuses his reader by abrupt transitions from one subplot to another and sudden jumps in narration. He is skilled at relating the immediate to its historical context but obviously does not feel bound by a linear progression of events.

These structural difficulties should not, however, detract from the larger contributions of Tsirkas's work. Tsirkas offers a lucid picture of the Middle East at a critical time in Greek history. Most important, Tsirkas creates an empathy for his subject that is often lacking in the histories of this period.

The Liberal Theory of Justice by Brian Barry
(Clarendon Press; 168 pp.; $3.95)

Alan Emdin

It may be remembered that in his A Theory of Justice, published two years ago, John Rawls postulated a group of individuals attempting to formulate the basic rules of their society. The actors were thought of as in an "original position," aware of certain general social and psychological facts but ignorant of the particular goals they might later wish to pursue. Rawls claimed that they would unanimously grant each other (1) "an equal right to the most extensive system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all." They would also decide that (2) "any social and economic inequalities be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest advantage to the least advantaged consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." These would be (lexically) ordered such that the first had absolute priority over part (b) of the second, which (in economically developed societies) would take absolute precedence over part (a).

In what I believe is the longest study devoted exclusively to Rawls to date, Barry subjects to careful scrutiny each aspect of the original position and of the two principles of justice Rawls deduced from it. He also comments upon several statements by Rawls which are not, strictly speaking, part either of the principles themselves or of their derivation. In this connection Barry makes many of his most interesting and telling points. Oddly, they serve as specific corrections to what are some of the most engaging general features of Rawls's own work.

Most academic philosophy hardly deigns to consider what the practical implications of its doctrines might be. It was even necessary to start a new journal, Philosophy and Public Affairs, to insure an outlet for such work. To his credit, Rawls outlined policies enjoined by his principles of justice in such areas as taxation, savings, social welfare legislation, and the range of permissible civil disobedience. Unfortunately, his policy proposals are often rather disconcerting. Rawls's economics seems to be a direct throwback to classic liberalism. He neglects the possibility that some structural features of a modern economic system might not be correctable through what were once thought of as standard solutions. Barry performs a commendable service in pointing out that, contrary to Rawls, a competitive economy and open-class system.
might not be enough to eliminate excessive social and economic inequalities. Similarly, Barry must reiterate what one would have thought to be commonplace by now: that raising the average incomes of the unskilled will not in itself solve the problem of poverty. Sickness, having children, old age, and disability are other causes which must also be attended to.

Rawls's politics are little better than his economics, and again Barry provides a needed corrective. One flaw is Rawls's insistence that, while in economic matters men should be thought of as self-serving, in politics they are to be seen as motivated by a desire to attain justice. Political arrangements are to be judged according to the results they would yield if men behaved in this manner. Rawls terms this position Kantian (one suspects Kant might have declined the honor). To say the least, criteria of this sort are not of much use in making the choices we face in real life. Even such esoteric idealists as Plato and Aristotle recognized the need for prudential standards by which to guide everyday coping. Rawls's failure to provide such a fallback position is one difference between his work and theirs, as well as between his and what Barry terms the realistic "constitutional engineering" of Harrington, the Federalist, and Bentham.

The errors of Rawls's political psychology are compounded by the naive generalizations (also attributed to Kant) which he makes about political preferences. Barry's point here is that what an individual (even every individual) chooses for himself may not be what he (or anyone) would choose for society. Each might wish for power, but abhor the thought of so many powerful neighbors. Each might wish to avoid persecution, but prefer a small risk of it in return for a high probability of enjoying the perceived benefits of life in a society with even enforced solidarity.

In addition to these choice morsels, Barry attempts a programmatic critique of Rawls's theory. As Rousseau chided Hobbes for having read modern man back into the state of nature, so Barry scores against Rawls's implicit assumptions. Men in the original position were said to have no knowledge of their own desires, and to know only a few general facts about human nature. Yet they are all said to agree on principle (2)(a) (the maximum criterion), a sophisticated and rather unusual policy toward the socialization of risk. It is difficult to see how so singular a precept could be so simply derived. Nor is it obvious how it could be universally agreed to unless, as Barry argues, Rawls assumed that all actors had identical preferences on rarefied matters of choice.

Rawls's "original men" were also assumed to act upon what he termed an "Aristotelean Principle," stating that people will rationally prefer a more demanding activity to a less demanding one. Rawls is not clear whether this is meant to be an empirical generalization or a criterion of rationality. Either claim is dubious. Virtually everyone violates the principle a great deal of the time. A criterion so honored in the breach is not of much use. Barry goes on to note (a bit waspishly) that the Aristotelean Principle is less a rule of reason than a maxim of that portion of the American middle class which feels a need to fill each waking hour with strenuous and rewarding activity.

In light of the deficiencies he claims to have detected in Rawls's presentation of the original position, Barry takes issue with most every point of the two principles derived from it. Rawls had constructed these in terms of civil liberties, equality of opportunity, and the justification of inequalities. Barry argues that actors in the original position will only be able to know a broad characterization of their future wants. Any principles they may agree upon can be concerned only with wants, or with such general means toward want satisfaction as wealth and power. Rawlsian ideals and liberties find no place in Barry's principles. Even their role as causal factors in politics is deprecated. Instead, Barry slowly lifts the curtain to reveal a rather English brand of socialism. Eventually he says, without so much as temporal or cultural qualification, that "the furtherance of working class interests is what justice requires."

Barry is to be praised for his careful reading of Rawls. And he was not content with the relatively easy victories of criticism. Rather, an alternative position is put forth, and, in the best Rawlsian manner, several of its practical consequences are discussed. The effort is not without shortcomings of its own, however.

The linchpin of Barry's argument is the absolute disjunction of wants and ideals, a disjunction he himself oversets. Rawls had argued that the two principles were concerned with ideals (or "ideal-regarding") because they prescribed the incalculability of certain character traits. Barry admits that any theory must make such provisions and on that ground could not be strictly derived from wants (or "want-regarding"). The stipulation, however, could be viewed as the addition of distributive criteria; one is still not forced to admit ideals.

Barry's assertions notwithstanding, the question remains what justification can be given for the introduction of distributive criteria. They are meant as a remedy for the faults of want-regarding theory, and hence cannot themselves be derived from wants. And, as Barry is fond of noting, what comes out of a theory must at some time have been put into it. Either Barry's theory is itself ideal-regarding, or the gap between ideals and wants has been tacitly bridged. Whichever the case may be, the high road Barry constructed between wants, wealth, power, and socialism takes an unexpected detour:

The road becomes serpentine, in fact, as Barry scatters a number of errors throughout the book. Whereas Rawls is accused of unquestioned acceptance of much liberal doctrine, Barry is rather blithe in his socialism. He often seems to neglect the possibility that a position approved of by some ideology other
than his own might still be correct on independent grounds. Rawls (with J. S. Mill) had suggested, for example, that superior education might lead to greater disinterestedness among voters. Barry claims to refute this by reporting that constituencies made up of university graduates elect "rather undistinguished Tories." That even undistinguished Tories might have their virtues does not seem to cross his mind.

There are methodological problems as well. Barry defines Liberalism as a position viewing society as "made up of independent, autonomous units who cooperate only when the terms of cooperation are such as to make it further the ends of each of the parties." Barry then argues for socialism through the use of microeconomic models which presuppose just such a view of human society and motivation. He also presents a two-dimensional diagram to show the absurdity of Rawls's lexical ordering of principles. He is apparently not aware that lexical ordering is specifically intended for problems requiring more than two dimensions, making his demonstration quite irrelevant.

By far the most serious flaw is Barry's failure to defend his socialism with arguments as weighty as its claims. Rawls's original position was an attempt to reach a conceptual core of justice applicable in all times and places. In contrast, Barry identifies justice with the furtherance of working-class interests. Yet not every age can be said to have had classes, let alone working classes. Some had large status groups, others are best seen in terms of dyadic relations along any of a number of lines. Indeed, even a concept so central to socialism as property cannot be analyzed apart from various cultural, legal, and religious frameworks. Weber made these points against Marx, and the debate has continued since. Barry shows that he is aware of these difficulties, fails to follow his acute criticisms of Rawls with a persuasive grounding of his own position. Until such a defense is forthcoming, socialism remains a (rather ill-defined) position, which sometimes has worthwhile remedies for present ills, but remains little more than a stuffer in the conversations of eternity.

The Freud/Jung Letters
edited by William McGuire
(Princeton University Press–Bollingen Series XCIV; 650 pp.; $17.50)

Joseph F. Rychlak

Though exchanged between Freud and Jung, these letters reflect a distinct triangle, for always hovering in the background is the shadow of Eugene Bleuler, Jung's superior and sometime mentor at the Burghölzli Hospital. Freud and Jung even diagnose the situation as that of a "father complex" for Jung, who must decide where his allegiance lies in his budding career. Is he an academician and conventional scientist in the medical-biological tradition represented by Bleuler, or is he now committed to a new father in the figure of Freud, who has a revolutionary form of science needing promulgation? In the early letters there is no doubt on Jung's part—at least in his conscious sphere. Though he was later to expect a more nearly equal status in the relationship, Jung could say in a letter of February, 1908: "Let me enjoy your friendship not as one between equals but as that of father and son." Freud readily granted this request, referring to Jung later that year as "My dear friend and heir." The father-son theme reappears throughout the letters, which cover the period April, 1906, through January, 1913, at which time a complete break between the correspondents occurred. (There are a few scattered letters from Jung after this, but of no real consequence.)

One might even see these letters as a quadrangle. For if Bleuler was a shadowy figure in the father complex of Jung, then surely on Freud's side there lurked the image of Wilhelm Fliess. Freud had carried on a lengthy correspondence with Fliess, whom he called his "only audience," during the difficult years of his self-analysis in the 1890's. But this very personal relationship had ended in bitter dispute over the proper role of psychoanalysis in the explanation of neurosis. Fliess was just as committed to the medical-biological explanation as was Bleuler, and it would be easy to see how some invidious symbolisms could have taken root in Freud's feelings for the Bleuler-Jung tandem as a potential source of opposition to psychoanalytical explanations of behavior. There is no doubt that Freud was crushed by the parting with Fliess, and many clues appear in the present correspondence which suggest that he endured a mild neurosis as a result of this affair. So, as Jung was working through his father-complex in the relationship, so too was Freud reworking his Fliess episode—which accounts for the extreme anxiety displayed by Freud if Jung's letters were tardy or insufficient. Jung was to complain of Freud's excessive expectations as correspondent, and Freud admitted that it had to do with Fliess.

Of course, these letters are far more than a chronicle of the minor neuroses of Freud and Jung. They show how two dedicated men were able to take a relatively narrow-gauged group of Viennese physicians and professional people with a new and strange outlook on life and broaden this collection into a worldwide psychoanalytical society. Jung played an immense role in this, as he himself states at one point. Freud worked more in the background, but he was always clearly in command.