

What Kissinger Feels in His Bones

An Interview with Bill Moyers

In mid-January Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was interviewed on a new public television series, Bill Moyers' Journal: International Report, produced by WNET/13 for the Public Broadcasting Service. Except for some introductory comments, this is the complete interview.

BILL MOYERS: When Thomas Jefferson became Secretary of State in 1790 there were to be representatives of four foreign countries in Washington—Britain, the Netherlands, France, and Spain. Jefferson's chief problems were to negotiate commercial relations with each of the four countries, to gain from three of them control of territory surrounding the new nation, and to maintain neutrality in the war that raged between two of them.

Now there are 128 diplomatic missions in Washington, and while the chief problems continue to be commerce, war, and peace, the world is a far more complicated place. As we move toward the end of the twentieth century the problems we face are a crisscrossing web of issues, each of which is tangled with the next, so that today's solution may be tomorrow's headache or war.

It seemed fitting to begin discussion in Washington, on the eighth floor of the State Department, with our fifty-sixth Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger.

Mr. Secretary, I was thinking, coming down here, of a conversation we had when you were teaching at Harvard in 1968, six months before you came to the White House. You had a very reasonably clear view, a map of the world, in your mind at that time, a world based on the stability brought about by the main powers. I'm wondering what that map is like in your mind now of the world.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I thought at the time, and I still do, that you cannot have a peaceful world without most of the countries, and preferably all of the countries, feeling that they have a share in it. This means that those countries that can have the greatest capacity to make—to determine peace or war—that is, the five major centers—be reasonably agreed on the general outlines of what that peace should be like. But at the same time one of the central facts of our period is that more than a hundred nations have come into being in the last fifteen years, and they too must be central participants in this process. So for the first time in history foreign policy has become truly global, and therefore truly complicated.

MOYERS: What about the flow of wealth to countries in the Middle East? Hasn't this upset considerably the equilibrium that you thought could be possible between the five centers of power?

KISSINGER: The world that we all knew in 1968, when you and I talked, is extraordinarily different today. At that time we had the rigid hostility between the Communist world and the non-Communist world. At that time Communist China, the People's Republic of China, was outside the mainstream of events, and at that time, you're quite right, the oil-producing countries were not major actors. The change in influence of the oil-producing countries, the flow of resources to the oil-producing countries in the last two years in a way that was unexpected and is unprecedented, is a major change in the international situation to which we are still in the process of attempting to adjust.

MOYERS: All of these changes brought to mind something you once wrote. You said, "Statesmen know the future. They feel it in their bones. They are incapable of proving the truth of their vision." And I'm wondering, what are your bones telling you now about the future, with all of these new forces at work?

KISSINGER: Well, I feel we are at a watershed. We're at a period which in retrospect is either going to be seen as a period of extraordinary creativity or a period when really the international order came apart politically, economically, and morally. I believe that with all the dislocations we now experience there also exists an extraordinary opportunity to form for the first time in history a truly global society carried by the principle of interdependence. And if we act wisely and with vision, I think we can look back to all this turmoil as the birth pangs of a more creative and better system. If we miss the opportunity, I think there's going to be chaos.

MOYERS: But at the same time the opportunity exists. As you yourself have said, the political problem is that the Western world—and this is a direct quote of yours—is suffering from inner uncertainty and a sense of misdirection. What's causing that inner uncertainty? Is it external? Is it internal? Or

is it simply that we don't know what we really want to do?

KISSINGER: Bill, I think you are quite right. The aspect of contemporary life that worries me most is the lack of purpose and direction of so much of the Western world. There are many reasons for this. The European countries have had to adjust in this century to two world wars, to an enormous change in their position, to a really dramatic social revolution in all of them, and now to the process of European unification.

The new countries are just beginning to develop a coherent picture of the international world, having spent most of their energies gaining independence. And in the United States we have had a traumatic decade—the assassination of a President and his brother, the Vietnam war, the Watergate period. So we have this great opportunity at a moment when the self-confidence in the whole Western world has been severely shaken. On the other hand, as far as the United States, at least, is concerned, I believe we are a healthy country, and I believe we are capable of dealing creatively with the problem that I have described.

MOYERS: But you also used a “perhaps” in that statement. You said every country in the Western world is suffering from inner uncertainty, with the exception perhaps of the United States. And I'm wondering why you brought in the “perhaps.”

KISSINGER: Because no country can go through what the United States has gone through without suffering on the one hand some damage, but also gaining in wisdom. I think it's the process of growing up to learn one's limits and derive from that a consciousness of what is possible within these limits.

Through the greater part of our history we felt absolutely secure. In the postwar period we emerged from a victorious war and with tremendous resources. Now the last decade has taught America that we cannot do everything and that we cannot achieve things simply by wishing them intensely. On the other hand, while that has been a difficult experience for us, it also should have given us a new sense of perspective. So that I used the word “perhaps” because our reaction to these experiences will determine how we will master the future. But I'm really quite confident that if we act in concert and if we regain, as I think we can and must, our national consensus, we can do what is necessary.

MOYERS: In the postwar world the consensus between Europe and America was built around a common defense against a mutual danger. Now that's disappeared. The defense structure is very weak in the West at the moment, and a new factor, the economic imperative, has arisen, and Europe and Japan are much more dependent, for example, on Middle Eastern oil than we are. Doesn't this make them less dependable as members of this new consensus?

KISSINGER: I would not, Bill, agree that the defense is weak. Actually, we have had considerable success in building a quite strong defensive system between us and Europe and between us and Japan, especially between us and Europe. The difficulty is that the perception of the threat has diminished and so many new problems have arisen that a common defense is not enough by itself to provide a cement of unity.

You pointed out the economic problem. It is an interesting fact that in April, 1973, I called for the economic unity of the industrialized countries. At that time this was rejected as carrying the alliance much too far. Today every one of our friends insists that we coordinate our economic policies, because they recognize that their prosperity depends on our economic programs. Now the problem of relations to the oil producers, for example, has, in Europe and in Japan, evoked a much greater sense of vulnerability than in the United States, because it is based on facts.



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MOYERS: Wouldn't we be worried if we were in their position?

KISSINGER: Absolutely. I'm not criticizing either the Europeans or the Japanese for their reaction. We have attempted to create in them a sense that together with us we can master the energy problem, and in all the discussions of conservation, recycling, alternative sources of energy, financial solidarity, there are many technical solutions. We have always chosen the one that in our judgment has the greatest potential to give our friends a sense that they can master their fate and overcome the danger of impotence which is a threat at one and the same time to their international as well as to their domestic position. This process is not yet completed, and as we go through it there are many ups and downs.

On the other hand, we have to remember it is only one year since the Washington Energy Conference was called—less than a year. In that time an international energy agency has been created, a conservation program has been agreed to, emergency

sharing has been developed for the contingency of new embargoes. I'm absolutely confident that within a very short time, a matter of weeks, we will have agreed on financial solidarity, and within a month we will make proposals on how to develop alternative resources.

One of the problems is that each country is so concerned with its domestic politics that these very important events are coming to pass in a very undramatic manner and in a way that doesn't galvanize the sort of support that the Marshall Plan did. But the achievements have, in my view, not been inconsiderable and in retrospect may be seen as the most significant events of this period.

MOYERS: Is it conceivable to expect Europe and Japan to go with us on our Middle Eastern policy when they have to get most of their oil from the OPEC countries, and we do not?

KISSINGER: I think it is not only conceivable; I think it is, above all, in their own interest, because we have to understand what our Middle East policy is. Our Middle East policy is to enable Europe and Japan to put themselves into the maximum position of invulnerability toward outside pressures, but at the same time to engage in a dialogue with the producers to give effect to the principle of interdependence on a global basis. We recognize—in fact, we were the first to advance—the proposition that the oil producers must have a sense that the arrangements that are made are not only just, but are likely to be long-lasting. We have pursued a dialogue with the producers on the most intensive basis. We have set up commissions with Iran and Saudi Arabia, and we have very close relationships in economic discussions with Algeria and other countries in which we are trying to relate our technical know-how to their resources and in which we are attempting to demonstrate that jointly we can progress to the benefit of all of mankind.

MOYERS: Our foreign aid program, which you raised, has been about constant the last few years, and therefore in real dollars is down.

KISSINGER: I agree.

MOYERS: We, almost virtually alone among the industrial nations, have not helped the underdeveloped world with its manufactured goods with our tariff policy. A lot of the food that we're giving right now is going into political areas, strategical areas, rather than humanitarian areas. The Brazilians and the Indians say that we are excluding them from the definition of consumer. And the impression you get from talking to representatives of the developing world is that they really don't agree that we are very conscious of their considerations and needs.

KISSINGER: **Well, I think, quite honestly, there's a difference between what they say publicly and what they say privately. It is a fact that in many of the less-developed countries it is politically not unhelpful to seem to be at least aloof from the most powerful**

country in the world and to give the impression that one is not dominated by this colossus, and therefore the rhetoric of many of these countries is much more strident than the reality of their foreign policy.

Now it is true that the American people have been disillusioned by some of their experiences in international affairs, and inevitably during a recession it is difficult to mobilize public support for a very large foreign aid program. And these are obstacles with which we contend.

But your question suggests a more fundamental problem. Many of these new countries—this doesn't apply to the Latin American countries—formed their identity in opposition to the industrial countries, and they are caught in a dilemma. Their rhetoric is a rhetoric of confrontation; the reality is a reality of interdependence. And we have seen in the United Nations and elsewhere that the rhetoric doesn't always match the necessities, and one of the problems of international order is to bring them closer together.

MOYERS: One of the issues they point to, for example, is the fact that the oil-producing countries have recently allocated some two billion dollars in aid to these forty-or-so poorer countries in the world. That's roughly the amount of the increase in the price these countries are paying for oil. They're paying us about a billion dollars more for food and fertilizer, and yet we have not adjusted our assistance to them to compensate for this. So they say they're being driven into a "tyranny of the majority" by turning to the OPEC countries for the kind of assistance that interdependence makes necessary.

KISSINGER: Well, I don't think it is correct that we are not adjusting. For example, our PL-480 program, which is our food contribution, is on the order of about a billion-and-a-half, or almost that large, and we have opted, after all the discussions, for the highest proposal that was made, or substantially the highest proposal. I also don't agree with you that we're giving most of our food aid for strategic purposes.

MOYERS: I didn't say most. I didn't mean to say most. I meant a substantial amount.

KISSINGER: We're giving some in countries in which political relationships are of importance to us, and it stands to reason that when a country has a vital resource, it keeps in mind the degree of friendship other countries show for it before it distributes this resource essentially on a grant basis.

But the considerable majority of our food aid goes for humanitarian purposes. And even in those countries where political considerations are involved, those are still countries with a very real and acute food shortage.

MOYERS: You said recently that we have to be prepared to pay some domestic price for our international position. More food aid is going to mean increased prices at home. And I'm wondering, what are some of the other prices you anticipate Ameri-

cans are going to have to be paying because of this international position?

KISSINGER: I think first of all we have to understand that what seems to be a domestic price, in the long term it's the best investment we can make, because if the United States lives in a hostile world, if the United States lives in a depressed world, then inevitably, given our dependence on the raw materials of the world and given our essential interest in peace, in the long term we will suffer. What we have to recognize domestically is, first of all, that foreign aid programs, as they're now being developed, are in our interest; secondly, that in developing such programs as financial solidarity and conservation of energy, and even though they're painful, they're absolutely essential for the United States to be able to play a major role internationally and to master its domestic problems. And of course we have to be prepared to pay the price for national security.



MOYERS: In Europe recently I found some feeling of concern that the emphasis on interdependence, and because of the economic and energy crisis in particular, is going to bring an alignment of the Old Rich, the industrial nations, against the New Rich, the oil nations and commodity nations, at the exclusion of the poor. And if I hear you correctly, you're saying we can't let that happen.

KISSINGER: Well, first of all, we are not talking of an alliance of the Old Rich against the New Rich, because we're seeking the cooperation between the Old Rich and the New Rich. Both need each other, and neither can really prosper, or indeed survive, except in an atmosphere of cooperation. And it seems to us that the Old Rich and the New Rich must cooperate in helping the poor part of the world.

You take the problem of food, which you mentioned. There is no way the United States can feed the rest of the world. And from some points of view the level of our food aid has mostly a symbolic significance, because the ultimate solution to the food

problem depends on raising the productivity of the less-developed countries. This requires fertilizer, help in distribution, and similar projects. This, in turn, can only be done through the cooperation of the technical know-how of the Old Rich with the new resources of the New Rich, and we will, within the next two months, make a very concrete proposal of how all of this can be put together to increase drastically the food production in the poorer part of the world.

MOYERS: What about the psychological adjustment that all of this is causing us to make? Does it disturb you that a handful of Arab sheiks, in a sense, have so much new power and so much dominance on the world scene?

KISSINGER: It is a new fact to which we all have to adjust, including the oil-producing countries. But I think that on the whole everybody is trying to deal with these long-range problems in a cooperative spirit, although, of course, obviously the level of experience in dealing with global problems differs between various nations.

MOYERS: Is the specific purpose of our policy toward the oil-producing countries to arrest the flow of wealth to them?

KISSINGER: No. Our concern is that the flow of wealth, which is inevitable, is channeled into—in such a way that it does not disrupt the international—the well-being of all the rest of the world. If you take countries like Iran, for example, or Algeria, that use most of their wealth for their own development, which means, in effect, that they are spending the energy income in the industrialized part of the world, this is not a basically disruptive effect. It has certain dislocations, but I think this is not basically disruptive.

What presents a particular problem is in those areas where the balances accumulate and where the investment of large sums or the shifting around of large sums can produce economic crises that are not necessarily intended. And this makes the problem of finding financial institutions which can handle these tremendous sums—\$60 billion in one year, which is more than our total foreign investment over a hundred years, just to give one a sense of the magnitude—to have those sums invested in a way that does not produce economic chaos.

MOYERS: What are the consequences if we don't find those international monetary structures?

KISSINGER: Well, I think the consequences will be rampant inflation, the potential economic collapse of some of the weaker nations, and the long-term backlash economically will be on the oil producers as well as on the consumers. But I'm confident we will find the institutions, and I think you will find that the discussions of the finance ministers taking place this week are making very substantial progress in developing these financial institutions.

MOYERS: Some people have said that we're on the

edge of a global economic crisis akin to that of the 1930's. I know you were just a boy in the 1930's, but that part of your life you remember quite well. Do you see similarities?

KISSINGER: I didn't understand too much about economics at that time. I was better versed in football than economics. But I think there are similarities in the sense that when you are faced with economic difficulty, you have the choice of retreating into yourself or trying to find a global solution. Retreating into yourself is a defensive attitude which over a period of time accelerates all the difficulties that led you to do it in the first place. I think our necessity is to find a global solution. It's our necessity and our opportunity, and in many ways we're on the way to doing it, although with all the debates that are going on, this isn't always apparent.

MOYERS: Isn't what's happening in the Middle East, and particularly the flow of wealth to the Middle Eastern and oil-producing countries, simply an adjustment of history? Isn't it a rhythm of history? Wasn't it natural that when they finally got control of their own oil production, they would use it for their own benefits?

KISSINGER: That was inevitable. I don't know whether it was inevitable that God would place the oil in exactly those places. . . .

MOYERS: Or that He would place the Arabs there.

KISSINGER: But once it was placed there, it was inevitable that sooner or later these trends would develop, and we're not fighting these trends.

MOYERS: But the price was kept down for four decades by Western control of the production of oil. That's gone.

KISSINGER: Well, I don't want to speculate about what kept the price down, because it could happen that the price will go down again. This depended on the relationship of supply and demand in a very important way. The oil resources of the Middle East were so vast compared to the energy requirements of the world that that kept the price down. When I came to Washington in 1969, people were still talking about oil surplus, and they were still talking about how to restrict the importation of foreign oil lest the prices go down even more. It is only in the last six years that there has been such a dramatic increase in the energy requirements that the opportunity for raising the prices existed. I believe that before then there was—it was roughly in balance between supply and demand.

MOYERS: You talk about the solidarity of consumers in dealing with, in negotiating with, the oil-producing countries. What will that solidarity produce? What economic pressure, Mr. Secretary, do we have on the Arabs?

KISSINGER: I don't think it's a question of economic pressure. I think there are two possibilities. Right now every consumer, or every group of consumers, has its own dialogue going on with the producers.

It isn't that there's no dialogue going on. There's a European dialogue with the Arabs. There's an American dialogue going on with both Arab countries and with Iran. The question is whether a multilateral conference—that is to say, getting all consumers together with all of the producers—how that can advance matters. In our view it can advance matters only if the consumers do not repeat at such a conference all the disagreements they already have.

I believe that in such a conference, if both sides are well prepared, one should address the question of long-term supply, that is, give the oil producers an assurance that they will have a market for a fairly long future. There has to be some discussion about price. There has to be some discussion about international facilities, both for the benefit of the poor countries and to make sure that the investments are channeled in such a way that they do not produce economic crises. We're working hard on all of these issues, and we believe all of them are soluble in a constructive manner.

MOYERS: And you don't believe that pressure is the way.

KISSINGER: I don't believe that such a negotiation can be based upon pressure. But each side obviously has to be aware of its own interest and has to defend its own interest in a reasonable manner. We don't blame the producers for doing it, and they can't blame the consumers for doing it. But the attitude must be cooperative, conciliatory, and looking for a long-term solution.

MOYERS: Do you think the oil-producing countries have an interest in that kind of negotiation, dialogue?

KISSINGER: I believe the vast majority of them do.

MOYERS: Well, if pressure isn't that important a part of the scenario, I need to ask you: What did you have in mind when you gave that interview to *Business Week* and talked about the possible strangulation of the West? What was going through your mind at just that minute?

KISSINGER: **First of all, the sentence that has attracted so much attention is too frequently taken totally out of context, and it was part of a very long interview in which I put forward essentially the conception that I have developed here, that is to say, of a cooperative relationship between the consumers and producers. In addition, I made clear that political and economic warfare, or military action, is totally inappropriate for the solution of oil prices, recycling problems, et cetera. The contingency, and the only contingency, to which I addressed myself was an absolutely hypothetical case in which the actual strangulation of the entire industrialized world was being attempted; in other words, in which the confrontation was started by the producers. I have said repeatedly, and I want to say now, I do not believe that such an event is going to happen. I was speaking hypothetically about an extreme situation that would have to be provoked by other countries.**

I think it is self-evident that the United States cannot permit itself to be strangled, but I also do not believe that this will really be attempted, and therefore we were talking about a hypothetical case that all our efforts are attempting to avoid and that we are confident we can avoid. We were not talking, as is so loosely said, about the seizure of oil fields. That is not our intention and that is not our policy.

MOYERS: What intrigued so many people, it seemed to me, was that a few days before, you'd given a similar interview to *Newsweek*, and much the same thing had been said with no particular alarm. Then a few days later a similar statement is made and it's seized upon. And I—some of us thought perhaps you had calculated between the first interview and the second interview to be more precise in some kind of message.

KISSINGER: I was astonished when this was seized upon. We were not the ones who spread it. I think there are many—many people have spread this around, frankly in order to sow some dispute between us and the oil producers.

We—our whole policy toward the producers has been based on an effort of achieving cooperation. We have spent tremendous efforts to promote peace in the Middle East, precisely to avoid confrontations. We were talking about a very extreme case about which only the most irresponsible elements among producers are even speaking, and it is not our policy to use military force to settle any of the issues we are now talking about.

MOYERS: But neither, if I understand your philosophical view of diplomacy, can a power ever rule out any contingency.

KISSINGER: **Well, no nation can announce it will let itself be strangled without reacting, and I find it very difficult to see what it is people are objecting to. We are saying the United States will not permit itself or its allies to be strangled. Somebody else would have to make the first move to attempt the strangulation. It isn't being attempted now.**

MOYERS: Well, I was in Europe about the time, and some of them almost came out of their skin, because depending as they do on Middle East oil and with our troops on their soil, they could see a confrontation between us and the oil-producing countries that would have them the innocent bystander and victim. That's why they seized upon it.

KISSINGER: I find it difficult to understand how they would want to announce that "Please strangle us." We did not say, and I repeat it here, that any of the issues that are now under discussion fall into this category. There would have to be an overt move of an extremely drastic, dramatic, and aggressive nature before this contingency could ever be considered.

MOYERS: Who, Mr. Secretary, has a stake in division between us and the oil-producing countries?

KISSINGER: Oh, I think there are many forces, and

I don't want to speculate on that.

MOYERS: Let me ask you, though. I'm curious not about how you see a possible final solution in the Middle East, but by what in history and in your own philosophy makes you believe that people who have fought so bitterly over so long a period of time can ever settle a conflict like that peaceably.

KISSINGER: If you are in my position, you often find yourself in a situation where as an historian you would see the problem is insoluble, and yet as a statesman you have absolutely no choice except to attempt to settle it. Because what is the alternative? If we say there is no solution, then another war is guaranteed. Then the confrontation between oil producers and consumers, which it is our policy to attempt to avoid—the risk of this will be magnified. The danger of a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States will be increased. And therefore, with all the difficulty and with all the anguish that is involved, we must make a major effort to move step-by-step toward a solution. And some progress has already been made that most people thought was difficult. And we find ourselves often in a situation, and many national leaders do, that if you attempt something new, there is no historical precedent for it, and you have to go on an uncharted road.

MOYERS: And you never announce that you're giving up hope.

KISSINGER: Not only can you not announce you're giving up hope; you must not give up hope. You must believe in what you are doing.

MOYERS: Is our step-by-step diplomacy in the Middle East on track?

KISSINGER: Our step-by-step diplomacy is facing increasing difficulties, as one would expect. As you make progress, you get the more difficult circumstances. I believe we have an opportunity. I believe that progress can be made, and I expect that over the next months progress will be made.

MOYERS: In the ultimate extremity of war, wouldn't the level of violence be increased by the sale of arms we have made to the Arabs and the arms we have shipped to Israel? Aren't we in a sense guaranteeing that any war that comes . . .

KISSINGER: Well, none of the states that are likely—none of the Arab states likely to fight in a war have received American arms. The sale of arms to Israel is necessitated by the fact that the Arab countries are receiving substantial supplies from the Soviet Union and because the security of Israel has been an American objective in all American administrations since the end of World War II.

MOYERS: There's some confusion out there as to whether or not you have systematically excluded the Soviets from playing a peacekeeping role in the Middle East and whether, if you have, this is to our advantage. Is it possible to have a solution there that does not involve the Soviets?

KISSINGER: A final solution must involve the Soviet Union, and it has never been part of our policy to exclude the Soviet Union from a final solution. The individual steps that have been taken have required—have been based on the methods we judged most effective; and at the request of all of the parties, we have proceeded in the manner in which we have. But we have always kept the Soviet Union generally informed of what we were doing.

MOYERS: Is there any evidence that under the general rubric of détente the Soviets have been playing adversary politics in the Middle East?

KISSINGER: I think the Soviet Union has not been exceptionally helpful, but it has also not been exceptionally obstructive. And I don't believe it is correct to say they've been playing adversary politics.

MOYERS: On the word détente, I wish you would define it for us.

KISSINGER: The problem of détente is often put as if the United States were making concessions to the Soviet Union in order to achieve peace. Basically, the problem of détente—the necessity of détente—is produced by the fact that nuclear war in this period is going to involve a catastrophe for all of humanity. When the decision of peace and war involves the survival of tens of millions of people, you're no longer playing power politics in the traditional sense. And for this reason, every American President in the postwar period, no matter how different their backgrounds, no matter what their party, has sooner or later been driven to making the problem of peace the central preoccupation of his foreign policy. This is the case also, obviously, in this Administration. We would like to leave a legacy of having made the world safer than when we found it, as must every Administration. To conduct confrontation politics when the stakes are going to be determined by nuclear weapons is the height of irresponsibility. This is what we mean by détente. We have sought systematically to improve political relations, to increase trade relations in order to produce a maximum number of links between us and the Soviet Union, and to create a cooperative environment to reduce the dangers of war.

MOYERS: But in the twenty years immediately after World War II, there was nuclear peace, one could say. Every Secretary of State has said, "That's my objective, not to have a nuclear war." What are the special reasons for détente as a systematic policy? What have we got from it beyond nuclear peace?

KISSINGER: What we have got from détente is, first of all, that the situation in Europe is more peaceful than it has ever been. As late as the Kennedy Administration in the 1960's there was a massive confrontation over Berlin between the United States and the Soviet Union. Throughout the '60's there was a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over the question of nuclear arms, over the question of the ultimate shape of the European ar-

rangements, and over the whole evolution of world policy.

In the last three years, the European issues have been substantially, if not settled, I think substantially eased. In all parts of the world, except the Middle East, the United States and the Soviet Union have pursued substantially compatible, and in some cases cooperative, policies. A trade relationship has developed for the first time that would give both countries an incentive, and especially the Soviet Union an incentive, to conduct moderate foreign policies. And most importantly, two major steps have been taken to arrest the nuclear arms race. For the first time, agreed ceilings exist to reduce the danger that both—to eliminate the danger, in fact, at any rate, substantially reduce it, that both sides will be racing, or conducting an arms race out of fear of what the other side would do.

I think these are major steps forward which must be built on and which I'm confident would be built on no matter who is President in this country.

MOYERS: I would like to come back in just a moment to the Vladivostok agreement, but before we leave détente, we seem to be leaving it on very curious legs, with the announcement this week—if trade is important—that the Soviet Union was not going to fulfill the recent agreement on trade.

KISSINGER: Well, I don't think it is correct to say that the Soviet Union will not fulfill the recent agreement on trade. Unfortunately, the Congress has seen fit to pass legislation that imposed on the Soviet Union special conditions which were not foreseeable when the trade agreement was negotiated in 1972 and which the Soviet Union considers an interference in its domestic affairs. We warned against this legislation for two years. We went along with it only with the utmost reluctance, and I think that this event proves that it is absolutely essential for Congress and the Executive to work out a common understanding of what is possible in foreign policy and what can be subject to legislation and what must be subject to other forms of congressional advice and consent.

MOYERS: Did Congress kill the agreement by imposing too strict a limitation?

KISSINGER: I don't want to assess blame. I believe that the legislative restrictions, coupled with the restriction on export-import credits, had the effect of causing the Soviet Union to reject the agreement. We shared the objectives of those in Congress who were pushing this legislation. We differed with them as to tactics and as to the suitability of enshrining these objectives in legislation. We were prepared to make them part of our executive negotiations, and we had, in fact, brought about an emigration of 35,000 before this legislative attempt was made, and the emigration now is lower than this.

And I repeat, we will go back to the Congress with the attitude that both sides should learn from this

experience and with the recognition that as a co-equal partner, they must have an important part in shaping American foreign policy.

MOYERS: Is détente on precarious legs as a result of the events this week?

KISSINGER: I think détente has had a setback, but I think that the imperative that I described earlier of preventing nuclear war, which in turn requires political understanding, will enable us to move forward again, and we will immediately begin consultations with the Congress on how the Legislative and Executive branches can cooperate in implementing this.

MOYERS: You raised the Vladivostok agreement that puts a ceiling on the number of launchers and MIRVed missiles that both the Soviet Union and the United States can have. The question that's being asked is: What you've done is escalate the equilibrium, the military equilibrium, at what appears to many people to be an unnecessarily high level. Why couldn't we just stop?

KISSINGER: Well, I would say that the people who say "unnecessarily high" have never negotiated with the Soviet Union. The level at which that has been set is 200 delivery vehicles below what the Soviet Union already has. And therefore I find it difficult to understand how it can be said it was escalated. If we were willing to live with our present forces when the Soviet Union had 2,600 missiles and bombers, then we should be able to live with our present forces when the Soviet Union will have, under the agreement, only 2,400 missiles and bombers. So there's nothing in the agreement that forces us to build up, and there is something in the agreement that forces the Soviet Union to reduce. Whether we build up or not is a strategic decision which we would have to make in any event and which would face us much more acutely under conditions of an arms race. So we put a ceiling on the Soviet deployment below their present level, and that therefore enables us to consider our ceilings with less pressure than would be the case otherwise. Secondly, once a ceiling exists, both military establishments can plan without the fear that the other one will drive the race through the ceiling, which is one of these self-fulfilling prophecies which has fueled the arms race. Thirdly, once you have ceilings established, the problem of reductions will become much easier. The reason reductions are so difficult now is that when both sides are building up, you never know against what yardsticks to plan your reductions. And I'm confident that if the Vladivostok agreement is completed, it will be seen as one of the turning points in the history of the post-World War II arms race.

MOYERS: What is the next step?

KISSINGER: The next step is to complete the Vladivostok agreement, on which only a general understanding exists up to now. Once that is completed, we will immediately turn to negotiations on the re-

duction of armaments. . . .

MOYERS: The reduction of the ceilings?

KISSINGER: The reduction of the ceilings, both of MIRVs and of total numbers. And actually I believe this will be an easier negotiation than the one we have just concluded at Vladivostok, because it is going to be difficult to prove that when you already have an enormous capacity to devastate humanity, a few hundred extra missiles make so much difference.



MOYERS: The Vladivostok agreement would run to 1985. Is it possible that reductions in the ceilings could begin many years before that?

KISSINGER: In the aide-memoir that has been exchanged between us and the Soviet Union it has been agreed that the negotiations on reductions can start immediately upon the completion of the other agreement. They can start at any time before. They must start no later than 1980, but they can start at any time before that.

MOYERS: To set aside the figures for a moment and put it in the way that laymen ask me: Why do we keep on? This is going to mean, even if it does have a ceiling, more money for defense. We're going ahead with B-1

KISSINGER: Excuse me. The agreement doesn't mean more money for defense. More money for defense was inherent in the arms race. The question that the agreement poses is whether more should be spent on top of what was already planned. I do not believe that the agreement will make it easier to reduce the spending [sic].

MOYERS: Do you see any end, then, in the foreseeable future to the arms race, both nuclear and conventional?

KISSINGER: One of my overwhelming preoccupations has been to put an end to the arms race, and the reason I have been such a strong supporter of the SALT negotiations is to turn down the arms race. And I believe that the Vladivostok agreement will permit over the ten years—will lead to reductions that would involve substantial savings, and that will be our principal objective.

MOYERS: Just a couple of more questions. You wrote once, "An excessively pragmatic policy will be empty of vision and humanity. America cannot be true to itself without moral purpose."

One of the chief criticisms of your tenure as Sec-

retary of State in the last several years has been that we've been long on expediency and pragmatism, and it may have helped us strategically, but we've been short on humanity—the invasion of Cambodia, the bombing of Hanoi at Christmas, the tilting in favor of Pakistan, the maintenance of a constant level of foreign assistance, our preference for a change in the Allende government. These all add up, your critics say, to an excessively pragmatic policy devoid of humanity and vision.

KISSINGER: Any statesman faces the problem of relating morality to what is possible. As long as the United States was absolutely secure behind two great oceans, it could afford the luxury of moral pronouncements divorced from the reality of the world in which other countries have to make the decisions, or make an important part of the decisions, which determine whether you can implement them.

I still agree with this statement that I made some years ago. A purely pragmatic policy is unsuited to the American character and, in any event, leads to paralysis. An excessively moralistic policy will be totally devoid of contact with reality and will lead to empty posturing.

In foreign policy you always face difficult choices, and you always face the problem that when you make your decision, you do not know the outcome. So your moral convictions are necessary to give you the strength to make the difficult choices when you have no assurance of success.

Now the particular events you mentioned one could go into. It would be impossible to do it justice in the limited time we have. Several of them had to do with the conduct of the war in Vietnam, and there, really, the criticism is between those who wanted to end it more or less at any price and those who believed that it was essential to end it in a manner so that the American people did not feel that all these efforts had only led to a turning over by the United States of people who had depended on it to outside invaders. Now it's an issue that we will not settle in this debate, but this was our judgment from which the various military moves flowed.

On the issue of how to vindicate human rights in foreign countries, I think we have never denied their importance. We have, however, always claimed that we could achieve our objectives more effectively quietly, without making it a confrontation. This is why we never made anything of the fact that between 1969 and 1973 we increased Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union from 400 to 35,000 without ever announcing it. And I believe when all the facts are out, it will turn out that a substantial number of releases from Chilean prisons were negotiated by the United States without ever making anything of it, not because we did not believe these human rights, but because we believed it would facilitate the objective of implementing these human rights if we did not make an issue of it. So, some of it

concerns methods toward agreed objectives.

MOYERS: I think what concerns a lot of people is that we are liable, in our search for stability, to be linked with strong authoritative, unrepresentative governments at the expense of open and more liberated governments. You say that's a necessity sometimes.

KISSINGER: It is very difficult to make an abstract pronouncement on it. Ideally, we should be able to achieve our objective by working with governments whose basic values we support. But just as during World War II we became allies of Stalin, even though his values were quite different from ours, so in some concrete situations we occasionally find ourselves under the necessity of choosing whether we want to achieve important objectives with governments of whose domestic policies we do not approve, or whether we sacrifice those interests. Sometimes we can make the wrong choice, but it is important to recognize that it is a different choice and that everybody in his own life knows that the difficult issues are when two desirable objectives clash, or two undesirable objectives clash, and you have to choose the less undesirable. It is not a black-and-white problem. I understand the criticism that is being made, but I think the critics should understand that the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy is more complex than can be encapsulated in a slogan.

MOYERS: Finally, you've talked about stable structures of peace and you've talked about institutionalizing the conduct of foreign policy. Well, if you're not Secretary of State for life, what will you leave behind and what do you care the most about?

KISSINGER: What I would care most about is to leave behind a world which is organically safer than the one I found. By "organically safer" I mean that has a structure which is not dependent on constant juggling and on *tours de force* for maintaining the peace. But just as it can be said that in the period from 1945 to 1950 the United States constructed an international system that had many permanent features, as permanent features go in foreign policy—let's say a decade is a permanent feature in foreign policy—so it would be desirable to leave behind something that does not depend on the constant management of crisis to survive. And within this department I would like to leave behind an attitude and a group of people committed to such a wish, so that succeeding Presidents can be confident that there is a group of dedicated, experienced, and able men that can implement a policy of peace and stability and progress. I think we have the personnel in this department to do it. And when I say I want to institutionalize it, I don't mean lines on an organization chart. I mean a group of people that already exist, that work to the full extent of their capabilities, and this is why I sometimes drive them so hard.

MOYERS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.