

provision" making him dictator.

Romulo also missed the exciting developments in the provinces where farmers were suddenly finding spectacular success in organizing themselves and consolidating their position in the participatory democracy. The Reverend Bruno Hicks, the American Franciscan missionary expelled after the Marcos coup who had worked for years among the farmers of Central Philippines, said that the organized farmers were "delivering an impact on the political institutions" and that this was "democracy beginning to work."

So here we have two verdicts on the Philippines of 1972. Romulo, from his ivory tower, calls it an American-style democracy that failed to work. Father Hicks, who worked with the people, calls it Philippine democracy beginning to work.

Some shortsighted U.S. businessmen feel more comfortable with the Romulo verdict. Labeling Philippine democracy "American-style" was a handy excuse for crushing civil liberties and for reversing a certain nationalist trend which former U. S. Secretary of State William Rogers once hailed as healthy for a developing nation. Labor strikes have been banned, the labor movement has been emasculated, and, in order to provide the Marcos regime with the facade of a "quickie" prosperity, foreign investors are now invited to "write their own ticket." This means profits, and it is the language businessmen best understand.

Fortunately, an increasing number of Americans are beginning to appreciate the verdict of their fellow American, Father Hicks. Development without popular participation, plus the instability of a dictatorship without succession, adds up to an explosive condition that could suck the large American economic and military presence in the Philippines into another protracted debacle. All the eighty-one Roman Catholic bishops of the Philippines have openly demanded the end of martial law "to heal the wounds of the nation." Leaders of the important Protestant minority had de-

manded it even earlier. American leaders in Washington have begun to wonder aloud why American tax money should go in military aid to the Marcos repression.

A word about the author. Ms. Day is to be commended for allowing the publisher to reveal quite candidly that she had "first visited the Philippines in January 1973." For readers who may wonder how she could then speak with such authority on

the Philippines it is added that "she became fascinated with the story of Philippine democracy while interviewing President and Mrs. Marcos." Perhaps some day, when she will have learned more about Philippine democracy from sources other than those who conspired to shatter it, Ms. Day will lend her pleasant and readable style to a more authoritative book on the rebuilding of that democracy.

The United Nations and Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia

by Leonard T. Kapungu

(Lexington Books; 155 pp.; \$12.50)

Andrew Lukele

Prior to 1965 there was little interest in the affairs of Rhodesia. But in November of that year this dependent of Great Britain was dramatically thrust into the center of world attention when its white settler community, defying Britain, made a unilateral declaration of independence. The Rhodesian settlers, seeing that Britain was bowing to what one of her prime ministers had termed "the winds of change," were fearful that some aspects of Britain's new policy of decolonization might also be imposed upon Rhodesia. It was a move calculated to forestall African majority rule and to bring Rhodesia closer to neighboring South Africa in entrenching white privilege and dominance in Africa.

Unlike her practice in previous situations, Britain did not seek to suppress this rebellion by military intervention. Instead, she attempted to institute a series of economic sanctions against Rhodesia and, at a later stage, also called on the United Nations to establish a program of selected sanctions. The hope was that the sanctions would force the rebels to see the error of their ways and ultimately give up their rebellion.

It is now nearly a decade after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), and the Rhodesian rebel government has not been brought to a halt. The U.N. sanctions remain simply words, and this small country, now led by a minority representing less than 1/25 of the total population of four million, has succeeded in defying not only Britain but the United Nations as well.

Why did Britain not quell the rebellion in the manner to which she was accustomed? What prompted the U.N. to follow Britain's lead into an adventure so elaborate and futile? And finally, what enabled Rhodesia to withstand the economic sanctions and to continue in defiance and apparent prosperity? (The meaning of fast-breaking events of recent weeks, leading to tenuous discussions between the regime and its African opponents, is by no means clear as of this writing.)

These are some of the questions posed by Dr. Kapungu, a native of Rhodesia now with the United Nations. His answers are remarkably persuasive, especially in view of the modest length of the book. Many of the points Kapungu raises in response to these and other questions

can also be helpful in understanding why other United Nations resolutions for peace have not been translated into meaningful action.

Although the main task of this book is an appraisal of the U.N.'s economic sanctions against Rhodesia, the author discusses at length the role played by the British. Rhodesia was, after all, a dependent of Britain and therefore the latter's responsibility. The economic sanctions were introduced in the United Nations on behalf of Britain and were tailored to her specifications. Thus Kapungu's description of the British involvement also provides insight into the position of great powers in the U.N.

Britain's role in Rhodesia is filled with contradictions, intrigue, and duplicity. She authored the 1961 Constitution of Rhodesia which gave Africans fifteen seats in a Parliament of sixty-five seats—an obvious token representation, since Africans outnumbered Europeans twenty-five to one. But, in a previous constitutional provision, Britain reserved the right to intervene in Rhodesia's domestic affairs to protect the interests of the African majority. Yet when the white settlers launched UDI, Britain completely overlooked this constitutional right. Instead, she immediately announced that she would not under any circumstances intervene militarily in Rhodesia.

"Mr. Wilson [then Prime Minister]," writes the author, "had hoped that if he made it clear that the British government would not use military force against Rhodesia, the African Nationalists would decide to salvage the situation by participating in the Rhodesian Constitutional system." Britain was attempting to signal to the rebels that she would go easy with them and their illegal act while at the same time she was pressuring the Africans to abandon extraconstitutional modes of confrontation.

This inconsistency was also apparent in the attitudes Britain adopted during the U.N. debates on the question of whether or not the Rhodesian crisis amounted to a threat to international peace, warranting action by that body. Before UDI,

Britain had consistently disagreed with the contention of the Third World countries that such a threat did in fact exist. After UDI, however, she sought United Nations intervention, arguing that now such a situation was present. The fact is that conditions in 1966 were in no way different from those in 1961 when Britain bestowed on Rhodesia a constitution which guaranteed and encouraged domination by the white minority.

The situation had not changed, but Britain's attitude had. She now decided that it was time to call upon the U.N. and to assume a posture of opposition to the rebel government. In a strong indictment against Britain and the Western member states of the United Nations, Kapungu asks:

"But what had made the violations of human rights in Rhodesia a threat to international security in December, 1966 and not in November, 1965, when these Western member states both in the Security Council and the General Assembly joined Britain in rejecting the proposition that the situation in Rhodesia had become a threat to international peace? The Rhodesian laws that deprived the African people of their human rights in November, 1965 were the same laws, enforced with the same vigor, that deprived them of their rights in December, 1966."

The sanctions against Rhodesia also were designed in a manner to assure their ultimate failure. Britain had been threatening to establish sanctions a long time before she initiated their establishment. She had been broadcasting this threat even while she was arguing in the U.N. against the proposition that a threatening situation existed. As Kapungu points out, for economic sanctions to succeed it is essential that they be put into effect as immediately as possible so as to deprive the country in question of time to plan evading action. In the case of Rhodesia this element of surprise was completely lost.

Moreover, while Britain was making known her intentions, she had not made a thorough study of Rho-

desia's economy in order to determine what aspects of it would be most vulnerable to sanctions. As a result, Rhodesia, now forewarned, was able to set up adequate foiling strategies—diversify the economy; establish stronger economic ties with South Africa and Portugal; and strengthen political control in order to suppress internal dissension.

Britain met this high level of preparedness with economic sanctions which were hopelessly imperfect in design and carried out in a surprisingly perfunctory manner. At one instance, for example, the British stopped a tanker from docking in Beira to deposit oil destined for Rhodesia, but in a similar situation failed to stop another tanker in Lourenço Marques carrying Rhodesian-bound oil.

To view all this in terms of technical inefficiency and shoddiness is to miss the point altogether. Kapungu makes it clear that Britain was partially motivated by a desire not to endanger her relations with South Africa. What might be puzzling, however, is why Britain would construct a whole program of economic sanctions against Rhodesia and then feign surprise and even indignation when those sanctions were sabotaged by South Africa and Portugal. Britain's failure to devise a contingency plan against sabotage was, it is suggested, not adventitious but an essential part of a broader dynamics.

In order to gain a better understanding of Britain's apparent ambivalence in the Rhodesian situation one must also examine the background of her colonial policy and practice. Having only recently carried out decolonization, Britain could hardly afford to confront the newly independent African states who were to be her "partners in development" with an endorsement of Rhodesia's white rebels. To do so would reveal the hollowness of those partnerships and undermine the confidence of her former African colonies.

But neither could Britain treat the white rebels too severely, lest she estrange South Africa and Portugal.

Besides, a government which dealt too harshly with what Prime Minister Wilson had termed "our kith and kin in Rhodesia" could hardly expect to fare well in British elections. This is the impasse in which Britain found itself and which it sought to solve by playing both ends against the middle.

Britain also feared, Kapungu notes, that if it did not enter the Rhodesian scene the Communists would. Britain sought to preempt the field, thus following a pattern created by many of the Great Powers, who frequently find it necessary to infringe on the rights of Third World countries and peoples in order to prevent the spread of communism.

But why did the U.N. agree to play Britain's game? Kapungu observes that "one of the major weaknesses of economic sanctions against Rhodesia is that they were principally British sanctions and never at any point became United Nations sanctions. . . . They were an instrument of an attempt to effect an aspect of the foreign policy of a member state."

The United Nations reduced itself to being simply a tool for Britain's foreign policy. Kapungu writes: "The United Nations is not a supranational organization. Although it is a decision-making body, it is without independent means of enforcing its decisions." Lacking executory power of its own, the United Nations must depend upon those of its member states who do have resources, namely, the major powers. The U.N.'s handmaiden role is, therefore, not a matter of design (philosophical), it is a function of practice and reality—the reality of power. This basic condition more than any other explains why Great Britain was able to take the U.N. in tow in the case of Rhodesia.

In general, the U.N. has never been eager to understand or to cooperate with national liberation movements. The late Amílcar Cabral, leader of the liberation movement in Guinea-Bissau, said of the U.N.: "that organization has shown itself incapable of resolving disputes

between colonized peoples and the colonial powers." Others have expressed the same point of view.

The United Nations' attitude toward movements of liberation in the Third World, if not hostile, has been at best one of aloofness. The U.N. is an organization of existing states. In theory, if not in practice, the U.N. does not concern itself with how a state came into being before it is granted membership. But the United Nations is also committed to world peace. That would be taken by some to mean that the U.N. must therefore be opposed to revolution, and yet revolution is still the means through which new states and new societies come into being.

This book deals essentially with three large themes in the international order: the United Nations; the role of the Great Powers in it as exemplified by Britain; and the place of the national liberation movements in an international context. Kapungu has succeeded in knitting these themes together in an able manner. Political scientists and others involved in movements of liberation will profit immensely from his efforts.

The Germans by Erich Kahler

(Princeton University Press; 305 pp; \$13.50)

Hitler by Joachim C. Fest

(Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich; 844 pp.; \$15.00)

Robin W. Winks

One generation learns at its parents' knees what it initially believes to be true about the events those parents lived through, and that generation of children, grown to adulthood, then find they require a new examination of the tales as told by their

parents. There are two very sound reasons for this: We must learn the past in the context of the present, and we must gain freedom from the parents. These two needs have little to do with that part of history that may be true and everything to do with that part of history that is felt. There was a time not long ago when a college teacher could easily enough identify those in his class who came from parents who had themselves experienced the Great Depression as comparatively young people. The parental view, and the consequent children's view, differed subtly from the view held by students whose parents had been at middle-age in the Depression.

This generational need helps to explain the recent resurgence of interest in Adolph Hitler. Other explanations come to mind as well, of course: the simple distance from the subject that makes it possible to speak in flat tones of monstrous events; the rise of a new generation of German scholars and writers who were not participants in the holocaust; even the ever recurrent concerns of the world with the fate of the Jews, with Israel, or with a sudden memory of just how much of the present world dates explicitly from the world that Hitler made. Perhaps the new anarchy and terrorism have also driven people back to look at the Great Terrorist himself.

There has also been a renewal of interest in the idea of a "national character." Presidents declare what they believe "the American people" will stand for in the context of their reading of the American national character. Social scientists investigate highly complex ranges of transaction between a variety of integrative processes in order to arrive at conclusions that—although the terminology is not used—look suspiciously like descriptions of national characters. To speak of national character was once quite acceptable; the ideology of Hitler and his party helped throw such phraseology into ill-repute. Now some fear to return to the concept lest they be called Nazi, while others happily seek again for the roots of national character.