

Besides, a government which dealt too harshly with what Prime Minister Wilson had termed "our kith and kin in Rhodesia" could hardly expect to fare well in British elections. This is the impasse in which Britain found itself and which it sought to solve by playing both ends against the middle.

Britain also feared, Kapungu notes, that if it did not enter the Rhodesian scene the Communists would. Britain sought to preempt the field, thus following a pattern created by many of the Great Powers, who frequently find it necessary to infringe on the rights of Third World countries and peoples in order to prevent the spread of communism.

But why did the U.N. agree to play Britain's game? Kapungu observes that "one of the major weaknesses of economic sanctions against Rhodesia is that they were principally British sanctions and never at any point became United Nations sanctions. . . . They were an instrument of an attempt to effect an aspect of the foreign policy of a member state."

The United Nations reduced itself to being simply a tool for Britain's foreign policy. Kapungu writes: "The United Nations is not a supranational organization. Although it is a decision-making body, it is without independent means of enforcing its decisions." Lacking executory power of its own, the United Nations must depend upon those of its member states who do have resources, namely, the major powers. The U.N.'s handmaiden role is, therefore, not a matter of design (philosophical), it is a function of practice and reality—the reality of power. This basic condition more than any other explains why Great Britain was able to take the U.N. in tow in the case of Rhodesia.

In general, the U.N. has never been eager to understand or to cooperate with national liberation movements. The late Amilcar Cabral, leader of the liberation movement in Guinea-Bissau, said of the U.N.: "that organization has shown itself incapable of resolving disputes

between colonized peoples and the colonial powers." Others have expressed the same point of view.

The United Nations' attitude toward movements of liberation in the Third World, if not hostile, has been at best one of aloofness. The U.N. is an organization of existing states. In theory, if not in practice, the U.N. does not concern itself with how a state came into being before it is granted membership. But the United Nations is also committed to world peace. That would be taken by some to mean that the U.N. must therefore be opposed to revolution, and yet revolution is still the means through which new states and new societies come into being.

This book deals essentially with three large themes in the international order: the United Nations; the role of the Great Powers in it as exemplified by Britain; and the place of the national liberation movements in an international context. Kapungu has succeeded in knitting these themes together in an able manner. Political scientists and others involved in movements of liberation will profit immensely from his efforts.

The Germans by Erich Kahler

(Princeton University Press; 305 pp.; \$13.50)

Hitler by Joachim C. Fest

(Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich; 844 pp.; \$15.00)

Robin W. Winks

One generation learns at its parents' knees what it initially believes to be true about the events those parents lived through, and that generation of children, grown to adulthood, then find they require a new examination of the tales as told by their

parents. There are two very sound reasons for this: We must learn the past in the context of the present, and we must gain freedom from the parents. These two needs have little to do with that part of history that may be true and everything to do with that part of history that is felt. There was a time not long ago when a college teacher could easily enough identify those in his class who came from parents who had themselves experienced the Great Depression as comparatively young people. The parental view, and the consequent children's view, differed subtly from the view held by students whose parents had been at middle-age in the Depression.

This generational need helps to explain the recent resurgence of interest in Adolph Hitler. Other explanations come to mind as well, of course: the simple distance from the subject that makes it possible to speak in flat tones of monstrous events; the rise of a new generation of German scholars and writers who were not participants in the holocaust; even the ever recurrent concerns of the world with the fate of the Jews, with Israel, or with a sudden memory of just how much of the present world dates explicitly from the world that Hitler made. Perhaps the new anarchy and terrorism have also driven people back to look at the Great Terrorist himself.

There has also been a renewal of interest in the idea of a "national character." Presidents declare what they believe "the American people" will stand for in the context of their reading of the American national character. Social scientists investigate highly complex ranges of transaction between a variety of integrative processes in order to arrive at conclusions that—although the terminology is not used—look suspiciously like descriptions of national characters. To speak of national character was once quite acceptable; the ideology of Hitler and his party helped throw such phraseology into ill-repute. Now some fear to return to the concept lest they be called Nazi, while others happily seek again for the roots of national character.

As a result, historians are again using sweeping phrases that incorporate virtually all things and everyone. One such flypaper is "the modern soul," which we all either have or, not having, stand in violation of; we are all insiders or outsiders, inner-directed or outer-directed; we all either live in "depersonalized technological societies" or in "lesser developed nations"; in the one we are unhappy and beset by terrorists because of depersonalization, while in the other we are unhappy and beset by terrorists because of hunger, or Savak, or Boss, or wheat prices. A moral judgment—that the soul may be "modern"—thus becomes a value-laden remark resonating with policy implications.

This leaves the general reader, and indeed the general historian, unclear as to the kinds of judgments he might legitimately render when reading a book such as Erich Kahler's *The Germans*. Originally written as a series of lectures and delivered at Cornell University in the early 1950's, and then given again for Manchester, this material has clearly been presented with the intelligent, nonspecialist reader in mind. Very ably edited by Robert and Rita Kimber after Kahler's death, the book may just possibly be the best short history of Germany now available in English. It may also irritate the generation of historians just past, for it is full of part-titles like "The Modern Age," and it roots out evidence on how the German national character reveals itself in the German economy, or intellectual life, or in the nature of the cities. It concludes with two chapters on the Nazi assumption of power and the literature of nihilism which, Kahler argues, provides the underpinnings of Nazi anti-intellectualism.

This approach makes for an unconventional distribution of space. Ernst Jünger, and especially *On the Marble Cliffs*, gets six crystal-clear paragraphs, while the whole of World War I gets seventeen paragraphs, not all of them without internal ambivalences and equivocations. The conclusion is nonetheless a chilling one:

"If Germany's political evolution had been different; if she had undergone the same kind of organic growth that England and France had experienced, if she had acquired some kind of national existence early in her development, then she might not have been doomed to play the role she has played in the history of the West. But the fact that she never did achieve nationhood constitutes her uniqueness among the major powers of modern Europe. She is unique precisely because she continued to lead a divided, splintered existence long after the other countries of Europe had become coherent national units. . . . City stood against country, aristocracy against middle class, power against intellect. Because these forces could never coalesce, the only national existence Germany ever did achieve was the purely intellectual one of German Classicism. Unfortunately, the national impulse that emerged from that intellectual achievement quickly degenerated into jingoism that characterized nineteenth-century political life in Germany. Once again power and intellect, body and spirit went their separate ways. But this time political power, coupled with the massive physical power of industrialization, gradually destroyed the one Germany of which all Germans could be justly proud. What remained was the military technocracy that Ernst Jünger's 'second and colder consciousness' perceived with such terrifying clarity."

Anyone who has read *Zauberberg* will find Hans Castrop and Settembrini in the above paragraph with little difficulty. It is magnificent historian's rhetoric, and it just may be true. But one fears that the author may, in bringing the *deus ex machina* of the "physical power of industrialization" onstage in this manner, in his far-reaching generalizations, in his failure to recognize that if the names of the players were changed his paragraph might well apply to a variety of other countries (try Argentina), the very sweep of his attempt at judgment, summary, and benediction may prove irrevocably his major point. One almost

wants to say that he is "thinking like a German"—in categories. In fine, the book is an excellent one for proving its own thesis. It is, as I have said, quite possibly the most readable, indeed the best, short history of Germany; it may also be the most self-fulfilling.

What kind of national character, then, produced Adolph Hitler? As it turns out, Joachim C. Fest, in his massive biography *Hitler*, cites identical causes for the rise of Nazism without seeing these causes embedded in a national character. A warped, sometimes brilliant man, Hitler is here seen neither solely as the expression of a "second and colder consciousness" in the German psyche nor as the product of a string of accidents. Rather, he is one of a limited number of possible responses the Germans could have given at a time when the social order was shaken to its foundations. That they gave the particular response they did may be explained by Kahler; that Hitler acted upon that response in the particular way he did must nonetheless be explained by the minute details amassed by Fest.

In truth it is explained more by the minute detail than by Hitler's personality, for Fest finds Hitler to be an "unperson," a man of such little interest in his character, mind, or soul (if one permits such a word) as to have driven otherwise sensible scholars into worrying about whether he had his full complement of testicles or not. Certainly there should be no need for another biography until the next generation demands it, for there is more than enough material here to "explain" Hitler, Nazism, and modern Germany.

Alan Bullock's *Hitler, A Study in Tyranny*, especially as revised in 1962, remains the more readable and consistently compelling book. But Fest's has a great deal of material that has not generally appeared in English before, especially on Hitler's accomplishments on behalf of Germany prior to 1937. (I have not read the original, which has been extremely successful in Germany, but the translation by Richard and Clara

Winston appears to be very good indeed.) The book is well researched, and as a journalist Fest has proven, as William L. Shirer did not, that "academically acceptable" history, imagination, and interpretive sweep may all come from the hands of one who conceives of audience as mass, as at the other end of a radio set or television tube, or as other than a captive group within the classroom. The book is very good, and despite its length it seldom wearies the reader; it is balanced, stern, and yet absorbing.

For all the difference in approach between Messrs. Kahler and Fest, the latter does arrive at the former's conclusion:

"Hitler had no secret that extended beyond his immediate presence. The people whose loyalty and admiration he had won never followed a vision, but only a force. In retrospect his life seems like a steady unfolding of tremendous energy. Its effects were vast, the terror it spread enormous; but when it was over there was little left for memory to hold."

Little left of Hitler's life perhaps, but a powerful memory has been left for many of us to hold, a memory that some will take to be a clear expression of the German "national character." One hopes for a better answer.

CONTRIBUTORS

RAUL S. MANGLAPUS is a former Foreign Secretary and Senator of the Philippines, leader of the Progressives in the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and now Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in New York.

ANDREW LUKELE teaches in the Department of Political Science at Livingston College, Rutgers University.

ROBIN W. WINKS, Professor of History at Yale, has written and edited many books, among them *The Age of Imperialism* and *The Historian as Detective*.

Briefly Noted

The Long Dark Night of the Soul

by Sandy Vogelgesang
(Harper & Row; 249 pp.; \$8.95)

Mixed in with the confrontations, heroics, and occasional heroism of the intellectuals' protest against the Vietnam war were some pretty stupid things said about America, about power, and, most particularly, about American power. Sandy Vogelgesang has catalogued many of them in this polemic against intellectuals who, she says, value moral purity above political effect. She makes no secret of her admiration for Henry Kissinger, for whom she also works at the State Department, as the model of intellectual engagement in public policy. Although the author tends to take the madness of the intelligentsia more seriously than the madresses that drove Left intellectuals to distraction, the book is nonetheless a useful reminder of the restraints that are needed if, in more normal times than the sixties, power is to be legitimated by wisdom.

A Black Political Theology

by J. Deotis Roberts
(Westminster; 238 pp.; \$3.95 [paper])

A fresh and unusually careful statement of the theological significance of what is distinctive to the black American experience. While concerned for intellectual integrity, Roberts does theology in accountability to the believing community. Those who look for a political program will be disappointed, but the author does set forth with rare persuasiveness the presuppositions and goals of political engagement that is religiously serious in intent. A stated purpose of the book is to break black theology out of its exclusivism and thus challenge the whole Christian community to come to terms with the black perception of God's workings. In this the author succeeds admirably.

The Broken Covenant

by Robert Bellah

(Seabury; 172 pp.; \$7.95)

Following through on his 1967 essay that provoked a new discussion of "American civil religion," sociologist Bellah here traces historically the ways in which Americans have envisioned, and frequently apotheosized, their social experiment. Many historians noted that Bellah's "discovery" of civil religion some years ago revealed a certain naiveté about the history of American self-consciousness. This book may be viewed as a response to that criticism, offering in addition a spirited appeal for the recovery of a covenantal awareness of American life. Neither the historical material nor the analysis is new, but for many unfamiliar with the religious roots of the ways in which American has been defined it will be a readily accessible introduction to a discussion that, one hopes, will become livelier in the years immediately ahead.

Trumpeter of God: A Biography of John Knox

by W. Stanford Reid
(Scribners; 352 pp.; \$12.50)

Reid, a Canadian historian, offers a sympathetic, carefully researched, and occasionally fetching account of the life of the sixteenth-century Scottish reformer. Knox has never come across as a very winsome figure, but Reid insists that the rigor and extremism with which he is frequently associated must be understood in the context of the times and temper of a Scotland largely unacquainted with our notions of civility. A strength of the book is its emphasis upon Knox's influence in the English and Continental reformations and upon his contributions to the theory and practice of resistance to illegitimate authority. It is a worthy retelling of an important part of our religious, cultural, and political history. In sometimes surprising ways Knox's trumpet notes still reverberate through our presumably secularized society.

In Cuba by Ernesto Cardenal

(New Directions; 340 pp.; \$10.50/
\$3.95)

Inside Cuba by Joe Nicholson, Jr.

(Sheed & Ward; 235 pp.; \$8.95)

Two accounts of brief visits to Cuba, neither of them very interesting, but together constituting a rather instructive package. Cardenal is a Nicaraguan priest, poet, and avowed "Marxist revolutionary" (the book is a translation from the Spanish); Nicholson is an investigative reporter for the *New York Post*. Cardenal went to Cuba with the pious attitude of a pilgrim; Nicholson went out of his way to ask hard questions and look at disagreeable facts; both talked to spokesmen for the regime as well as opponents. Nevertheless, the pictures emerging from both accounts are quite congruent: a country in which a lot has been done for the poor; an economy that is struggling with immense problems but is making headway; general acceptance of and widespread enthusiasm for the regime; despite this, a pervasive presence by the organs of repression, at times acting with brutality.

Jonathan Edwards: Theologian of the Heart by Harold Simonson

(Eerdmans; 174 pp.; \$6.50)

A well-informed and extremely sympathetic study with the focus on the personal piety of Jonathan Edwards, perhaps America's greatest religious thinker. For those unfamiliar with Edwards, except for his oft-quoted misunderstood sermon, "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," the book can be recommended as an introduction. Students of Edwards will be interested in Simonson's critique of people such as Perry Miller, who, he believes, refused to understand Edwards from the inside of his own religious experience, so to speak. Simonson particularly admires Ed-

wards's courage in contending against the tide of liberalism that so enervated Christian distinctiveness and confidence. Yet it is to be feared that Simonson's own celebration of "self-authenticating religious experience" will play into the hands of the pervasive subjectivism which is among the more noxious forces in our own culture. By so relentlessly setting grace against nature, reason against experience, and head against heart Simonson's picture of Edwards fails to capture precisely the *thinker* whose wisdom is so sorely needed in the present unhappy state of the American ethos. Nonetheless, a fine book that deserves to be widely read. Simonson is professor of English at the University of Washington in Seattle and has edited a collection of Jonathan Edwards's writings.

Man by Jürgen Moltmann

(Fortress; 124 pp.; \$3.25 [paper])

Moltmann, one of the most important theologians of our day, addresses himself to one of the oldest questions in theology and every other field of disciplined reflection: What is man? Rejecting the nineteenth-century doctrine associated with Feuerbach, that God is the highest projection of man, Moltmann insists that an adequate anthropology must begin with "God as the criticism of man." Part of a "themes in theology" series published in Germany, this little book deserves a place on any shelf of contemporary religious thought.

Correspondence

(from p. 2)

regain their rights and responsibilities as citizens. Properly interpreted, it could be a real force for national reconciliation.

Instead, the spirit in which it was presented was, at points, punitive and vindictive; until recently, al-

most no attempt has been made to present the principled argument that can and should be made for the policy; and there have been no clear and reasonable guidelines for the alternative service requirements.

On the other hand, opponents of conditional amnesty have done their share to assure the program's failure. Those opposed to any kind of amnesty will, of course, be happy to see the program fail; they will have won the argument by default. Those who will accept nothing less than unconditional amnesty may also see in the program's failure a victory for their cause. They seem primarily interested in making a point about the evil of the draft, the Vietnam war and/or American society in general. In a sense, the exiles are being held hostage to the views of active minorities committed not primarily to amnesty but to the vindication of their own ideological positions.

We've come a long way from the time when any sort of amnesty was officially unthinkable. Unless the program is extended and improved, and unless an effort is made to present the principled argument that can and should be made for conditional amnesty, we may well end up back at the starting point with little to show for the experience.

Eugene Mihaly
*Chairman, Issues Center
for a World Without War, Inc.
Berkeley, Calif.*

Correction (with apologies to Derr, Augustine, St. Thomas, and a host of moderns):

Cremlins struck at just one letter in Thomas Derr's "Religion's Responsibility for the Ecological Crisis" (*Worldview*, January), but thereby changed the meaning of the sentence. The sentence correctly reads: "Clacken patiently documents a continuing strand of thought, including St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and a host of moderns, protesting the 'crude utilitarianism' which says nature exists *only* for man's use."