The Modern World System
by Immanuel Wallerstein
(Academic Press; 416 pp.; $16.50)

Martin Green

This book seems already to have made its mark—very deservedly—so I shall not spend much of my time expounding its merits, but pass on to characterize and criticize it. I shall just associate myself with the general praise for its breadth of scope, depth of knowledge, size of concepts, and, above all, its suggestive combination of political with economic and sociological material. And I should, for the sake of those who have not heard of it, summarize before I begin to criticize.

The modern world system, whose establishment is the subject of this book, can be characterized by its difference from empire. Empires had been a feature of the world scene throughout its history; their economic strength lay in their monopolies of trade and their inward flow of tribute and taxation; their weakness lay in their bureaucracies, which absorbed so much of these profits. The world system by which Europe came to dominate the modern world made its surplus appropriation by other means, for which three preconditions were necessary: a huge geographical expansion, new forms of labor control, and strong state systems in the core countries. Wallerstein invites us to watch the establishment of these conditions during the sixteenth century.

The first of these is quite familiar. But Wallerstein argues that besides mere expansion this was a construction, dividing the world up into zones of unequal development. The main zones he names are the core (the countries of northwest Europe), the semiperiphery (the countries of southern Europe), and the periphery (eastern Europe and the Americas). Beyond the...
periphery lay those countries with which Europe traded sometimes substantially but never "systematically" in this sense of system. Each zone had its typical form of labor control. There were slaves (working in sugar and mining) in the periphery states; sharecroppers and serfs (working on large agricultural domains) at the semiperiphery; and at the core self-employed yeomen and artisans. There at the core towns flourished, industries were born, merchants rose to power, work became specialized. The third, political, condition also corresponded in distribution to the zones, for it was only in the core states that the state machinery became strong and intervened in economic affairs. The ceremonial of the court and the doctrine of the divine right of kings were symbols of this power. At the periphery, and to a less extent the semiperiphery, state power was weak, so that the nobles were often semi-independent.

What happened in the sixteenth century was the failure of empire, in the form of Charles V's kingdoms of Spain and Austria—the Emperor abdicated in 1556 amid the tears of his imperial knights—and the rise of Amsterdam and London to replace Seville as the capitals of the new prosperity. The core states of the new world system were not politically united. But they were intertwined in economic and military tension as they competed against each other for the priority in exploiting the periphery. They structured the world to their joint advantage. Industry became concentrated in northwest Europe, and its previous centers within Charles V's empire (the cities of southern Germany and northern Italy) fell into the comparative decadence of the semiperiphery. England, which had been a colony of Europe during the Middle Ages, became dominant within the world system. The gentry, the owners of untainted land producing for the market, became its ruling class politically, and the city of London, dominated by its merchants, shaped the whole country to its pattern.

Of the many ideological implications of this scheme, perhaps the most important is that most social systems, including tribes, communities, and even nation-states, are really only parts of some world system. Much political analysis goes wrong by treating them as absolutes. Readers of Wallerstein's earlier books, those about modern Africa and those about the student revolts of the 1960's, will recognize in this idea his characteristic preoccupations. Despite some "radical" convictions, his is a very synoptic and in some ways conservative mind, more akin to Max Weber than to Marx. He takes into account every kind of fact, and builds a system of explanation so very large and complex that it repels all hope of revolution and all large-scale change.

But in another way this book is strikingly unlike those earlier books of his. It is, in its every aspect, a piece of echt deutsch scholarship. The footnotes often cover half the page, and must do so, because Wallerstein is re-conciling the views of all the most recent and impressive scholars. French, German, Spanish, and Portuguese authorities on history, economics, sociology, and whatever jostle each other on the page. And if this method reminds one of the great nineteenth-century Germans, so does the anti-ideological demaskierende bias.

When Wallerstein considers the suggestion that people's Christian beliefs explain their behavior, he decides "history has seen passion turn to cynicism too often for one not to be suspicious of invoking such belief systems as primary factors in explaining...social action." One can detect a touch of exaggeration there, an anti-ideological bias in favor of "realism." It is even more evident in his discussion of the trade between Europe and Islam, which seemed to be mostly for luxuries. Wallerstein is clearly uneasy with the idea of such a superficial motive having such profound effects. "In the long run, staples account for more of man's economic thrusts than luxuries. What western Europe needed in the 14th and 15th centuries was food (more calories and a better distribution of food values) and fuel." That "in the long run" sounds very like a man returning to what he feels must be true despite the evidence for an opposite view. And to accredit motives in terms of what men need (even as measured in terms they know nothing of) rather than what they want—surely that is to make an ideology out of anti-ideology.

But such objections to the argument count for nothing against my enthusiasm for it. And since I am not a scholar in any of the disciplines it deals in, perhaps I can best pay my tribute by "applying" its thesis to the field I am most familiar with, literature. It seems to me very likely that the shift from empire to the modern world system is illustrated in the field of fiction by the shift from the chivalric romances, like Amadis de Gaul and Palmerin of England, to the beginnings of modern fiction in Defoe. Cortés and his Conquistadores, who headed that geographical expansion of Europe from which all else followed, were both devoted to Empire and Emperor, and enthusiastic readers of the romances. Those books had shaped the imaginations of the Spanish knights who fought in the Reconquista of Spain from the Moors; and when that cause triumphed with the fall of Granada in 1492, they turned to similar adventures in the Americas. Those romances were of course fantastic in their mode, and the style they induced in their devotees was exaggeratedly chivalric; the king of Spain had to issue edicts against them and forbid their introduction into the American colonies.

Defoe clearly starts, in books like Robinson Crusoe and Captain Singleton and A General History of the Pirates, from the soberly useful collected voyages, compiled to help English merchants plan their expeditions and calculate their expenditures. They did of course create images of valor and success, but of the most practical kind, full of geographical and navigational and economic and military facts and figures. The voyages of Hakluyt and Purchas were translated by Defoe into a literary form that was the natural aesthetic expression of the modern world system—and the form out of which, by general agreement, the rest of modern fiction has come. Instead of the poetry of fantasy, the poetry of fact became dominant.

One could apply Wallerstein's thesis...
with equal fruit to the phenomenon of Kipling—the overexcited celebration of the English ruling class induced by Britain's having become an empire (after the Indian Mutiny), an excitement that so soon brought on reaction and ridicule just because it was a betrayal of the deeper truths of the modern world system. But this is enough to show how endlessly suggestive is Wallerstein's thesis and how much to be recommended his book.

Religious Movements in Contemporary America
edited by Irving I. Zaretsky and Mark P. Leone
(Princeton University Press: 838 pp.; $25.00)

Martin E. Marty

Two worlds, both unfamiliar to most of us in America, are opened for readers of this two-pound book. The first is the world of marginal religions; the second, the cosmos inhabited by anthropologists. Excellent bibliographies and careful editing make this a most valuable reference work. I picture that for a generation to come some of its chapters will be the main point of access to the separate cults or movements that are studied. While it is true that different methods are employed and different aspects of religion attract the various scholars' eyes, a distinctive plot emerges.

John Wilson properly points out that the marginal religions, those that are nowhere near the putative "mainstream," have not received their due by the historians. In one sense this is not true. In recent years much more notice has been given Mormonism, Christian Science, Pentecostalism, and the like than has been shown Methodism or other mainline denominations. The more withdrawn or exotic churches inspire curiosity, while the standard brands and garden variety types are so familiar they blend into the landscape.

The curiosity extended the marginal groups by scholars and the book-buying public, however, has been selective and unsustained. In this sense Wilson is correct. The story of these groups has not yet been successfully integrated into the whole plot of American religiosity. Could it be, ask many of the contributors to this volume, that there is no such thing as "normative" religion, over against which the marginal groups are measured negatively? Could it also be that in their splendid varieties they offer people many of the same things that Catholicism, Judaism, and the statistically predominant forms of Protestantism do?

Could it even be that in certain periods of crisis and stress they offer more and better boons and bounties than do the domesticated and accommodated familiar religions? Yes, it could be. After a generation of studies like this one edited by Zaretsky and Leone, it should be possible to see parallels, complementarities, and overappings between what once was regarded as mainline and what once was regarded as marginal.

For the moment, though, let the cults and sects themselves have their moment in the sun. They have attracted attention in the mass media: We have seen cover stories about "Occult Explosions," Jesus People, Pentecostalism, and the like. Eastern religious emphases have made their way into taken-for-granted places of repose in the culture, far from the days when only San Francisco beatniks embraced them. They are not likely to prevail, but they are establishing themselves on cultic lines and supplying many of the biblical religious

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