

The Portuguese Revolution

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In the final years of Portugal's old regime much of the non-Communist opposition came to equate the idea of anti-Communism with cold warriorism. The Soviet Union and the people's democracies tended to be seen as generally progressive forces. The chief enemy of the world's oppressed peoples was American imperialism. The United States, the land of napalm and the CIA, was seen to be the paramount exploiter of the suffering Third World—a view not incompatible with the Old Right's vision of the U.S. as the home of moneygrubbing Calvinist gumchewers.

The non-Communist left had not forgotten the events of Prague and Budapest, Sino-Soviet squabbles, and the ghost of Trotsky—which was why it was non-Communist—but many of the educated young and some older intellectuals revered Lenin, Mao, Che, Castro, and Ho as what we would call liberals with guts. Anti-Communism and the defense of the Occident were causes the rulers of Portugal endlessly invoked to justify their colonial wars and domestic repression.

The Portuguese Communists had earned the respect of the rest of the opposition by courage and perseverance. Ten years ago an anti-Communist member of the democratic opposition admitted to believing that the Communist Party was the only available organized means of striking back at an unjust government; the ambiguous feelings he expressed about the Communists in a "Letter From Lisbon" in *The New Leader* in November, 1965, are an insight into attitudes prevalent at the time of the revolution in April, 1974.

Those of us who fear their intolerance, their habit of seeing things in black and white, their inhuman simplicity, and who know that were they to achieve power all this would turn into a supposedly virtuous ruthlessness, nevertheless feel helpless. One cannot

reply to tortures with arguments. If the man standing in front of you has been beaten unconscious dozens of times, has lost five years of his life in a dark cell, has no wife, children or friends, has lived under 10 false names in as many years and been able to go into the street only at night or at dawn—what can you say to him? For him, and for many others like him, right is measured by the amount of suffering each one accepts, nothing else. The very fact that the regime tolerates our existence, that we lead almost normal lives, is proof to our Communist friends that we are opportunists.

There was a proliferation of Marxist grouplets in Portugal after May, 1968, manifestations in France. While some developed effective underground resistance groups, none had as broad a base as the mainstream Communist Party, which had the benefit of outside support. Portuguese opinion, always susceptible to the intellectual climate in France, was further influenced in the direction of anti-anti-Communism by the electoral alliance between French Communists and Socialists.

These matters, of course, were mainly the concern of educated élites. Many disliked the old regime because of its fascist affiliations, favoritism, class biases, and colonial wars. The government abetted the alienation of the educated young by a penchant for red tape, stuffiness, and geriatric leadership—peculiarities interpreted by an urban public, familiar with how things were done in the rest of Western Europe, as marks of Portuguese backwardness. There was a tendency to blame the government for anything wrong in the country.

Such attitudes penetrated the armed forces. The officer corps, upon which the regime depended, had at no time been a hundred per cent behind it. The chief opposition candidates for President of the Republic had been General Norton de Matos, Admiral Quintão de Meireles, and General Umberto Delgado, who was

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later killed by the political police. Over the years there had been a variety of unsuccessful military plots against both Salazar and Caetano.

On the other hand, most of the regular officers in recent years were not politically oriented. When delegates of the semiclandestine Armed Forces Movement (MFA), which later brought off the coup, at one point took a vote for a general to be designated their chief, Costa Gomes—now President—came in first, Spínola was second, and Kaulza de Arriaga—a reactionary by any standard—was in third place. This is not surprising when it is recalled that the MFA originally had been organized on the basis of professional grievances. Many participants had been apolitical, although key leaders had ideological intentions from the start. The publication of Spínola's book and the dismissal of Spínola and Costa Gomes from their commands was a windfall that allowed them to move with the widest possible support.

Poorly paid career officers almost without exception served long years in Africa, usually in places where the positive results of Portugal's five centuries-old civilizing mission were less than inspirational. Among their comrades were conscripted university graduates, the social group least enthusiastic about saving Africa from the Africans. The conscripts, a cross section of their age group, naturally included clandestine radicals. As might be expected, it is frequently claimed there were card-carrying Communists among leaders of the MFA. Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves is alleged to have been one such—card No. 1062—by Robert Moss writing in *National Review* this past April. Gonçalves declined in a recent newspaper interview to say whether he had been or is a Communist on the ground that the officers who made the revolution had promised not to discuss their political affiliations.



It is not necessary for there to be ex- or crypto-Communists in high places to explain sympathy for the Portuguese Communist Party among the leadership of the MFA. The more intellectual officers had been subject to many of the same influences as other educated Portuguese. Geographically and socially isolated in Africa, they remained part of the same community of ideas and attitudes, but in Africa there was time for serious reading and conversation with the occasional kindred spirit.

Salazar and Caetano's censorship had banned some

radical literature, but works on economic development available in Lisbon bookshops often reflected what might be called Third World radicalism. Serious books and periodicals on political affairs sponsored by the regime were scorned by Portuguese intellectuals. By and large, writers sympathetic to the regime were neither the best nor the brightest.

Opposition periodicals addressed to intellectuals seldom mentioned Portuguese Africa, but could print articles by Wilfred Burchett criticizing the U.S. role in Vietnam and could conduct polemics about the thought of Marcuse or young Marx's humanism. Nine thousand copies of *Socialism and the Future of the Peninsula* by an eminent historian, Magalhães Godinho, were printed in 1969. Although Godinho advocated democratic socialism, he believed the Communist bloc had demonstrated that socialist organization was the most effective means of modernizing backward societies. Many Portuguese intellectuals tended to find answers to what was wrong with their country in the machinations of international finance capital and underdeveloped Portugal's handful of overdeveloped conglomerates.

Bright officers in Africa certainly had reason to be concerned about the Third World. Some may have been turned leftward by the ideology of their adversaries, others by their own administrative duties and overseas experiences. An interesting case is Brigadier Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, head of the MFA's security force, or political police, and one of the most outspoken among the authoritarian radical officers.

While a captain in Guinea Carvalho had been an aide of Spínola, with whom—according both to his own and other testimony—he was not at ease. Evidently his revolutionary consciousness had been raised by engaging in psychosocial warfare and translating the General's sociopolitical philosophy for visiting journalists. This very model of a modern military militant explained to an interviewer last winter how he hoped to continue in Portugal the good work he had been doing in Guinea.

Our intention now is to free the men from the barracks and place them in direct contact with the people, so the phrase "communion of the Armed Forces with the people" may become an effective reality, so we may do here the extraordinary work we did overseas for thirteen years on behalf of the native populations. The action undertaken by the Armed Forces in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea, from 1961 to 1973, in fact was extraordinary. In the latter, for example, in the period from 1968 to 1973, the work done was truly gigantic. It is enough to say that in '68 Guinea had sixty kilometers of tarred roads and in 1973, five years later, there were 550 kilometers. All this was possible through the combined action of the Department of Public Works, contracted technical specialists, and the army, with planning by military engineers and construction by the soldiers. Our achievement

overseas had the aspect of cyclopean development. It is what we want to do now in the Metropole where large zones of underdevelopment still exist which we can help to develop, utilizing armed forces personnel in opening roads, in effective sanitary welfare, cultural welfare, etc. There really are an elevated number of activities to which the Armed Forces can dedicate themselves in order to bring about a real communion between the Armed Forces and the people (*Cinco Meses Mudaram Portugal*, by Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho).

Not all of Portugal's best and brightest leaned toward Marxism or Leninism before the coup. An important group had hoped to spur economic development and social welfare in order to bring Portugal in line with democracy as practiced in Western Europe. Representing the aspirations of many Portuguese, this group included genuine democrats and democratic socialists at one end and Spínola, Caetano, and certain business elements at the other. Caetano had hoped to manage an opening to a left of liberalizing technocrats, but his power base included an ultraconservative bloc that checked moves in that direction.

Salazar had emerged from the Catholic intelligentsia, but, although most of the hierarchy and laity remained conservative after the Second World War, many idealistic activists associated with the Church began to drift leftward. Portugal before the coup was a society whose politically conscious classes were moving to the left. The colonial war had accelerated the process, as did the international climate of opinion. Events in Chile convinced moderates that the cold war mentality had indeed distorted much that was positive in the Communist bloc and the Third World while idealizing the cause of the West.

An early clue to the perspective of the men who engineered the coup was the rather elegant protest song broadcast to signal its start. The provisional government initially established by the revolutionaries was a fragile coalition of coalitions. The MFA itself was a coalition evolving in directions toward which its most effective members were moving it. Its Manifesto published in April, 1974, was an ambiguous document, whose first line ended in a phrase suggestive of the old regime's boast that the Africans were Portuguese:

Considering that after thirteen years of struggle in the lands overseas, the political system in power did not succeed in objectively and concretely defining an overseas policy for bringing peace between Portuguese of all races and creeds.

A compromise with traces of the debate preceding it, the Manifesto sketched a kind of constitution for a provisional government, guaranteeing freedom of speech and promising the beginning of a new economic and social policy on behalf of the working classes. The new government promised elections for a constitutional assembly within a year.

For those long opposed to the old regime it was a glorious time to be alive, but the revolutionary euphoria did not long mask tragic problems and bitter conflicts. The provisional government's lines of authority were confused. Though residual control was in the hands of the leading officers of the MFA, it was shared with the officers behind them, the formal government, and a junta of seven generals and admirals who had chosen Spínola from their ranks to be President. The prime minister was an old republican lawyer who had defended opposition personalities. He headed a cabinet that embraced a political spectrum ranging from Communist to Monarchist. The loquacious Saraiva de Carvalho, in the interview previously noted, revealed it was

...General Spínola himself, to our great alarm, who selected and invited into the Provisional Government Dr. Alvaro Cunhal (head of the CP)—now attacked profoundly by all the Spinolists, who say that Dr. Cunhal is under orders from Moscow, that the country is on the road to Communism, that six months from now we will be in a Communist country taking orders from the Presidium—when it is precisely General Spínola who boasted, in response to our reaction on asking him what would be said at an international level by bringing to the government such a leading figure of the Portuguese Communist Party, "I am much more democratic than you, I am much more to the left of the Movement, I am much more progressive and guarantee to you that there is no reason for fear."

The Communists, with an established organization, discipline, fronts, and funds quickly moved into key positions in unions, local government, and the information media. Others attempted as much, but with less success. Long depicted as the root of all evil, the Communists at first cultivated a moderate image, but—first and last—sided with the MFA on every significant issue.

The revolution unleashed a pandemic of political agitation characterized by numerous leftist sects each eager to show itself more revolutionary than the next. A variety of Maoists, Trotskyists, Stalinists, and Anarchists engaged in demonstrations, sit-ins, wall painting, strikes, and jargon-flavored denunciation of fascism, imperialism, and bourgeois values. Schools, factories, public and private offices were in a state of exhilarating turmoil marked by demands for purges and reorganization. All the new lifestyle movements, which the old rulers held to be sure signs of the decline of the West, proved to have numerous or at least vocal votaries in Portugal. The daily newspapers were taken over by their staffs and changed overnight from a conservative, or anodyne, line to radical Marxism. Radio and television commentary, of course, followed a similar turnabout. Book publishers discovered a booming market for

political books of all kinds. Marxist-Leninist tracts proliferated and sold well. A year after the revolution the best-seller list in Lisbon still consisted mainly of books of political import.

An economy already weakened by the world economic crisis was further enfeebled by the extraordinary wave of strikes and agitation. The Communists, who quickly slipped into the corporate state's labor organization, played a restraining role, jeopardizing their position with workers in order to retain the esteem of the military power behind the throne. Competing socialists and left sectarians attempted to use working-class dissatisfaction to build their own constituencies.

On July 9 Prime Minister Palma Carlos and ministers representing the right wing of the revolutionary coalition resigned. He argued that he lacked sufficient authority to control what he considered a climate of indiscipline that was not consonant with his idea of democracy. He wanted greater power for his office and an early presidential election—the latter being widely interpreted as a device to use Spínola's charisma to strengthen the right.

The new government was more openly dominated by the MFA, although the Socialist, Communist, and Popular Democratic (PPD) parties were still represented in the cabinet. The PPD professes democratic socialism and is led by men who once attempted to exert a liberalizing influence within the old regime. It would have affiliated with the Second International if the latter had not already recognized the Socialist Party led by Mário Soares. After Spínola, the latter was the most popular political figure in Portugal. He had been jailed and exiled and was attorney for the family of the assassinated General Delgado. As the revolutionary government's foreign minister and Socialist leader he garnered prestige by associating with European statesmen and negotiating with the African liberation movements.

The Socialists were a vigorous group, whose well-attended meetings were characterized by open debate; the symbol of a clenched fist contributed to their revolutionary cachet. Pro-Allende, anti-CIA, anticolonial, and anti-anti-Communist, some segments had Leninist leanings, but the mainstream leadership and rank and file were committed to democratic institutions. In other words, the Socialist Party, like the PPD, advocated bourgeois democracy.

The appointment of Colonel Vasco Gonçalves as prime minister was a rebuff to Spínola and the right. As it turned out, it also was a blow to the establishment of genuine democracy. At the time Gonçalves was known to the public only as a leader of the MFA and an engineer who liked to read economics. At the inauguration Spínola introduced him as the brains of the MFA.

Negotiations for liquidation of the colonial wars

began immediately after the coup, but were not to the liking of the Africans, who scented complete victory and wanted to negotiate only about the transference of power. The Portuguese overtures had been in line with the plan for plebiscites in Spínola's book. As widely noted, Spínola had argued therein that guerrilla war could not be won by military means alone, but he also had attempted to show how the empire might be salvaged by other means. Spínola did not see eye to eye with the young officers on the issue of decolonization.

The Gonçalves government hastened settlements agreeable to the liberation movements. Before the end of July President Spínola, who had hoped to insist on plebiscites, was constrained to declare publicly the right of the overseas territories to immediate independence. On August 26 an agreement was signed in Algiers to recognize formally, and to withdraw Portuguese troops from, Guinea-Bissau. The Cape Verde Islands was to decide its status by a referendum.

An accord was signed with the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in Lusaka on September 7. It was agreed that both sides would participate jointly in a coalition government until June, 1975, when Mozambique would become fully independent. There were racial riots and disturbances after the signing that resulted in scores of dead and hundreds of wounded, but both FRELIMO and the Portuguese army lived up to their duties. Mozambique suffered a brain drain of fleeing Portuguese professionals, but a majority of the colonists will remain.



Working out a settlement in Angola was more difficult than elsewhere. The three main liberation movements had a long history of mutual hostility sealed in bloodshed. An accord was signed with the leaders of these groups on January 15 at a hotel not far from the spot where Prince Henry's tiny caravels sailed five and a half centuries before to begin an age of exploration and overseas empire building. The impending loss of Angola was a bitter pill for conservative Portuguese. The military force of the liberation movements was minimal, the economy was booming, and the colony was inhabited by hundreds of thousands

of whites as well as *mestiços* and a majority of apparently pacified blacks.

According to the terms of the accord, each of the three movements was to furnish 8,000 troops to match Portugal's 24,000 and jointly participate in a provisional government. Independence was scheduled for November 11, 1975. Unhappily, repeated clashes before and after the accord indicated civil war was more than a theoretical consideration. Probably well over a thousand people have been killed in Angola since the coup in Portugal. In May, 1975, alone the worst of many incidents in Luanda resulted in at least five hundred deaths. Obviously the decolonization of Angola will not be easy.

President Spínola addressed the nation on September 10, 1974, on the occasion of the formal recognition of Guinea-Bissau. He urged the state's new rulers to follow his example in promoting democratic institutions and live up to his slogan of Guinea for the Guineans. He also told the Portuguese that the MFA's program, which he had pledged to uphold, was clear on the necessity of democratic elections. He stated that he was not opposed to any form of authentically democratic socialism, but warned against extremists and those who sought to create de facto situations without the consent of the people; bypassing the democratic process, by giving in to loud and militant minorities, was preparing the ground for a future dictatorship. "The silent majority of the Portuguese people will have to awake and actively defend itself against extremist totalitarianisms dueling in the dark, using the well-known tricks of mass manipulation to channel and condition the emotionality and the behavior of a people perplexed and confused by half a century of political obscurantism."

Silent majority was a term used by the reemerging Right. Conservatives now made it the center of a new campaign. Advertising calling for a manifestation to honor Spínola, protest extremism, and support the MFA's program was sent to all the daily papers. The copy was illustrated by faces with mouths blocked by the words "silent majority." The dailies, now oriented to a Marxist worldview, refused to accept the advertising on the ground that it was unsigned. When names were supplied, they still refused. The organizers responded by printing posters of the same design and plastering them all over Lisbon. Announcements were even dropped from the air.

On September 26 President Spínola and Prime Minister Gonçalves attended a benefit bullfight packed by stalwarts of the silent majority. The President was greeted with cries of *ultramar! ultramar!* (overseas= empire) and Spínola! Spínola! The Prime Minister was hooted. The rally, scheduled for September 28, was announced over the loudspeaker, and a horseman displayed a "silent majority" poster in the arena. The left quickly mobilized enough militants for a street brawl

at the exits, suggesting something worse if the rally came off as planned.

The rally was denounced by the entire left as a starting point for a Bonapartist coup. Spínola, who opposed banning the rally, was at bitter odds with Gonçalves. On the evening of September 27 Communists, Socialists, and Communist-organized workers manned barricades at which cars coming into the city were inspected for arms; those headed for the rally were turned back. Radio appeals urged railroad and bus driver unions to deny passage to the silent majoritarians.

The radio stations were occupied by police and paramilitary government forces loyal to the President, while the television studios were occupied by the MFA. Starting at 3 A.M. appeals to lift the barricades were broadcast over the radio, but at 8:40 A.M. the chords of the revolutionary anthem were followed by an MFA bulletin explaining that the reaction had been engaged in seditious maneuvering, playing on passions, trafficking in arms, and plotting economic sabotage. The MFA was vigilant, malefactors were under arrest, and all was well. Later it was announced the President wanted the rally canceled in order to avoid dangerous confrontations. The militants at the barricades were replaced by the armed forces, and the ban was made official.

In the predawn hours Gonçalves and Saraiva de Carvalho had been tacitly detained at the presidential palace until Spínola understood he could not command the loyalty of the forces controlling Lisbon. On September 30 Spínola resigned, delivering a final television address fiercely denouncing the course of the revolution. He charged that decolonization was proceeding undemocratically, to the detriment of the Africans; certain groups were promoting partisan interests through calumny, violence, and control of the media; the nation was blocked from freely choosing its institutions, being presented with a series of irreversible situations; bourgeois revolutionaries were agitating the workers; the economy was being destroyed by galloping inflation, unemployment, business failure, lack of investment, and general economic incompetence.

The new president, General Costa Gomes, had been privy to a plot against Salazar in 1961 and, after rehabilitation, later was associated with Spínola in the struggle within the old regime. On taking office he praised his predecessor as a fine man somewhat mistaken. Never had so profound a revolution been marked by so little bloodshed. Preparations were being made to allow the Portuguese to choose their political institutions in accordance with the principles of democratic pluralism, the only system compatible with the full development of human dignity.

Convincing evidence that the planners of the canceled rally planned to seize power on September 28 has yet to see the light. Vasco Gonçalves and his advisors evidently believed they did. In any case, the Prime Minister did not appreciate being hooted at the

bullying or detained by Spínola. Militants at the barricades confiscated a motley collection of weapons, adding to the store already accumulated by Communist-connected organizations. Weapons for street fighting reportedly were found at the headquarters of the Progress Party, one of the rally's sponsors.



Among the silent majority were passionate reactionaries and right activists who might not unfairly be characterized as fascists, but there also were moderate conservatives who indeed had been deprived of the right to expound their opinions openly. Whether the silent majority was fascist was debatable, but there was little doubt that a rather taciturn majority of the Portuguese were non-Communist. The Communists and their sympathizers indicated an awareness of this by advocating the postponement of elections ostensibly because half a century of obscurantism had rendered the people incapable of progress without the leadership of the revolutionary vanguard. The MFA's response was to send psychological action teams to evangelize the densely populated rural north, where a clergy devoted to Our Lady of Fátima had been the chief font of political wisdom. Supported by brass bands, parachute jumps, helicopters, and audio-visual aids, the soldiers discussed local problems and nonpartisanly preached the wickedness of the old regime, the injustices of capitalism, and the openhearted idealism of the MFA.

Their foothold in the labor movement being challenged with some success by others less ardent about remaining in the MFA's good graces, the Communists began a campaign to legislate a single comprehensive labor federation designed to allow them to maintain control. This issue induced the Socialist and Popular Democratic parties to oppose the Communists openly for the first time and aroused alarm in Western Europe. It was argued that a compulsory single union was the first step to a single party. The Communists organized mass demonstrations on behalf of a united union for a united people, and the MFA's Council of Twenty finally voted 11 to 9 in favor of their position. A Socialist mass demonstration was canceled after the MFA banned all street marches when the Communists proposed a counterdemonstration.

Western European opinion, already disturbed by the trend of events in Portugal, was further disturbed when the most important remaining conservative party attempted to hold a convention in Porto on the night of January 25-26. Representatives of various foreign Christian Democrat and free enterprise parties were present. Headed by a member of the State Council, the Democratic and Social Center Party (CDS) had a program which would have put it on the enlightened right elsewhere in Europe. Leftist demonstrators surrounded the convention hall, burning cars, disarming guards, and threatening to attack. When the army was called in, the soldiers fraternized with the demonstrators and forced the retreat of the police. Officers declared they could not be held responsible for the actions of their men if the meeting were not canceled.

Meanwhile the foreign observers were calling their embassies, and an embarrassed government found itself under pressure from abroad. No less a personage than Valéry Giscard d'Estaing called Lisbon for an explanation. At dawn delegates and guests were liberated by parachutists flown in from the capital. Despite the participation of some of their youth, the Socialists considered the incident another attack aimed at the heart of democracy. The Communists grudgingly admitted it to have been unfortunate. Most of the radicalized press did not find much reprehensible or remarkable in the event. The unfavorable image it created abroad was bolstered by the frequent repetition of similar incidents. In March—to cite the most extreme example—one person died and the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* was badly beaten as a CIA agent at a PPD rally attacked by "anti-Fascists."

The kind of issue that draws the attention of the American press was raised at the end of January with a report that the Soviet Union requested a Portuguese base for its fishing fleet, raising the specter of NATO's Iberian command coming under Soviet surveillance. The charge was officially denied, but the increasing coziness of MFA leaders with the Communists suggested such fears were not unfounded. On April 18, 1975, the *New York Times*, recounting a not-for-attribution Kissinger briefing to European journalists, stated that Washington believed the Soviet Union transferred \$50 million to the Portuguese Communists. If true, this opens the possibility of subversion as an instrument to ameliorate the balance of payments.

President Costa Gomes announced on February 10 that elections for a constituent assembly would be held in April, fulfilling repeated promises and calming fears of a slide to the totalitarian left. There remained a question about what the constituent assembly would be allowed to do. In a nearly two-hour address to the nation Prime Minister Gonçalves declared: "The new constitution cannot betray the spirit of the MFA's program. We are not going to lose by the electoral road what has cost the Portuguese people so much."

A comparatively moderate economic plan was announced by the provisional government on February 20. It outlined policies for an agrarian reform and nationalization of key industries, but it also sought to encourage foreign investment and the private sector.

At this time there was known to be contention within the MFA with regard to its exact role, although it was perfectly clear it would not fade away. Political parties that qualified for the election were required to accept this. The MFA's dominant radicals advocated implementation of a socialist program under their control. The moderate parties felt constrained to go along with MFA demands, but, encouraged by favorable opinion polls, hoped their performance in the election would give them power derived from demonstrated representivity. The plausibility of this tactic was enhanced by evidence of dissent within the armed forces. Both the democratic left and the conservatives thought they had constituencies among the officers.

A great leap leftward was triggered on March 12 by a putsch attributed to Spínola and supposedly timed to avert an Easter massacre of 1,500 antileftists—a story reminiscent of the Chilean Z Plan. The attempted coup—the answer to a radical militant's prayers—inevitably has been called a Communist plot. Its immediate result was the establishment of a Revolutionary Council formalizing radical military control.

Political parties were to be strictly advisory. The election campaign would proceed, but the parties had to agree beforehand to accept what amounted to MFA dictatorship. The constitution would be what the MFA decided; the election would be a popularity contest. It should be noted that the radicals did not have their way entirely, for most were opposed to the idea of elections.

On March 13 the banks were nationalized, and, a week later, the insurance companies, putting the government in direct control of business and cutting a source of funds available to the opposition. Leading industrialists were among those arrested on suspicion of implication in the attempted coup. Spínola made it to Brazil.

The cabinet was reorganized on March 25 for the fourth time in less than a year. Socialist and PPD ministers participated, but the pro-Communist contingent was enlarged. Somewhat earlier the two Maoist parties and the conservative Christian Democrats were excluded from participating in the election campaign. The CDS, the only remaining conservative group, could not campaign freely, but was allowed to stay in the race. The PPD—left liberal by U.S. standards—was under radical attack as counterrevolutionary. The Socialists also were similarly vilified. To the Communists and their allies social democracy was bourgeois mystification. Writing in the newspaper *Seara Nova* in April, 1975, Augusto Costa Dias said:

The leaders of the Socialist Party have proceeded in their electoral and electoralist strategy like their English, Federal German, Dutch, and Nordic brothers. They defend that anti-Socialist game of give and take, of victory and defeat in elections, the rise and fall of governments, while their countries are where neocapitalism has sunk its deepest roots. But the Portuguese revolutionary process does not sympathize with collaborationism with the monopolies. Who does not understand this has missed the train of our revolution.

During the election campaign prominent members of the new ruling class publicly denigrated the role of political parties. Admiral Rosa Coutinho—the Red Admiral—aired the idea of a single party and indicated that the Socialist leaders were not socialist enough. The Minister of Information, Commander Correia Jesuino, remarked: "We are the vanguard of the revolution, and thus have the right to assume direction of the nation." The radical military, claiming that anti-Communist peasants and workers were confused by the contradictory claims of the parties and the obscurantist urgings of their priests, advised such folk to cast blank ballots. Commander Jesuino predicted 40 per cent might do so.

Huge crowds at a Socialist demonstration in Lisbon chanted, "Freedom not dictatorship!" To many this was what the election was about. The people were less confused at the polls than predicted. Less than 7 per cent cast blank or invalid ballots. Thirty-eight per cent voted Socialist. The PPD was second with 26 per cent. The Communists received 12 per cent, and the conservative CDS 8 per cent. The Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP)—a coalition of Communists and "progressive" Socialists, which had seized control of local government machinery after April 25 and hewed closely to the Communist and radical MFA lines—received slightly over 4 per cent. Only one of seven other parties received over 1 per cent of the vote.

The Socialist Party capitalized on what it interpreted to be its mandate, which was rudely denied by opponents, who argued the people had voted for the S.P. because they knew the MFA favored socialism. Events after the election continued much as before. Nationalizations, purges, demonstrations, exalted rhetoric, and a wretched economy remained the order of the day. When a union took over the Socialist newspaper *República*, the last Lisbon daily free of Communist influence, the government chose to regard the seizure as a labor dispute, shutting the paper until its fate could be decided by bureaucratic due process.

Socialist ministers, who had suffered other affronts since the election, boycotted the cabinet. Socialist masses demonstrated and foreign pressures were brought in, to the annoyance of the MFA. A troubled meeting of the new Assembly of the MFA rejected Saraiva de Carvalho's proposal to abolish the parties, but announced it would attempt to develop an alliance

of the military and the workers. The Socialists were reprimanded for rocking the boat. Inasmuch as the MFA generally interprets workers to mean Communist-controlled labor, Portugal might be viewed as heading in an orthodox Communist, Castroist, or Nasserist direction.

After April the young officers of the MFA were ubiquitously praised as dedicated, generous, and disinterested. No one believed this more profoundly than the ruling officers themselves. Their general purpose was to do what they believed all honest intelligent people knew had to be done: smash the monopolies, promote social welfare and agrarian reform—in short, everything good and just. It followed that critics must be knaves or dupes.

They did not intend to establish a totalitarian state. Their political prisoners outnumber Caetano's but have been treated far better, so far, than Pinochet's in Chile or than Castro's. Similarly, free speech has not yet quite disappeared and may in some fashion be preserved. Within the services, right-wing forces' have been weakened by purges and the leftward drift of the unpolitical. A silent right and taciturn left is discouraged from direct action by newly politicized enlisted men, who now are represented in the Assembly of the MFA. As to the Communist issue, the MFA leadership clearly includes people in some sense Communistic, but, to echo Saraiva de Carvalho, that does not put them in the hands of the Presidium. On the left alone there are many countervailing pressures that make it impossible to predict in which direction the country will go. (After the event it will all be perfectly obvious.)

Portugal's economic prospects are such that some

feel whoever rules will be discredited—the cold comfort of the MFA's adversaries. The social and economic ideals of the radical leadership will be of little help in improving the lot of the Portuguese working class effectively in the immediate future. The economy has grown considerably in the years since World War II, but was badly hit by the world economic crisis. Caetano's attempt to encourage a flourishing stock market resulted in a local crisis that contributed to the weakening of his government. These problems have been compounded by the revolution.

MFA leaders have complained of economic sabotage and unavoidable problems stemming from decolonization, social reform, and political change. There is truth in this, but their haste to impose a radical program exacted a heavy price. Capitalists are not eager to invest in countries where they are denounced as leeches. Emigrants do not risk hard-earned life savings in other people's noble experiments.

There may yet be breathing space for developing a coherent economic policy. The head of Portugal's social welfare service told a Brazilian interviewer that Portugal had gold reserves worth nearly \$5 billion at current prices. In an otherwise optimistic account he stated: "Even if we maintain the present situation, that is, even if we continue to live beyond our resources, consuming our reserves, we shall have some years to go before the disaster."

The Portuguese revolution has brought independence to Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and—in more tragic circumstances—Angola. It has wrought tremendous economic and social change in Portugal. In the strictly political sense the change from the old regime may be less radical than it appeared. Whether all this results in a better life for the Portuguese people is a question that will not be answered for some time.

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