

not be as deleterious as is generally supposed. With Saudi crude selling around \$6, America's foreign trade should be in balance by 1985, and the exporters' current capital surplus should drop from over \$60 billion in 1974 to only \$11 billion in 1976. However, most of this drop will be at the expense of the oil states that need development capital the most, and the populous undeveloped importing states will continue to suffer.

Obviously the 1973 price hikes benefited the established producers. Less obviously the outlook for states about to increase production drastically might be especially bleak, presuming the world market price does drop. Here one thinks of the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and Brazil, among others (an article in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* of February 8, 1975, by Frances Cairncross entertains just this nightmare).

Part V also contemplates the effects of a future Arab embargo on Western military flexibility. It concludes that America's military fuel requirements are relatively small and would increase by only 361,000 barrels a day in the most extreme case—that of major war in Europe. Furthermore, this added demand would be balanced by a drastic fall in civilian consumption in Europe, and the USSR would not be likely to interdict the flow of Persian Gulf oil to Europe, except through the expedient of mining the Strait of Hormuz, pyloric valve to the Gulf. (Some wargamers with the U.S. Navy believe it would be possible, though admittedly not easy, for the USSR to close the Strait by laying two battered supertankers end to end across the bottom of the narrowest stretch of deep water in this strait. But it might lose more than it gained by this strategy.)

The Brookings study also speculates at some length on the outlook for nuclear reactors throughout the world. The United States, it explains, has a near-monopoly on light-water reactors, the type of plant with the best market potential, but they require very expensive uranium enrichment plants costing about \$2 billion each. America now has three enrichment plants, and a near-monopoly on this technology too. Still, it will have to build two more

enrichment plants, starting by the end of 1976, if it is to keep up with its planned level of light-water reactor construction by 1984, and these plants are not yet on the drawing boards. Breeder reactors of course hold much greater promise for the efficient use of uranium, but they are devilishly risky and will also add to the real danger of nuclear sabotage and theft—which the sloppy existing system of international safeguards, vividly deplored by this study, will hardly ease. "On the other hand," the study does concede, "large sums of money have already been spent on the breeder." That is a hard

argument to overrule.

One good piece of news the study offers is that natural gas is still a buyer's market in Europe, and an interesting question arises between the lines of the chapter on China. Will the People's Republic make a strong stand at the United Nations in support of claims to 200-mile or unlimited rights to territorial waters advanced by such states as Ecuador and Peru, and, if it does, will this encourage South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan to do the same with respect to oil rights in the waters that lie between them and the People's Republic?

## The Fifth Year of the Nixon Watch by John Osborne

(Liveright; 243 pp.; \$7.95)

## Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth by Raoul Berger

(Harvard University Press; 430 pp.; \$14.95)

## Watergate: Implications for Responsible Government by Frederick C. Mosher and others

(Basic Books; 137 pp.; \$8.95)

## Presidential Power and Accountability: Toward a New Constitution by Charles M. Hardin

(University of Chicago Press; 257 pp.; \$7.95)

## Donald Allen Robinson

During October, 1973, the crisis called Watergate came to a thundering climax. Spiro Agnew had just resigned, the first President or Vice President to be forced from office in disgrace. At mid-month President Nixon caused Archibald Cox to be fired and tried to abolish the office of Special Prosecutor. The top two officials in the Justice Department resigned rather than carry out the President's orders. The ensuing "fire storm" brought the

creaking machinery of impeachment into reluctant but inexorable motion.

Then suddenly, as war raged in the Middle East, American military forces were put on worldwide alert, and the anguished Secretary of State had to tell a skeptical press conference that the United States had not taken the world to the brink of catastrophe simply to distract attention from a domestic scandal.

The effort to understand the implica-

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Wilson during his professorial days, and by a committee of distinguished political scientists in the early 1950's. Inertia and the ability of the framework of 1787 to muddle through have always weighed against it, but it may be that the current occasion will be less inhospitable than the past. The parties are in terrible shape, to be sure. Yet the work of reform, if it is to serve democratic values, must begin with them. They are our most flexible institutions, and if they can be strengthened and mobilized for con-

stitutional reform, we may accomplish more than seems possible now.

We are now reliving, in a two hundredth anniversary, the cadences of our founding as a nation. The celebration comes at an awkward moment. Yet the rehearsal and restudy of our basic political principles may be opportune. By reviewing our fundamental principles, we may be driven to consider basic constitutional reform, and thus to save a heritage that we are in danger of losing by taking it for granted.

## Jews and American Politics by Stephen D. Isaacs

(Doubleday; 302 pp.; \$8.95)

Perry Davis

In the months preceding the publication of *Jews and American Politics* rumors swept the Washington and New York Jewish communities. Politically active Jews were whispering, "Who is Stephen Isaacs, and why is he saying such terrible things about us?" In his second chapter Isaacs writes:

"One man named in the first chapter of this book reacted with alarm when he was shown a draft of the chapter. 'Oh no!' he exclaimed. 'You can't do that. Please don't do that.' He explained that, while he felt flattered to be included, identifying him as being Jewish would cause him problems. 'You just don't understand; it's getting bad out there,' he said, pointing his forefinger back over his right shoulder. 'I pick it up everywhere I go. It's increasing like you wouldn't believe. I really wish you wouldn't do this book at all.'"

The anxiety felt over the appearance of Isaacs's book was an age-old aversion to "washing our dirty linen in public." Nothing verified the theme of the book as much as the writing and publication of it.

By interviewing over two hundred Jewish leaders and leading Jews, Isaacs decides that Jewish political action in America is manifested in vari-

ous contradictory forms, but that the underlying motivation for this activity is fear—fear of the loss of status, fear of spiritual or physical harm, fear of anti-Semitism, a term defined individually and subjectively. According to Isaacs:

"In one way or another, Jews in politics are, at the extreme, striving to avoid becoming lampshades or, at least, striving for a 'just society'—which may ultimately be the same thing."

Jews, for example, fear the General Brown form of anti-Semitism that alleges a conspiracy of Jewish bankers and media moguls. As a result, the Jewish establishment condemns Brown, but refuses to press for his dismissal lest the power he alleged be confirmed. Jews like Ben Wattenberg, who worked for Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey, work as behind-the-scenes aides to elected officials hoping to foster pro-Jewish policies. But for the most part they refuse to run for elective office, fearing that such blatant activity is unfitting and may provoke a hostile slumbering giant. In a different setting, the leader of the New York Orthodox German Jewish community told his congregants to avoid political demonstrations or pres-

sure because "they may break our windows"—a clear allusion to *Kristallnacht*.

Some Jews marched with blacks in Selma, fearing that if black subjugation is successful, Jews would be the next scapegoat in line for persecution. On the other hand, a growing Jewish hostility to blacks, indeed overt and covert racism, has come from the fear of street crime and economic competition. The former "liberal coalition" has opposed affirmative action hiring and low-income housing projects in middle-class neighborhoods.

Isaacs notes that in recent years one of the clearest examples of Jewish political contradiction involves the public and private reaction to the position and power of Henry Kissinger. To some he epitomizes the pride and hope of a people; to others he is an Uncle Jake bending over backward to avoid his Jewishness—intermarrying, taking his oath on a King James version of the Bible, exchanging kisses with Anwar Sadat.

Isaacs correctly identifies the State of Israel and the issue of Soviet Jewry as central reminders of the potential pride and danger attached to being a Jew.

*Jews and American Politics* provides a clear analysis of the insecure Jewish voter and of the suppressed ethnicity of some Jews who have "made it." The author identifies men like Walter Lippmann who chose "to ignore their roots, never mentioning their being Jewish, perhaps never even thinking of it."

However, in setting up Arthur Waskow ("The Freedom Seder") as the radical Jew Isaacs neglects the increasing numbers of Orthodox Jewish young people who manage to fit the political and social liberalism and activism of the commune (*havura*) into the all-encompassing framework of *halacha*—traditional law. Unlike Waskow, their feet are bare but their heads are covered.

Isaacs also skirts over the political importance of access to high officials found to be a common goal of activist Jews. The very apt American description—having a "rabbi"—is multiplied and expanded in Israel, where *protectzia*—having political