

This was particularly notable in that circle round Auden who started out in the 1930's as left-wing radicals. They defined themselves as new men, and with an emphasis on the "men" as well as the "new." They rebelled contemptuously against their predecessors' aestheticism; they substituted an iconography of tractors and pylons and strikes and tanks for the iconography of the *Commedia dell'Arte*; they spoke with the manly purposefulness of comrades. And yet, it seems now clear, they were of the same generation and the same temperament as the dandies they displaced. Perhaps the ideal type of their movement was more the naïf than the dandy, but Auden himself, and Isherwood, were always only faux-naïfs. Theirs was a rebellion of style, but not of temperament, as their subsequent development made plain. As we read now of the outrageous way Auden performed that "committed" style, we can hardly understand (or credit) his being taken seriously. Betjeman, in this volume, recalls his first meetings with the serious young Auden, and his shame at his own frivolity; but the reader of the anecdotes is bound to feel Betjeman was either fooled at the time or is fooling himself as he looks back. Auden was playing a game. He was incapable of seriousness about such matters, and grasped at politics as another field for the performance of brilliant style.

This handsome volume of "tributes" concentrates on the late Auden. (The book should, incidentally, be read only a bit at a time, for most of the contributions are, naturally enough, pretty sentimental.) In those years the poet preached very decorous and conservative and responsible values, though he allowed his anarchic and "naughty" impulses full expression in private life. It was still recognizably the same temperament, but instead of being expressed with youthful panache, it was controlled by a quite Edwardian decorum.

So that what one confronts, time and again, is this entity, temperament, as something that united all the members of that generation, and which could express

itself equally well in both left-wing and right-wing ideologies, in both dandy-aestheticism and political activism. Thus one of Auden's friends, Brian Howard, was in the twenties a dandy-aesthete, from whom Waugh drew his two characters, Ambrose Silk and Anthony Blanche. In the thirties Brian Howard became a leading reviewer for *The New Statesman*, a prominent anti-Nazi and socialist, a figure in the Left Book Club. But he was still an outrageous and aggressive pansy. Another friend of Auden's—and of John Strachey's and Harold Nicolson's—was the even more outrageous Communist, Guy Burgess. And it was in reaction against figures like Brian Howard and Guy Burgess that George Orwell and F.R. Leavis, the prophets of ideological manliness in that period, defined themselves. Their feeling that they were isolated in their own times, and must single-handedly defend old values, derived from this temperament all round them. It was their life work to manifest an alternative temperament in intellectual terms, rooted in the old traditions of English manliness.

Orwell and Leavis refused to define themselves by party affiliation or political formula. They were culture critics, naming what they liked and what they disliked in terms of "voice," "persona," "maturity," "decency," and "seriousness." The study of these four books (and the other documents of this generation of Englishmen) suggests that culture is often the best way to approach problems that seem variously political, aesthetic, or sociological; culture in the older sense of cult, as when we say that the Prince of Wales was the object of a cult. It seems that the apparatus of English culture provided various means for a cult of the young-man figure, which powerfully persuaded individuals to fix their own and other people's identities in those terms. That was the imaginative *religion* of England then, to which Orwell and Leavis opposed another. Their religion won its adherents in the succeeding generation. Much of English life can best be understood as proceeding from those religions.

## Beyond Containment: U.S. Foreign Policy in Transition edited by Robert W. Tucker and William Watts

(Potomac Associates; 212 pp.; \$3.50)

### Bruce M. Russett

This is a collection of "best articles" from the first three years of *Foreign Policy*, a new and already influential journal begun in 1971. It is prefaced by a rather substantial essay by the editors.

While such a collection may now seem to have passed its peak of interest, its central focus—how to devise, in the wake of past disasters, a new foreign policy for the United States—certainly is not passé. The

urgency of that task is reflected in the trenchant remarks of many critics of past policy—among them George Kennan, Leslie Gelb, and John Kenneth Galbraith—in this volume. In examining the policy-making ap-

paratus, bureaucratic politics, and the constraints of American domestic politics the contributors search for reasons why things went wrong and for some sense of whether "better" policy can be expected to emerge.

These are good essays, gracefully written and penetrating. Nevertheless, there is little concrete guidance as to what alternative policies should be. Galbraith, for example, forcefully cites the failures of American policy toward Third World nations, but except for recommending that we stop doing a lot of the things we have been doing there—and of course that is the beginning of wisdom—none of the contributors offers much that is positive. Nowhere is there the quality of detailed and carefully thought-out policy recommendations (whatever one might think of their propriety) typified by Tucker himself in *A New Isolationism* or in his advocacy of military intervention in the Persian Gulf.

Contributors to this volume probably should not be blamed for this lack; all of us are still groping clumsily toward alternative policies. Still, some recognition, however critical, of recent thinking about economic dominance of poor countries by rich ones, or of the implications of transnational terrorism, or of the accumulating evidence that in the Third World many poor people are becoming *absolutely* poorer despite growing gross national products would have been welcome. The editors themselves express a fear of "unchanging interests supported by a changing rationale." Yet one comes away with the suspicion that Pierre Hasner's critique of Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy, "deadly wrong in their present view of the rest of the world [the Third World, that is] and in their long-range view of where that world is going," might be applied to some of these contributions as well. Especially for those analysts who concentrate on dissecting the policy-making apparatus to see where things went wrong, one has a stronger sense of search for better ways of deciding and executing policy than for fundamentally different policies to be executed.

Two possible reasons for this can be offered. First, despite the criticisms offered in it, the volume does have a

certain air of "establishmentism," or at least of establishment critics. As a Yale professor myself, it is almost impossible to miss the fact that all but one (Hasner) of the contributors had then-current or recent roots on the East Coast (twelve out of fourteen had been based in Washington or Cambridge, with a thirteenth from Princeton). Second, there are the limitations of the essay genre. For example, a recurrent and important theme of the volume is the relative importance of public—even elite—opinion as a constraint on policy-makers, with frequent speculation on the content of current opinion and how it may have changed from that of the cold war years. The editors wonder about the relative contributions of anticommunism, security concerns, and imperial interest in shaping opinion. They also observe that there is "little ground for the belief that, in the arena of foreign affairs, the public has broken its deeply ingrained habit of deferring to presidential judgment and initiative." There are, however, means to establish pretty accurately whether and how public opinion has changed; such means are not employed in these essays.

The problem of weighting the contributions of anticommunism, security considerations, and imperial interest is much more difficult, as is that of establishing whether and how a change in public opinion actually does matter in policy-making. It would be unfair to expect much progress on these complex questions within the format of such an essay. A good formulation of the question, yes—but answers, no. Similarly, it would be unfair to expect here grand theorizing or rigorous empirical social science on matters of international dominance or inequality. In lamenting their absence from this volume, we are merely reminded of what we cannot expect to find in such essays, and of how very much we need to *know* (not just have opinions about). We need good essays like these. We also need to keep vividly in mind that our search for a new foreign policy still bears a too-close resemblance to our "understanding" in the 1950's and early 1960's, when there seemed to be so many certainties. Real understanding on the basis of knowledge must be the foundation of new policies that one day might make us proud rather than ashamed.

## Global Reach

by Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Müller

(Simon & Schuster; 508 pp.; \$11.95)

## The Role of Transnational Business in Mass Economic Development A Working Group Report by United Church of Christ

Collin Gonze

In an interesting turnaround a pair of usually tough-minded intellectuals, Richard Barnet and Ronald Müller, have written an indignant moral denunciation of the international spread of American business, while a United Church of Christ Working Group in a report of February 1, 1975, has pro-

duced a mild wrist slap in the context of a *Realpolitik* acceptance of "things-as-they-are." Barnet and Müller want a better world; the UCC, safer and cleaner investments.

Barnet and Müller waste no time in surfacing their eschatological intentions: Multinational business managers