are denounced as "diabolic and anti-Christian. Jews could no longer ever produce a Messiah; they have no land, no autonomy, no christm. And, clearly, that is the way patrician Christianity means for things to remain. The problem is not that the Church Fathers were bad men; it is that Christianity seems to them to require that they discard and destroy in practice what they have superseded in theory.

"In the fourth century, however, Christianity became the religion of the Graeco-Roman Empire. What had previously been theology and Biblical hermeneutics now was to become law and social policy." The Jewish condition in Christendom deteriorated steadily. A right once lost was never recovered; the Jews suffered ever new kinds of discrimination "until, finally, one arrives at that state of total vilification, rightlessness, and ghettoization that was to characterize Jewish life in Western Christendom from the Later Middle Ages to the Emancipation." Successive codes legalized invidiousness. Synagogues were destroyed by bishops, and communities exiled by princes. The Crusades, which killed more Jews than Muslims, was only the climax of centuries of brutalization by Christian emperors and Catholic popes. A Masada, a unique community suicide under the Romans, became epidemic on the Rhine a thousand years later under Christian domination. The diabolic "remained the basic image of the Jew up to its use by Nazism." Hitler is not only Luther's but also St. John the Evangelist's heir.

Ruether's "theological critique of the Christian anti-Jewish myth" is apposite and strong. It unpacks "the schism of judgment and promise," defends Jewish particularism against vague and self-serving Christian ecumenism, and a putative Jewish theology of the word and deed against quasi-Gnostic spiritualism and other "tricks of realized eschatology." For her Christ can in no sense be "final" unless Christianity is to seal off history, condemning not only Jews to death. He must point beyond himself to the "One who is yet to come." "For [present] Christianity there can be no 'way' to the 'end,' because the 'end' [Christ] is the way. For Judaism, which had Torah without the Messiah, Christianity substitutes the Messiah without Torah." But this premature messianism, she asserts, is merely triumphalist; it prates of victories not won, and which are, in fact, unwinnable unless such anomic theology is overcome. Christianity must Judaize or die. It "can lose its anti-Judaism only when it is able to hear and internalize the message from Judaism which heretofore it has repressed and projected back as the sin of Judaism in 'rejecting Christ.'"

The key is a new Christology. "Is it possible to say 'Jesus is the Messiah' without implicitly or explicitly saying at the same time 'and the Jews be damned'?" Her answer is a qualified No. Christianity will have to surrender its claim to finality. It will have to become a kind of incident in the working out of a (Jewish?) story; it will have to look forward to a Messiah who has not yet come.

For a Jew such a prospect seems unlikely and fearsome. If the Christian must change his spots before we Jews are safe from the leopard, we are in graver danger than even Franklin Littell thinks. Rosemary Ruether has made a strong, convincing case against Christianity. But I hope, with Littell, that it is only Christians we have to fear.

**Politics and Crime**

by Hans Magnus Enzensberger

(Seabury. 215 pp.; $8.95)

**Charles W. Kegley**

Enzensberger has produced a very unusual book. It will at once inform and irritate; it will stimulate with its originality and literary brilliance and at the same time anger with its sweeping generalizations and cynicism.

Part of the explanation of the odd character of *Politics and Crime* is to be found in the author's own personality and philosophy. He is a sterling representative of that unusual breed—well known on the European Continent but almost nonexistent in America—the poet-social-critic. His book, *Gedichte*, appeared in Frankfurt in 1962. The power of his writing, whether in prose or poetry, makes the sociopolitical criticism of American folk singers sound like mere chattering of the teeth. English readers were jolted by the strength of this poet-essayist when they read *The Havana Enquiry and The Consciousness Industry*. Now, in six essays written between 1964 and 1975, we have a still more provocative encounter with the high quality of his social and political philosophy. Although he is a bit too heady for most undergraduates, we dare not ignore this work. This book probably establishes Enzensberger, at age forty-six, as the most brilliant Continental leftist now writing.

A splendid example is his lead essay (1964), "Towards a Theory of Treason." Operating with the Freudian view of paranoia, Enzensberger analyzes the allegedly arbitrary notion of "national security." He writes: "...what is primarily secret is what is a secret and what isn't; that is perhaps the actual state secret." From Roman law on one encounters the view that treason, which arose as sacrilege, advances the "ruler taboo," the primary aim of which is to make the ruler secure. But the psychological mechanism at work—projection—allows the mod-
ern state to judge "every one of us traitor," in part because treason, like the concept "state secret," allows of no definition. Little wonder, then, that in the post-World War II world any act that is presumed to affect national security is considered treasonable. So, he concludes, "the more state secrets a government guards, the more it has to hide from those it pretends to represent."

But before we all plead guilty, Enzensberger's argument should be analyzed carefully. For one thing, the generalizations are too sweeping. Enzensberger writes on the "inevitability of treason," but upon closer inspection it turns out that the most he really claims is that "under certain historical circumstances"—e.g., during the German occupation of Norway, Holland, France, Greece and Yugoslavia—"everyone must become a traitor." Clearly this is a different and not very exciting claim. For another thing, he totally ignores the treatment of treason in the United States Constitution. One suspects that there are psychological and other biases at work here. But regardless of the reason for this omission, it is an odd and significant one. In the Constitution not only does the concept of treason play a unique role; a special effort is made, if not to define it, at least to set forth some operating criteria for identifying treasonable acts.

An essay equal in excitement to the one on treason is his wrestling with the concept of crime. With appropriate sarcasm Enzensberger quotes Hobbes's identification of crime and sin, the absurdity of which reduces to: "What is punished is a crime, what is a crime is punished." Again building on Freud, Enzensberger sees an "ancient, intimate, and dark connection... between murder and politics..."

If Enzensberger can ridicule contemporary Marxist theory and practice and demonstrate that as a revolutionary movement it is a failure, he is no less vigorous in his criticism of Western and democratic capitalist failures. Nowhere is this more apparent than in his essay on the Cuban revolution and of Cuba's subsequent socialism. In fact, these are invaluable pieces of writing. That Enzensberger is miles away from being an uncritical Marxist is evidenced in these essays. "The Party in Cuba is supposed to govern, but it does nothing of the kind...Political power in Cuba is exclusively in the hands of a tiny number of persons who huddle around Fidel, and who are under no party discipline whatever...Fidel needs the party and can't stand it."

In this bold and important book, Hillman carefully traces the constantly developing theology of marriage in Western Christendom against the traditional place of polygamy in African tribal culture. But is monogamy necessarily the Christian view? Is it, perhaps, the product of white, Western history and culture? Here, Hillman sheds new light not only on the attitudes of the Christian Churches toward African polygamy, but on their current reassessment of the full meaning of human sexuality as well. Paper $7.95, Cloth $15.00

African Traditional Religion
by E. Bolaji Idowu

This important book is the first to place the study of African religion in the larger context of religious studies... The book is well written. It includes an index and notes. There is no comparable work; this one should be in any collection on African religion." Choice Cloth $6.95

Reaping the Green Revolution
by Sudhir Sen

This, the second part of the study which began in A Richer Harvest, deals with how to make the green revolution a complete success, and how, in addition to regulate it so as to provide food and jobs for all. Cloth $10.95

Clash of Titans
by Edward W. Chester

"To this reviewer's knowledge, this is the only book in English to survey American-African foreign relations from America's beginning to the present." Garland Dow-"num, History  Cloth $12.95

At your bookstore, or write:
ORBIS BOOKS, Maryknoll, NY 10545
for anyone literate enough to think about, and reckless enough to write about, today’s problems of population and pollution. It is at once the most incisive, carefully written, and controversial of his essays. It brings together his concern with the mass media, and with the folly of present-day socialism and capitalism. Further, it exhibits his anarchistic view that it is simply too late in human history to hope for a change in social and political relations sufficiently radical to save mankind.

Starting with definitions much more sound and helpful than those that shaped his analyses of treason and crime, he assesses ecology as a very young scientific study, a subdiscipline of zoology, concerned with the total relationship between any animal species, including man, and its environment. Being so young, and necessarily drawing upon the social as well as the natural sciences, human ecology is simply not prepared to perform the very demanding service required by the enormity of the problem. “The more far-reaching its conclusions, the less reliable it is.” He argues that the manifestly desperate condition of humankind today will be improved neither by biologists, demographers and their colleagues, nor by present-day nonrevolutionary leftists, nor by naive do-gooders and liberals (the liberals, he thinks, will “let the constitution die of hunger”).

The ecological problem is at base a class problem and hence resolvable, if indeed a resolution is possible, only by a radical restructuring of social and political forms. Industry is responsible for the pollution, and industry employs the mass media as a means of reassuring the public. The result is that what most citizens learn about ecology is processed “through the sewage system of industrial publicity.” Watch your TV ads eighteen hours a day. Matching the evil effects of the industrial technocrats are the results achieved by do-gooders, the “concerned and responsible citizens” who, in Enzensberger’s judgment, are no less politically conditioned and no less politically dangerous than the industrialists. These are middle-class people, the “new petty bourgeoisie,”

who, though normally engaged in such innocuous actions as the boycotting of nonbiodegradable products, are capable of dangerous militancy. (One is inclined to agree with Enzensberger concerning the political naiveté of these citizens, especially those in America as compared with Europeans. But much more documentation than he offers is required to sustain his judgment that those engaged in the ecological movement are all that stupid and potentially dangerous.)

The exciting part of his argument, however, deals neither with the industrial technocrats nor the deplorable egoism of the bourgeoisie—“who can conceive of its own imminent collapse only as the end of the world”—but with his penetrating criticism of the current role of the Marxists in the ecological debate. He thinks that Marxists have gotten all the mileage possible out of their thesis that the capitalist mode of production has “catastrophic consequences.” He notes that if one subscribes to the definition of capitalism as a system characterized by private ownership of the means of production, then Marxists can triumphantly show that the ecological problem, like all the other ills of capitalism, will be solved by the nationalization of the means of production. “It follows,” he writes, “that in the Soviet Union there can be no environmental problems.” This in spite of the “bundle of quotations from Pravda and Izvestia about the polluted air of the Don Basin or the filthy Volga as evidence.”

Enzensburger’s judgment is that both state socialism and capitalism are committed ideologically to their respective institutional structures and methods of problem recognition and problem solving. Neither ideology nor the political complex can solve the ecological problem. If it is to be solved—and Enzensberger is very cynical about that prospect—it must begin with the recognition that the crisis is essentially a human one, a crisis of man in society, for “society is the unity of being of man with nature.” If a solution is possible, it will be the result of efforts to meet human and social needs, not institutional and ideological ones. Enzensberger rises above the tired capitalist vs. Communist battle by rising above ideological confrontation and putting the question on a global and transideological basis.

Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science
by Robert A. Packenham
(Princeton University Press: 367 pp.; $15.00)

Joseph A. Kahl

Professor Packenham is a gentle debunker. He is concerned with the ideas that guide United States policy toward the Third World, particularly ideas about political development and how it might be promoted. He notes that a major change took place in both our thinking and our policy starting with the Truman Doctrine, then moving through the Marshall Plan, Point Four, Mutual Security, the Alliance for Progress, and finally the Vietnam war. Before these programs, the United States left the rest of the world mainly to its own devices except for moments of crisis, but through the new approaches we attempted to shape the world to our long-range purposes. Packenham divides the guiding ideas into two streams: the “doctrines” of the practitioners in government and the “theories” of the professors in the