for anyone literate enough to think about, and reckless enough to write about, today's problems of population and pollution. It is at once the most incisive, carefully written, and controversial of his essays. It brings together his concern with the mass media, and with the folly of present-day socialism and capitalism. Further, it exhibits his anarchistic view that it is simply too late in human history to hope for a change in social and political relations sufficiently radical to save mankind.

Starting with definitions much more sound and helpful than those that shaped his analyses of treason and crime, he assesses ecology as a very young scientific study, a subdiscipline of zoology, concerned with the total relationship between any animal species, including man, and its environment. Being so young, and necessarily drawing upon the social as well as the natural sciences, human ecology is simply not prepared to perform the very demanding service required by the enormity of the problem. "The more far-reaching its conclusions, the less reliable it is." He argues that the manifestly desperate condition of humankind today will be improved neither by biologists, demographers and their colleagues, nor by present-day nonrevolutionary leftists, nor by naive do-gooders and liberals (the liberals, he thinks, will "let the constitution die of hunger").

The ecological problem is at base a class problem and hence resolvable, if indeed a resolution is possible, only by a radical restructuring of social and political forms. Industry is responsible for the pollution, and industry employs the mass media as a means of reassuring the public. The result is that what most citizens learn about ecology is processed "through the sewage system of industrial publicity." Watch your TV ads eighteen hours a day. Matching the evil effects of the industrial technocrats are the results achieved by do-gooders, the "concerned and responsible citizens" who, in Enzensberger's judgment, are no less politically conditioned and no less politically dangerous than the industrialists. These are middle-class people, the "new petty bourgeoisie," who, though normally engaged in such innocuous actions as the boycotting of nonbiodegradable products, are capable of dangerous militancy. (One is inclined to agree with Enzensberger concerning the political naiveté of these citizens, especially those in America as compared with Europeans. But much more documentation than he offers is required to sustain his judgment that those engaged in the ecological movement are all that stupid and potentially dangerous.)

The exciting part of his argument, however, deals neither with the industrial technocrats nor the deplorable egoism of the bourgeoisie—"who can conceive of its own imminent collapse only as the end of the world"—but with his penetrating criticism of the current role of the Marxists in the ecological debate. He thinks that Marxists have gotten all the mileage possible out of their thesis that the capitalist mode of production has "catastrophic consequences." He notes that if one subscribes to the definition of capitalism as a system characterized by private ownership of the means of production, then Marxists can triumphantly show that the ecological problem, like all the other ills of capitalism, will be solved by the nationalization of the means of production. "It follows," he writes, "that in the Soviet Union there can be no environmental problems." This in spite of the "bundle of quotations from Pravda and Izvestia about the polluted air of the Don Basin or the filthy Volga as evidence."

Enzensburger's judgment is that both state socialism and capitalism are committed ideologically to their respective institutional structures and methods of problem recognition and problem solving. Neither ideology nor the political complex can solve the ecological problem. If it is to be solved—and Enzensberger is very cynical about that prospect—it must begin with the recognition that the crisis is essentially a human one, a crisis of men in society, for "society is the unity of being of man with nature." If a solution is possible, it will be the result of efforts to meet human and social needs, not institutional and ideological ones. Enzensberger rises above the tired capitalist vs. Communist battle by rising above ideological confrontation and putting the question on a global and transideological basis.

Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science
by Robert A. Packenham
(Princeton University Press: 367 pp.; $15.00)

Joseph A. Kahl

Professor Packenham is a gentle debunker. He is concerned with the ideas that guide United States policy toward the Third World, particularly ideas about political development and how it might be promoted. He notes that a major change took place in both our thinking and our policy starting with the Truman Doctrine, then moving through the Marshall Plan, Point Four, Mutual Security, the Alliance for Progress, and finally the Vietnam war. Before these programs, the United States left the rest of the world mainly to its own devices except for moments of crisis, but through the new approaches we attempted to shape the world to our long-range purposes. Packenham divides the guiding ideas into two streams: the "doctrines" of the practitioners in government and the "theories" of the professors in the
universities.

There were three principal doctrines. The economic approach suggested that our material and technological aid could speed up economic development, which would in turn have beneficial consequences not only in improving the living conditions of poor people in the world but in expanding the possibilities for democratic government and weakening the causes of Communist revolt. The cold war approach dealt more directly with political stability as the key goal and sought to fight subversion; it led to greater emphasis on help to military and police forces around the globe. The democratic approach had a brief vogue under President Kennedy, and claimed that political aid could directly improve the living conditions of poor people in the world but in turn have beneficial consequences and police forces around the globe. The democratic approach had a brief vogue under President Kennedy, and claimed that political aid could directly improve the living conditions of poor people in the world but in turn have beneficial consequences and police forces around the globe.

These doctrines were not directly shaped by academic thinking, but there was some indirect influence on the practitioners from the academics. So Packenham turns to the professors, and again finds three major approaches. The traditional view of political science lingered on into the early part of the postwar period; it stressed the legal and formal structures of government and espoused the superiority of constitutional forms close to those of our own system. It was superseded in influence by some fifteen years of emphasis on the theory of modernization, much of it smuggled into political science from sociology. This theory said that all aspects of society tended to change in interdependent ways, so that rising incomes, expansion of the middle class, growth of literacy, increase in civil strength to control military caudillos, and general expansion of democratic institutions all go together.

There is some crude statistical evidence to support these propositions on a cross-sectional basis that compares countries in the world, but none to support it as an historical prediction of the trend for any given country from one epoch to another. Recognizing that limitation, there has been a recent tendency for political scientists to study particular countries more carefully and make worldwide comparisons more gingly. They now look for specific conditions that illuminate why some countries produce the leaders, the parties, and the will to change and develop against the odds that stem from tradition and poverty and backwardness. Unfortunately for the feel of those who believe in democracy as a universal good, they often discover that the impetus for development comes from a powerful military leader or caste of military men, or from Communist parties.

When Packenham evaluates both the doctrines and the theories, he finds them wanting. The doctrines obviously have had more failures than successes in the real world: economic development and political democracy are not spreading around the world, and Congress decides to cut the foreign aid budget more each year. The theories are also weak, as shown by the short span in which any one of them remains

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in vogue, to say nothing of the telling fact that the practitioners in government find them irrelevant as guides to action. So Packenham asks a crucial question: Why have these doctrines and theories been advanced, and why do some of them persist in the face of so much contrary evidence? He answers that they are popular because they resonate with the great liberal tradition that dominates American political thought. Following Louis Hartz's influential exposition, he says that our own history showed that gradual, nonrevolutionary change was possible and that each small success in economic, social, or political improvement aided and strengthened the entire process of development. Since it worked for us, we try to convince the world that it will work for them.

Packenham is too sophisticated to reduce our foreign policy to a simple expression of the liberal credo, since he recognizes, the influence of economic vested interests and other facts of life. But his book centers on the theme of the impact of our liberal premises on specific doctrines and theories of political development in Third World countries, and shows how we have gone wrong time after time because those countries do not share our history. Since Packenham is a gentle debunker, he spends much of his effort with examples of failures. His prescriptions for improvement can be summed up in a phrase: take it easy. We should recognize how hard it is to come up with a comprehensive theory of political development that will cover all times and all places, and admit that it is even harder for the United States to influence such a complex matter in other nations. Since he is a hardworking gentle debunker, Packenham covers a lot of literature, trims it all down to size, but stops short of any radical revisions.

I wish he had been a little less gentle. I like the debunking and agree that vulgar Marxism is inadequate as a response, but I am left unsatisfied. Unable myself to offer good alternatives to the discredited doctrines and theories, I must accept the advice to take it easy. But I wonder if the criticism could not have dug deeper and thus prepared us better for new roots and new growth. I think that in addition to the liberal credo we suffer from a strong dose of the missionary spirit. The notion that we have the right and the obligation to shape the development of other societies is something more than the notion that we should enhance liberalism in the world if we could only figure out more effective ways of doing so. It is a form of evangelism, a sense that having discovered salvation, we have the duty to force it on others. And the search for an adequate theory of development is another form of myth: the belief that "science" can spread from the physics laboratory to the social studies and come up with reliable predictions about real trends. I believe that neither liberalism nor scientism are so readily exported from their native spheres, and that attempts to do so involve great arrogance and maybe a touch of devilishness.

The Economics of Energy by Roger Leroy Miller

(Morrow; 131 pp.; $4.95)

Harold J. Barnett

This is a book by a young (thirty-three year-old), well-educated (University of Chicago Ph.D.) professional economist, now associate professor at the University of Washington. It is a serious book in the importance of its subject and in much of its implicit economic content. But it is not a serious public policy or economic analysis. The arguments are assertions, economic slogans, nonarguments. The book is economic journalism, in the racy, pungent, breathless style of The Reader's Digest and Time. The chapter headings illustrate: "A Fairy Tale," "The Blackout Blues," "How to Get a Crisis," "Nixon's Greatest Coup (Maybe)." It is very readable, very short, very glib. The 35,000-40,000 words in large print on small pages will be easily swallowed in an hour or two, and probably quickly forgotten.

The book is not wholly about energy. Three chapters are devoted to ecology and conservation. In these Miller states that the Club of Rome writers are wrong to cry doomsday; that contemporary challenge to resource and energy use is simply a New Puritanism; and that the market economy suitably conserves valuable resources. He is mostly right, but the truths are not as simple and unqualified as in his presentation.

In another three or four chapters Miller offers his own catchy phrasings of a variety of major economic aphorisms. We learn that pollution externalities occur because no one owns the environment, and so we discard our wastes into it. Price controls are bad because they interfere with the allocation of goods to most important uses, namely, cost incentives to economize on consumption of scarce goods and price incentives to increase supply. National self-sufficiency is also bad because it foregoes gains from foreign trade, wherein the goods we trade away have less value to us in economic resources than the goods we receive in exchange.

On energy proper Miller simplifies and oversimplifies additional economic principles and facts. Domestic oil production has long been cartelized. Tax favors, quota restrictions on oil imports since the 1950's, and proration legislation have really been designed to maintain high prices and profits, not national security or future needs. Security and the future could have been served better by oil storage, by the development of synthetic oil technology and other resources, and by free markets. The U.S. Government powerfully contributed to making the OPEC foreign oil cartel effective. The U.S. oil crisis developed from price...