

he seeks to develop. His esoteric references to obscure people and events will limit his audience to those thoroughly familiar with Soviet history. His gratingly sarcastic debating style will restrict his audience still further.

Lenin, subjected to an *ad hominem* character assassination, is accused of greed, vanity, cruelty, laziness, and stupidity. Navrozov considers Lenin "the greatest impersonation of self-effacement in human history," and argues against the pro-Leninist bias of Soviet ideology, as well as against "some Western scholars [who] would still say in the 1960's that [Lenin's] genius was so supernatural that no written words could express it."

Marx and Trotsky, although allotted less space, fare no better. Navrozov's indictment is again a petty one: Trotsky, we learn, "kept pedigreed hunting dogs," while Marx had "material interests," a "love of influence and prestige," and a father-in-law who is accused of "love of promotion to the rank of Minister of the Interior in Prussia."

How totally different Navrozov's caustic, humorless acerbities are from the light and delightful ways in which he tells his personal story: the poignant, loving sketches of his parents, for example, or this marvelous description of some highly placed relatives and their provincial worship of things Western:

"With great difficulty a dress 'straight from Fifth Avenue, New York' (the 'Paris' of the moment) was secured for her, and when she put it on, everyone gasped at the sight of something so exquisite. The style was flat in front ('The West, the West!'), but had waves on the back ('The West, the West!'), until someone spoiled it all by saying: 'You've put it on backwards.'"

Navrozov's book, too tightly packed with thoughts, feelings, emotions, and theories, suffers from repetition—of ideas and of words and images. His nonstop eloquence seems out of control. If I had been his editor, I would have penciled out more than half of this lengthy book. Interwoven within its six hundred-odd pages are the outlines of a lovely, lyrical autobiographical novel, set against the harsh backdrop of early Soviet Russia, which Navrozov filters through the

gauze of childhood nostalgia and transforms into a place of joy and pain and wonder. I would have encouraged him to let that delicate story grow, to set it

free from the anti-Soviet polemics that ultimately overwhelm it and the many other virtues of this nevertheless remarkable book.

Resignation in Protest by Edward Weisband and Thomas M. Franck

(Grossman; 236 pp.; \$10.00)

Hillel Levine

For the high-level government official personal integrity is important but insufficient. This is the conclusion of Weisband and Franck's study of *Resignation in Protest*. Resignation for reasons of principle may enable officials in a compromising situation to uphold a sense of conviction. But bowing out like a "gentleman" conceals problems that exist in the Administration and, consequently, contributes to their perpetuation. By making known their disagreement with the Administration public officials can stimulate a more open discussion of controverted issues and poorly conceived policies. Inside information can raise the level of discourse and mobilize legitimate political action. Silent resignation cannot.

In view of the significance of public resignation it should be a matter of serious concern, the authors claim, that over 90 per cent of the resigning public officials they studied resigned with public pronouncements that were inane, concealing the real issues that prompted their course of action. The lengths to which some would go in order not to "rock the boat," even in their departure, are illustrated in the detailed case studies.

Weisband and Franck assess the constraints on public resignation. The team has its gentle ways by which internal dissenters can be muffled and shuffled offstage, preventing appearances under the spotlights where they could make statements damaging to the Administration. Further political aspirations of would-be resigners certainly influence their style of departure from the centers of power. Of the 355 silent resigners fully 73 returned to positions

as senior or more senior than the ones from which they resigned. Only one of the 34 who resigned in protest received a similar reappointment. The message is clear.

Both efficacy and personal cost influence the style of resignation among those prepared to take a principled stance. Here the argument for resignation in protest is somewhat ambiguous. The loss of a power base, of visibility, and of access to information is a serious factor in deciding to work for change from within or to become an ungentlemanly outcast. From most positions one can resign but once. This may induce the officeholder to wait for an even more significant issue about which to announce his or her resignation.

The team can also play rough against defectors who cause it embarrassment. One who leaves the team is certain to be cast as an oddball, to be diagnosed in clinical terms, and to have unflattering motives attached to one's actions. "In disarming a rebel the team always prefers to tackle his etiquette rather than his cause." Team play is so pervasive in American society that the quitter is likely to arouse general distrust no matter how worthy the issues that are being politicized. The ensuing careers of those likely to serve in high-level positions may be most damaged by the transfer to the White House "Enemies" list—a further restraint on public resignation.

In considering the influence of the occupational and class background of these officials the authors dispense with the more conspiratorial dimensions of military-industrial complexes. What they suggest is equally insidious,

but humanly more sympathetic. The ways of thinking and the norms of action useful and appropriate in one profession may be inappropriate in another. For the lawyer, protecting the confidentiality of the client is of paramount concern. However, the lawyer who becomes a government official and relates to the government as a client is compromising at least part of his mandate. The General Motors executive is encouraged to maintain an image of compliance and keep disagreement confined to the boardroom. But if he is truly troubled by a decision or feels his position has not received a fair hearing, he may be able to find an equally attractive job at Ford. A governmental official cannot move over to the competitor.

This recruitment through nonpolitical channels installs officials who may have administrative competence, but whose spectacular rise to power is related primarily to the grace bestowed upon them by the Chief Executive. Not being elected officials, their loyalty to the President is untempered by concern for their public images. Because they do not have constituencies and public concerns to represent before the President, they contribute to, rather than reduce, his insulation.

It is on this point that Weisband and Franck argue for structural change. In order that the President be surrounded by a Cabinet that is at least sensitive to diverse interests rather than a Cabinet of yea-sayers, it is important for the President to recruit from among elected officials, for example, from the members of Congress. Supposedly, under these conditions, team play would be counteracted by other loyalties. Members of the Administration with independent bases of power would be able to maintain greater integrity and broader considerations of the public interest in presenting their views to the President.

This recommendation is supported by a comparison with the British system, where the prime minister chooses his advisors from the members of the House of Commons. Under those conditions, if the frequency of protest resignation is an indication, high-level government officials are better able to maintain their ethical autonomy and resist the pressures of team play. More than half of the British resigners who were studied made their resignations

public, and nearly half of those were subsequently invited back to comparable positions. The ritualized manner in which letters of resignation are read and responded to in the British Parliament is another means of protecting resigners and increasing the efficacy of their gesture.

The authors are distressed by what they see as a countersystem developing to respond to the dysfunctions of the American government. As part of this countersystem they would include the frequency with which inside dissenters are willing to leak information even when they are not willing to go public and the tendency of the press to publicize this material. But Daniel Ellsberg and "Deep Throat" in a Washington garage are, as Weisband and Franck must concede, "an unsatisfactory palliative for a serious systemic dysfunction."

This concern with systemic problems stands out among the virtues of this fine study. Rigorous analysis is

combined with plausible advocacy. It is timely not only in its specific proposals but in the manner in which it argues for political reform. After years of abuse the degree of secrecy with which the government can conduct its affairs is being questioned. Unless the information about the inner sancta of government that has become common knowledge in sensational ways is now utilized to improve the processes by which unwise and illegal activities were decided upon in the past, these revelations will prove to be little more than high-level voyeurism.

CONTRIBUTORS

JERI LABER is a long-time student of and writer on Soviet affairs.

HILLEL LEVINE is Assistant Professor of Sociology and Religious Studies at Yale University and Associate Editor of *Worldview*.

CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA

A PARADOX OF CONSCIENCE

L. HAROLD DeWOLF

This myth-exploding work provides the first comprehensive, historical and ethical analysis of America's most pressing moral problem.

"I would hope a wide audience of legislators, scholars, jurists, and all concerned citizens will attend to what DeWolf says."—Judge Marvin E. Frankel, *United States District Court, New York, New York*

"Will be warmly welcomed by the entire profession and, since it is immensely readable, it promises to be a significant contribution to the thinking of all American intellectuals."—Chief Gerhard O. W. Mueller, *Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Section, United Nations*. \$15.00

 **Harper & Row**
10 E. 53rd St., New York 10022
1817