

The CIA in

Chile

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To what degree was the U.S. responsible for the tragic end of Chilean democracy in the September, 1973, coup? Congressional investigations, press leaks, and the publication of the secret Chile files of ITT have continued to provide new evidence for those on all sides of the question.* Now, through the investigations of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, we have important new information about U.S. policy toward Chile.

The Committee has released an interim report, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, which includes a detailed study of the U.S. relation to the kidnapping-murder of General René Schneider, Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army, in October, 1970. It has also published a staff report on *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-73*, and in early December, 1975, it held two days of hearings on CIA activities in Chile. Based on the secret files of the CIA, State and Defense departments, and (to a limited degree) the White House, the three sources supplement and modify the fragmentary and frequently inaccurate reports published earlier. They are indispensable in assessing the U.S. role in Chile. They also provide documentary evidence on the extent and nature of CIA clandestine involvement in Chilean politics and society in the decade before 1973, they

examine the relation of the U.S. Government to members of the Chilean military who favored a military coup against Salvador Allende in 1970 and 1973, and they evaluate the degree and impact of U.S. economic pressures upon the Allende government. A review of their conclusions produces a much more complex picture of the relation of U.S. policy to events in Chile than the one espoused by partisans of either the right or the left.

The Select Committee did not examine CIA activity in Chile prior to the early 1960's, but its Staff Report mentions earlier Chilean programs with peasants, labor, students, and the media. According to the report, operational relationships with Chilean political parties were first established in 1961. The aim was to promote the development of non-Marxist parties as an alternative to FRAP, the alliance of the two Marxist parties in Chile, the Communists and the Socialists. (FRAP was the party of Salvador Allende, who had narrowly missed being elected president in a five-way race in 1958.) In 1962 the CIA was authorized to spend a

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*For examples of the debate see James Petras and Morris Morley, *The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government* (New York, 1975), ch. 1; the exchange between Elizabeth Farnsworth and me entitled "Chile, What Was the U.S. Role?" *Foreign Policy* (Fall, 1974); and Richard Fagen, "The United States and Chile: Roots and Branches," *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1975).

total of \$180,000 in support of the center-left Christian Democrats, and the next year a total of \$50,000 was approved for the other principal centrist party, the Radicals. When it became apparent in early 1964 that the strongest anti-Allende presidential candidate was Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democrats, \$3 million was authorized for CIA support for his election; \$2.6 million was actually spent, accounting for about half of the Christian Democratic expenditure in the 1964 Chilean presidential elections.

Much of this money seems to have been channeled through the European Christian Democrats, although the report only mentions the use of a "third-country funding channel." Additional sums went to peasants, slum dwellers, and other organizations influenced by the Christian Democrats, as well as for right-wing anti-Communist propaganda (including a last-minute anti-Allende radio broadcast by Fidel Castro's sister). That brings the total CIA expenditure in the 1962-64 period to \$4 million.

Frei won the election. Did CIA covert funds accomplish this? Given the size of his victory—56 per cent to Allende's 39 per cent—it seems unlikely. Besides his own party's support, Frei had the support of the Conservative and Liberal parties—who saw him as the lesser evil and backed him to prevent Allende's election—and it seems clear that these groups together could have given Frei a plurality, if not a majority.

It is interesting to note, in view of later developments, that according to the Staff Report the CIA and the Embassy were approached on three occasions by Chileans before the election to sound out the possibility of American support for a military coup d'état in the event of an Allende victory. All three approaches were rebuffed. The CIA was also instructed to turn down an offer of \$1.5 million to aid the Christian Democrats by a group of American businessmen, which included representatives of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT).

While CIA assistance in the 1964 Frei campaign was widely known—earlier press reports had estimated its financial contribution as high as \$20 million—the Select Committee Report provides new information on expenditures between the 1964 and 1970 Chilean presidential campaigns. A total of \$2 million was spent on twenty covert CIA action projects during the period. Included was \$175,000 for support to selected candidates in the March, 1965, congressional elections, in which the Christian Democrats won a majority in the lower house; \$30,000 for the anti-Marxist wing of the Radical Party (which later split off to form a separate party when the Radicals moved left between 1967 and 1970); and \$350,000 to support candidates in the March, 1969, congressional elections. Part of the latter went to the Popular Socialists under Raúl Ampuero, who had left the main body of the Socialist Party in 1967.

Other projects included support for non-Marxist trade unions, peasant and women's groups, and a right-wing weekly (probably *PEC*), placing editorials and agents ("assets") in *El Mercurio*, Chile's leading newspaper,

and subsidizing a right-wing radio commentator. The organizational efforts were not particularly successful, especially after some of them were exposed in the U.S. press in 1967, but the media connections established in this period proved valuable in the anti-Allende effort of the early 1970's.

New CIA covert action programs in Chile involving substantial expenditures had to be approved by a committee made up of representatives of the White House, the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the March, 1969, Chilean congressional election the CIA proposed to the 303 Committee (since February, 1970, the Forty Committee) that a political action program be initiated for the September, 1970, Chilean presidential race. No decision was made by the Committee until March, 1970, when \$135,000 was authorized for an anti-Allende "spoiling" operation. That operation did not involve financial support to either of the other two candidates—Radomiro Tomic of the Christian Democrats and Jorge Alessandri of the Right. In June the funding was increased to \$300,000, principally for anti-Communist propaganda in the media and by "independent" anti-Communist groups.

Also in June Ambassador Edward Korry proposed that a contingency plan involving \$500,000 be approved to "influence" the vote of the Chilean congress if, as was almost certain, the three-way election did not produce a majority winner and, in accordance with the Chilean constitution, the congress had to choose between the top two contenders. Korry's proposal was opposed by the State Department representative and a decision deferred until after the September election. (The report does not indicate why CIA funding was so limited in the 1970 popular election, as compared with 1964, but it probably was related to State Department opposition to electoral intervention and to U.S. indecision about which of the two non-Marxist candidates to support.)

As in 1964 ITT approached the CIA with a proposal that it transmit ITT money to Alessandri. The proposal was turned down formally, but the CIA gave ITT advice on channels through which to pass the money; \$350,000 was given to Alessandri by ITT and an additional \$350,000 came from other U.S. businesses. (A spectacular holdup of Alessandri's advertising agency in July, 1970, led to exposure of some of these financial sources, including contributions from Anaconda Copper.) The only information the report provides about external financial help to Allende is a CIA estimate of \$350,000 from Cuba and an additional, undetermined, amount from the Soviet Union.

Allende narrowly won the popular election on September 4, 1970, receiving 36.1 per cent of the vote to Alessandri's 34.9 per cent. A CIA summary of the intelligence community's views on the effects of an Allende presidency, issued on September 7, concluded: "(1) The U.S. has no vital national interests

within Chile. There would however be tangible economic losses. (2) The world military balance of power would not be significantly altered by an Allende government," although an Allende victory would represent "a psychological setback to the U.S. as well as a definite psychological advance for the Marxist idea" (Assassination Report, p. 229).

Nevertheless, on September 14, 1970, the Forty Committee met and, over reported State Department objections to "subornation," authorized \$250,000 to swing to Alessandri, the runner-up, the necessary congressional votes in the October 24 runoff. In fact none of the money was spent, since it was quickly perceived that bribery would be ineffective in the Chilean political context.

The Forty Committee also decided upon a coordinated campaign of propaganda and economic pressure to persuade President Frei and the Christian Democrats either to support Alessandri (who had announced publicly that he would, if chosen, resign to permit new elections to be held in which Frei would be eligible to run as the joint candidate of the Right and the Christian Democrats) or to step down in favor of military intervention, again leading to new elections. It was in this connection that Ambassador Korry reported to his superiors that he and Frei's Defense Minister had agreed that pressure should be put on Frei to warn him that "not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende.... We shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to the utmost deprivation and misery" (Assassination Report, p. 231).

The economic pressures also included CIA attempts to enlist the assistance of U.S. companies and to establish an interagency working group to coordinate economic policy toward Chile. According to the Staff Report, the stepped-up program of economic warfare was opposed by the State Department representatives when it was decided upon by the Forty Committee on September 29, 1970. Their objection was that it involved a major shift in previous policy toward Chile.

A major economic panic was already under way in Chile as a result of Allende's election, and U.S. efforts only intensified it. Frei refused to take any action to interfere with the normal constitutional processes, and he was supported in this by an equally determined commander in chief of the Chilean army, General René Schneider.

As early as the September 8, 1970, meeting of the Forty Committee Henry Kissinger put on the agenda an exploration of the pros and cons of supporting a military coup in Chile. Following the meeting, both the Ambassador and the CIA responded with decidedly negative estimates to a Forty Committee request for an assessment of the possibilities of a coup. In his December 4, 1975, testimony to the Select Committee former Ambassador Korry quoted from dispatches he had sent on September 25 and October 9, 1970, warning that a U.S.-assisted military coup could be another Bay of Pigs fiasco. He also testified that he had repeatedly assured the Frei government that the U.S. would not

support any military action "independently of President Frei and without his knowledge and consent."

Despite all these negative indications, a secret effort outside all normal government channels—the so-called Track II—was made by the White House. The plan was to use the CIA to promote a military coup and thus to prevent Allende from taking power. (The origins and implementation of this effort are reminiscent of another White House secret operation two years later.) Augustin Edwards, publisher of *El Mercurio*, had left Chile immediately after the election and was staying at the home of Don Kendall, president of Pepsi-Cola and a friend of Richard Nixon. On September 15, at Kendall's suggestion, Henry Kissinger and Attorney General John Mitchell met Edwards for breakfast to discuss the Chilean situation. This was followed by a White House meeting about Chile attended by Nixon, Kissinger, Mitchell, and CIA Director Richard Helms. Helms's notes and subsequent instructions to the CIA indicate that he was told that \$10 million was available for an action plan involving the Chilean military, a plan that was to be concealed from the Embassy and from the Departments of State and Defense. The Committee Report quotes CIA dispatches from Santiago indicating continuing pessimism about the possibilities of carrying out Track II, but the "station" was told not to argue but simply to report on actions taken (Assassination Report, p. 239).

By early October it was apparent that the only way to stop Allende was through removing or neutralizing General Schneider, who continued to insist that the constitutional procedures prescribing the congressional runoff be followed. During October the CIA made a total of twenty-one contacts with active and retired military men who were plotting a coup, the first step of which involved the kidnapping of Schneider. One group, headed by retired general Roberto Viaux, but mainly civilian in composition, was initially encouraged. Then, after a meeting between Kissinger and the CIA on October 15, the group was requested to postpone taking any action "because it would be counterproductive to our Track Two objectives" (Assassination Report, p. 243). That is, such action was thought likely to fail due to incompetence or lack of support from the military on active duty.

But the CIA continued to support the coup plans of a number of high-ranking officers in all three branches of the military and the national police, headed by General Camilo Valenzuela, chief of the Santiago garrison. At Valenzuela's behest there were two efforts made at kidnapping General Schneider, one on October 19, the other on the 20th. Through the U.S. military attaché the CIA had passed to Chilean military officers on October 18 six tear gas grenades. On October 22, the same day that members of the Viaux group made a kidnapping attempt (apparently without using the CIA weapons), three submachine guns had been passed along. It was this latter attempt that resulted in Schneider's death. The CIA Santiago station thought initially that it was Valenzuela who had carried out the abduction and authorized the attaché to "hand over \$50,000 if General Valenzuela requests" (Assassination Report, p. 245).

Henry Kissinger told the Select Committee that he was informed of nothing after October 15 and that it was his understanding of the October 15 meeting with the CIA that coup plans had been "turned off." However, the Assassination Report quotes a CIA Headquarters cable to Santiago on October 16 as stating: "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup." The report also refers to an October 20 cable requesting information in response "to queries from high levels" on the unsuccessful October 19 kidnapping attempt. After General Schneider's assassination, however, Allende's opponents were thrown into disarray, and it was apparent there was no further possibility of a coup. On October 24, by a vote of 153-35, the Chilean congress voted to elect Salvador Allende president of Chile.

President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger have both said that CIA covert action in Chile during the Allende period was directed at maintaining political pluralism through support for opposition parties and media. The record as laid out in the Select Committee Staff Report and hearings indicates that, while the bulk of the funds went for this purpose, other programs and actions were carried out that went beyond the maintenance of political democracy.

According to the report, more than half of the \$6 million approved by the Forty Committee during the period went to support opposition political parties in two national elections and four by-elections, and to subsidize party purchases of newspapers and radio stations and party organization and activities. Beginning in September, 1971, *El Mercurio* also received support, which totaled \$1.5 million over the next two years. Opposition magazines, radio stations, research organizations, pamphlets, and books—these too were subsidized by the Agency.

But it was not only democratic organizations that received support. According to the Select Committee Report, *Patria y Libertad*, a right-wing extremist group that turned increasingly to violence at the end of the Allende period, received \$38,500 during the Track II efforts of 1970 and additional amounts totaling \$7,000 during 1971. Support was supposed to end then, but the report indicates the possibility that some of the assistance to right-wing parties was passed to *Patria y Libertad* after that, despite its increasing resort to violence.

Beginning in September, 1972, CIA aid was also funneled to private sector organizations that were leading the opposition to Allende. At that time \$24,000 was authorized for the *Sociedad de Fomento Fabril* (Society for the Development of Manufacturing), and at the end of October \$100,000 went to various anti-Allende *gremios* as part of a \$1.5 million authorization justified as support for propaganda for the March, 1973, congressional elections. The private sector groups did engage in electoral activity, but after the election they also supported a lengthy strike by copper miners, which had a crippling effect on the Chilean economy. Beginning in late July they began a series of strikes that lasted until the September coup.

The report devotes particular attention to the relation of the CIA to the truckers' organization, since their crippling strikes in October, 1972, and from July to September, 1973, were believed by many to have been CIA-financed and thought to have had much to do with provoking the coup itself. From the Staff Report it now appears that the truckers did not receive as much CIA assistance as many had assumed (certainly not the "majority" of the CIA expenditures, as asserted in a *New York Times* story of September 20, 1974), and that because it was known that the truckers wanted to provoke a coup, Ambassador Nathaniel Davis was strongly opposed to their receiving any assistance at all. The Select Committee's investigators were able to identify one case in which "a private sector organization" (probably the *Sociedad de Fomento Fabril*) passed \$2,800 to the truckers in late 1972 in violation of an express CIA prohibition imposed by the Forty Committee. The CIA rebuked the organization, but continued to pass it money. In August, 1973, while the second truckers' strike was in progress, the CIA proposed they be given \$25,000, but this was again opposed by the Ambassador. More than \$2,800 may have found its way to the truckers through other organizations, especially during the 1973 strike, but the Forty Committee never approved such expenditures.

How much difference did the covert assistance to opposition groups make? To anyone watching Chilean politics in the early 1970's it was clear that the opposition, completely demoralized and defeatist in late 1970, had a very different attitude a year later. For by then they had experienced the first anti-Allende street demonstrations, by-election victories, and the successful resistance to government efforts to bankrupt the private paper company (which, we now know, was salvaged by a CIA-financed fund that outbid the government in efforts to purchase shares in the company). Still, with Chile so polarized and politicized in the early 1970's, it is difficult to imagine the middle- and lower-middle-class groups giving up without their own fight—or that the elections were decided by the number of radio spots or opposition advertisements. Many groups in Chile, and not all of them wealthy, felt—were—directly threatened by Allende's policies; they did not need CIA propaganda to inform them of that fact. The small amounts that went to *Patria y Libertad* and to the truckers were not vital to their existence or significant in terms of their overall activity. (It did illustrate, though, the difficulty of distinguishing between democratic and undemocratic groups once the CIA was involved in massive assistance to the anti-Allende opposition.) The CIA aid made a psychological difference, but it is doubtful that it was a necessary or sufficient cause of the anti-Allende movement.

Not all covert opposition to Allende was conducted by the CIA. Since the Chilean coup there has been a continuing controversy over the extent, motivation, and nature of the Allende govern-

ment's difficulty in obtaining credit from the United States and from international financial institutions. The Select Committee Staff Report indicates that at least some of those difficulties resulted from a secret policy decision adopted well before the dispute over compensation for nationalization of the copper mines in October, 1971, and the Chilean moratorium on debt repayment in the following month—actions which some, including this writer, have taken to be the principal reasons for Allende's credit problems.* In November, 1970, National Security Decision Memorandum 93 called for termination of new bilateral U.S. aid to Chile, although disbursements would continue under loans previously made. In addition, the U.S. was to use its influence in international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to dry up the flow of new multilateral credit for Chile; and "to the extent possible, financial assistance or guarantees to U.S. private investment would be ended, and U.S. businesses would be made aware of the government's concern and its restrictive policies" (Staff Report, p. 33).

In fact, Chile did not request or receive any new AID loans; it asked for several loans from the Interamerican Development Bank, but received only two small loans to private universities in 1971. Its requests for loans from the World Bank were still "under study" at the time of the coup. The IMF did make two large export shortfall loans in 1971 and 1972, and the Export-Import Bank, while "postponing" a new loan in August, 1971, did not terminate its guarantee program until February, 1972, in response to the Chilean default on debt repayments. U.S. pressure for compensation payment for the nationalized copper companies prevented any agreement on renegotiation of the Chilean debt of nearly \$1 billion. Pending such an agreement, Chile did not make any debt repayments to the U.S. (with the interesting exception of payments on the military aid program) after November, 1971—thus saving substantial amounts of foreign exchange.

On the copper compensation question, the U.S. Ambassador in Chile initially pursued a policy of accommodation with Allende. The transcript of the December 4, 1975, hearings of the Select Committee contains a declassified cable from Ambassador Korry, dated October 1, 1971, describing his negotiations with the Allende government in the preceding several months. He offered a U.S. Government guarantee of Chilean bonds if Allende would agree to compensate the American copper companies for their share of the ownership of the newly nationalized mines. The offer was finally rejected, but Korry points to it as an indication of his good faith in attempting to establish the basis for an improvement in U.S. relations with the Allende government. (It would have had the additional advantage of saving the American taxpayer the monies used to reimburse the companies for that part of their losses insured by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.) The negotiations demonstrate at least that American policy was not always and everywhere aimed at the destruction of the Allende government.

How much of a difference did the economic squeeze make in the politics of Chile under Allende? Until 1973

Allende was able to get considerable economic assistance from Europe and Latin America. This kept the economy going, although there were serious problems with spare parts, for which Chile was dependent on American credits and suppliers. It is difficult to know whether the Chilean credit problems in the U.S. were the result of U.S. Government pressures or a normal reaction by banks and suppliers to Allende's domestic economic policy, a policy that created doubt that creditors would be repaid. However, there is no doubt that the U.S. Government intended to create serious credit difficulties for Allende—whether or not it was wholly effective or decisive in practice.

The question whether the U.S. Government had a direct role in the 1973 coup is examined in detail in the Staff Report. It estimates that out of \$14 million spent on covert activities in Chile between 1963 and 1973, less than \$200,000 was spent on the promotion of a military coup in 1970 (Staff Report, p. 7). It found that the only covert CIA efforts to influence the military against Allende took place at the end of 1971. In September, 1971, the CIA Santiago station proposed fabricating information that Cuban intelligence was working with the Allende-controlled *Investigaciones* to gather material prejudicial to the army high command. CIA Headquarters recommended the use of "verifiable" information, but in December, 1971, it approved the passage of a packet of materials that included a fabricated letter to a Chilean officer in Mexico. At about the same time a short-lived effort was made to subsidize an antigovernment news pamphlet directed at the armed services.

The Staff Report indicates no other covert operations designed to promote military action against Allende, although the CIA began to monitor coup plotting within the Chilean military in late 1971. Reports of an impending coup peaked at the end of June, 1973 (when a tank

*See my "The Invisible Blockade and the Overthrow of Allende," *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1974).



regiment revolted) and at the end of August and during the first two weeks of September (when everyone in Chile, including Allende, believed that a coup was likely). However, the report finds "no evidence" that the U.S. was directly involved in the coup itself and observes that in November, 1971, at the beginning of its military penetration program, CIA Headquarters had warned the Santiago station that it did not have Forty Committee approval to become involved in a coup. But it does conclude that "the CIA information gathering efforts went beyond the mere collection of information.... They put the United States Government in contact with those Chileans who sought a military alternative to the Allende presidency" (Staff Report, p. 39). The report on the Schneider assassination also quotes a CIA official as testifying that "the seeds that were laid in that effort in 1970 [Track II] had their impact in 1973" (Assassination Report, p. 254), i.e., dissident officers could assume on the basis of Track II that the United States would favor a coup.

The relationship established before the coup had certain effects in its aftermath. Chilean collaborators with the CIA were involved in the preparation of the *White Book* justifying the coup and in the elaboration of the junta's economic program, which also drew on the work of CIA-supported research organizations. CIA funds paid for a trip by Chilean trade unionists to other countries to justify the coup and fulfilled previous commitments to purchase a radio station. As late as July, 1974, the Forty Committee approved the transfer of \$50,000, previously committed, to the Christian Democratic Party, which had been declared "in recess" by the junta. The CIA is also described as assembling "arrest lists" during the Allende period, but it denies that it passed them to the Chilean military after the coup.

What emerges from the Committee reports and hearings is extensive CIA intelligence contact with the Chilean military between 1971 and 1973, but a conscious policy of avoidance of involvement in the September coup. (Newspaper reports have claimed that CIA contact with the military was broken off several months before the coup, when it became apparent that it was in the offing.)


This review of what is now the most complete set of revelations of U.S. covert policy toward Chile (or any other nation, for that matter) has added important new elements to our understanding of U.S. policy toward Chile.* These include the revelation of the secret Track II effort by the White House to provoke a coup in 1970, the formal decision (not fully implemented) in November, 1970, to undertake economic warfare against Allende, and the Forty Committee prohibitions (violated on at least one occasion) of financial assistance to the striking truckers. Such revelations change one's perception of U.S.-Chilean relations in the Allende period, but they do not provide a definitive answer to the question of the causes of the coup. We do not have an analysis of the internal factors in Chile, especially of Allende's domestic economic policy and of the relations of the principal domestic political actors, and this renders us unable to reach a final conclusion

about the relative importance of external factors. What is clear is that U.S. covert intervention in Chile went beyond support for opposition parties and the media and bears some share of responsibility for the overthrow of Allende. In any case, it is likely that the increasing political polarization and economic mismanagement under the Allende government would have made it impossible for him to finish his six-year term. But given a different U.S. policy, a variety of alternative Chilean political scenarios can be constructed.

The reports provide a more complete picture on the role of American companies in Chile. They add to what was already known about close ITT-CIA relations in 1964 and 1970, and they add also the personal role of the president of Pepsi-Cola, friend to both President Nixon and *El Mercurio's* publisher, in September, 1970. But the basic motivation for the opposition to Allende seems to have been political rather than economic, and the multinationals appear to have been a contributing, but not decisive, factor in the pattern of U.S. Government decision-making. As the Staff Report concludes, the basic objectives of the program were to frustrate the Allende experiment so that it would not be used as a model elsewhere, to prevent Chile from being used as a base for subversion elsewhere in Latin America, and—only in third place—to sustain the principle of compensation for nationalized U.S. firms (p. 27). Behind these considerations was a general view of international relations summarized by one Committee witness as "a worldwide strategic chess game" in which Chile was "worth a couple of pawns, perhaps more," which once lost could not be regained (p. 52).

The pattern of decision-making reveals both a general policy of opposition to Allende and considerable differences over how to do it. The State Department and Ambassador Nathaniel Davis display a consistent preference for what an ITT memo writer called in October, 1971, the "soft-line low profile policy." They opposed covert expenditures in December, 1969, and in June and September, 1970, as well as the program of economic pressure initiated in late September, 1970. They opposed aid to the striking truckers in 1972 and 1973, and

*The staff report, comprehensive and balanced as it is, contains some errors of fact and interpretation. The military revolt of October, 1969, was not called the *Tacnazo* because it took place in the city of Tacna (p. 36), but because it was carried out by the Tacna Regiment, stationed in Santiago. Track I and Track II were not as similar as the reports indicate, since the military intervention contemplated in Track I seems only to have involved the formation of a military cabinet to supervise new elections after the constitutionally permitted resignation of President Frei. Henry Kissinger's assertion in his testimony to the Select Committee that the two tracks "were merging" because they "were working on exactly the same problem" glosses over the important difference between maintenance and rupture of Chile's constitutional processes. The implication that the Christian Democrats did badly in the 1970 presidential elections because the CIA was not assisting them financially (p. 55) is unpersuasive to anyone who observed the inept campaign of Radomiro Tomic. The ITT eighteen-point anti-Allende plan was submitted to the White House in October, 1971 (after the "intervention" of their Chilean holdings) rather than in October, 1970 (p. 59). (The ITT and Tacna errors have been corrected in later reprintings of the report.)



generally preferred diplomacy over economic warfare and subversion. The CIA does not emerge as the "rogue elephant" characterized by Senator Frank Church, but, on the whole, faithful to the directions given to it by the Forty Committee and (even when it was very dubious about the wisdom of those directions) by the White House. There were problems, however, in controlling the ultimate destination of funds passed, as the examples of the truckers and *Patria y Libertad* illustrate.

The question of responsibility I raised at the outset turns out to be a difficult one to answer. If there is no direct connection between the anti-Allende effort and the September, 1973, coup, there are indirect links that are now revealed to have been considerable. And the revelation of Track II adds a whole new dimension to military thinking about U.S. policy. It demonstrates that before and after Allende came to power there was never really a chance for the U.S. "to have the kind of relations with Allende that he wishes to have with us"—to use President Nixon's duplicitous description of U.S. policy toward Chile in 1972. It demonstrates also that at least in the case of Nixon and Kissinger the promotion of a military coup was an active option from the beginning.

On the other hand, it seems that others in government, notably the State Department, were strongly opposed to this course, and that their opposition had an effect on policy, both in the furtive character of Track II and on the limits placed on CIA activity thereafter. Yet those limits were not always effective in practice, and on at least two occasions the CIA engaged in morally repulsive acts involving the distribution of "fabricated" (i.e., false) documentation against a legitimately elected democratic government.*

These actions and the entire program of covert activity have been justified on the basis of a possible threat to

democracy on the part of the Allende government or its supporters. In particular, the government pressures upon the media, especially radio stations, newspapers, and Chile's only private paper company, have been cited as actions that justify assistance to the non-Marxist opposition. It is regrettable that, aside from the passing reference to Allende's external sources of funding, there is nothing in any of the reports on Chile about what the CIA knew about the activities and plans of the other side, for this can help us assess the degree of threat to Chilean democracy U.S. Government policy-makers may have perceived. In particular, the report gives no information about the widespread distribution of arms and the organization of paramilitary groups on both sides, which by 1973 had made Chile an armed camp approaching civil war and which were cited by the Chilean military to justify its intervention.

The Chilean case is not the "exaggerated morality fable" alluded to by Ambassador Korry in his testimony to the Select Committee "in which American officials are all Nazi-like bully boys cuffing around innocent Social Democrats." But it does show the astonishing degree to which an open society can be penetrated by political and economic means and demonstrates the dangers of uncontrolled covert activity. When that covert activity results in the establishment of a repressive military regime that denies basic civil liberties—which is what Chile now has—it raises all the more graphically the questions of responsibility and culpability. The cutoff of U.S. military aid to Chile in 1974, the efforts in the U.S. Congress to terminate economic assistance to Chile in the current Foreign Assistance bill, and the likely establishment of much stronger controls on covert activity are understandable responses to a story whose conclusion stands as a sad contradiction to the democratic values for whose furtherance it was ostensibly initiated and carried out. For reasons different from those that Henry Kissinger would ascribe, it seems to confirm the judgment made by Thucydides 2,500 years ago: "Democracy is incapable of empire."

*Besides the false information passed to a Chilean officer in 1971, the Assassination Report (p. 234) also quotes CIA Headquarters directives to its Santiago station in 1970 to "create a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation and terrorist activities" (October 9, 1970) and to prepare a "report based on some well-known facts and some fiction to justify coup which could be 'planted' during raids planned by the Chilean national police (October 19, 1970).