

cellent analysis is that insufficient responsibility for the failure of sanctions is assigned to nations other than Great Britain. In Good's view Wilson is clearly the villain of the whole affair; thus he tends to overlook a virtual conspiracy of the industrialized nations to continue business as usual. The decision of the U.S., for example, to continue chrome purchases from Rhodesia is barely mentioned. Of far more pragmatic significance, most developed nations continued to purchase goods nominally from South Africa that they must have known originated in Rhodesia. Japan, for one, complied with the letter of the U.N. resolution and reduced its imports from Rhodesia by 95 per cent in the first quarter following the resolution. During the same quarter it increased its imports from South Africa by the very same amount. Both the businessmen directly concerned and the Japanese Government certainly knew the source of their

increased purchases in South Africa and, like most of the developed nations, chose to ignore the spirit of the U.N. resolution.

Despite the very limited effect of world economic pressures against Rhodesia, Good closes with an appeal for the indefinite continuation of sanctions. He recognizes that they are not likely to induce Rhodesian whites to change their position radically. In common with many African leaders, Good maintains that it must ultimately be the "...African people themselves who fuel the engines of change in Rhodesia, as elsewhere in Southern Africa," but that international economic pressures against Rhodesia are of crucial symbolic significance in speeding this process. In recent months and weeks the crisis in Rhodesia has intensified. Good's book is an invaluable aid to understanding some of the ingredients in that crisis.

ing effort to explain *the* correct position on such issues as noncombatant immunity and the probability of proportionate good resulting from modern war on the basis of *the* just war teaching of the Church.

At the time of these Vatican II debates some of us thought it was not possible to reach such clear-cut conclusions, because we did not think that the just war tradition was all cut of the same cloth. We saw different sources within the tradition and different emphases, depending on the subject and the historical context in which various moral prescriptions were proposed. Now we have Johnson's detailed treatment of these very points. Since, not surprisingly, the moral and practical problems addressed by Vatican II remain to challenge us, it is well that we have Johnson's book to help us in our continuing efforts to study the question of war.

Two fundamental aims are set forth in this book. First, Johnson undertakes "to explore the nature of the interaction between religion and secular society, not just in the dissolution of just war doctrine but also in its formation...." Second, the book is written in order "to investigate just war doctrine as an ideological pattern of thought, expressive of a greater ideology." Johnson rightly claims that in addressing these aims he is making an original contribution to just war literature.

With respect to the first, Johnson points out that much of just war literature is excessively theoretical. It is markedly lacking in reference to the effects of the doctrine on contemporary society as well as in recognition of the impact of secular thought and behavior patterns on the doctrine. In the latter regard Johnson is particularly concerned with the state of warfare in the centuries wherein the doctrine developed and claims to have consulted a substantially more detailed literature on that subject than have previous writers, a claim he appears to have substantiated.

Johnson's second purpose, reflected in the book's title, is to clarify the role of ideology in just war doctrine. He takes Max Weber's meaning of ideology as his starting point, using the term in a neutral sense "to refer to belief structures that are discretely based and different from one another," without value judgment as to the content. Johnson perceptively applies this concept not only to the Christian practitioners of just

Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200-1740 by James Turner Johnson

(Princeton University Press; 291 pp.; \$12.50)

William V. O'Brien

James Turner Johnson teaches in the Department of Religion, Douglass College, Rutgers University. He has already written some first-rate scholarly articles on just war issues and, with David Smith, is a coeditor of, and a contributor to, *Love and Society: Essays in the Ethics of Paul Ramsey*. His book *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War* fills a major gap in just war literature. Tracing the evolution of just war doctrine from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century, he shows the multiple sources that produced not one but several models of just war. In so doing he convincingly demonstrates the continuities and differences in these models. Such a comprehensive and authoritative treatment has long been needed to correct those who argue just war issues in terms of a single monolithic doctrine bearing the author-

ity of all writers in the tradition back through St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine. Johnson demonstrates clearly the changing content and emphases of just war thinking over the five and a half centuries surveyed.

Some of us have long thought it was necessary to make the kinds of distinctions brought out by Johnson. However, to the best of my knowledge no one has so thoroughly and comprehensively analyzed the stages and content of the evolving just war doctrine in the periods of its greatest growth. It is a pity that this book was not available during the Vatican II debates over war/peace issues in the Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (see *Peace, the Churches, and the Bomb*, edited by James Finn and published by the Council on Religion and International Affairs). At that time there was a continu-

war doctrine but to a combined theological-geographical entity, Christendom. Just war doctrine was part of the ideology, the community law of Christendom. Johnson asserts: "There is considerable evidence that so long as Christendom existed the developing just war doctrine did effectively limit conflicts within the community." While concurring generally, I think that this point requires more convincing proof.

Johnson distinguishes four components of "Classical Just War Doctrine" that had developed by the end of the Middle Ages. Two components are theological or churchly: the just war doctrine in Scholastic theology and canon law. Two components comprise the secular portion of the doctrine: the chivalric code and the customary law or *jus gentium* that emerged from the practice of belligerents. It is important to note that the churchly doctrine dealt mainly with the *jus ad bellum*, the law regulating recourse to armed coercion. The secular doctrine was concerned mainly with the *jus in bello*, the law governing the conduct of armed coercion, including, notably, issues like noncombatant immunity.

The Classic Just War Doctrine broke up into two streams of thought: the theological "Holy War Doctrine" and the secular, naturalist "Modern Just War Doctrine." The Holy War Doctrine, applied in the religious wars that rent Christendom, affected both the *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* and reflected conflicting Christian ideologies rather than a community sense of objective justice. The secularist-naturalist thought was increasingly nonideological and unconcerned with justice. It gradually deemphasized the *jus ad bellum* and built up the *jus in bello* in what became positive international law.

By modern times the Holy War Doctrine was a relic and the Modern Just War Doctrine of interest primarily to Catholic thought. Justice had all but disappeared in the just war tradition. Catholic thought, notably in papal pronouncements, picked up the post-World War I emphasis on "outlawing" aggressive war. This secular, nonideological law amounts, in effect, to a "no first use of armed coercion" rule. The modern just war theory is essentially, then, a reiteration of the aspirations of the League Covenant, Kellogg-Briand Pact, U.N. Charter law outlawing aggressive war, its *jus ad bellum*, and a


faltering effort to apply such traditional *jus in bello* concepts as noncombatant immunity and proportionality to the runaway military technology of modern war and deterrence.

Thus it came about that the most important descendant of the Classic Just War tradition, the Catholic just war doctrine of the twentieth century, is not directly concerned with justice. It is concerned with limiting the occasions for permissible resort to armed coercion and with limiting the destructiveness of such coercion when it occurs. Accordingly, I have thought it would be more accurate to characterize both the *jus ad*

bellum and the *jus in bello* components of contemporary Catholic just war with Myres S. McDougal's term "permissible coercion" (as defined in the book he wrote with Florentino P. Feliciano, *Law and Minimum World Public Order*).

Indeed, as Johnson points out, contemporary Catholic just war doctrine, along with positive international law, has reached a point where justice must be sacrificed in order to respect the comparatively value-free legal-moral prohibition against first use of armed coercion. Johnson says that "when a non-meritarian standard of justice is in play, there may come a time when that

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standard implies first use of force, even when the country initiating armed action is not directly threatened but acts altruistically to defend or support another nation." He continues: "This possibility is certainly provided for in classic just war doctrine through its own version of non-meritarian justice, that based in charity. But this element in classic doctrine's concept of justice is removed when religion is excised from among the causes of war." Johnson is concerned whether "the contemporary narrow construal of the *jus ad bellum*, a concept designedly as free from ideological (value) taint as possible, is not a case of throwing out the possibility of war for humanitarian or charitable reasons along with the possibility of holy or ideological war."

Johnson's work concludes with three propositions for further study:

1. Nonideological restraints on war have proved to be minimal, e.g., the failure of the functional definition of noncombatant immunity.

2. The nonideological no-first-strike rule fails to meet "even objective meritarian standards of justice."

3. "[I]deological constraints on war hold out a hope as well as a threat."

Johnson argues that only ideological constraints on war "seem to support a doctrine that can truly be called 'just,' both in the meritarian sense just referred to and in the higher, non-meritarian sense earlier identified as present in both Christianity and humanitarianism." But he recognizes the danger "that ideological justifications can be turned around to support the waging of war for narrow, particularist reasons—whether 'holy war' in the seventeenth century or 'war of national liberation' in the twentieth."

It is Johnson's conviction that we are in a relatively good position to investigate the possibilities of ideological restraints on war. He points out that today we are more skeptical about ideologies and aware of their relative nature. Moreover, he believes that we are closer to a universal value system in a rudimentary international community than is generally realized.

In this review I have outlined Johnson's contribution to the history of just war doctrine while emphasizing specifically some of the implications of his critique for contemporary doctrine and problems. I reiterate that this lucid and scholarly treatment of the develop-

ment of just war theories is enormously valuable. Having said this, a word about his three hypotheses for future study is in order.

First, it is certainly true that nonideological restraints on the conduct of war have proved ineffectual. This is so true that major figures in positive international law such as Lauterpacht have despaired of achieving any serious *jus in bello* in the principal areas of belligerent activity and have argued that only humanitarian law on subjects such as protection of prisoners of war and civilians in occupied territories is possible in our time. There remains, however, the question of the nuclear balance of terror and the record to date of abstention from use of nuclear weapons based, apparently, on a community of fear irrespective of ideology. This would need discussion in the event of initiatives to find adequate ideological bases for a revived *jus in bello*. Other critical *jus in bello* issues of conventional and revolutionary war need renewed attention.

Second, it is clear that the no-first-use of armed coercion rule is in jeopardy. Thirty years after the U.N. Charter was ratified it is increasingly uncertain whether the practice and expectations of international persons reflect this rule. Nor is it clear whether normative publicists, particularly outside the "official" Catholic tradition, support this prohibition of first recourse to force, regardless of justice.

Third, one must agree with Johnson that a revival of ideological constraints

on war holds out hope as well as a threat. Perhaps it will be easier to recognize the need to address this question if we realize that it has already been reopened for us. Wars of national liberation remain a reality. Their endorsement, notably by influential segments of the major religious and humanitarian communities, has, indeed, produced a double standard that threatens to condemn all wars that are not for national liberation and accept without question all that are so characterized.

It is to be hoped that Johnson is right in his reading of contemporary trends. We may be more clearheaded about conflicting ideologies and better able to perceive an emerging rudimentary international community with a universal value system. On the other hand, the questionable status of efforts to develop international law in areas ranging from the law of the sea to suppression of international hijacking and terrorism to the laws of war themselves provides little encouragement. The irresponsible brinkmanship currently practiced by the Third World and Socialist nations in the United Nations and other international forums threatens seriously the kinds of hopes held out by Johnson. Nevertheless, if there is ever to be progress toward the regulation of armed coercion, it will be because the problems reviewed in Johnson's book have been attacked with the blend of traditional wisdom and creative new thinking that marks Johnson's own contribution to the perennial just war tradition.

The Great War and Modern Memory by Paul Fussell

(Oxford; 363 pp.; \$13.95)

Stanley G. Payne

It is standard practice among professional historians to hold that the twentieth century began not in 1901 but 1914, the argument being that the real break between the institutions and ideas of the past and present centuries occurred only with the onset of World War I. In the Western countries there was a general tendency for some two decades after the armistice to consider the "Great War" as an historical object in

itself, a unique historical climax. After 1939, however, it became clear that the Great War was indeed merely the beginning of an historical period, the "era of world wars" that lasted from 1914 to 1945 and established the matrix of the twentieth century (those of more apocalyptic mind would say of the final period of human history).

Fussell's book is set within this conceptual framework, though in fact its