standard implies first use of force, even when the country initiating armed action is not directly threatened but acts altruistically to defend or support another nation.' He continues: 'This possibility is certainly provided for in classic just war doctrine through its own version of non-meritarian justice, that based in charity. But this element in classic doctrine's concept of justice is removed when religion is excised from among the causes of war.' Johnson is concerned whether 'the contemporary narrow construal of the *jus ad bellum*, a concept designedly as free from ideological (value) taint as possible, is not a case of throwing out the possibility of war for humanitarian or charitable reasons along with the possibility of holy or ideological war.'

Johnson's work concludes with three propositions for further study:

1. Nonideological restraints on war have proved to be minimal, e.g., the failure of the functional definition of noncombatant immunity.
2. The nonideological no-first-strike rule fails to meet "even objective meritarian standards of justice."
3. "[I]deological constraints on war hold out a hope as well as a threat."

Johnson argues that only ideological constraints on war "seem to support a doctrine that can truly be called 'just,'" both in the meritarian sense just referred to and in the higher, non-meritarian sense earlier identified as present in both Christianity and humanitarianism." But he recognizes the danger "that ideological justifications can be turned around to support the waging of war for narrow, particularist reasons—whether 'holy war' in the seventeenth century or 'war of national liberation' in the twentieth."

It is Johnson's conviction that we are in a relatively good position to investigate the possibilities of ideological restraints on war. He points out that today we are more skeptical about ideologies and aware of their relative nature. Moreover, he believes that we are closer to a universal value system in a rudimentary international community than is generally realized.

In this review I have outlined Johnson's contribution to the history of just war doctrine while emphasizing specifically some of the implications of his critique for contemporary doctrine and problems. I reiterate that this lucid and scholarly treatment of the development of just war theories is enormously valuable. Having said this, a word about his three hypotheses for future study is in order.

First, it is certainly true that nonideological restraints on the conduct of war have proved ineffectual. This is so true that major figures in positive international law such as Lauterpacht have despaired of achieving any serious *jus in bello* in the principal areas of belligerent activity and have argued that only humanitarian law on subjects such as protection of prisoners of war and civilians in occupied territories is possible in our time. There remains, however, the question of the nuclear balance of terror and the record to date of abstention from use of nuclear weapons based, apparently, on a community of fear irrespective of ideology. This would need discussion in the event of initiatives to find adequate ideological bases for a revived *jus in bello*. Other critical *jus in bello* issues of conventional and revolutionary war need renewed attention.

Second, it is clear that the no-first-use of armed coercion rule is in jeopardy. Thirty years after the U.N. Charter was ratified it is increasingly uncertain whether the practice and expectations of international persons reflect this rule. Nor is it clear whether normative publicists, particularly outside the "official" Catholic tradition, support this prohibition of first recourse to force, regardless of justice.

Third, one must agree with Johnson that a revival of ideological constraints on war holds out hope as well as a threat. Perhaps it will be easier to recognize the need to address this question if we realize that it has already been reopened for us. Wars of national liberation remain a reality. Their endorsement, notably by influential segments of the major religious and humanitarian communities, has, indeed, produced a double standard that threatens to condemn all wars that are not for national liberation and accept without question all that are so characterized.

It is to be hoped that Johnson is right in his reading of contemporary trends. We may be more clearheaded about conflicting ideologies and better able to perceive an emerging rudimentary international community with a universal value system. On the other hand, the questionable status of efforts to develop international law in areas ranging from the law of the sea to suppression of international hijacking and terrorism to the laws of war themselves provides little encouragement. The irresponsible brinkmanship currently practiced by the Third World and Socialist nations in the United Nations and other international forums threatens seriously the kinds of hopes held out by Johnson. Nevertheless, if there is ever to be progress toward the regulation of armed coercion, it will be because the problems reviewed in Johnson's book have been attacked with the blend of traditional wisdom and creative new thinking that marks Johnson's own contribution to the perennial just war tradition.

The Great War and Modern Memory
by Paul Fussell
(Oxford: 363 pp.; $13.95)

Stanley G. Payne

It is standard practice among professional historians to hold that the twentieth century began not in 1901 but 1914, the argument being that the real break between the institutions and ideas of the past and present centuries occurred only with the onset of World War I. In the Western countries there was a general tendency for some two decades after the armistice to consider the "Great War" as an historical object in itself, a unique historical climax. After 1939, however, it became clear that the Great War was indeed merely the beginning of an historical period, the "era of world wars" that lasted from 1914 to 1945 and established the matrix of the twentieth century (those of more apocalyptic mind would say of the final period of human history).

Fussell's book is set within this conceptual framework, though in fact its
focus is considerably more limited than the title implies. It is basically an exercise in the identification and restatement of the most striking and typical expressions of the English literary consciousness that stemmed directly from the Great War, whether during the war itself or the broader postwar generation. The author, a specialist in eighteenth-century English literature, is not concerned with the “consequences of World War I” in any general sense, but specifically with the literary myths, the iconography, and the psychological and aesthetic devices to which it gave rise in England.

The book is organized, not by authors or by literary genres, but, more appropriately, by themes and motifs. Thus, after a brief exposition of the conditions under which the war was fought, the author presents the literary imagery of the trenches, the enemy, the structure and symbolism of wartime literary myths, the idea of national war literature and the changes in propaganda and language, the sense of the war experience as theatre, the pastoral motifs of war, and finally a lengthy chapter on homoerotic literature. The concluding chapter deals with the persistence of Great War themes and ideas in aspects of British literature for three and four decades afterward.

Fussell does not pretend to major philosophical analysis or anything remotely approaching comprehensive discussion of the cultural consequences of the war. Since his goals are always restricted to the exposition of literary imagination and motif, he almost always takes for granted the mass of Thomas Hardy’s work as cultural background and the notion of “loss of innocence” as integrating theme. The general conclusion toward which the reader is always led is that of disillusion, skepticism, emotional exhaustion, and ultimately a sort of cultural nihilism. For Fussell this finally ends in what, quoting Northrop Frye, he calls “the total cultural form of our present life.”

There is no point in criticizing a book for not being something entirely different from what it proposes to be, nor is there any real doubt that Fussell has achieved his primary goal. As an aesthetic exercise in the identification of new literary expression it is an unqualified success, well written, thematically integrated, and drawing on a vast corpus of war literature.

The broader historicocultural generalizations, which Fussell has probably indulged in merely to try to draw some deeper concepts together, are, however, too extreme and sweeping. All human generations lose “innocence,” and the difference in the case of World War I Britain lay not in absolute uniqueness but in the mass traumatic effect of trench warfare within a few brief years. This should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the loss of nineteenth-century social and cultural ideals, a growing skepticism and civic fragmentation, had already been under way for a generation and more before the war began. It is natural for the literary imagination to exaggerate considerably the “innocence” and “idealism” of the society and new generation that entered the conflict.

Since the book is limited almost exclusively to British literature, the question naturally arises as to whether the literary (and, by implication, the broader cultural) impact of the war was largely the same for other major European countries. Fussell does not face this question directly, but by implication he seems to suggest that such was the case, even though in specific cases, as in the sense of war as theatre, he indicates that he is dealing with a uniquely British cultural predisposition. In fact, if one is to look at the problem in a broader context, there was greater difference in the nature of national cultural responses to the war than Fussell tends to believe, while, conversely, supposed British idiosyncrasies were not altogether unparalleled elsewhere. D’Annunzio and the Italian arditi made of the war a sport or a form of theatre about as much—some might argue more—as the British did.

The sense of revulsion in the European cultural consciousness was indeed deep, widespread, and international, yet at the same time an entirely different kind of war culture emerged after 1918, particularly in Central Europe. Ernst Jünger’s militarist literature of total mobilization was not inferior in literary quality to that of the best antimilitarist British war writing. The most popular and influential literary figure in all Europe during these years was Gabriele d’Annunzio, who was never disillusioned or disillusioned with the war.
consciousness may indeed have been greater in Britain than elsewhere because of the absence of institutionalized militarism there compared with the major Continental powers, and perhaps also because of the greater scope of the concepts of autonomy and civilized orderliness in British culture. However that may have been, the First World War did not really produce as much basic change and sense of exhaustion of values as did the Second, as far as the broader institutions and strata of society were concerned. Yet it did produce a greater impact on the literary elite, and that in large measure because of the novelty of the trauma of mass war to the literary mind.

In a general sense Fussell’s book does not tell us very much about this that is new, but the reader of war literature and student of British letters will find here a skilled account of some of the major symbols and themes in British literature arising from World War I.

The shock of the Great War to cultural

(Norton; 296 pp.; $9.95)

Jeffrey L. Lant

When Theo Lippman, Jr., first considered writing about the career of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Kennedy was front runner for the 1976 Democratic Presidential nomination. Lippman might have made a tidy profit from those eager to learn about the candidate’s senatorial career. When Kennedy took himself out of the running, Lippman found himself in a dilemma. Though he was without a candidate, and though the profits no longer looked so tidy, he had already done too much research to abandon the project. Too bad.

Lippman, an editorial writer for the Baltimore Sun, came up with what he thought was a convincing reason for going ahead. Kennedy’s career in the Senate, he determined, has been “full enough to be worthy of study whether he is a presidential candidate or not.”

True. Unfortunately, it is either far too

early to produce the complete study of the Senator’s career Lippman set out to do, or Lippman has been nowhere near thorough enough in his research—or, as I suspect, both.

What Lippman has in fact produced is not a detailed look at Kennedy’s senatorial career, certainly not a complete explanation and analysis of it. It is a pretty standard campaign biography, dealing with Kennedy’s many accomplishments: his stand on the Vietnam war, his drive for improved medical care, civil rights legislation, the vote for eighteen-year-olds, campaign finance reform, and the complex of issues subsumed under “Watergate.”

To be sure, it is a superior campaign biography and doubtless ranks above most examples of this genre. But it is a superior campaign biography nonetheless, a comfortable narrative in flat prose, anodyne, without flare or much
distinction. There will no doubt be other books on Kennedy, and one hopes they will recognize, as this one does not, that while Kennedy is a progressive man and a humane one, he also understands power and knows it is occasionally necessary to use it in ways that could scarcely be termed genteel. Campaign biographers, even those who have lost their candidates, are handicapped in trying to deal with the whole subject.

RANDALL G. STOKES is Professor of Sociology at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

WILLIAM V. O’BRIEN is Professor of Government at Georgetown University and Chairman of the department.

STANLEY G. PAYNE is Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.

JEFFREY L. LANT holds a doctorate in history from Harvard University, where he is an Affiliate of Dudley House.

Hostage to the Devil by Malachi Martin
(Reader’s Digest Press; 477 pp.; $9.95)

An intriguing narrative by the celebrated author of a number of books dealing with the Church and its relation to modern culture. Using tape recordings of actual exorcisms, interviews with persons involved, and his own experiences, Martin tells the story of five living Americans who were liberated from demonic possession through the formal rite of exorcism. For those whose minds are not closed to the spiritual possibilities suggested, the book is an informative introduction to the very up-to-date world of good and evil spirits. The author declares himself sensitive to the dangers of sensationalism and clearly intends his account to be submitted to critical judgment, although it is written in a popular style. Included are brief historical and theological reflections on exorcism, as well as the relevant rites of the Roman Catholic Church.