perspective of what constitutes good health. Only by doing this, Illich believes, can the correct political solutions be found. As he says, "Better health care will depend...on the recognition of our present delusions."

This statement is only partly true. Our delusions about health care need not only to be recognized but placed in a coherent cultural perspective, and *Medical Nemesis* does not succeed in doing this very well. Illich makes far too much of the distinction between the "self-limiting" nature of traditional religions and the "unbounded arrogance" of modern medicine. Both serve similar functions in their mystification of the causes of disease; as Phillippe Aries (whom Illich cites) and others have shown us, modern medicine's attitudes toward pain, suffering, and death derive ultimately from our Christian heritage, and it is from the perspective of this heritage that our present-day attachment to institutional medicine must be understood. There is an historical as well as existential link between the "withering of the human spirit" that Goethe was talking about and that which has occurred under modern institutional care. To say, as Illich does, that "political limits" must take the place of "mythological boundaries," or to imply that people's need for "supernatural explanations" will somehow disappear with the recovery of the ability for self-care, is not enough. We must know from what facets of our cultural past people are to regain the emotional resources necessary for self-care and autonomy.

Though not succeeding in putting "our present delusions" about health care into a perspective for the future, Illich does succeed in providing a cogent analysis of them; though not giving us all the answers, he does raise most of the right questions. This achievement is considerable. Illich, by questioning our most basic assumptions about health care, rescues debate on the issue from its preoccupation with technical concerns and places it back on the level of the emotional as well as physical needs of the individual. Good health, *Medical Nemesis* reminds us, is a matter not just of warding off disease but of embracing life. Any health care system that drains us of our resources to do this can only be, as Illich says, sickening.

The Next 200 Years by Herman Kahn, William Brown, and Leon Martel

(William Morrow; 241 pp.; $8.95)

R.W. Behan

Your shelf-stock liberal cannot praise a report by the Hudson Institute without damaging his credentials, at least among most liberals. Well, so be it: This is a good book.

Kahn, Brown, and Martel posit a stabilized world two hundred years hence of some 15 billion people enjoying a gross world product (GWP) of $300 trillion, or $20,000 per capita. The GWP will not be distributed absolutely equally, but everyone will be a lot better off. There will be sufficient commodities and amenities for all, and only relative poverty will remain. That is, the rich will be richer, but so will the poor.

The engine for getting us there will be More of the Same: economic growth, technological development, and industrialization. There will be enough food, energy, and materials to achieve these levels of population and production, and to do it fairly easily at that. Indeed, the authors see the reason for stabilization as inadequate demand, not inadequate supplies. They deal neatly with the apocalyptic orthodoxies: population will stabilize when (not because) the global community makes its demographic transition; food and natural resources will be available through extended (not necessarily expanded) technology and recycling; and pollution will not kill us because we have decided

to improve our environment, not let it deteriorate. (The last job is being done. Cf. Pittsburgh air and the Willamette River.)

The authors see a transition under way from a world inhospitable to its few desperate inhabitants to one commanded by its wealthy multitudes. The interim problems of population, resources, and pollution are both transitory and soluble. The early chapters in the book make the points—abundance for 15 billion people; the later chapters make the apologies: humankind will need to be smart and careful in order to realize the opportunity.

In Chapter 1 the authors present a table of eleven issues of population and resources, and of four differing views of each of them. The table should be used by readers to test themselves. I agreed with the "Convinced Neo-Malthusian" once, the "Guarded Pessimist" twice, the "Guarded Optimist" six times, and the "Technology-and-Growth Enthusiast" three times. (My responses sum to a dozen because I was irreducibly ambivalent on one issue.) My intuitive judgment—my assumption pattern—is apparently optimistic. That no doubt has a lot to do with how one responds to this book.

When we begin with assumptions, all we see thereafter is evidence to support them. This is, of course, as true of authors as of readers. The present authors' argument is eclectic, a combination of past historical performance, heroic generalization, the Judeo-Christian tradition of subduing the earth, the central tendency dictum of theoretical statistics, and enthusiasm for ingenuity. In the rather conspicuous absence of a data base, the book must be called a polemic, not a treatise hewing closely to the scientific method. I cannot fault the authors' general conclusion, but I am unhappy with an argument that could be paraphrased: When everybody is like us the world will be peachy.

I do not think we need to be richer before we can do better by the disadvantaged among us. The distribution problem is not solved by doubting the production problem. Unlike the authors, I am concerned about the "consumer euphoria" by which otherwise decent folk are transfixed, stunned, emotionally engaged, and intoxicated by trash compactors, garden tractors, and dietetic dog food. Yet the authors are enthusiastic about a fifteenfold increase in the goods and services for each of us. And what of the corporate beneficiaries of consumer euphoria, the producers who induce us to buy the glittering flow of redundant trivia? The authors are blasé about the expansion of multinational corporations.

For all this, however, here is a book to be read carefully. I suspect it should be, and will be, more read and challenged than read and believed.

CONTRIBUTORS

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Briefly Noted

Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare
edited by Sam C. Sarkesian

(Prudent Publishing; 622 pp.; $13.95)

Nostalgia buffs notwithstanding, some of my more vivid memories of the 1950's revolve around the fear of nuclear attack, as expressed by preparatory drills in the public schools in which you got under your desk, always facing away from the windows, and did not talk (presumably the better to hear the explosion). Reflecting on those concerns now, we might say in boxing jargon that our main fear was the one punch knock-out that could be delivered at any time. But twenty years have altered our circumstance. We now find ourselves groping for effective responses to a new problem, namely, revolutionary guerrilla movements supported and/or led by Communists that threaten to isolate the West and surround it with countries antithetical to all we stand for. So far we have vacillated between overreaction (Vietnam) and inaction (Angola), neither decision reflecting credit upon us. Even Kissinger's promising new initiatives in Southern Africa pose questions and problems for us. It is important to continue and amplify a national discussion on these issues in order to find a more satisfactory position for the future. This can be done fruitfully only when we understand the full complexity of the phenomenon confronting us. Mr. Sarkesian's compilation is a long step in the right direction, covering a vast range of research, doctrine, issues, strategies, tactics, and problems of involved governments and populations.

Lawrence Stone's interdisciplinary article on different theories of revolution is eminently useful; it not only enumerates, but also analyzes and criticizes, some of the work done by scholars in this immense field. Anyone who has ever looked askance at some of the contradictory explanations of revolution (for example, increasing or decreasing poverty, too little or too much élite circulation) or was confused by the variety of theories should find aid and comfort in this article. Although Stone treats research outside his own discipline with both sympathy and respect, he warns quite directly (and deliciously) that "Some of the writings of contemporary social scientists are ingenious feats of verbal juggling in an esoteric language, performed around the totem pole of an abstract model, surrounded as far as the eye can see by the arid wastes of terminological definitions and mathematical formulae." In the same section, however, is an interesting article on the dangers of dramatic cutbacks to rising expectations in society, backed by much quantitative data. Much of Y. Krasin's arguments about the nonvalidity of Western studies of revolution can be seen as ideologically motivated, yet he makes the valid point (as all Marxists are aware) that research emphasis must be placed on political interaction, something frequently forgotten by Western economists and sociologists.

It is one of the book's great virtues that selections in each section address each other's positions. Discussions and controversies are frequently set up. In another section it is fascinating to read Sun Tzu on "The Art of War" and then Mao on the struggle against Japan and note the recurring themes (over a period of 2,500 years) of political and psychological conflict as the basis of warfare. There is also an excellent article on Karl

von Clausewitz, who is frequently quoted and misunderstood by many who have not read his works. Lenin's justification of certain types of terrorist activities (those under Party control or that aid the Party) is as interesting for its statements that are at odds with later doctrine as it is for what it argues. Of course many Marxist historians to this day deny that Lenin ever made these assertions. Altogether, this is a reader well worth reading.

—*Stuart Spivak*

Bismarck
by Alan Palmer

(Scribner's; 325 pp.; $12.50)

The focus of this biography is on the personality and motives of the "blood and iron" chancellor who, in the opinion of many, built modern Germany. Palmer argues persuasively that Bismarck's was a much more individualistic and eccentric achievement than is commonly recognized. He did not, says Palmer, leave a system so much as a delicately interlocked set of powers attuned to his own overriding quest for personal power. Yet the portrait is far from unsympathetic, and there is no effort to downplay the enormous force, imagination, and daring of this remarkable man who dominated European politics for so long. Although Palmer does not mention contemporary affairs, the burgeoning Kissinger industry will be further fueled by his analysis. Palmer's critical summary of Bismarck's achievements and failings will be welcomed by those who believe Kissinger is more like Bismarck than like Metternich or other giants of diplomatic history to whom he is sometimes compared.

Stalin's Masterpiece:
The Show Trials and Purges in the Thirties
by Joel Carmichael

(St. Martin's; 238 pp.; $10.00)

In brief compass Carmichael manages to tell a story as filled with complexity as it is with horror. The author of a well-received biography of Trotsky, Carmichael's strength is the seriousness with which he treats ideas and myths in

political affairs. Among the eeriest sections of the present book is the description of the various ways in which Stalin's millions of victims rationalized their misfortune to the glory of the very system that was oppressing them. It is a moving instance of the power of a certain kind of civil religion. Carmichael emphasizes that, despite Khrushchev's admissions at the Twentieth Party Congress, the Communist Party in the Soviet Union has still not admitted nor disowned the purges in the thirties. Indeed, Carmichael argues, the placing of blame for other abuses on a "personality cult" surrounding Stalin rather than on the system itself was a kind of personality cult in reverse. Much of the information is familiar from the writings of Robert Conquest and others, but Carmichael's analysis is attractively succinct and frequently original.

The Pursuit of Loneliness: American Culture at the Breaking Point (Revised Edition) by Philip Slater

(Beacon; 205 pp.; $8.95/$3.95)

The original version was something of a bible among sundry counterculturalists in the sixties. The updating is much less confident of the revolutionary impact of the counterculture and other celebrations of social discontent—although the counterculture does perdure, we are told, in the form of "the new culture" (cooperative, collectivist) vs. "the old culture" (competitive, individualistic). As before, Slater argues that the more we think we are free the more we are enslaved, that technology has become our master rather than our servant, that money should be the means rather than the end of labor, and related platitudes of the disaffected. A new element is Slater's discovery of the women's movement. He opposes sexual stereotyping, deplores woman's captivity to domesticity, advocates collective rearing of children—and does all this with an impassioned sense of fresh discovery. No doubt the revised edition will be welcomed, as was the original, by adolescents grateful for adult confirmation of their dawning suspicion that all is not right with society and the world.

Jerome by J.N.D. Kelly

(Harper & Row; 368 pp.; $15.00)

Saint Paul by Michael Grant

Scribners; 250 pp.; $14.95)

Two books by noted British scholars of early Christian and Roman history. Kelly's is the first full-scale biography of Jerome, the fourth-century polemicist and producer of the "Vulgate" version of the Bible, in the English language. Through Kelly's scholarly preoccupations comes the strong feeling for an awesomely gifted, although far from winsome, figure of immense importance to world history. The wider significance of Paul, beyond the circle of Christian believers, is also the focus of Grant's study. This is less a biography of Paul than a profile of his thought as it is illuminated by historical background. Grant's hypotheses about Paul's relations to other Jews and to Jewish Christians are sometimes controversial and almost always relevant to contemporary discussions of Jewish-Christian relations. Grant also takes strong issue with "political theologies" that portray the gospels as revolutionary and Paul as passive toward secular authority. He argues that Paul's interpretation of Christianity is culturally and politically "incendiary" and that this has been demonstrated again and again in Christian history.

The Hundredth Year: The United States in 1876 by John D. Bergamini

(Putnam; 402 pp.; $12.95)

Following the newspaper clippings, the editor gives a page or so to what he considers the chief event of each day of 1876. The result might be mildly interesting to those with only sketchy knowledge of American history.

Correspondence *(from p. 2)*

must not delude ourselves into believing that this is also honest. In pursuing such a course we forfeit our integrity and our historic claim to moral leadership.

Norman Saul Goldman
Rabbi, Congregation Beth Sholom
Dover, Del.

Mark Bruzonsky Responds:
Rabbi Goldman commits two historical sins that so color his perceptions that he fails to recognize the moral-political linkage Israel Singer and I outlined in April ("Dependent Israel: The Two Options"). As for my more recent article ("U.S. and Israel: The Coming Storm"), it is primarily an analysis of political realities—which Rabbi Goldman seems to acknowledge—but not *ipso facto* advocacy of immoral policies, as he charges.

For his first sin Rabbi Goldman seems to believe that only Jewish history is tragic. Comparing tragedies is useless, and besides, the Holocaust does indeed stand by itself. But if the Holocaust, either unconsciously or for self-serving reasons, is now turned into an excuse for moral myopia toward others and for politically motivated Sampson-like threats, then we Jews of today become guilty of a form of sacrilege. Furthermore, I hope Rabbi Goldman will attempt a future-orientation considering the possibility of tragedies even surpassing the Holocaust should we continue to be unable to use reason to dominate passion, intercultural understanding to counter chauvinistic impulses. I hope the Rabbi will ponder the implications of the passage I quote in my Excursus in this issue: "Observers with different opinions on the substance and process of the conflict are coming to agree that nuclearization could happen very suddenly, if indeed it has not already happened." As Secretary Kissinger has indicated, "We do not underestimate the dilemma and risks that Israel faces in a negotiation. But they are dwarfed by a continuation of the status quo."

The Rabbi's second sin is his insistence on comparing Hitler with the Arabs, the Holocaust with contemporary Jewish survival, and American