

make many at the top somewhat apprehensive. The victims of Crossman's pen may find themselves asking with Bernard Shaw, "How can we have any self-respect if we don't pretend that we are better than we are?"

Dean Acheson: The State Department Years by David S. McLellan

(Dodd, Mead; 454 pp.; \$17.50)

Daniel Yergin

For most of his working life Dean Acheson was a successful Washington attorney. He became the very epitome of the postwar "foreign policymaker." He clearly did not mind the latter role, but he certainly might have objected to some of the interpretations placed upon it. In much recent history he has been portrayed as not only a prime instigator but the very embodiment of the cold war, the organizer of containment, and, in his own way, no less its ideologue than George Kennan. Many of his contemporaries saw it altogether differently. A large number regarded him as suspiciously "soft" on communism. The widespread acceptance of that belief in the late 1940's and early 1950's served as a powerful constraint on his actions as Secretary of State.

David McLellan has tried to sort out the portraits in this admirable new biography of Acheson. It is basically sympathetic, more sympathetic than the graceful biography of Acheson by Gadis Smith published five years ago. A considerable amount of documentary evidence has become available in the last few years and McLellan has availed himself of it. In particular he had early access to Acheson's own papers.

The Acheson that emerges is a man not only of great ability but also of considerable self-confidence and arrogance, even a muted self-righteousness. He lacked patience and possessed a cutting irony. The results sometimes worked to his own disadvantage—as in his troubled relations with Congress. During hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty one Senator asked why it was called the North Atlantic Treaty. "It has to do with the defense of the North Atlantic area," Acheson replied. "Obviously that does not mean that you are defending water. This is not a treaty that has to do with water and not with land."

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relations with China that, in fact, was to America's own advantage. Later, Acheson seemed to have no regrets about this postponement. In January, 1952, Churchill asked him about the future of Sino-American relations.

"The United States no longer felt, as it had in January 1950, that there was any real possibility of inducing Chinese Titoism in the foreseeable future," Acheson replied.

Dean Acheson thought of himself as a person with little use for grand schemes. "He isn't more than wistfully moved by the possibility of applying intelligence to life on a large scale because he knows that there isn't much intelligence to apply," Acheson once wrote of a mentor, Louis Brandeis. "I don't think the Justice puts the slightest faith in mass salvation through universal Plumb Plans." Acheson might as well have been describing his own attitudes in later life. He thought he was responding only to the realities of world politics as they existed. Grand schemes were really only cloaks for emotion, and, as he said in 1945, "emotional reactions cannot change facts." Yet, by the late 1940's, he had acquired a highly schematic interpretation of Soviet behavior—that the USSR was a world revolutionary state with which any kind of diplomatic settlement was impossible. Perhaps that belief derived from other strongly held ideas. Acheson did not believe that harmonious composition was necessarily a "natural" part of international politics.

Thus, he did not think he was remiss in not pursuing a settlement with the Soviet Union. Neither did he feel, on the other side, the sense of betrayal that many Americans did in the late 1940's because "peace" had not been fully restored. Perhaps it was necessary for Acheson to believe that diplomacy with the Russians was worth nothing, for otherwise he would not have been able to work, as he so energetically did work, for the "unity of the West." Diplomacy with the Russians inevitably would have created deep suspicions among the Western allies.

But there were gains and losses. McLellan writes that Acheson's "peculiarly mechanistic view of the future of Soviet-American relations left little room for negotiations or for the chance that Soviet policy might change or mellow. Preoccupied as he was by the immediate problems facing the West, Acheson seems not to have considered what

While McLellan sheds light on many aspects of Acheson's long life, the book is focused on the State Department years. The basic theme is Acheson and communism. McLellan is especially illuminating on three aspects of that theme. The first concerns Acheson's reaction to communism, as it took shape in his pursuit of a genuine Western alliance. Having concluded that the gulf between the U.S. and the USSR was unbridgeable, Acheson threw all his energies into the alliance diplomacy. Indeed, he brought "the alliance" into existence. McLellan delineates this process in a most interesting fashion—including Acheson's failures and blind spots as well as his successes.

The second aspect deals with Acheson's efforts to cope with the fervent domestic anticommunism that reached its peak with McCarthyism. One need not hold the Administration responsible for McCarthyism, as some historians do, to recognize that the hysteria was an inevitable outgrowth of a polarizing postwar world. However, McLellan does point out that Acheson's Congressional enemies were nowhere so numerous as their loud noise led many to believe.

The third aspect involves communism in Asia. The Korean War was very much a watershed for America's Asian policy. Through 1949 Acheson was realistic about what was happening in China. He thought some kind of modus vivendi was possible and was already aware of the potential for Sino-Soviet conflict. Yet along with other policymakers he did not realize the degree to which the People's Republic would feel threatened by America's sweep into North Korea. The consequence, of course, was an expanded and protracted Korean War and the postponement for two decades of a seminormalization of

might be done to modify Soviet behavior once the West had regained its strength.... Thanks to Stalin's crude threats, Acheson was free to concentrate single-mindedly upon organizing the Atlantic community and restoring some degree of manageability to the non-Communist portion of the international system. But this same view led him to

ignore the potential for change in the Kremlin and, later, to minimize the divergencies that existed within the Communist camp." McLellan concludes: "Herein lies the principal strength but also the principal weakness of Acheson's statecraft." The gain was the Western alliance. The loss was the possibility of a more muted cold war.

The Electronic Battlefield by Paul Dickson

(Indiana University Press; 244 pp.; \$10.00)

Frederick C. Dyer

Moralists as well as strategists and tacticians will have to revolutionize their thinking about "conventional warfare." This is especially true of those who have relaxed behind the thought that "real" war, nuclear war, will never happen. Paul Dickson's *The Electronic Battlefield* demonstrates by documentation, pictures, and anecdotes that conventional warfare is nearing the climax of its technological revolution. (Dickson is also author of *Think Tanks* and *The Future of the Work Place*, books that have established him as a competent analyst of new institutions, both promising and threatening.)

Just ten years ago the term Electronic Battlefield meant the effort to employ sensors to detect intruders such as submarines, land vehicles, or armed human beings. That phase Dickson calls "EB I." "EB II" means the full, science fiction-like automated battlefield, which includes three main components: sensors to detect the enemy; remotely controlled or robotic mines and bombs; and a computerized control system.

Among the items in EB II are: Gravel Mines, like bits of ravioli that can blow off a foot (they are also used in letter bombs); Button Bomblets, aspirin-sized to make noise when stepped on, but capable of blowing off a finger if picked up or fooled with; Sadeye Clusters, which are quantities of baseball-sized bombs that send smaller steel balls in all directions; Dragontooth, a tiny jagged object, packed 4,800 to a bomb, that is exploded in the air against people; WAAPM (wide area antipersonnel mine), or "spider mine," that, when

placed, shoots out ground wires that set off the mine when tripped. A BLU-42 sends out pellets to 200 feet; a BLU-43 first pops up into the air ("bounding mine") before exploding to maximize its range. The Daisy Cutter (or "explosive bulldozer") explodes with a force greater than the "blockbuster" and is dropped by parachute. It doesn't dig craters, but it does clear a bald spot the size of a football field. Destructor is an antivehicular mine set to explode when a moving object draws near. The Claymore Mine is a small box on legs that is remotely fired and blasts steel balls at a man's height to a distance of 150 feet. Grasshopper, a 65-pound air-dropped mine, buries itself in the ground and waits for something to come within range; then it pops up high enough to get the best spread from its explosion. The FAM (fuel air munition) is sort of "poured out" and then detonated; it can explode around corners. Then there is Tursid, a mine disguised as a dog dropping (probably useless against city dwellers). Before long there will be laser death-and-destruction rays. And the list goes on. We may not like to hear about such things, much less to read a whole book about them. Unless perhaps one is a member of the Cricket Society or the Association of Old Crows, which groups Dickson describes as dedicated to greater electronic warfare capabilities.

The revolution in conventional warfare, says Dickson, is based on three developments. First is the electronics revolution that has provided the transistors, miniaturizations, TV cameras, in-

frared scanners, computers, and other marvels that can be adapted to weaponry. Second is the development of remotely controlled systems that make it possible to send machines to do man's work at less cost and with greater precision. RFD and COD are no longer postal acronyms but military: "remote firing device" and "covert observation device." The third new factor is the emergence of bionics, which is a mix of biology and engineering. It includes improved swim-flippers for frogmen and study of the frog's eye for ways to improve automatic target sensors. The term dates from the First Air Force Bionics Symposium in September, 1960.

In EB II many different kinds of sensors can be connected by wire or radio to the firing device. When the sensor is disturbed, the mine, bomb, missile, or torpedo is also triggered. As Dickson puts it: with the beep comes the boom. And if the disturbance is a boy with a shovel instead of a man with a gun, or a cow with a bell instead of a jeep with a driver, well, not all the wrinkles have been worked out. An electronic Mylai will be possible—even probable. In any event, the IBCS (integrated battlefield control system) is likely to grow, and like the telephone system to become ever more automated. ("This is a recording. The bombs are on the way.")

The Electronic Battlefield voices political, economic, and moral issues of great moment. In some forms the "new conventional warfare" may be indistinguishable from the effects of nuclear warfare. The book does not answer the questions it voices, but it presents the facts and urges discussion before we find ourselves responsible for, but with no control over, merciless robot-myrmidons that have turned the world into their electronic battlefield.

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